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INDO-PERSIAN RELATIONS

BY
RIAZUL ISLAM

IRANIAN CULTURE FOUNDATION



Shah Tahmāsp and Emperor Humāyūn shown together in the wall-painting in the Chihil Sūtān pavilion in Isfahān

به فرمان

شاهنشاه آریامهر

BY ORDER OF
HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY ARYAMEHR
SHAHANSHAH OF IRAN

INDO-PERSIAN RELATIONS

A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL AND
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE MUGHUL EMPIRE AND IRAN

BY

RIAZUL ISLAM

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آثار و بنیاد فرهنگ ایران

IRANIAN CULTURE FOUNDATION

THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE

THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE IN THE LIGHT OF A
RECENT CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE
HALL OF THE BIBLE IN THE LIGHT OF

*This book represents a revised and amplified version of the thesis approved
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by the University of Cambridge
in 1957*

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FOREWORD

IRAN and the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent have had a long history of close cultural and political ties. These links go back to pre-Islamic times. The conquest of the subcontinent by the Persianized Turks during the eleventh and twelfth centuries added a new dimension to these relations. Persian became the language of culture and administration in large parts of the subcontinent. This ensured a free movement of ideas, of books and of men of learning and skill between the two countries. Relations between them grew still closer with the rise of the Safavids in Iran and the Mughuls in India.

Research on these mutual relations is of paramount importance, and it is the duty of the scholars of Iran and the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent to make a thorough study of the various aspects of this immense and important subject. The present work is a valuable contribution in this direction. Based on original records, it is the fruit of the erudite researches of Dr. Riazul Islam, one of the leading scholars of Pakistan.

The Iranian Culture Foundation feels honoured to undertake the publication of this valuable study on the suggestion of the Institute of Central and West Asian Studies, Karachi.

PARVIZ NATEL KHANLARY
General Secretary
The Iranian Culture Foundation
Teheran

1. Introduction

The first part of the paper is devoted to the study of the properties of the function $f(x)$ defined by the equation $f(x) = \int_0^x f(t) dt$. It is shown that $f(x)$ is a constant function. The second part of the paper is devoted to the study of the properties of the function $f(x)$ defined by the equation $f(x) = \int_0^x f(t) dt$. It is shown that $f(x)$ is a constant function. The third part of the paper is devoted to the study of the properties of the function $f(x)$ defined by the equation $f(x) = \int_0^x f(t) dt$. It is shown that $f(x)$ is a constant function. The fourth part of the paper is devoted to the study of the properties of the function $f(x)$ defined by the equation $f(x) = \int_0^x f(t) dt$. It is shown that $f(x)$ is a constant function. The fifth part of the paper is devoted to the study of the properties of the function $f(x)$ defined by the equation $f(x) = \int_0^x f(t) dt$. It is shown that $f(x)$ is a constant function. The sixth part of the paper is devoted to the study of the properties of the function $f(x)$ defined by the equation $f(x) = \int_0^x f(t) dt$. It is shown that $f(x)$ is a constant function. The seventh part of the paper is devoted to the study of the properties of the function $f(x)$ defined by the equation $f(x) = \int_0^x f(t) dt$. It is shown that $f(x)$ is a constant function. The eighth part of the paper is devoted to the study of the properties of the function $f(x)$ defined by the equation $f(x) = \int_0^x f(t) dt$. It is shown that $f(x)$ is a constant function. The ninth part of the paper is devoted to the study of the properties of the function $f(x)$ defined by the equation $f(x) = \int_0^x f(t) dt$. It is shown that $f(x)$ is a constant function. The tenth part of the paper is devoted to the study of the properties of the function $f(x)$ defined by the equation $f(x) = \int_0^x f(t) dt$. It is shown that $f(x)$ is a constant function.

2. Conclusion

The author

1977

To
Professor I. H. QURESHI
in token of
Respect and Admiration

[illegible]

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BY THE SAME AUTHOR

1. **A CALENDAR OF DOCUMENTS
ON INDO-PERSIAN RELATIONS
DURING THE MUGHUL PERIOD**
(Ready for the Press) [See notice of
this work at the end of the Biblio-
graphy.]
2. **A HISTORY OF
FIROZ SHAH OF DELHI, 1351-88**
(Ready for the Press)

TRANSLITERATION

<u>th</u>	تھ
ch	چ
h	ح
<u>kh</u>	کھ
<u>dh</u>	دھ
zh	زھ
sh	شھ
s	سھ
d	دھ
t	تھ
z	زھ
,	ہ
<u>gh</u>	گھ
q	ق
,	پ

(indicated only where essential as
in Mir'āt, Ma'āthir, Munsha'āt,
but not in Tārīkh, Inshā.)

Short vowels: a, i, u

Long vowels: ā, e, ī, o, ū

Oriental words which have passed into English language and are included in the Concise Oxford Dictionary (e.g., Bengal, Khan, Mirza, Shah, Sultan, etc.) have not been transliterated, except where they are compounded with other words (e.g., Khān-Khānān, Nizām-Shāhī, Tārīkh-i Sultānī).

Current English spelling of names like Delhi, Golconda, Lahore, Mecca, Quetta, etc., has been retained.

CONVERSION OF DATES

In the conversion of dates, I have generally followed the *Taqwim-i Hijri wa 'Isawi: Comparative Tables of Hijri and Christian Dates*, compiled by A. M. Khalidi, revised by Professor Mahmud Ahmad Khan (Osmania University), published by the Anjuman-e Taraqqi-e Urdu (India), Delhi, 1939. The work is based on Wüstenfeld-Mahler'sche *Vergleichungs-Tabellen der Mohammedanischen und Christlichen Zeitrechnung* by Eduard Mahler, Leipzig, 1926.

ABBREVIATIONS

A.A.A.	<i>Tarikh-i 'Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī</i> by Iskandar Beg Munshī. Tihiran, 1314/1896.
'Abbās Nāma	by Tāhir Vahīd, C.U. MS.
Abd.N.	'Abdullah Nāma by Tanish b. Mīr Muḥammad al-Bukhārī. Ethé 574.
Af.T.	<i>Afḍalut Tawārikh</i> by Faḍlī Iṣfahānī. B.M. Or. 4678.
Ah.T.	<i>Aḥsanut Tawārikh</i> . Baroda, 1931.
A.N.	<i>Akbar Nāma</i> by Abul Faḍl. Calcutta, 1877-8.
A.N., tr.	<i>The Akbarnāma</i> translated by H. Beveridge. Calcutta, 1897-1921.
A.N.K.	'Ālamgīr Nāma by Muḥammad Kāẓim. Bib. Indica.
Atakī	<i>Muntakhabut Tawārikh</i> by Yūsuf Atakī. C.U. MS.
Badāyūnī	<i>Muntakhabut Tawārikh</i> . Bib. Indica.
Badi'a	<i>Tawārikh-i Badi'a</i> . Bod. 169.
Barāri	<i>Mujmal-i Mufaṣṣal</i> . Bod. 242.
Basāṭin	<i>Basātinus Salāṭin</i> by Mīrza Ibrāhīm Zubairī. Haidarabad, A.H. 1310.
Bāyazīd	<i>Tadhkira-i Humāyūn wa Akbar</i> . Bib. Indica.
Bijan	An untitled account of the life and times of Rustam Khan. B.M. Add. 7655.
B.M.	British Museum.
B.N.	<i>Babur-nama</i> tr. by A.S. Beveridge. London, 1912-21.
Bod.	<i>Catalogue of the Persian . . . MSS in the Bodleian Library</i> . Oxford, 1889.
Calendar	Riazul Islam, <i>Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations</i> (See Note on the <i>Calendar</i> at the end of the Bibliography).
C.U.	Cambridge University.

- Dhail *Dhail-i Tārīkh-i 'Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī*. Ed. Suhailī Khwānsārī. Tihiran, A.H.S. 1317.
- Ethé *Catalogue of the Persian MSS in the Library of the India Office*. Oxford, 1903.
- Ethé 2067 *Tahmās Nāma* (A collection of letters).
- Falsafī, 'Abbās-i Awwal *Zindagānī-i Shāh 'Abbās-i Awwal*, Tihiran.
- Falsafī, Rawābiṭ *Tārīkh-i Rawābiṭ-i Irān-o-Arūpā*. Tihiran.
- Farīdūn Beg *Munsha'ātus Salāṭīn*. Constantinople, A.H. 1264.
- F.Q. *Fayyādūl Qawānīn* by 'Ibādullah al-Fayyāḍ. I.O. 3901.
- f(p), ff(p). folio/s of manuscripts marked as pages.
- Ghulām Sarwar *History of Shah Ismā'īl Ṣafawī*. Aligarh, 1939.
- Golconda Letters Collection of Letters by 'Abdul 'Alī Tabrizī. B.M. Add. 6600.
- Gulbadan *Humāyūn Nāma*, Ed. and Tr. by A. S. Beveridge. London, 1902.
- Dr. Haq S. Moinul Haq: Urdu translation of Jauhar's *Tadhkiratul Wāqī'āt*. Karachi, 1955.
- H.S. *Ḥabībūs Siyar* by Khwand Amīr. Bombay, 1857.
- I.C. *Islamic Culture*, Hyderabad-Deccan.
- I.N.J. *Iqbāl Nāma-i Jahāngīrī* by Mu'tamad Khan. Bib. Indica.
- I.O. India Office MSS not included in Ethé's *Catalogue*.
- I.T.V. *Inshā-i Ṭāhīr Vahīd*. Lucknow, A.H. 1260.
- Jalāl Munajjim *Tārīkh-i 'Abbāsī*. Bod. 288.
- J.A.S.B. *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, Calcutta.
- Jauhar *Tadhkiratul Wāqī'āt*. B.M. Add. 16711.
- J.I. *Jāmi'ul Inshā* by Bhāgchand. B.M. Or. 1702.
- J.R.A.S. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London.
- Kanbū 'Amal-i Ṣālīh. Bib. Indica.
- Khuld *Khuld-i Barīn* by Yūsuf Wālih. C.U. MS.
- King's King's College, Cambridge, MS.
- K.K. Khāfī Khan, *Muntakhabul Lubāb*, Bib. Indica.
- Lāhaurī *Pādshāh Nāma* by 'Abdul Ḥamīd Lāhaurī. Bib. Indica.
- M.A. *Ma'āthīr-i 'Ālamgīrī*. Bib. Indica.
- Manucci *Storia do Mogor*. London, 1907.
- Maqāl *Khulāṣa-i Maqāl* by Ṭāhīr Qazvīnī. Bod. 300.

- Ma'sūmī* *Mīr Ma'sūm's Tārīkh-i Sind.* Poona, 1938.
- M.ḡ.* *Ma'āthir-i Jahāngīrī.* Bod. 223.
- M.R.* *Ma'āthir-i Rahīmī.* Bib. Indica.
- M.U.* *Ma'āthirul Umarā.* Bib. Indica.
- Mujmal* *Mujmal-i Mufaṣṣal* of Muḥammad Barārī Ummī.
Bodleian 242.
- Muqīm-Khānī* *Tadhkira-i Muqīm-Khānī.* R.A.S.MS, Morley, 161.
- N.ḡ.M.* *Nuskha-i Ḥamī'a-i Murāsālāt-i ulul albāb.* In two
recensions, indicated by their respective Catalogue
Nos., B.M. Add. 7688 and Or. 3482.
- O.U.P.* Oxford University Press.
- Qazvinī* *Pādshāh Nāma.* B.M. Or. 173.
- Qipchāq-Khānī* *Tārīkh-i Qipchāq-Khānī.* Bod. 117.
- Qīṣaṣ* *Qīṣaṣul Khāqānī* by Walī Qulī Shāmlū. B.M. Add.
7656.
- R. and B.* *Tūzūk-i Jahāngīrī*, tr. by Rogers and ed. by Beveridge.
London, 1909-14.
- R.A.S.* Royal Asiatic Society, London.
- Ray* *Humāyūn in Persia.* Calcutta, 1948.
- Rieu* *Catalogue of the Persian MSS in the B.M.* London,
1879-83.
- Rieu Supp.* *Supplement to the Cat. of Persian MSS in the B.M.*
London, 1895.
- Roe* *The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe.* O.U.P., 1926.
- R. Ṣafaviyya* *Raudaṭuṣ Ṣafaviyya* by Mīrza Beg Junābādī. B.M.
Or. 3388.
- Ṣādiq* *Shāhjahān Nāma.* B.M. Or. 174.
- Sarhindī* *Tārīkh-i Humāyūn Shāhī.* King's, 84.
- Storey, I.* *Persian Literature*, Vol. I. London, 1927-1953.
- Tab.Ak.* *Ṭabaqāt-i Akbarī* by Nizāmuddīn Aḥmad *Bakhshī.*
Bib. Indica.
- Ṭabāṭabāī* *Shāhjahān Nāma.* I.O. 684.
- T.M.* *Tadhkirat al-Mulūk* translated and explained by V.
Minorsky. London, 1943.
- Tadh. S.Ch.* *Tadhkira-i Salāṭīn-i Chaghātā* by Hādī Kāmwar Khan.
R.A.S.MS, Morley, 96.
- T.A.M.* *Tārīkh of Amīr Maḥmūd.* C.U.MS.

- T.I.N.S.* *Tārīkh-i Ilchī-i Nizām Shāh* by Khur Shah. B.M. Or. 153.
- T.R.* *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī* by Mirza Ḥaider Dughlāt, tr. by E. D. Ross. London, 1898.
- T. Sulṭānī* *Tārīkh-i Sulṭānī* by Sayyid Ḥasan al-Ḥusainī. C.U. MS.
- Ṭūsī* *Majmū'a-i Munsha'āt*. Blochet, IV, 2338.
- Tūzuk* *Tūzuk-i Jahāngīrī*. Aligarh, 1864.
- Wārith* *Pādshāh Nāma*. B.M. Add. 6556.

The following abbreviations have been used only in the foot-notes:

T.	—	<u>Tārīkh</u>
Tadh.	—	<u>Tadh</u> kira
Tr.	—	Translation.

PREFACE

This thesis deals with the relations between the Mughul Emperors of India and the Shahs of Iran from the year 916/1510, when Bābur as yet ruled only the small kingdom of Kābul, to the middle of the eighteenth century. It may be remembered that prior to Bābur's conquest of India in 932/1526, there had not been much diplomatic contact between India and Iran. In India the pre-Mughul Sultans of Delhi, with the exception of Muḥammad b. Tughluq,¹ were too much engrossed in domestic troubles and dynastic revolutions to look beyond their frontiers. As for Persia, prior to the sixteenth century she was either a part of a wider empire, or herself divided into warring principalities. Thus before the advent of the Mughuls in India, there were next to no relations between India and Persia on the diplomatic level, though there was, of course, an active and living contact in the realm of culture, ideas, and commerce.

The background for the intercourse of the Great Mughuls, Akbar to Aurangzeb, with their contemporary Safavids, is provided by the personal relations between the immediate ancestors of the two parties. The recurring mention in the Mughul and the Safavid chronicles, and in the Indo-Persian diplomatic correspondence, of long-standing, traditional ties of friendship and accord, is founded on the alliance of Shah Ismā'il with Bābur and the friendship of Humāyūn with Ṭahmāsp. And this is the main reason for taking up the story of these relations from a place and a point of time which both fall outside Indo-Mughul history.

India and Iran became great powers under the rule of two outstanding dynasties. The heyday of the Safavids of Persia synchronised with that of the Great Mughuls of India. Between these two powerful dynasties there were close relations. The Mughuls were not involved so deeply with any other foreign power, whether in friendship or otherwise. Their intercourse with

1. See Dr. Agha Mahdi Husain, *The Rise and Fall of Muḥammad bin Tughluq*, pp. 124-26. Ishwari Prasad, *A History of the Qaraunah Turks of India*, Allahabad, 1936, pp. 118-25.

Persia presents, in fact, the most important facet of the foreign policy of the Mughuls. These relations were generally of a peaceful nature and an invasion in force by either side during this period never occurred. Qandahār was, however, a constant bone of contention, and changed hands several times, but its possession was not a matter of life and death for either party.

The personal relations between the two families were fondly traced back by them and by their court chroniclers to the days of Tīmūr, whose setting free of the prisoners of war from Ottoman Turkey at the request of Khwāja Sultan 'Alī, ancestor of Shah Ismā'īl, provided the nucleus of the Turkish partisans of the Safavid family.¹ The present study begins from the second decade of the sixteenth century, when the defeat of the Uzbek Shaibānī Khan by the Safavid Shah Ismā'īl I brought Bābur for the first time into active contact with the Shah.

Mughul-Safavid relationship has long attracted the attention of scholars and historians. From the time of William Erskine, all modern historians of the Mughul Empire have dealt with the subject in so far as it relates to the particular period or aspect of which they treat. Recent monographs discuss the matter within the limits of the reign under review. The important subject of Humāyūn's sojourn in Persia, has been treated with painstaking thoroughness by Mr. Sukumar Ray of the Calcutta University. Mughul relations with Persia during the reigns of Akbar, Jahāngīr and Shah Jahān, constitute one aspect of an excellent (unpublished) thesis entitled *The North-West Frontier Policy of the Mughuls* by Dr. M. Jahangir Khan. Dr. Abdur Rahim's articles on Mughul relations with Persia form part of a wider thesis.² So far, however, there is no work which covers the entire period from Bābur to Muḥammad Shah and treats the subject independently in its own right and not as part of a broader canvas.

The material on the subject is fairly extensive. The material in Persian comprises a large number of chronicles written under court patronage in India and Iran, an equally large number of chronicles written independently, and a considerable amount of biographical literature including three royal autobiographies. Besides, there is a fairly large volume of diplomatic correspondence, which, in spite of the frequent verbosity of diction and obscurity of meaning, illuminates various aspects of the subject. Some of this material has not been used so far except cursorily. The travellers' accounts, the records of the East India Company, and the correspondence of its factors, contain numerous references to Indo-Persian relations.

1. Appendix A to this thesis treats of the reputed relations between the great Tīmūr and Khawāja Sultan 'Alī, an ancestor of Shah Ismā'īl Ṣafavī.

2. For a fuller notice of the works referred to here, see Appendix K: A Note on the Sources.

The intercourse between India and Iran was many-sided; it covered politics, diplomacy, culture, literature, trade, commerce, religion. There was a continuous caravan traffic between the two countries. The Mughul patronage of culture constantly attracted Persian scholars to India; an unbroken stream of talented Persians was absorbed in the expanding services of the Mughul Empire. From this vast field of intercourse, I have chosen the political and diplomatic relations between the Mughuls and Iran as the subject of this dissertation; it embodies the results of a special study of the diplomatic despatches. Other aspects have been touched upon only in so far as they have a bearing on the subject proper.

Acknowledgements

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CHAPTER I

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

ABOUT a century after the death of Tīmūr in 807/1405, the Central Asian regions of his empire presented a chequered scene. Persia was divided into principalities ruled by faction-ridden dynasties constantly contending for local advantage. Khurāsān was the only sizable domain administered by a Tīmurid prince, Sultan Ḥusain Mirza Baiqarā. Samarqand was a prize for the strongest bidder and was still in Tīmurid hands, but not firmly. Its possession carried great prestige, inspiring young Bābur to seize it in 903/1497 though only temporarily. Further east, Turkistān was administered by the Mughul Khans, descendants of Chaghatāi Khan, the second son of Chingīz Khan.

The first decade of the sixteenth century witnessed profound changes in this region. In Iran a new dynasty named after its ancestor Shaikh Ṣafīuddīn (died 735/1334-35) was laying the foundation of a strong kingdom in which the alliance of religion and state played an important part in cementing political and national loyalties. In Transoxiana the Uzbeks were emerging as a powerful factor under the leadership of Shaibānī Khan.¹ Shaibānī's ambition to govern a vast Central Asian kingdom made him the most determined foe of the Tīmurids. Bābur, whose passion for his ancestral city of Samarqand attracted him to it once again in 906/1500, was defeated by Shaibānī Khan and had to retreat to Kāshghar in 1501. His proposal to the Chaghatāi Khans to cooperate against the Uzbeks did not evoke much response.² In 910/1504, Bābur, after enduring a period of privation and tribulation when he had no territory of his own, succeeded in establishing himself at Kābul. Meanwhile Shaibānī Khan's increasing might made all the Tīmurids apprehensive. The old, venerated Sultan Ḥusain Mirza Baiqarā, ruler of Khurāsān, the

1. His name occurs in the chronicles variously as Shah Bakht Khan, Shaibānī Khan, Shah Beg Khan, Muḥammad Khan Shaibānī and Muḥammad Shaibānī Khan. In this work he will be called Shaibānī Khan.

2. *B. N.*, p. 158.

leading Timurid of his time, made ineffective attempts to organize resistance against the rising Uzbek tide. But his feeble state of health and the disaffection of his sons, prevented him from playing an effective role in this critical situation. He wrote "long and far-fetched letters" to Bābur in 910/1504-5, appealing for cooperation against the Uzbeks, but his half-hearted proposals excited compassion rather than action.¹ However, when in 911/1506 Sultan Ḥusain Mirza decided to make a determined move against the Uzbeks and summoned Bābur to his side, the latter immediately responded and marched to Khurāsān. But Sultan Ḥusain Mirza died in the meanwhile (911/1506). Bābur learnt of his death on the way, but felt duty bound to proceed to Herāt.² Sultan Ḥusain Mirza's loss left a big vacuum. He was succeeded by two of his sons, Badi'uzzamān Mirza and Muẓaffar Ḥusain Mirza, who simultaneously held their court by mutual arrangement at Herāt. This division of authority destroyed all chances of Herāt holding out against the Uzbek hordes. When Bābur arrived at Herāt, he found the two rival courts vying with each other in luxury and enjoyment. No one seemed to give serious thought to an effective defence against the impending Uzbek invasion. The chance of confronting the Uzbeks with the assembled might of all Timurids, made possible by Bābur's presence, was frittered away by divided counsels and mutual jealousies. Bābur found the situation so hopeless that after a short stay, he returned from Herāt to Kābul.³

In 913/1507 the Uzbek Shaibānī Khan easily defeated the ill-assorted and loosely organized armies of Herāt, and the kingdom of Khurāsān soon passed into Uzbek hands.⁴ Shaibānī's resounding victory had an unnerving effect on the neighbouring kingdoms. Bābur felt insecure at Kābul. Dhūn Nūn Arghūn, the ruler of Qandahār in vassalage to the Timurids of Herāt, was the only military leader on the Timurid side, who had died fighting like a man against the Uzbeks. His sons at Qandahār, Shujā' Beg Arghūn and Muqīm Beg Arghūn, felt sure that they would be the next victims of Shaibānī's prowess. Qandahār's erstwhile vassalage to Herāt also gave to Shaibānī Khan a pretext, if he needed one, of taking Qandahār. So the Arghūn princes looked around for support and decided to seek the protection of Bābur, offering to accept his supremacy.⁵ Bābur responded to their appeal and marched to Qandahār,

1. *B. N.*, pp. 190-91.

2. *B. N.*, pp. 255, 294-5. According to the *H. S.*, III, iii, p. 355, Bābur continued to march to Herāt in the hope of benefiting from the discord among Sultan Ḥusain Mirza's sons.

3. *B. N.*, pp. 269-308.

4. *H. S.*, III, iii, p. 353.

5. *B. N.*, pp. 330-31. Cf. Ma'sūm, p. 102, according to whom the Arghūn brothers, prior to Bābur's first invasion of Qandahār, had offered allegiance to Shaibānī Khan and struck sikka and read *khutba* in his name. We prefer the *Bābur-nāma's* account. Cf. M. H. Siddiqi, 'Chronology of Bābur's occupation of Qandahār and the expulsion of the Arghūns', *University Studies*, Karachi, III, No. 1, April, 1966, who follows Ma'sūm.

but the Arghūn princes soon repented of their invitation. The prospect of the strong fort passing out of their hands and their reduction to mere vassals or worse, was not pleasing. They shut themselves in the fort, but after a while came out and fought an action against Bābur outside Qandahār. They lost the battle and fled. Bābur occupied the stronghold and came into possession of the wealth amassed there by the wise Dhūn Nūn. He appointed his brother's son, Yādgār Nāṣir Mirza to the governorship of Qandahār and of Zamīn-Dāwar. Bābur did not stay there for long and returned to Kābul, possibly because Shaibānī Khan was not far away from Qandahār. The Uzbek leader soon appeared outside the historic fort, probably at the instigation of the Arghūn brothers. Bābur felt so alarmed by the proximity of Uzbek power at Qandahār that he held a council of nobles to consider the question of moving away from Kābul in the direction of India. Yādgār Nāṣir Mirza fled from Qandahār after making an arrangement with Shaibānī Khan, who was himself in a hurry to return to Khurāsān to deal with certain untoward development there. The fort of Qandahār was restored to the Arghūn princes, who were beholden for this to Shaibānī Khan.¹ Thus the position by the end of A.H. 913 was that the great Uzbek leader had occupied practically the whole of Khurāsān and had extended his sway to Qandahār. It was a situation which endangered the position of Bābur's small kingdom of Kābul as well as of the eastern marches of the much larger realm of Shah Ismā'il Ṣafavī. Bābur was, however, relieved of immediate worry by Shaibānī Khan's retirement from Qandahār.

A clash between Shah Ismā'il and Shaibānī Khan was inevitable. The latter was the able and ambitious leader of a warlike and predatory people. The conquest of Khurāsān whetted, rather than satiated, his ambitions. Marauding frontier raids suited both his own inclinations and those of his booty-loving followers. The sectarian antagonism between Iran and Tūrān also played its part. Transoxiana has always been well known for its Sunnī orthodoxy. The Persians, on the other hand, were becoming Shiite zealots under the religio-political leadership of Shah Ismā'il. He was, however, nothing if not a realist. He wrote a moderately worded letter to Shaibānī Khan, asking him to stop the frontier raids. The Uzbek chief, whose rapid military success had turned his head, sent an insolent reply to the reasonable proposals from Persia. This led to further exchange of letters full of abusive threats and challenges. The epistolary encounter soon turned into an armed conflict. Shah Ismā'il marched eastward. The historic battle, in which the Shah showed great tactical skill, was fought at some distance from Merv and is known as the battle of Merv. Shaibānī had arrogantly provoked war, though he was at that time ill-prepared for a large-scale encounter. In the battle,

1. The accounts of these events vary in certain details. *B. N.*, pp. 339-43; *H. S.*, III, iii, pp. 364-5; *C. U. Add.* 200. f. 101a.

during which Shah Ismā'il very cleverly enticed Shaibānī out of the secure citadel of Merv by feigning flight, the Persians put the Uzbegs to rout. Shaibānī lost his life during the headlong flight.¹ (December, 1510).

This historic battle is the starting-point of our study since it brought Bābur for the first time into diplomatic contact and military alliance with Shah Ismā'il against the "hated" Uzbegs. Before passing on to our theme, it may be pointed out that the battle of Merv dealt a serious blow to the Uzbeg dreams of westward expansion. In this encounter they lost not only prestige but the greatest leader of their history. The Uzbeg might, however, had been only checked and not destroyed. During the entire sixteenth century, the fear of the Uzbegs was to dominate the minds of the Persians; Uzbeg cavalry repeatedly was to overrun Khurāsān. The Uzbegs formed the third side of a triangle with India and Iran.

1. *H. S.*, III, iv, pp. 59-60; for the best modern account, see Dr. Ghulām Sarwar, *History of Shah Ismā'il Šafawī*, pp. 58-63. It was evidently to announce this victory that Shah Ismā'il sent Yādgār Beg (Yādgār Sultan in the *Mir'ātuš Šafā*, B. M. Add. 6539, f. 195a) on an embassy to Sultan Muẓaffar Shah of Gujarāt in 217/1511. See *Tab. Ak.*, III, pp. 173-74.

CHAPTER II

BĀBUR AND THE SAFAVIDS

SEC. I: MERV TO GHUJDUWĀN

THE spectacular victory of Shah Ismā'il I over the Uzbeks attracted a great deal of attention. The battle of Merv was fought on 2 December 1510, and the news of Persian victory reached Bābur in Kābul the same month. Babur's cousin Khan Mirza in Badakhshān who had sent him this news, exhorted him to energetic action: "If you will quickly turn the reins of your power in the direction of Qunduz, I will attach myself to you, and I have the firmest hope that you may soon recover your hereditary kingdom."¹ Bābur acted promptly. Braving the severities of a highland winter he marched from Kābul to Qunduz, arriving at his destination in January 1511. Mirza Ḥaidar Dughlāt, the author of the *Tārīkh-i-Rashīdī*, accompanied Bābur on this march.²

Shortly after Bābur reached Qunduz, an ambassador arrived from Shah Ismā'il, "bearing tenders of friendship". The Shah also sent to Bābur, with due honour, the latter's sister, Khānzāda Begum who had been recovered from the Uzbeks at Merv and who now rejoined her brother after a decade of separation.³ This friendly gesture on Shah Ismā'il's part afforded Bābur the much desired opportunity to start negotiations with the Shah. Marching swiftly over mountain passes in cold December Babur could not have possibly brought a formidable force from Kābul, and consequently needed substantial

1. *T. R.*, pp. 237-8; also see *B. N.*, translator's note, p. 350.

2. *T. R.*, p. 267. The *H. S.* III, iv, p. 65 and other Persian sources place Bābur's departure considerably later, which seems inaccurate; The *T. Sulṭānī*, f 310, dates the event as late as 918/1512.

3. For details of Shaibānī's marriage to Khānzāda Begum in 907/1501 and of her divorce and remarriage to Sayyid Hādī, who died at the battle of Merv, see *B. N.*, p. 147; *T. R.*, pp. 157, 239. Bābur makes a brief reference to Khānzāda Begum's return in his account of his father's children: "Khān-zāda Begim was in Merv when Shah Ismā'il defeated the Auzbeks near that town; for my sake he treated her well, giving her a sufficient escort to Qunduz where she rejoined me." *B. N.*, p. 18. See also *Abd. N.*, f. 33b.

military help to attain his objectives. On the other hand the Uzbegs, though stunned for the time being by the loss of their leader, were still a formidable power beyond the Oxus. Indeed, in his first move against the Uzbegs after his arrival at Qunduz, Bābur showed an utter lack of confidence and had to beat a hasty retreat.¹

Bābur, therefore, lost no time in opening negotiations with the victor of Merv. In view of the importance of the occasion, he sent Khan Mirza himself as his envoy to Shah Ismā'il to convey his protestations of loyalty and his request for help against the Uzbege. The Shah received him well, and favourably entertained Bābur's request for help. He issued a mandate that any areas in the Transoxiana conquered by Bābur would belong to him. He is also said to have conferred on Khan Mirza the government of Ḥiṣār Shādmān and Badakhshān. Khan Mirza was already ruling these areas as a vassal of Bābur, but it appears that in view of the proximity of his lands to Herāt and the formidable power that the Shah had attained recently, he thought it prudent to accept service under the Shah as well. The Shah dismissed him suitably.² On the whole the Shah's attitude towards the embassy from Bābur was favourable: he welcomed him as a potential ally against possible Uzbek resurgence. But it is unlikely that he provided any military aid at this juncture.³

Soon after this Shah Ismā'il marched out from Herāt towards the Oxus. The Uzbegs, in their alarm lest the victorious Shah should carry the war beyond the Oxus, sent envoys to seek a settlement making the Oxus a boundary between the Uzbek and the Safavid dominions. Shah Ismā'il's desire to return to western Persia and be near his western frontiers, where important events were taking shape,⁴ made him willing to listen to these counsels of peace. He authorized his Ministers to conclude a treaty with the Uzbegs

1. See *T. R.*, p. 238.

2. *T. R.*, p. 239. The *Abd. N.*, f. 33b, adds that Bābur offered to accept the political and religious leadership of Shah Ismā'il; also see Firishta, I, p. 327; Bod. 101. f. 113b; K.K., Vol. I, p. 41. The *H. S.* and other Persian chronicles say that Bābur sent ambassadors from Kābul and that Khan Mirza came independently. This account seems to be inspired by a desire to magnify Shah Ismā'il's importance and to make Khan Mirza's vassalage to him look more real. *H. S.*, III, iv, pp. 62-65; C. U. Add. 200, ff. 116b-17a, 123a; *A.A.A.*, p. 29. The *Khuld-i Barin*, Vol. IV, f. 50, says that a *manshūr* (mandate) of the government of Ḥiṣār Shādmān was written out in the *Diwān* and given to Khan Mirza; also see *Maqāl*, ff. 69a-b, 70a.

3. The statement in the *T. R.*, p. 243 and the *Abd. N.*, f. 33b, to the contrary seems inaccurate, for any Persian help would have most certainly been mentioned by the Persian sources. For subsequent military aid to Bābur, see below.

4. See Ghulām Sarwar, pp. 65-6 for the revolt of Safavid partisans in Turkey in 917/1511, and p. 73 for the deposition of the Ottoman Sultan Bāyazid II in early 918/1512. Also see *Ah. T.*, pp. 125-6, 134-7.

who solemnly undertook never to cross the Oxus. Balkh and its dependencies became part of the Persian Empire and the Shah appointed Bairam Khan Qarāmānlū as commander of this area.¹

Now this treaty ran counter to the spirit of the mandate to Bābur. The *Ḥabībūs Siyar* offers no explanation of the Shah's contradictory proceedings. Later Persian chroniclers, who wrote from a more exclusively Safavid point of view, tried to spare Shah Ismā'il from the charge of bad faith either by avoiding any mention of the pact with the Uzbegs² or of the mandate to Bābur,³ or by (inaccurately) placing the mandate to Babur after the Uzbegs had allegedly violated their treaty by frontier inroads.⁴

Encouraged by the favourable attitude of Shah Ismā'il, Bābur marched out from Qunduz to Ḥiṣār Shādmān. This was his second attempt on the fortress and ended in its capture. This success opened before Bābur's mind the vista of the conquest of the whole of Māvarāunnahr and of his return to the throne of his ancestral city of Samarqand. But it was a task beyond his own military strength. He, therefore, sent a report of his victory to Shah Ismā'il, asking for military aid, assuring him of an easy and rapid conquest of the whole of Transoxiana and promising, in the event of victory, to read the *khuṭba* and strike the *sikka* in the Shah's name.⁵ Bābur's victory had raised his credit at the court of the Shah, who now conveniently forgot his pact with the Uzbegs and sent military aid to him. The Persian sources seek to justify this by vaguely accusing the Uzbegs of having violated the pact, but fail to cite any large-scale frontier raids.⁶ The danger of Uzbek resurgence was, however, a real one and would have weighed with the Shah in extending military aid to Bābur against them.⁷ He despatched a Persian contingent under the command of Aḥmad Beg Ṣufī Īwāghli [Evoghlu] and Shah Beg Afshār to Bābur at Ḥiṣār.⁸ The strength of this reinforcement is nowhere stated. It was presumably large enough to make a difference to Bābur's military power. The assembled might

1. *H.S.*, III, iv, p. 63. Ethé 120 ff. 327a-b; C. U. Add. 200, f. 118b-19a; Yaḥyā Qazvīnī, f. 184b; *Ah. T.*, pp. 124-5; *Maqāl*, f. 69b.

2. C. U. Add. 200, f. 122a.

3. *Ah. T.*, p. 125.

4. *Maqāl*, f. 70a; *A.A.A.*, p. 30. Ethé 536, f. 196b, says that Shah Ismā'il authorized Bābur to occupy Tūrān if and when the Uzbegs violated their pledge.

5. *H.S.*, III, iv, 66; C. U. Add. 200, f. 122a; *Ah. T.*, p. 127; *Maqāl*, f. 70a. The Persian sources, of course, spare no effort to emphasize Bābur's subordination to the Shah. The C. U. Add. 200, e.g., says that Bābur applied to be enlisted as a servant of the Shah's court.

6. C. U. Add. 200; f. 122a; *Maqāl*, f. 70a.

7. *Badi'a*, f. 113a.

8. In addition to the references in f.n. 5 above, see *A.A.A.*, p. 30; *T.I.N.S.* f. 411a-b. According to the *T. Raḡḡidī*, p. 245, this was the second reinforcement sent by the Shah. This, however, seems unlikely. See p. 6 n. 3 above.

of Bābur at Hīṣār about this time is stated to have been 60,000 men;¹ his recent victory would undoubtedly have attracted a large number of local volunteers to his side. He now marched to Bukhārā and thence to Samarqand. Here Bābur had a splendid reception but his popularity did not last long and gradually gave way to a growing feeling of resentment against his subsidiary alliance with Shah Ismā'il. Bābur, in order to get the much-needed Persian help, had accepted the Shī'a creed. He had undertaken to strike money and read the *khutba* in the Shī'a fashion, and he carried out these undertakings. (See Appendix B.) According to the eye-witness account of Mirza Haidar Dughlāt, Bābur had even donned the Qizilbāsh dress including the *tāj*.² All this was, however, anathema to the people of Samarqand among whom, as in all Transoxiana, Sunnī orthodoxy was a powerful force.³ It was quite possibly this growing popular distaste to his Persian alliance which led Bābur to dismiss the Persian contingents from Samarqand.⁴

Bābur dismissed the Persian officers suitably, with honours and rewards, and presents for the Shah. Among those dismissed was Muḥammad Jān, *Eshik Aqāsi Bāshi*⁵ (Lord of the Gate) of Najm Thānī, the *Vakil* of the Shah, who had been sent, after the despatch of Persian reinforcements to Bābur, by his master, Najm Thānī, on the command of the Shah, with some important message. On his return Muḥammad Jān reported to the Shah that Bābur, having conquered Bukhārā and Samarqand with Persian help, had grown arrogant and was contemplating the withdrawal of allegiance to the Shah and setting himself up as independent ruler of Transoxiana. Muḥammad Jān is said to have so complained against Bābur because the latter had not shown him due regard and honour.⁶ Possibly, as envoy of the Shah, he had expected

1. *T. R.*, p. 245.

2. *T. R.*, p. 246; *Abd. N.*, f. 34a. The *T. Qipchāq Khānī*, f. 262b, adds that Bābur went out with young Qizilbāshes and corrupt women to the gardens and in this fashion passed two months in merriment. The suggestion of indecency in this remark needs to be discounted as arising from the author's sectarian prejudice. See footnote on the *tāj* in the next chapter, p. 29 n. 9.

3. See Appendix B.

4. The following sources state that Bābur dismissed the Persian contingent from Samarqand; *H. S.* III, iv, 66; *Ah. T.*, p. 127; *C. U. Add.* 200. f. 122b; *A.A.A.*, p. 30; *Firishta*, I, 373; *K. K.*, I, p. 42-5. The *T. R.*'s statement that Bābur dismissed them from Bukhārā (the same in *T. Alfī*, f. 518b) is unacceptable and is indirectly contradicted by itself later; *T. R.*, pp. 245-6, 256. The *T.I.N.S.*, f. 411b, says that Bābur dismissed them at Bukhārā when he arrived there victoriously from Samarqand; this, however, is obviously erroneous. See below. The *H. S.* and the *Ah. T.* make Bābur proceed from Hīṣār direct to Samarqand. I have followed the *T. R.* and the *C. U. Add.* 200 which are much more circumspect and detailed on this point.

5. "Literally 'Head of the masters of threshold'," Minorsky, *T.M.*, p. 118.

6. *H. S.*, III, iv., p. 65, 66; *Ah. T.*, p. 127; *C. U. Add.* 200, f. 122b (calls Najm Thānī's servant, Qulī Jān Beg); *T. Alfī*, f. 519a; *Ethe'* 120, f. 327b-28a, says that Najm Thānī took umbrage as Bābur had not sent him any presents and he, therefore, complained to the Shah against him.

special favours which he did not receive. It is, however, probable that there was some truth in his allegation.¹

Muḥammad Jān's report would have certainly annoyed the Shah, partly because of the implied duplicity of Bābur and partly because of the threat to his own position at Herāt. The city had been for long a part of the Timurid empire and had been in Timurid hands till only a couple of years before. An independent Timurid empire was certain to exercise a disturbing influence over Herāt. Shah Ismā'il, therefore, appointed Najm Thānī to lead a punitive expedition against Bābur. He set out on his mission the same winter (late 917/early 1512).²

In the meanwhile Bābur was losing ground in Smarqand. The dismissal of the Persian contingent, the antipathy of the Samarqandīs to his heretical alliance with the Persians, and the revival of the Uzbeg power progressively weakened his position. The Uzbegs advanced in great strength towards Bukhārā and defeated Bābur at the battle of Kūl-i Malik (Ṣafar 918/May 1512). Bābur barely escaped from the battle-field and fled to Bukhārā, thence post-haste to Samarqand, and with his family retreated to Ḥiṣār Shādmān.³

The Uzbegs, after occupying Bukhārā and Samarqand, advanced towards Ḥiṣār Shādmān. (Jumādā I, 918/August 1512). Bābur prepared to defend Ḥiṣār and sent an urgent appeal for help to Bairam Beg Qarāmānlū, the Persian commander at Balkh, who sent a contingent of 300 men to help Bābur. This, with the probable knowledge that Najm Thānī was marching towards Transoxiana, made the Uzbegs turn back from Chaghāniān.⁴

We now revert to Najm Thānī. His name was Amīr Yār Muḥammad Khan. Shah Ismā'il appointed him *Vakil* or the highest dignitary of the realm⁵ in 915/1509 after the death of Najmuddīn Mas'ūd, and gave him the title of Najm Thānī. The *Ḥabībūs Siyar* has an interesting account of his wealth and power, a description recurring in several other sources.⁶ His appointment to lead the punitive expedition against Bābur was made on his own suggestion.⁷ He was certainly a highly ambitious and headstrong man.

Najm Thānī's original commission to chastise Bābur had become void by the latter's disastrous defeat at Kūl-i Malik.⁸ The threat to the Safavid

1. See the *Nusakh-i Jahān Ārā*, f. 111b; *Sharaf Nāma-i Bitlisī*, f. 145a.

2. *H. S.*, III, iv, 65, 66; *C. U. Add.* 200, f. 123a; *Ah. T.*, p. 128-9. See also f.n. 8 below.

3. *H. S.*, III, iv, 66-7; *T. R.*, 259-60; *C. U. Add.* 200, f. 124a-b; *Ah. T.*, p. 129.

4. *H. S.*, III, iv, 67; *Ah. T.*, p. 130.

5. See V. Minorsky, *T.M.*, p. 114, "Under the early Safavids . . . the highest dignitary of the State is usually called *Vakil*." Cf. Ghulam Sarwar, p. 102.

6. *H. S.*, III, iv, 67-8; *C. U. Add.* 200, f. 125a-b.

7. *C. U. Add.*, 200, f. 123a.

8. It may be noted that according to the *T. R.*, p. 260, the *Abd. Nama*, f. 35a, the *T. Qipchāq Khānī*, f. 262b and the *Bod.* 101, f. 312a, it was on Bābur's request for help after

position in Khurāsān and beyond now came from the aggressive resurgence of the Uzbegs. Najm Thānī now changed his plan and decided to push back the Uzbegs. In doing so he did not ask for fresh instructions from the Shah. The new situation appeared to offer him an opportunity of repeating the exploits of his master at Merv, but all Safavid chronicles accuse him of underrating the difficulty of this ambitious project.¹ He proceeded with 12,000 troops to Balkh via Jām and the Marghāb and despatched Amīr Ghiyāthuddin Muḥammad of Herāt (of whom more hereafter) to Bābur at Hiṣār Shādmān, assuring him of Shah Ismā'il's goodwill and asking him to join forces against the Uzbegs. Amīr Ghiyāthuddin rejoined him at Tirmidh (Rajab 918/Sept. 1512), bringing tidings of Bābur's immediate arrival. Najm Thānī went out to receive him at Darband-i Āhanīn.² Bābur, who had five years earlier assumed the title of Pādshāh as the leading Timurid of his time,³ had now the mortification to serve in an almost subsidiary capacity under the minister of a neighbouring kingdom. There could be, in point of temperament and attitude, little in common between the two leaders; Najm Thānī was an arrogant, headstrong, ruthless and harsh-tempered man, while the nobility and charm of Bābur's character are writ large across his candid Memoirs. Less incompatible characters could not have been thrown together, and friction was inevitable between them.

Najm Thānī, with Bābur in his train, marched from Darband-i Āhanīn towards Khazar. At Khazar, Najm Thānī committed the heinous crime of massacring the Uzbek garrison after entering into a solemn agreement to spare them.⁴ This was something entirely alien to Bābur's character and he could not have been a party to this perfidy. But worse was to follow. The combined forces now proceeded to Qarshī (old Nakhshab) which they took by storm after a few days' siege.⁵ Najm Thānī ordered a general massacre of the garrison as well as of the population. The Chaghataīs who lived in the town approached Bābur and appealed to him to save them. He tried to intercede on their behalf but met with a rebuff from Najm Thānī. Equally unsuccessful was Amīr Ghiyāthuddin Muḥammad's appeal to spare the Sayyids of Qarshī. Fifteen thousand persons, including women and children, are said to have perished in the holocaust. The Qarshī massacre and the rebuff to Bābur strained his relations with Najm Thānī, while the latter's

Kūl-i Malik that Shah Ismā'il sent Najm Thānī for his succour. But all contemporary Persian chronicles place the appointment of Najm before Bābur's defeat at Kūl-i Malik (see above).

1. *H. S.*, III, iv, 68; *C. U. Add. f. 125b*; *Maqāl*, f. 71a; *A.A.A.*, p. 30.

2. *H. S.*, III, iv, 67; *Ah. T.*, 131.

3. In 913/1508, *B.N.*, I, p. 344.

4. *H. S.*, III, iv, p. 68; *C. U. Add. 200*, f. 125a-26a.

5. For Bābur's active participation in the siege, see *C. U. Add. 200*, f. 126a-b.

severe treatment of his own Persian officers during the recent siege was not forgotten or forgiven by them.¹

From Qarshī Najm Thānī and Bābur marched on Bukhārā where the Uzbek leaders, Jānī Beg and ‘Ubaidullah Khan were present in full strength. Before the allies could reach Bukhārā, another Uzbek force under Tīmūr Sultan and Abū Sa‘īd Sultan was reported to be marching on them from Samarqand; this force was compelled to take refuge in the fortress of Ghujduwan² which was now forthwith invested by the allies. But winter was fast approaching; the stronghold was well-provisioned, and supplies were running short in the besiegers’ camp. Khwāja Kamāluddīn Maḥmūd who was well-acquainted with the locality advised a return to Qarshī for the winter. Bābur supported the Khwāja’s counsel.³ Najm Thānī argued that retreat would be taken by the Uzbeks as a sign of weakness, but when Bābur pressed the point, he simulated agreement and said that next morning they would march away. In reality he intended to stay and fight. The situation was, however, completely changed when a big Uzbek force appeared on the horizon next morning (3 Ramaḍān 918/12 Nov. 1512). Jānī Beg and ‘Ubaidullah Khan, having learnt of the shortage of stores in the allied camp and Najm Thānī’s unsatisfactory position, had decided to advance from Bukhārā and force a battle with the allies; the garrison of Ghujduwān sallied forth and joined the advancing Uzbek force. Najm Thānī hastily placed his forces in battle array and directed Bābur to stand ready with his contingent in reserve and to rally to whichever part of the Persian army needed succour. As soon as the battle was joined and the Persians met their first reverse of the day, some Persian nobles, who had been offended by Najm Thānī, left the field without a fight. Bābur also now moved away with his men and took the road to Ḥiṣār. The Uzbeks fell on the remaining Persian forces. Najm Thānī was captured and beheaded, and a large part of the Persian army was put to the sword. The day ended in an unprecedented disaster for the Safavid arms.⁴

To what extent was Bābur responsible for the Persian defeat? When three decades later Humāyūn went to Persia to seek military aid from Shah Ṭahmāsp, his opponents at the Persian court recalled Bābur’s “treachery” at Ghujduwān. This, however, appears to be an afterthought. The Persian

1. The C. U. Add. 200, f. 120a-28b, gives the most detailed account of these events. Also see: *H. S.*, III, iv, 68; *Ah. T.*, p. 130; *T.A.M.*, f. 33b; *T.I.N.S.*, f. 458b; *Maqāl*, f. 71a; *A.A.A.*, p. 30.

2. *Six farsakhs* (leagues) from Bukhārā, see art. on Ghujduwān in *Enc. Islam*.

3. The *T. R.*, (p. 261) is alone in asserting that the siege of Ghujduwān was begun on Bābur’s advice.

4. *H. S.*, III, iv, 68-9; *Ah. T.*, p. 130-3; C. U. Add. 200, f. 127b-29b; *Nusakh-i Jahān Arā*, f. 111b; *T.I.N.S.*, f. 458b; *T.A.M.*, f. 34a-b; *Maqāl*, f. 71a; *T.R.*, p. 261 (see footnote above); *Abd. N.* f. 35a; *T. Alfī*, f. 531-32a; *Mujmal-i Muffaṣṣal* (MS 43, R.A.S.B., Calcutta), Vol. I ff. 203b-4b.

sources, contemporary as well as later, are unanimous in ascribing the military disaster to Najm Thānī's folly in acting without royal authority, to his haughty conduct and the ill-feeling engendered by it among the nobles, and to his disregard of competent advice. A contemporary pro-Safavid chronicle goes even further and says, "When Bābur witnessed many Persian generals fleeing from the field, he also turned away from fighting."¹

Though Bābur was not primarily responsible for the Persian defeat, there is no doubt that his defection at the crucial hour did hasten the doom of the Persian forces. Yūsuf Atakī, author of the *Muntakhabat Tawārikh*, observes, "Bābur Badshah, disgusted with Najm Thānī's haughty behaviour and manners, withdrew his hand from the battle in the midst of fighting and proceeded to Ghaznī and Kābul. Consequently the Qizilbāsh were utterly defeated."² This evidence coming from a work dedicated to Shah Jahān, is important. Read alongside with the Persian accounts of Najm Thānī's haughty conduct and the non-cooperation of the Persian nobles, it may be taken to give a complete picture of what happened at Ghujduwān, and to account wholly for the unqualified disaster that befell the Persians.

To what extent was Bābur's conduct justified? He was certainly beholden to Shah Ismā'il for help in recovering Bukhārā and Samarqand, but the same had also been the cause of his undoing. He had indeed paid heavily for this help, first by parting, even though only ostensibly, with the Sunnī faith, and next by losing the sympathy and allegiance of the people of Samarqand. As for Najm Thānī, Bābur had much provocation from him, and the non-compliance with Bābur's advice to retire from Ghujduwān would have made the former appear in the latter's eyes deserving of his fate.³ The fact that pro-Safavid chronicles do not take exception to Bābur's conduct also goes in his favour.

SEC. II: AFTER GHUJDUWĀN

The disaster to Persian arms at Ghujduwān at once encouraged the Uzbegs to march forward into Khurāsān. They crossed the Oxus and seized the cities of Balkh, Herāt and Mashhad. Shah Ismā'il now decided to proceed eastward in person. The news of his approach unnerved the Uzbegs and they evacuated Herāt and Mashhad⁴ (approx. Jumādā II 919/August 1513). Bābur was still biding his time at Hiṣār Shādmān. His prolonged stay in Badakhshān can only be ascribed to a desire for yet another opportunity to try

1. C. U. Add. 200, ff. 128a-9b.

2. Yūsuf Atakī's *Muntakhabat Tawārikh*, f. 53b. The earlier Mughul chronicles skip over this point.

3. It is interesting to note that Najm Thānī's descendants rose to high posts under Bābur's successors, especially Aurangzeb. See *Mir'ātuṣ Ṣaḡā* (B. M. Add. 6539) ff. 148b-49a.

4. *H. S.*, III, iv, pp. 70-72.

his fortune in Tūrān.

Two distinguished notables of Khurāsān, Amīr Ghiyāthuddīn Muḥammad of Herāt and Khwāja Kamāluddīn Maḥmūd, had followed Bābur from Ghujduwān to Hiṣār Shādmān. Bābur was characteristically kind to them. They left for Balkh, and had some further mis-adventures with the Uzbegs. Amīr Ghiyāthuddīn escaped from Samarqand, where the Uzbegs had taken him, and once again partook of Bābur's hospitality at Hiṣār Shādmān, soon retiring to Herāt. His contacts with Bābur had tragic consequences for him. (See below.) Khwāja Kamāluddīn too came once again to Bābur for protection and stayed with him at Kashm in Badakhshān to which place Bābur had moved after grave mishaps at Hiṣār. After remaining with Bābur for two or three months, he left about the middle of 919/1513 for Balkh to meet a tragic end there. Bābur's close association with these Persian notables strongly suggests that he still wanted to remain on good terms with the Safavids.¹

Balkh

Sometime towards the end of 920/1514-15 Bābur returned to Kābul from Badakhshān. But a couple of years later Bābur was again operating towards Tūrān in a venture that led him to regions belonging to Persia since the battle of Merv, though there was no contact or clash with the Persian authorities. Shah Ismā'il's grievous defeat by the Ottoman Turks at the battle of Chāldirān in Rajab 920/August 1514² may have encouraged Bābur to adopt a more forward policy in this area. Balkh had been retaken by the Uzbegs soon after Ghujduwān. But Persian forces recovered the city in the following year. In Rabi' II 922/May 1516, during the absence of the Persian commander from Balkh, Muḥammad Zamān Mirza (grandson of Sulṭān Ḥusain Mirza Baiqarā) captured the city. Later on the Mirza fell out with one of his leading nobles who sought Bābur's intervention. Bābur moved towards Balkh and sent his officers to take over the city. The Mirza fled away, but after many hardships and adventures, during which he was pursued and attacked by the Persian forces of Herāt, was apprehended by Bābur's officers and sent to Kābul. Bābur generously forgave him, gave him one of his own daughters in marriage and assigned him the government of Balkh. Muḥammad Zamān Mirza assumed charge of Balkh as Bābur's vassal. He was shrewd enough to keep the authorities of Khurāsān pleased by frequent embassies and by protesting loyalty to Shah Ismā'il. The Shah evidently did not consider the position altogether unsatisfactory. An obliging and obsequious Timurid at Balkh was in any case better than the troublesome Uzbegs. The Mirza was virtually

1. This account is culled mostly from the *H. S.*, III, iv, pp. 60, 72-5; and the *C. U. Add.* 200, f. 128b-35a; also see the *T. R.*, pp. 261-3 for Bābur's narrow escape from Hiṣār.

2. For details, see Ghulām Sarwar, p. 78f.

in a position of dual vassalage to Bābur and to the Shah. This lasted till about 932-34/1526-28 when the Mirza had to leave Balkh under Uzbek pressure. He then went to India and joined Bābur's service.¹

Qandahār

Qandahār occupied a position of great importance in the defence systems and on the caravan-routes of India and Iran in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. It lay athwart the routes by which men and merchandise passed between India and Persia and beyond. The fort was one of the strongest in the East. It had a fertile hinterland and a plentiful supply of water. A comparatively small force under an able and determined commander could hold out for a long time.² In the long period of two centuries which we are studying, Qandahār was besieged some fifteen times and changed hands on a dozen occasions, but it was hardly ever taken by storm. That is one reason why stratagem and the golden key were so frequently associated in the attempts on Qandahār. The rare occasions when the stronghold appears to have been seized by force were attended by exceptional circumstances. The possession of Qandahār was essential for the security of Kābul as well as Khurāsān; inevitably it became a bone of contention between the Mughuls and the Safavids, and indeed proved to be the rock on which their traditionally friendly relations were ultimately wrecked.

At the opening of the sixteenth century, we find Qandahār a part of the Timurid kingdom of Herāt but governed in a state of semi-independence by Amīr Dhūn Nūn Arghūn. Even Sultan Ḥusain Mirza Baiqarā, ruler of Herāt, felt jealous of his powerful vassal, but his attempt to wrest the fort from Amīr Dhūn Nūn was a fiasco.³ It can be safely presumed that Bābur had an eye on Qandahār from the day that he set foot in Kābul in 910/1504. The strength and importance of the fort could not have eluded his shrewd strategist's eye. Speaking of Qandahār in his memoirs of A. H. 910, Bābur observes, rather naively, that "some hold that Qandahār is a part of it [Ghaznī]."⁴ (Ghaznī was in his own kingdom). We know definitely that in 911/1505, Bābur made an attempt on Qandahār, but Amīr Dhūn Nūn's appeal for help brought Badī'uz Zamān Mirza, son of Sultan Ḥusain Baiqarā, with a big force to

1. *H. S.*, III, iii, 368-73; *Ah. T.*, pp. 162-67; *C. U. Add.* 200, ff. 165b-66b; *B. N.*, pp. 385, 402.

Khwand Amīr, who was for a time in the service of Muḥammad Zamān Mirza, has described these events at great length. Also see Calendar No. Tx. 325 which is an '*ard-dāsh*t' from one Sultan Bahādur (possibly one of the nephews of Sultan Ḥusain Baiqarā) to Bābur, soliciting the latter for the conferment of the governorship of Balkh.

2. For further details and references, see Chap. X below.

3. *H. S.*, III, iii, pp. 265-6; *Ma'sūmī*, pp. 88-9, also pp. 81-4; *B. N.*, p. 264.

4. *B. N.*, p. 217.

Qandahār and Bābur had to make peace and return to Kābul.¹

We have already seen how on the death of Amīr Dhun Nūn at the battle of Herāt (913/1507) which sounded the death-knell of the Baiqarā kingdom of Herāt, Qandahār was seized by Bābur from Dhun Nūn's sons, Shah Shujā' Beg (hereafter called Shah Beg) and Muḥammad Muqīm, and how their intrigue with Shaibānī Khan Uzbek led to their restoration to Qandahār. The battle of Merv left Shah Ismā'īl the unquestioned master of Khurāsān and the Arghūn brothers thought it prudent to submit to him.² Shah Beg proceeded to Herāt where he was arrested on the orders of Shah Ismā'īl who "saw marks of disobedience and rebellion in his forehead" (917/1511).³ Probably the real cause of the Shah's action was his understanding of the vital importance of Qandahār for Herāt and his apprehension of the danger of leaving it in the hands of weak and semi-independent princes on the periphery of the kingdom of Bābur whose interest in the fort was well known.

Shah Beg was released from prison in Herāt by his spirited and resourceful servant, Mehtar Sumbul, whose exploit in effecting his escape, is, indeed, one of the authentic romances of medieval Asian history.⁴ Shah Beg came back to Qandahār amid proud rejoicings. Commissioned by Shah Ismā'īl to reduce Qandahār (917/1511), Shah Rukh Beg Afshār presently laid siege to the fort, but finding it too hard a nut to crack, the Persian commander vented his spleen by ravaging the neighbouring areas of Shāl and Mastān.⁵

Not much is known of the history of Qandahār during the next seven or eight years.⁶ Shah Beg remained in possession of the fort, and once or

1. *H. S.*, III, iii, 323-4; *C. U. Add.* 200, f. 96b. Bābur makes a brief reference to his abortive Qandahār expedition in his *Memoirs*, p. 249.

2. The *T. Ma'sūmī*, p. 107, says that Shah Beg, discussing his position with his counsellors, observed that he was caught between the devil and the deep sea, with Shah Ismā'īl on the one hand and Bābur on the other. They advised that he should personally go to the Shah and at the same time seek an understanding with Bābur. Two notables were, therefore, sent to Kābul.

3. *H. S.*, III, iv, p. 75; *Ah. T.*, pp. 124-5.

4. For details, see: *H. S.*, III, iv, p. 75; *Ma'sūmī*, pp. 108-9.

5. *H. S.*, III, iv, 75; *K. B.*, IV, f. 55b.

The statement in *C. U. Add.* 200, ff. 135b-6a, the *Nusakh-i Jahān Arā*, f. 112b and the *R. Safaviyya*, ff. 94b-5b, that Shah Beg made his submission to Shah Rukh Beg, read the *khutba* in the *Shi'a* fashion and struck coins in the name of Shah Ismā'īl, seems unconvincing. It is also reproduced in the *T. Alf*, f. 521b.

6. The *T. Ma'sūmī* gives an account of these years which, however, lacks authentic confirmation and whose chronology is positively wrong. According to it, Bābur made three attempts on Qandahār, in A.H. 920, 921 and 922; on the last of these occasions, Shah Beg promised to surrender the fort, and in 923/1517-18, the keys of the fort were made over to Bābur. *Ma'sūmī*, pp. 109-12. Actually the final occupation of Qandahār by Bābur took place five years later (see below).

twice he sent emissaries or envoys to Bābur. For a couple of years during this period Shah Beg's son, Mirza Shah Ḥasan, having quarrelled with his father, stayed at Bābur's court at Kābul.¹ Of Shah Beg's relations with Persia during this period (1512-19) we know practically nothing. Shah Ismā'il's worries on his western frontier and his defeat at Chāldīrān prevented aggression elsewhere.

Bābur is said to have thought of invading Qandahār when Shah Beg was imprisoned at Herāt, but preoccupation with affairs in Balkh and Badakhshān kept him away.² It was not till 926/1520 that he once again turned to Qandahār. He besieged the fort and occupied the whole of Garmsīr. Shah Beg, pressed hard, sent frantic appeals for help to Amīr Khan, who, as tutor of Ṭahmāsp Mirza, the viceroy of Khurāsān, was the real administrator of the province, and to Amīr Ghiyāthuddīn Muḥammad, the *Ṣadr* of Khurāsān and a friend of Bābur. Shah Beg offered to make a personal submission to Prince Ṭahmāsp and to pay annual tribute to Herāt. Amīr Khan was already feeling apprehensive at the prospect of Bābur's occupation of Qandahār. Moreover, the news of an Uzbek gathering at Bukhārā with a view to invade Herāt³ and of Bābur's siege of Qandahār reached Amīr Khan about the same time and so added to his worries. He, therefore, exerted all pressure on Bābur to raise the siege of Qandahār. He and Amīr Ghiyāthuddīn sent repeated messages to Bābur to the effect that though Shah Beg had been guilty of some offences in the past and had deserved punishment, now that he had made his submission and offered to pay annual tribute to Persia, Bābur must retire to Kabul. Bābur was not the prince to be beaten in subtle diplomacy: he replied that Shah Beg was only simulating submission and no reliance could be placed on his protestations; and that after conquering Qandahār he (Bābur) would send Shah Beg in chains to the Persian court and hand over Qandahār and Garmsīr to whomsoever the Shah named. This, of course, brought cold comfort to Amīr Khan: Bābur continued the siege.⁴

In Rajab 927/June 1521, Amīr Khan executed Amīr Ghiyāthuddīn Muḥammad, the influential and universally respected noble of Herāt and *Ṣadr* of Khurāsān, well-known to history as the patron of Khwand Amīr. Shah Ismā'il had shown him great favour and the notable part played by him in the defence of Herāt against the Uzbeks in early 927/1521 had added to his influence and prestige. So Amīr Khan grew jealous of him. The important point for us is that in order to get rid of him, Amīr Khan had to accuse him of complicity with Bābur, of having secretly invited Bābur from Qandahār (where he

1. *B. N.*, p. 395, and Translator's note, pp. 365-6, 429-30; *Ma'sūmī*, p. 111.

2. *Ma'sūmī*, p. 109.

3. The Uzbek invasion under 'Ubaidullah Khan took place in early 927/1521. *H. S.*, III, iv, p. 97; *Ah. T.*, p. 171; *Ghulām Sarwar*, p. 92.

4. *H. S.*, III, iv, pp. 96-7; *Ah. T.*, pp. 169-70; *C. U. Add.* 200, f. 173a.

was besieging Shah Beg) with a view to handing over Herāt to him. A letter was also produced to that effect, purporting to be written by Amīr Ghiyāthud-dīn to Bābur. Having disposed of Amīr Ghiyāthud-dīn, Amīr Khan set out towards Qandahār "to make away with Bābur as well"¹ (Rajab 927/June, 1521). The late Amīr's friendship with Bābur was well known and Amīr Khan used it as a shield for his own crime. Shah Ismā'il was, however, too shrewd a man to be taken in by these fantastic charges and too strong a ruler to condone such high-handed action. He appointed two powerful nobles, Durmish Khan Shāmlū and Zainal Khan to take over Herāt from Amīr Khan and to send him to the court. The two nobles used threats, persuasion and cajolery to keep Amīr Khan from proceeding to Qandahār. Durmish Khan and Sām Mirza replaced Amīr Khan and Ṭahmāsp Mirza in the administration of Khurāsān. Amīr Khan's illness and death in the following year saved him from probable execution.²

Shah Beg now appealed to Durmish Khan. The Khan sent Saifuddīn Muẓaffar Beg from Sabzwār to Bābur with a message that he had restrained Amīr Khan from proceeding with large forces to Qandahār, and now hoped that Bābur too would march back to Kābul to enable Shah Beg to come to the Shah's court to make his submission. The message ended with a veiled threat that non-compliance with the request would change friendship into hostility.³

It was not possible for Bābur to ignore Durmish Khan's request and threat. Qandahār showed no sign of surrender after a blockade of nearly two years. The appearance of a Persian force would have forced Bābur to beat retreat and lose face. So he complied with the Khan's demand. In Rabi' I 928/February 1522 Muẓaffar Beg returned with the happy news. This greatly elated Durmish Khan and he sent Tājuddīn Ḥasan Chalabī, a noted scholar, on a friendly mission to Kābul, in Jumādā II 928/May 1522.⁴

At Qandahār events took an entirely unexpected turn. Shah Beg had been shut in the fort for a long period and was impatient to get out. There is some evidence that he realised the impossibility of maintaining himself permanently at Qandahār, with both Bābur and the Safavids against him.⁵ He left the fort in charge of his servant, Maulānā 'Abdul Bāqī, and himself retired towards the Indus. It is interesting to note that this act was regarded by the Khurāsān authorities as a violation of Shah Beg's promise to present himself

1. *T. A. M.*, f. 49a.

2. *H. S.*, III, iv., pp. 95-101; *C. U. Add.* 200, ff. 176a-79b and 180b-81a; *Nusakh-i Jahān Arā*, f. 144a; *T. Alfī*, f. 531b-32a.

3. *H. S.*, III, iv, p. 101; *C. U. Add.* 200, f. 172b.

4. *H. S.*, III, iv, p. 103.

5. See remarks ascribed to Shah Beg, *Ma'jūmī*, pp. 107, 110; Ataki, f. 75a; also see p. 15 n. 2 above.

at Herāt.¹ Maulānā 'Abdul Bāqī sent a fast messenger to Bābur requesting him to come and take over Qandahār. No explanation of this very strange behaviour of the Maulānā is given. Shah Beg, we are told, had written off Qandahār,² and the Maulānā presumably knew it. Bābur soon arrived to take possession of the fort and appointed his second son, Mirza Kāmran, as its governor. He despatched envoys to Herāt to communicate the news of his "victory". They arrived at Herāt in Jumādā II 928/May 1522. A little later Bābur ceremoniously dismissed Ḥasan Chalabī and appointed Mirza Qulī, a trusted servant, to accompany him to Herāt, where they arrived in Sha'bān 928/July 1522. It is significant that, in spite of what went before, Durmish Khan received Bābur's envoy, Mirza Qulī, favourably.³ The authorities at Herāt thus easily reconciled themselves to Bābur's occupation of Qandahār.

SEC. III: BĀBUR AND SHAH ṬAHMĀSP

In Rajab 930/May 1524, Shah Ismā'īl died and was succeeded by his eldest son Ṭahmāsp. Two years after this, Bābur conquered Delhi and Āgra and became the emperor of Hindustan. He used this occasion to display his instinct of generosity and bestowed rewards on all and sundry. He also sent presents to some people in Khurāsān and 'Irāq (western Persia).⁴ This consideration for his well-wishers in Persia reflects his desire to remain on friendly terms with that country which was his most powerful neighbour. Bābur's undiminished interest in his ancestral dominions also made it desirable for him to remain on the best of terms with the Safavids.

Some time after Ṭahmāsp's accession Bābur sent an ambassador named Khwājagī Asad to congratulate him.⁵ The envoy returned towards the end of Šafar 933/December 1526 in company with Shah Ṭahmāsp's representative,

1. *H. S.*, III, iv, p. 103.

2. *Ma'sūmī*, pp. 110-12.

3. *H. S.*, III, iv, p. 103; *Ah. T.*, pp. 169-70.

The date of Bābur's occupation of Qandahār, according to an inscription in the fort, is 13 Shawwāl 928/6 Sept. 1522, *B. N.*, I, p. 436 and II, Appendix J. Khwand Amīr was, however, himself at Herāt and was writing his account strictly contemporaneously; his chronology for contemporary events is elaborate and reliable. The inscription, as Mrs. Beveridge has pointed out, was set up several years later (*B. N.*, App. J., p. xxxiv).

Ma'sūmī, pp. 110-11, gives an entirely different account of these events. According to him, the fort was handed over to Bābur in accordance with an agreement concluded between the representatives of Shah Beg and Bābur. For a detailed discussion of the point, see M. H. Siddiqi, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

4. *A. N.*, I, p. 99; *Tab. Ak.*, II, 17; *Badāyūnī*, I, 337.

5. *B. N.*, p. 540; *Firishta*, I, p. 385; his full name is given by Bābur as Nizāmuddīn Khwājagī Asad Jāndār. *B. N.*, p. 566, also p. 150. Curiously enough, Bābur continues to call Ṭahmāsp as Shāhzāda even after his accession. See Mrs. Beveridge's comment on this, *B. N.*, p. 635n.

a Turkmān by the name of Sulaimān Āqā, with gifts including two Circassian slave girls who "became recognised ladies of the royal *harem*".¹

Sulaimān Āqā's presence at the battle of Kānwā (Jumādā II 935/March 1527) on the right wing of Humāyūn Mirza's army is noted by Bābur in his Memoirs; Khwājagī Asad was on the left wing. Two months later Khwājagī Asad was again despatched with gifts as envoy to Shah Ṭahmāsp, and Sulaimān Āqā accompanied him back to Persia.² It would have appeared singularly opportune to Bābur that both could give an eye-witness account of his epoch-making victory at Kānwā against the great Rājput chief, Rānā Sāngā.

There is no specific mention of diplomatic intercourse with Persia for the next two years, but one can see from the references in the Memoirs that Bābur kept himself in touch with affairs on that side. In Ṣafār 935/November 1528, he was pleased to learn from Kāmrān Mirza in Kābul about Shah Ṭahmāsp's belligerent attitude towards the Uzbegs.³ Three weeks later he received a full report brought by a fast messenger from Humāyūn Mirza in Badakhshān, of Shah Ṭahmāsp's great victory over the combined armies of almost all the leading Uzbek chiefs.⁴ The battle was fought in Muḥarram 935/September 1528 and is famous as the battle of Jām. Ṭahmāsp was then fourteen years old, the same age at which his illustrious father laid the foundation of the Safavid dynasty. A month later Bābur heard another account of this battle from a soldier who had fought in it.⁵ The repetition one after another, of these various accounts of the same event in the Memoirs, indicates Babur's very active interest in the Khurāsān-Turān region.

Evidently Bābur was watching events there from the angle of his own imperial and dynastic interests. Within five days of receiving a full report of the battle of Jām from Humāyūn's messenger, he sent in return by the same messenger a long letter to him. The following extracts are relevant to our purpose:

"... May He (i.e., God) now order our affairs by His own mercy and favour; not in many decades comes such a chance as this! ... Kāmrān and the Kābul Begs have orders to join thee; this done, move on Ḥiṣār, Samarqand, Herī or to whatever side favours fortune... Thank God! now is your time to risk life and slash swords. Neglect not the work chance has brought. . ."⁶

The chance emphasised here refers to the defeat of the Uzbegs at Jām. But the inclusion of Herāt (Herī) among the possible objectives is intriguing. For

1. *B. N.*, p. 540; p. 712 (translator's note); Firishṭa, I, p. 385.

2. *B. N.*, p. 566.

3. *B. N.*, p. 618.

4. *B. N.*, p. 622f.

5. *B. N.*, 625; for Ṭahmāsp's embassy to Bābur to report the victory, see below.

6. *B. N.*, p. 625. The letter was despatched on 14 Rabī' I 935/26 Nov. 1528.

an advance on Herāt would have meant war with Persia at a time when the prestige of her arms was very high. Perhaps the mention of Herāt indicates the influence of the presence of Baiqarā princes at Bābur's court.¹ Two and a half months later we find Bābur writing to Kāmrān Mirza, Governor of Kābul and Qandahār, "about taking the best care in the intercourse with the Shāh-zāda" (i.e., Ṭahmāsp).² The import of this injunction is not clear. Mrs. Beveridge has suggested that it might have been prompted by "a doubt in Bābur's mind as to Kāmrān's behaviour, perhaps, e.g. in manifesting dislike for a Shī'a".³ Kāmrān Mirza, it may be remembered, was well-known for his extreme orthodoxy (of which more later). It is equally likely that Bābur's advice had no sectarian significance and aimed simply at making Kāmrān more careful in his relations with his powerful neighbour.

Towards the end of 1528, it may be noted here, Humāyūn Mirza advanced in the direction of Tūrān and occupied Ḥiṣār.⁴ Bābur advised him to halt further advance, with the intent of himself proceeding there when the situation in India had cleared up.⁵ In any case Humāyūn had soon to fall back, for the Uzbegs were once again on the offensive. Shah Ṭahmāsp, immediately after his victory at Jām, had to hasten westward to deal with trouble at Baghdād. This gave heart to the Uzbegs and a few months later in the same year (935/1529) they reappeared in great force and reoccupied Mashhad and Herāt.⁶ The tide had once again turned in their favour. Bābur had to abandon the idea of making a renewed bid for his hereditary dominions in Tūrān.⁷

Embassy from Ṭahmāsp

It appears that Shah Ṭahmāsp, soon after the battle of Jām, arranged to send Bābur an official account of the great Persian victory. The Persian ambassador-in-chief, Ḥasan Chalabī [Chelebi], was delayed for some reason, but an advance party including the ambassador's younger brother arrived at Bābur's court; its presence is first noted in the account of a great feast given by Bābur on 6 Rabī' II 935/18 December 1528. On 15 Jumādā I 935/25 January 1529, Ḥasan Chalabī himself arrived. A fortnight later Bābur sent a letter to

1. For Muḥammad Zamān Mirza Baiqarā, see above. For Muḥammad Sultan Mirza Baiqarā and other Baiqarās at Bābur's court, see references in the *B. N.*, pp. 265, 397, 458, etc.

2. *B. N.*, p. 645. The letter was dated 30 Jumādā I 935/9 Feb. 1529.

3. *B. N.*, 645 n.

4. *B. N.*, pp. 639-40. The news reached Bābur on 5 Jumādā I 935/15 Jan. 1529.

5. *A. N.*, I, p. 113.

6. *Ah. T.*, p. 220.

7. *A. N.*, I, p. 113.

Ṭahmasp "accepting the excuse for the belated arrival of Ḥasan Chalabī."¹

We are quite in the dark about the import of this embassy and its influence on Bābur's relations with the Shah. All that can be pointed out here is that it was a fortnight after Ḥasan Chalabī's arrival that Bābur sent his instruction to Kāmṛān about being very careful in his relations with Shah Ṭahmāsp. For the remaining two years of Bābur's life we have no information about his relations with the Shah. His *Memoirs* practically terminate at the close of A.H. 935.² All other sources are silent on the subject.

1. Mrs. Beveridge has suggested in a footnote (*B.N.*, 630n) that Bābur had recorded full details about this embassy, but the record has "been lost in one or more of the gaps in his diary of 935 A.H." No other source says anything about this embassy. The account given here is a reconstruction from the casual references in the *Memoirs*. *B.N.*, pp. 630-32, 641, 649.

2. Only five lines of the *Memoirs* of 936/Sept. 1529 have survived. See *B.N.*, pp. 690-91.

CHAPTER III

HUMĀYŪN AND SHAH ṬAHMĀSP

SEC. I : KĀMRĀN MIRZA AND PERSIA

ON Bābur's death in Jumādā I 937/December 1530, his eldest son Humāyūn ascended the throne of India. But the border provinces of Kābul and Qandahār remained in the hands of Humāyūn's half-brother Kāmrān Mirza, who soon after Bābur's death extended his power as far as Lahore. Kāmrān was technically a governor, but for all practical purposes was an independent ruler and struck coins at Kābul in his own name.¹ Hence it was Kāmrān who was the next-door neighbour of Iran. For a decade after Bābur's death the Persians had to deal with Kāmrān and not with Humāyūn. Perhaps it was fortunate for the Mughul Empire to have Kāmrān Mirza as an independent warden of its western marches. For while the Empire in India, in spite of its rapid extension to Gujarāt and Bengal, was actually in gradual process of dissolution under Humāyūn's inept leadership, Kāmrān held the line firmly against the Persians.

In the year 941/1534-5 Sām Mirza, brother of Shah Ṭahmāsp, was Viceroy of Khurāsān. Aghzīvar Khan Shāmlū was his tutor and the actual administrator of the province. Aghzīvar Khan's own protector and patron, Hasan Khan Shāmlū, the leading figure of the powerful Shāmlū clan, was done away with by Shah Ṭahmāsp, for reasons which are irrelevant to our study. Aghzīvar Khan felt apprehensive of meeting a similar fate. Choosing the course earlier attempted by Amīr Khan (see above), he took Sām Mirza with him and marched on Qandahār with the intention of seizing and using it as his stronghold and refuge. Kāmrān Mirza's deputy in Qandahār, Khawāja Kalān, who came from a family with a long and creditable record in the service of Bābur and his forbears, defended the fort stoutly and wrote to

1. R. B. Whitehead, *Catalogue of Coins in the Panjab Museum, Lahore*, Oxford, 1914, vol. II, p. 17; also White King, *Mughal Coins*, London, 1896, p. 5.

Kāmṛān for help. The Mirza, acting energetically, marched with a strong force from Lahore via Kābul and soon appeared outside Qandahār. Aghzīvar Khan retreated and was pursued by Kāmṛān and Khwāja Kalān. The ensuing encounter resulted in a complete victory for the Mughuls. Aghzīvar Khan was killed and Sām Mirza retreated crest-fallen to Herāt. The Safavid accounts attribute the failure of the expedition to its having been undertaken without royal permission. Sām Mirza who professed to take the same view, accused his advisers of misguiding him and sent the heads of a few of them to the Shah with a petition for his own pardon.¹

Though Sām Mirza and Aghzīvar Khan's premeditated attack on Qandahār was in reality an act of rebellion, Shah Ṭahmāsp did not relish their defeat by the Mughuls and took it as an affront to the might of Persia. So he decided to punish the Mughuls for their daring. So keenly did the Shah feel the affront that he refused the offer of his nobles to undertake the campaign and took personal command of the punitive expedition.² Moreover the Shah intended to conquer and annex the whole region of Qandahār, Zamīn-Dāwar, Garmsīr and other neighbouring areas.³ He arrived at Herāt and set out from there with a force of seven to eight thousand *qurchis*⁴ for Qandahār (Dhul Q. 943/April 1537).⁵ Khwāja Kalān felt himself incapable of facing the Persian army under the personal command of the Shah and decided to withdraw. Mirza Haider Dughlāt, who was then at Lahore and was in close touch with Kāmṛān's affairs, says, "Mir Khwāja Kalān was not able to put the fort in a state to withstand a siege, on account of the numbers and the strength of Shah Ṭahmāsp's army, and also because, having the year before sustained a siege of eight months, his ammunition and other necessities were

1. Amīr Maḥmūd and M. Haider Dughlāt give detailed and well-informed accounts. *T.A.M.*, ff. 68a-69b, 72b-73b; *T.R.*, pp. 468-9; *Ah.T.*, pp. 260-3, (places the battle inaccurately in 941); *Af.T.*, ff. 84a-5a; *A.N.*, I, p. 135; *Tab.Ak.*, II, p. 40; *Badāyūnī*, I, p. 345; *Mujmal*, ff. 43a-b; *R. Šafaviyya*, ff. 161a-3a (gives a detailed account); *T. Dilkushā*, ff. 443a-b; *T. Alfī*, f. 562a. According to the *Khulāṣa-i Maqāl*, f. 98a, the Mughuls did not pursue the defeated force as they looked upon the Persian venture as an unauthorised raid by disloyal Persians. Lahaurī, II, i, pp. 46-7, alone says (inaccurately, of course) that Sām Mirza had been sent by Shah Ṭahmāsp to conquer Qandahār.

2. *T.A.M.*, f. 81b.

3. *R. Šafaviyya*, ff. 173a-b.

4. "The *qurchis* constituted a standing corps of troops . . . who represented the old tribal cavalry. They looked like walking arsenals, armed as they were with bows, lances, swords, daggers and battle-axes, and with shield as a protective weapon." Their original headdress was the *tāj*, "but on expeditions they wore helmets with mail protectors down their cheeks. Long moustache was a characteristic feature of the *qurchis*". V. Minorsky, *T.M.*, Intr., p. 32.

Professor Naṣrullah Falsafī (*Shah 'Abbās-i Awwal*, I, pp. 207-8) has a very good note on the *qurchis*. According to him, "the *qurchis* were the highest and the most trustworthy cadre of the *Qizilbāsh*, for the Shah selected them from among the senior *Qizilbāsh* for his personal security and service."

5. *T.A.M.*, ff. 81a-b; *Ah.T.*, pp. 288-9.

exhausted. Moreover, he entertained no hope of Kāmrān Mirza coming to his relief".¹

Khawāja Kalān ceremoniously surrendered the keys of the fort to Shah Ṭahmāsp with a polite message, excusing himself from personal attendance.² He retreated via Thatta and Uch to Lahore where Kāmrān refused to see him for a month. The Shah had the *khutba* read and the *sikka* struck in his name and in the name of the *Imāms*. Zamīn-Dāwar and the other territories attached to Qandahār also passed under Persian control. The Shah appointed Budāgh Khan Qāchār as governor of Qandahār and left for Herāt. His success in annexing the highly prized fortress did not pass unnoticed in Transoxiana. The Persian chronicles speak, with their wonted exaggeration, of tremors in Tūrān from Ṭahmāsp's resounding victory. 'Ubaidullah Khan and other Uzbek chiefs sent envoys to the Shah at Herāt in an evident attempt to placate him and keep him from turning in their direction.³

The contemporary Persian chronicles, while giving an elaborate account of Shah Ṭahmāsp's capture of Qandahār, omit to mention or skip over its unpleasant sequel, that is, Kāmrān Mirza's recovery of the fort.⁴ Kāmrān left his Indian possessions in the hands of Mirza Ḥaidar Dughlāt and marched off to Qandahār.⁵ The Persians suffered a defeat and fell back. All the territory up to the river Helmand once again passed into Kāmrān's hands (944/1537-8). Shah Ṭahmāsp wanted to march to Qandahār again, but the tension on his western frontier and the troubles in Ādharbāijān allowed him no respite.⁶ Qandahār remained firmly in Kāmrān's hands⁷ till it was wrested from him by Humāyūn with Persian help in 952/1545. It is interesting to note that Humāyūn during his visit to Shah Ṭahmāsp apologised for Kāmrān Mirza's folly in fighting against the Persians over Qandahār.

SEC. II : HUMĀYŪN IN IRAN

For the first thirteen years of Humāyūn's reign, i.e., from 1530 to 1543, we have no record of relations between him and Shah Ṭahmāsp. The few tantalizing references relating to this period actually occur in the accounts of events after 1543, and will be more appropriately noted subsequently. Suffice

1. *T.R.*, pp. 468-9.

2. *A.N.*, I, p. 125; *Tab.Ak.*, II, p. 40; *Mujmal*, f. 43a-b. According to Badāyūnī, II, pp. 347-8, Ṭahmāsp praised Khawāja Kalān's wisdom and good sense. The Persian chronicles have nothing of this and say that the Khawāja fled away, leaving the fort in the hands of subordinates who surrendered it to the Shah. See f.n. below for references.

3. *T.A.M.*, ff. 81a-82b; *Ah.T.*, pp. 288-9; *Jahān Arā* f. 152a; *A.A.A.*, pp. 48-9.

4. The *Af.T.*, f. 99b and the *A.A.A.*, p. 69 briefly mention it.

5. *T.R.*, p. 469.

6. *Af.T.*, f. 99b; *A.N.*, I, p. 136; *T.R.*, pp. 468-9; *A.A.A.*, 69.

7. Except for a short period when Prince Hindāl occupied the fort. *A.N.*, I, p. 200, tr., I, p. 408.

it to note here that, judging from the tone of these references, Humāyūn did not care to cultivate friendly relations with what he was inclined to consider a power inferior to the Mughuls.

Within a period of less than twelve months, June 1539-May 1540, Humāyūn suffered two decisive defeats at Chausa and Qanauj, and lost his throne to his able Afghān adversary, Sher Shah Sūrī.¹ With the complex tissue of ensuing events and Humāyūn's wanderings in Sind and the sandy desert of Western Rājputāna, we are not concerned. It is, however, interesting to note that, according to Firishṭa, many Mughul nobles deserted Humāyūn after his defeat on the ground that he showed excessive favour to individual Shiite Persians.² By the middle of 1543, Humāyūn had abandoned hope of finding quarter in India. Before proceeding to Persia as a last resort, he decided to make an attempt on Qandahār. The fort was in the dominion of Kāmṛān Mirza, and in the immediate charge of 'Askarī Mirza, half-brother of Humāyūn and full brother of Kāmṛān. Humāyūn proceeded via Shāl (Quetta) and encamped at Mastang.³ 'Askarī, under Kāmṛān's order, intended to apprehend the Emperor, ignoring the advice of some of his counsellors who warned him against this course, 'lest His Majesty should grow desperate and out of dire necessity proceed to Persia, and lest great calamities should occur'.⁴ Humāyūn was, however, warned just in time by one of 'Askarī's own men.⁵ He fled from Mastang with his wife Ḥamīda Bānō,⁶ leaving their infant son Akbar at the abandoned camp (Ramaḍān 950/December 1543).

Prolonged misfortune had made Humāyūn despondent of his future and the idea of abandoning all worldly ambitions had already crossed his mind. Fortunately his old friend and faithful noble, Bairam Beg Bahārlū (later Bairam Khan) had, at great personal risk, joined him in Sind in Muḥarram 950/April 1543, when Humāyūn's fortunes were looking very forlorn and when a large number of his followers and relatives had deserted him.⁷ Bairam, whose forbears had been closely connected with Persia and who was himself a Shī'a, advised Humāyūn at this juncture to proceed to that country.⁸ The *Akbar*

1. For details, see *A.N.*, I, pp. 163-69; Banerji, *Humayun Badshah*, I, pp. 228-49.

2. Firishṭa, I, p. 424.

3. Thirty miles s.s.w. of Quetta. *A.N.* (Tr.), I, p. 390n.

4. *A.N.* (Tr.), I, p. 390; *M.R.*, I, p. 563.

5. His name is given as Chūbī Bahādur or Jī Bahādur Uzbek. For other variations and for a full discussion, see Hodivala, *Studies in Indo-Muslim History*, p. 510.

6. For Ḥamīda Bānō Begum, see Mrs. Beveridge's interesting notice, Gulbadan, p. 237-41. Banerji (II, p. 34) and Ray (p. 37) have both described Ḥamīda Bānō as Shī'a, without, however, adducing any authority. No evidence supporting this view directly or indirectly has so far come to our notice.

7. *A.N.*, I, pp. 185-6; Atakī, f. 79a; *M.R.*, II, 13-17; also Jauhar, f. 58a.

8. *M.R.*, I, p. 575.

Nāma states that Humāyūn turned to Persia with the intention of proceeding to Mecca. There can be little doubt, however, that his first objective was to obtain help from the Shah. Subsequent accounts in the *Akbar Nāma* contain a clear indication to that effect.¹

With less than fifty men² in his train, Humāyūn marched towards the Persian border. To this faithful band of followers Humāyūn gave the title of *chūlis*.³ From Garmsīr, which then formed part of Kāmran Mirza's dominion, Humāyūn wrote his first letter to the Shah on the advice of Bairam Beg and other counsellors.⁴ The letter, unlike most royal letters of our period, is brief and to the point. Humāyūn therein describes his unhappy state and expresses his desire to go to the Shah.⁵ The letter was despatched in Shawwāl 950/Dec. 1543-Jan. 1544. The letter, it may be remembered, was sent before Humāyūn had set foot on Persian territory.⁶ Evidently he did not want to enter the Shah's dominion without his permission, but news of pursuit by 'Askari's men forced him at once to leave Garmsīr and cross over into the Persian province of Sistān.⁷

Aḥmad Sultan Shāmlū, the Persian governor of Sistān, invited the fugitive King to the capital and went out with the notables to receive him. The governor lodged him in his own house and sent his women-folk to look after Ḥamīda Bānō Begum.⁸ Immediately after Humāyūn's arrival, Aḥmad Sultan sent this report to Sultan Muḥammad Mirza, son of the Shah and

1. *A.N.*, I, pp. 191-2, 203; also see: Gulbadan, p. 68, tr., 168; *M.R.*, I, pp. 574-5, II, pp. 16-17; *Tab.Ak.*, II, p. 58; Bāyazīd, pp. 2, 3, 8.

2. The number of Humāyūn's followers is given variously from twenty to seventy. Jauhar's figure, forty-two persons including two women, which he gives on the personal authority of Humāyūn himself, seems to be the most reliable. A number of men joined Humāyūn subsequently. Jauhar, f. 64b; also see: *T.A.M.*, f. 91a; Gulbadan, tr., p. 166; Bāyazīd, pp. 4-7; *A.N.*, I, pp. 221-4; Ray, p. 3n.

3. *Chūli*, literally, belonging to the desert (*chūl*); here it signifies those who accompanied Humāyūn through the desert.

4. The author of the *A.N.* and of the *M.R.* each gives credit to his respective patron's father. Sarhindī and the *Mujmal* ascribe it to all the nobles. *A.N.*, I, p. 202; *M.R.*, I, p. 575, II, 17-18; *Mujmal*, f. 63a; Sarhindī, f. 59b.

5. The earliest text of the letter is given in the *T.I.N.S.*, f. 58b; the B.M. MS. of Jauhar mentions the letter without giving the text, but some other MSS. of Jauhar give the text, which was probably inserted later. The letter also appears in several collections of correspondence. For a standard critical text of the letter, see Ray, pp. 63-6, translation on pp. 5-6. Also see Calendar No. H. 6.

6. Ray, p. 64, has marshalled all the evidence on the question as to whether the letter was despatched from Sind (*T.I.N.S.* f. 58a) or from Garmsīr (*A.N.*, I, 203) or from Sistān in Persia (Jauhar, f. 65b). The text of the letter itself mentions Humāyūn's arrival in Sind. The letter may have been drafted in Sind, but was probably despatched from Garmsīr.

7. *A.N.*, I, pp. 203-4.

8. Bāyazīd, p. 9; *T.A.M.*, f. 90b; Jauhar, f. 65b-66a; Sarhindī, f. 59b; *Ah. T.*, p. 308; *A.N.*, I, p. 204.

Viceroy of Khurāsān, and to Muḥammad Khan Sharafuddīn Iwāghlī [Evoghlu] Taklū, the tutor of the Prince and the actual administrator of the province: Humāyūn with less than fifty ill-equipped followers had come to seek the Shah's help and should, if the Viceroy approved, be conducted to Herāt and thence to the Shah's court.¹ Muḥammad Khan immediately sought royal approval which was forthwith given.² Presently Humāyūn's courier reached the royal court.³ The Shah was overjoyed to receive Humāyūn's letter. Ṭahmāsp, it may be remembered, was the second ruler of his dynasty; he was greatly elated to find that the erstwhile Emperor of India, the seventh lineal descendant of the great Tīmūr, had come to take refuge in his realm and to seek his aid. The Shah had clearly an eye on the propaganda value of the event, as is evident from his *farmān* regarding Humāyūn's reception.⁴ He ordered the beating of drums for three days. To Humāyūn he sent a most considerate and polite reply, expressing his very keen desire to see his royal guest.⁵

Ṭahmāsp also issued a *farmān* to Muḥammad Khan regarding the arrangements for Humāyūn's reception. Copies of this *farmān* were sent to the governor of Sistān and to all governors through whose provinces Humāyūn was to pass on his way to the then Persian capital, Qazvin.⁶ The *farmān* is a most interesting document. It contains more than two thousand words, and may very well be the most elaborate order of its kind ever issued.⁷ The

1. *T.A.M.*, ff. 90b-91a.

2. *T.A.M.*, f. 91b; *Af.T.*, f. 117b. The *R. Ṣafaviyya* (f. 187a-b), written seventy to ninety years after the events, describes how Shah Ṭahmāsp called a council of nobles to deliberate on Humāyūn's reception. After the nobles had expressed their views, the Shah made a speech saying that Humāyūn should be received in a unique manner that would ever after be talked of in the assembly of kings. While there is nothing unlikely in this account, the evidence lacks corroboration.

3. *Af.T.*, f. 121; *A.A.A.*, p. 74.

4. See text of Ṭahmāsp's *farmān*, Ray, p. 70. The point is repeatedly emphasised in the *farmān*. Also see Ṭahmāsp's reply to Humāyūn's second letter. Ray, p. 78, tr., pp. 17-18. See *Tadh.* Ṭahmāsp for his boastful reference to his help to Humāyūn; also Ṭahmāsp's letter to Sultan Sulaimān I, see summary, p. 36 below.

5. For a standard critical text of Ṭahmāsp's reply, see Ray, pp. 67-8, English tr., p. 10. Calendar No. H. 7. The letter recalls Bābur's soliciting Shah Ismā'īl I for succour.

6. Bāyazid, p. 18; *A.N.*, I, p. 208.

7. The *farmān* appears in several chronicles and collections of correspondence. There are two main texts of the *farmān*: the one appears in Bāyazid (pp. 11-31) which he transcribed from the Mughul Department of Records in 1000/1592, and which has been copied with some variations by the Mughul historians including Abul Faḍl (*A.N.*, I, pp. 206-13; Tr. pp. 418-31); and the other in the *Afḍalut Tawārikh* f. 117b-21b. In substance there is much that is common to both the versions, but the variations are so many as to make them in parts look like two distinct documents. The text in Bāyazid and Abul Faḍl is also somewhat longer and much more elaborate on certain points, e.g., the titles of Humāyūn; it comprises approximately 2500 words.

instructions cover such details as the number of dishes to be served to the royal guest, the names and ingredients of the sweet dishes and *sherbets*, and the number of the robes of honour. It contains detailed directions regarding Humāyūn's reception at Herāt and how prince Sultan Muḥammad Mirza, only ten years old,¹ was to bear himself on the great occasion. Humāyūn was to be shown, among other things, the buildings of Sultan Ḥusain Mirza Baiqarā. 'In every shop and bazaar,' ran the order, 'where carpets and cloths shall be spread in order, women and maidens will be seated, and, as is the custom in that city, the women will engage in pleasant sayings and doings with the comers and goers.'² The *farmān* directed Muḥammad Khan to send daily reports regarding Humāyūn's reception, and threatened punishment for any one showing the slightest slackness in carrying out the instructions.³

Humāyūn now moved from Sīstān to the historic city of Herāt (Dhul-Q. 950/Feb. 1544), the former capital of the Baiqarā Timurids, which he was so eager to see.⁴ He received a right royal reception and was lodged in the palace of the grand-daughter of Sultan Ḥusain Mirza Baiqarā.⁵ A grand banquet was held in his honour by Muḥammad Khan and Sultan Muḥammad Mirza. The *Tārīkh-i-Amīr Maḥmūd* gives a full contemporary account⁶ of the occasion and the description fully accords with the elaborate instructions of the Shah's *farmān*. The propaganda value of Humāyūn's visit was fully capitalised. Humāyūn, too, enjoyed his sojourn at Herāt and prolonged it till the Naurūz (New Year) festival in March 1544. At the official Naurūz ceremony, he presided as a King and received presents from nobles and officials.⁷

Humāyūn left Herāt towards the end of March 1544, after writing a second letter to the Shah asking permission to visit Mashhad in order to pay homage to the shrine of Imām 'Alī b. Mūsā al-Riḍā (more popularly, Imām

According to Rieu (*Supp.*, p. 38), "The author [of *Af.T.*] appears to have had access to state papers. He frequently quotes royal letters, farmāns of investiture, and bulletins in extenso." It is, therefore, likely that the *Af.T.* version is closer to the original text than that of Bāyazīd and Abul Faḍl, and that the *munshīs* of Akbar's Record Department touched up the document with a view to magnify the importance of their patron's royal father. Also see Calendar No. H. 8.

The *Afḍalut Tawārīkh* text of the *farmān* is given by Ray, pp. 69-74. Muḥammad Mushīrī, 'Panāhindagī-i Humāyūn...' *Vahīd* (Monthly, Tihiran), Shahrivar 1348/Sept. 1969, pp. 778-91, gives the text of the *farmān* along with an introductory note.

1. *Af.T.*, f. 122a.

2. This occurs in the *Akbar Nāma's* version but not in the *Af.T.*'s. Bāyazīd's text gives this a little differently. The translation is Beveridge's (I, pp. 428-9), except that we have put 'custom' in place of 'rule'.

3. We have chosen only a few points from the *farmān* to illustrate its elaborate character.

4. Bāyazīd, pp. 10, 31; *A.N.*, I, p. 205.

5. *T.A.M.*, f. 91b.

6. *T.A.M.*, ff. 91a-92b.

7. *Af.T.*, ff. 122b-23a; *A.N.*, I, p. 214. We have avoided giving a more detailed account of Humāyūn's reception at Herāt for reasons of space. The details can be read in the *A.N.*, I, pp. 213-14, tr. pp. 432-4 and in Ray, pp. 10-13.

Riḍā), the eighth Imām of the Twelver Shi'as.¹ The letter was so drafted as to propitiate the goodwill of Shah Ṭahmāsp by pandering to his sectarian prejudices. The Shah, greatly pleased, gave him permission in a polite letter.² So from Herāt Humāyūn proceeded via Jām³ to Mashhad, where he showed the greatest reverence to the famous shrine.⁴ While at Mashhad, he received a letter from the Shah asking him to proceed to Qazvīn to see him. Humāyūn left Mashhad towards the end of Šafar 951/May 1544. At Nishāpur and Sabzwār he was received and entertained by the local authorities with great ceremony.⁵ As desired by the Shah, Humāyūn sent Bairam Beg ahead.⁶ Bairam presented himself at the Shah's summer quarters at Sulṭāniya.⁷ He discussed with the Shah certain matters relating to Humāyūn's visit.⁸ Ṭahmāsp commanded him to cut off his hair and put on the *tāj*.⁹ Bairam Beg excused himself from compliance on the ground that he could not do so without his master's permission. This greatly incensed the Shah, who as a broad hint to Bairam Beg, ordered some heretics¹⁰ to be brought and executed before them forthwith. It is likely that the incident left the Shah displeased, for soon after this he issued a letter to Humāyūn asking him to stay where he was until summoned.¹¹

1. For further details, see Curzon, *Persia*, I, p. 148f; *Enc. Islam*, articles on Meshhed (wherein the town is described as "The greatest place of pilgrimage for the Shi'is in Persia") and on 'Alī b. Riḍā.

2. Humāyūn's letter and the Shah's reply appear in several chronicles and collections of correspondence. For a critical text, see Ray, pp. 75-9, tr., 15-18. Calendar Nos. H. 9 and H. 10. The *M.R.*, II, p. 18, speaks of a letter from the Shah to Bairam Beg as well.

3. The famous Shaikh Aḥmad of Jām (fl. in the later half of the XIth and the first half of the XIIth centuries A.D.) is identified by Abul Faḍl as the ancestor of Humāyūn's mother, Māham Begum, as well as of his wife, Hamida Bānō. See *A.N.*, I, p. 18, and Beveridge's f.n. on p. 52.

4. Jauhar, f. 67a-b, gives an anecdotal account of Humāyūn's visit to Mashhad.

5. Jauhar, ff. 67a-68a; *A.N.*, I, p. 215; *Af.T.*, f. 123a.

6. The entry in the *Dhakhiratul Khawānīn*, I (Karachi, 1961), p. 12, that Bairam was despatched from Pushang (Pishin) is evidently incorrect.

7. *A.N.*, I, pp. 215-16; *A.A.A.*, p. 75; Jauhar places the interview at Qazvīn, and Bāyazīd, p. 32, at Zanjan.

8. *M.R.*, I, p. 590; this work gives a rather exaggerated account of Bairam's reception at the Shah's court.

9. "This *tāj* of red velvet was shaped like a small kettle narrowing downwards; its sides formed twelve scallops in memory of the Twelve Imāms; in the centre of its top there was a point somewhat similar to a chess pawn." V. Minorsky, *T.M.*, Intr., p. 32, f.n. 3; also see Falsafi, *Shah Abbās I*, I, pp. 209-12; *J.R.A.S.*, 1897, pp. 114-17, letter of Sir A. Houtum-Schindler from Tehran.

10. The heretics here mentioned were the *Chiragh-kush* or the *Ibāḥatiyyas*, for which see the article on the *Ibāḥatiyyas* by Riazul Islam, *J.A.S.B.*, 1948, Part I, pp. 109-12.

11. Jauhar, f. 69b; the *Qisṣa*, f. 12a puts a fine gloss over it. The pleasant account of Bairam's interview with the Shah given in the *A.N.*, I, p. 216 and the *M.R.*, I, p. 590, can be dismissed as incorrect.

A little later Humāyūn received another letter from the Shah asking him to proceed to Qazvīn and thence to the court. After a three-day sojourn at Qazvīn, Humāyūn left for the Shah's camp in the evening. It was during the night-march that Bairam Beg arrived from his meeting with the Shah. Jauhar's minute account at this point again suggests a certain amount of strain in the relations of the two monarchs: Bairam submitted that the Emperor had come *too* near his destination; Humāyūn replied that it was impossible to go back. Evidently Bairam Beg was apprehensive lest the slight upsetting of the schedules of reception should annoy the Shah.¹ Next morning the representatives of the Shah, the nobles and the royal princes,² arrived to conduct Humāyūn to the Shah's camp. As he approached the camp, the nobles and the princes came forward to receive him. Sām Mirza,³ brother of the Shah, dismounted from his horse at a distance and Humāyūn reciprocated the courtesy. Bahrām Mirza, another brother of the Shah, came with a robe of honour and helped Humāyūn to put on the robe "excepting the *tāj*."⁴ The *tāj*, with its sectarian significance, was left out at this stage, presumably to spare the visiting king embarrassment, though, as we shall see presently, he was not spared for long. As he proceeded to the royal camp, he was met on the way by numerous men of all classes. This was probably by arrangement, and one can easily see the motive behind it. As Humāyūn approached the Shah's pavilion, he dismounted from the horse and walked. The Shah came to the edge of the carpet to receive him.⁵ He seated Humāyūn on his right on the throne, spoke kindly to him and made enquiries about his long journey. The Shah then proposed to Humāyūn to put on the *tāj*, to which he readily agreed,

1. Jauhar, ff. 69b-70a. His further account confirms that Humāyūn had marched a bit too rapidly.

2. Gulbadan's (p. 68; tr., p. 169) inclusion of Alqāš Mirza among the princes who came to receive Humāyūn is incorrect. See below.

3. Sām Mirza, born 923/1516, died 984/1576; author of *Tuḥfa-i Sāmī*. For details, see Rieu, p. 367.

4. Jauhar, ff. 70a-b.

5. The Venue and Date of the meeting: (a) Venue. The place of the meeting is difficult to determine. The only thing that can be said with certainty is that the Shah was encamping somewhere to the west of Qazvīn (which he had left before Humāyūn's arrival there) and to the east of the Takht-i Sulaimān (to which place the two monarchs moved after their first meeting). Jauhar, f. 69a, says nothing about the place of the meeting, except that the Shah had previously moved from Qazvīn to Chashma-i-Jūki-Jūki(?). Bāyazid, p. 32, mentions Zanjān (text has Zankān) as the place of the Shah's meeting with Humāyūn (and earlier with Bairam Beg). Ilāq [? prob. *Taylak* (Turkish)—summer quarters] Surlāq, written variously, is mentioned in the *Af.T.*, ff. 123b-24a, the *Tab.Ak.*, II, p. 60, the *A.A.A.*, p. 75, and other chronicles. The *A.N.*, I, p. 436 (tr.) says the meeting took place between Sulṭāniya and Abūhar.

(b) Date of the meeting: Jumādā I 951/July-August 1544. *A.N.*, I, p. 437 (tr.), *T. Ibrāhīmī*, ff. 237a-8b.

saying it was a *tāj* of honour for him.¹ Evidently he was trying to suggest that he was accepting the *tāj* rather as an honour than as a religious symbol which it undoubtedly was. Humāyūn in any case showed himself to be much more pliant than his own servant, Bairam Beg, who had earlier refused the *tāj* in spite of being himself a Shī'a. The fact that Shah Ṭahmāsp asked Humāyūn to don the *tāj* in their very first meeting indicates the importance attached by him to the conversion of his royal guest.

Humāyūn retired to his apartment after paying a brief visit to Bahrām Mirza's house. Next morning he found the Shah cold and indifferent and was naturally much distressed by this unexpected change; he even regretted coming to Persia.² Before examining the reasons for this change, we have to make up our mind on an important issue relating to the evidence of Jauhar *Āftābchī* on Humāyūn's relations with the Shah during his stay with him. According to Sukumar Ray, "Humāyūn's stay with the Shah may be divided into three well-defined periods. The first period saw the attempt of the Shah to convert Humāyūn; the second lasted for more than two months when the hostility of Shah Ṭahmāsp reached its climax and there was complete cessation of any intercourse between the two monarchs; and the third covered those days when a *rapprochement* was arrived at, and the Shah changed his attitude and made preparations for the recovery of Humāyūn's dominions."³ This is indeed the conclusion one would draw by accepting the evidence of Jauhar *as it stands*; but a closer scrutiny warrants a different conclusion. So let us proceed with Jauhar's account (on the basis of the British Museum MS):⁴

The Shah told Humāyūn that if he accepted the Shī'a faith, he (the Shah) would spare no effort to help him; but in case he did not, the Shah threatened to immolate him with all his followers.⁵ Humāyūn at first made a firm stand and sent word to the Shah that he was not so fond of kingship as to sacrifice his faith. The Shah replied that he had for long desired to send an expedition against a Sunnī king; now that one had come to him of his own accord, he would not let him retain his faith. The Qāḍī Jahān, *Vakil* of the

1. Jauhar, f. 71a; *T.A.M.*, f. 93a. Gulbadan, tr., p. 169, says that Ṭahmāsp rode out to receive Humāyūn. The *A.N.*, I, pp. 216-17, and the *M.R.*, I, pp. 590-92, give an entirely different account of the meeting and speak of a succession of festivities in Humāyūn's honour and of the Shah's offering himself as a younger brother to him to offset the treachery of his (Humāyūn's) brothers. Gulbadan, tr., p. 170, describes a huge feast held by the Shah's sister in honour of Ḥamida Bānō Begum, but its venue and date are not indicated.

2. Jauhar, f. 71a.

3. Ray, *Humāyūn in Persia*, p. 27.

4. What follows is an account based on the British Museum MS of Jauhar's *Tadhkirat al Wāqī'āt*, Add. 16711, f. 71b-78a. Important variations in other MSS have been noted in the footnotes. The parallel pages in Stuart's translation are 65-70.

5. Also in Sarhindī, King's College Camb. MS, f. 64b; not in Dr. Haq's MSS and the S.O.A.S. MS of Jauhar.

Shah,¹ now came to see Humāyūn and gave him a friendly warning that his intransigence would spell death for all his seven hundred followers.² He advised him to comply with the Shah's demand as he (Humāyūn) was no longer his own master.³ The Qāḍī Jahān presented three papers from the Shah to Humāyūn. The contents of the last of these papers were particularly objectionable to Humāyūn, but on further pressure he recited its contents in the presence of the Shah, thus signifying his acceptance of the Shī'a faith.⁴ This was followed by an amicable participation in a royal hunt.⁵ A few days later Humāyūn presented some jewels to the Shah by the hand of Bairam Beg. The largest of these jewels was declared by the Shah's jewellers to be priceless.⁶ Ṭahmāsp accepted the gift, and sent a message to Humāyūn that he was conferring the title of Khan on Bairam Beg.

Apparently nothing went particularly wrong in these transactions. It is, therefore, surprising that Jauhar closes the above account with the remark that for the next two months there was no communication between the two monarchs. Sukumar Ray observes, "Jauhar does not offer any explanation why all of a sudden Shah Ṭahmāsp stopped all intercourse with his fugitive guest."⁷ Ray himself offers no satisfactory explanation either. The analysis⁸

1. Qāḍī Jahān Saifī Qazvinī had been once accused of being inclined to Sunnī beliefs. He was promoted to the chief ministership (*Wizārat-i Kul*) a few years before Humāyūn's coming to Persia. He remained Wazīr for over twenty years and died in 960/1553. See *Af.T.*, ff. 166b-67b. For a fuller discussion of Qāḍī Jahān's position as Wazīr, see R. M. Savory, 'Principal Offices of the Ṣafawid State,' *B.S.O.A.S.*, vol. XXIV, Part I, 1961, pp. 70-73.

2. Evidently the number of Humāyūn's followers had increased in the meanwhile, presumably through defections from Kāmraṇ. See above.

3. Sarhindī's statement that Humāyūn quoted the Holy Qur'ān against compulsion in matters of faith, is obviously an embellishment added by him to Jauhar's "unadorned tale". Sarhindī, f. 65a. According to the S.O.A.S. MS, p. 123, and Dr. Ḥaq's MSS, p. 99, the Qāḍī Jahān said that the Shah's displeasure was occasioned by the anti-Shī'a remarks of Humāyūn's followers.

4. See Appendix C: Humāyūn's conversion to Shiism.

5. Jauhar gives a detailed account of the hunt.

6. According to the *T.I.N.S.*, ff. 58b-59a, the value of this jewel was assessed to be equal to two and half days' expenditure of the world; even so, says the chronicle, Ṭahmāsp did not think much of it and subsequently sent it as a gift to Niẓām Shah of the Deccan by the hand of Āqā Salmān *alias* Mehtar Jamāl. The *Mir'āt-i Jahān Numā*, f. 323b, identifies this jewel to be the same as had formed part of the spoils at the time of Bābur's conquest of Delhi, and says the value exceeded all the expenses incurred by the Persian government on Humāyūn since his entry into Persia. The last point occurs in several Mughul chronicles. Also see: *Maqāl*, f. 124a-b; *F. Safaviyya*, f. 23b; Sujān Rāi, p. 306; *Af.T.*, f. 124a.

On the question of the identity of this jewel with the Kōh-i Nūr and Mir Jumla's stone, see Dr. Ball's note in Tavernier, vol. II, pp. 331-46; Mr. 'Abdul 'Azīz's article in the *Jour. of Ind. Hist.*, 1933, pp. 63f.; Mr. H. Beveridge's art., "Bābur's Diamond", *Asiatic Qrly. Review*, April, 1899; Iswari Prasad, *Humāyūn*, pp. 231n-32n.

7. Ray, p. 32.

8. For this analysis, see below.

of the causes of the Shah's hostility to Humāyūn, given by Jauhar in his next chapter, looks more like an explanation of Ṭahmāsp's attitude from the beginning, and sounds inadequate and unconvincing as an explanation of the sudden change of attitude after Humāyūn's acceptance of the Shī'a faith and the pleasant hunting party that followed. Jauhar then goes on to say that Ṭahmāsp spoke to Bahrām Mirza of his hostility to Humāyūn and said his nobles were opposed to his giving any aid to him. The Mirza, who was a sincere well-wisher of Humāyūn,¹ was so distressed by these remarks that he wept; he went to his (and the Shah's) sister, Sultan Begum, and requested her to intercede on Humāyūn's behalf with the Shah. Presently the Shah came to see her and found her in tears. On being questioned, she explained to the Shah that he had enemies on all sides in the Ottoman Turks, the Circassians and the Europeans; he should not add to his enemies by tormenting Humāyūn who had a son and brothers (to avenge him); that if he was unwilling to help him, he should allow him to depart.² The Shah said that he had been misled by his nobles and expressed his approval of her counsel. Next day Ṭahmāsp wrote a letter to Humāyūn, inviting him to the hunt. The Shah was all kindness and attention to Humāyūn and assured him of his goodwill. The Shah told him that the Qāḍī Jahān would make certain proposals which, the Shah hoped, he would accept. Returning to his camp,³ Humāyūn called a small council which included Jauhar *Āftābchī*, and gave them an account of his conversation with the Shah and also mentioned his remarks about the proposals to be brought by the Qāḍī Jahān.⁴ The men were delighted by these welcome tidings and prayed for the Emperor (Humāyūn). Soon after, the two monarchs proceeded to hunt at the *Takht-i Sulaimān*.

We have deliberately recorded this rather long resumé of Jauhar,⁵ because a close study of his text on the matter described above and the useful though scanty evidence of Bāyazīd Bayāt and Abul Faḍl, has led us to believe that Jauhar, writing in his old age and after a lapse of about forty-five years, confused the sequence of events. It seems that the two months during which the Shah did not see Humāyūn occurred *before*, and not *after* (as in Jauhar), his conversation with the Qāḍī Jahān and his conversion to Shiism. This

1. For Bahrām Mirza's friendship with Humāyūn, see Appendix E.

2. The S.O.A.S. MS, p. 131, and Dr. Haq, p. 105, add a quatrain full of fervent praise of Haḍrat 'Alī, which the Shah's sister recited and ascribed to Humāyūn, to prove his inclination towards Shiism; Sarhindi, f. 68a has a quatrain in praise of Ṭahmāsp himself. Also see Firishta, I, p. 446.

3. Excluded from our account are one or two petty incidents showing Ṭahmāsp's solicitude for the safety and comfort of his royal guest.

4. Ray, pp. 35, 36, has misunderstood this to mean that the Qāḍī Jahān was to speak to Humāyūn's followers.

5. Jauhar, B.M. Add. 16711, ff. 71b-78a.

arrangement affords a more coherent sequence of events. Jauhar himself states that on his reconciliation with Humāyūn, Ṭahmāsp said that the Qāḍī Jahān would make certain proposals. According to our reconstruction of evidence, these proposals were the same which the Qāḍī Jahān brought in the form of three letters and this occurred *after* (and not before) the two-month breach. This also explains why Jauhar makes no further reference to these proposals. The evidence of Bāyazīd and Abul Faḍl also lends support to our thesis. Bāyazīd was with Humāyūn in Persia during the course of the events we are discussing,¹ and his account, though brief, is particularly valuable. Now Bāyazīd records, rather emphatically, that the conferring of the title of Khan on Bairam Beg and the handing over of the muster roll of the Persian expeditionary force for Humāyūn's help occurred on the same day.² This, also stated in the *Afḍalut Tawārīkh* and the '*Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī*,³ carries conviction. The award of the title of Khan to Bairam Beg would occur naturally at the end of Humāyūn's stay with the Shah. Jauhar, on the other hand, places the award of the title before the two-month breach and the appointment of the Persian contingents after it, which seems improbable. The *Akbar Nāma* also allots the same day to both these events and places them *after* the misunderstanding between the two monarchs had been removed.⁴ It may also be mentioned that Jauhar describes two hunting parties, one before and the other after the two-month breach. We are, however, inclined to believe that there was no hunting party before the breach (so also in the *Akbar Nāma*),⁵ and the two hunts described by Jauhar are really one and the same.

Jauhar has on the whole given a faithful account of the events. It is not, however, surprising if after four decades his memory should have failed in some respects.⁶

1. It is not certain when and where Bāyazīd Bayāt joined Humāyūn. Sukumar Ray, p. 42, without citing his source, says that Bāyazīd joined Humāyūn at Tabriz. Bāyazīd himself mentions his presence in Humāyūn's camp at Takht-i Sulaimān. When Humāyūn proceeded to Tabriz, Bāyazīd left for Mashhad (*ibid.*, p. 37) where he joined Humāyūn when the latter arrived there on his way to Qandahār (*ibid.*, p. 38).

2. Bāyazīd, pp. 34-5:

در همان روز... بیرم بیک را خطاب خانی... ارزانی فرمودند و در همین روز
طوبارده هزار کس سوار... بوکلای حضرت سپرده...

Also see: *M.R.*, I, pp. 592-3.

3. *Af.T.*, f. 124b; *A.A.A.*, p. 76.

4. *A.N.*, I, p. 218.

5. The *A.N.*, I, pp. 218-19, describes three hunts, but places all of them after the reconciliation.

6. Another place where Jauhar (f. 84a) has confused the sequence of events is the muster of the Persian troops and the capture of Bust. Stewart, p. 77, has evidently rearranged the material in his translation.

We now return to the causes of Ṭahmāsp's displeasure with Humāyūn. Jauhar says that three Mughuls, Raushan Beg, Khawāja Ghāzī Divān and Sultan Muḥammad, who were servants of Kāmrān Mirza, spoke to the Shah against Humāyūn, ascribed the non-co-operation of his brothers to his own incompetence, and offered to capture Qandahār for the Shah with Persian auxiliaries.¹ Gulbadan Begum says that two of these men had been involved in the theft of some of Humāyūn's jewels and on discovery turned against him and slandered him to the Shah. This, according to the Begum, was the only reason for the Shah's displeasure and he became fully reconciled with Humāyūn when he presented the jewels.² The fact that the above-mentioned three men were arrested by the Shah on his reconciliation with Humāyūn,³ is certainly an indication that they were in some way responsible for the deterioration of relations between the two monarchs. The next reason given by Jauhar is that the Persian nobles reminded the Shah of Bābur's treachery at Ghujduwān and hinted that Humāyūn would do the same.⁴ Next, says Jauhar, Humāyūn had after his conquest of Gujarāt claimed himself to be superior in power and prestige to Shah Ṭahmāsp.⁵ This was reported by some people to the Shah. When the two monarchs met, the Shah enquired about this incident and Humāyūn tried to explain it in terms of territorial proportion between India and Iran. Naturally, this explanation did not please the Shah, and he said to Humāyūn's face that it was because of his presumption and arrogance that he met his downfall.⁶ A very interesting piece of evidence occurs in a long letter which Shah Ṭahmāsp wrote to Sultan Sulaimān I of Turkey. It deals, *inter alia*, with the coming of Humāyūn to Persia. It is a revealing document as it shows the working of the Shah's mind and helps us to understand the motives behind his fits of anger against Humāyūn. A gist of the relevant part of this letter is as follows:

Humāyūn, one of the greatest kings in the world, had five lac troops and 12,000 war elephants. Then Satan sowed the seeds of sedition in his brain and he became so vain as to claim divine powers. His occasional appearance to the people was described as divine effulgence.⁷ In his entire dominion

1. Jauhar, f. 75a-b. Jauhar's remark that these men were returning from Mecca, is incorrect in view of his own earlier evidence. See Dr. Ḥaq, pp. 61, 63, 67; Gulbadan, p. 66; A.N., I, p. 222.

2. Gulbadan, pp. 73-4; Raushan Beg's defalcation of jewels is also mentioned by Jauhar, f. 73b.

3. Jauhar, f. 78b.

4. Jauhar, f. 75a. Jauhar repeats this point again in the account of the Shah's talk with Bahrām Mirza. Also see Dr. Ḥaq, p. 104.

5. We have left out here certain details as unnecessary. These details are given variously in different MSS of Jauhar.

6. Jauhar, f. 75a-b.

7. It is curious that a somewhat similar charge against Humāyūn is made by Badāyūnī, I, p. 446.

and in his army, the *Shari'at* was abrogated and heresy and evil prevailed. One day he called a meeting of his notables, soothsayers and astrologers and said he had seen in a dream that the moon, the sun and stars had come down to the foot of his throne. The soothsayers and astrologers said that the position of the heavenly bodies confirmed the purport of the dream and that the Sultan of Turkey, the Shah of Iran, the rulers of Tūrān and other kings would soon have to present themselves at his (Humāyūn's) court and accept his service, and their tenure of sovereignty would depend on his will. Then one of the Chaghatai Amīrs asked Humāyūn to apportion places for the various kings in his assembly. Humāyūn said, "The rulers of Transoxiana will sit here and the Shah of Iran here and the Ottoman Sultan here." Thus his might and prowess led him to entertain these wild fancies. Then all of a sudden Providence tore off his robe of honour and put on him the sackcloth of degradation. He was defeated by Sher Khan and hounded out by his brothers and at last found refuge in my realm.¹

* Certain manuscripts of Jauhar (but not the B.M. MS) add one or two points: Kāmārān Mirza wrote a confidential letter to the Shah condemning his royal brother. Humāyūn's men indulged in anti-Shiite talk which made the Shah angry with Humāyūn.²

The various elements which could turn Shah Ṭahmāsp against Humāyūn are all brought out in the foregoing analysis. The tragedy at Ghujduwān had not been forgotten and still cast a shadow on the Mughul-Safavid relations. The one-time arrogance of Humāyūn and his patronizing attitude would have been gall to a proud and powerful monarch like Ṭahmāsp. The inept, though seemingly clever, remark of Humāyūn about the *tāji*, and his explanation of his claim of superiority would have added point to the Shah's anger. Of the factors behind the Shah's attitude, the religious motive must have been the strongest. It may be noted that even though Humāyūn was his virtual prisoner for more than a year, at no stage did the Shah make any attempt to force political vassalage on him. But he spared no effort to force the Shī'a faith on Humāyūn.

The Shah's displeasure and his dire threats had left Humāyūn in a complete quandary. His counsellor and friend Bairam Beg advised him pliancy and submissiveness.³ Fortunately Humāyūn had some powerful friends in the camp of the Shah as well. The Qādi Jahān, who had himself once been accused of partiality to Sunnism and was presumably a man of liberal ideas, was his most powerful supporter.⁴ Ḥakīm Nūruddīn, one of

1. *N.J.M.* B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 80a-81a; also *Af.T.*, f. 194a-b; Ethé, 2067, f. 397ff. According to Beveridge (*A.N.*, I, Addenda No. 136, p. XIX), the letter was not despatched; that, however does not decrease its value. *Calendar* No. Ott. 379.

2. S.O.A.S. MS of Jauhar, pp. 123, 129; Dr. Haq, pp. 99, 103-4. Sarhindī (King's) does not mention either of these points.

3. *Firishta*, I, p. 446.

4. For the Qādi Jahān, see the *Af.T.*, ff. 166b-67a; also see p. 32 n. 1. above. The Qādi Jahān became a close friend of Humāyūn. Probably no Persian spent so much time

the confidants of the Shah, was another.¹ The Shah's own sisters and brothers exerted their influence in Humāyūn's favour. Sultan Begum also known as Shāhzāda Sulṭānam, was a lady of great political acumen. She exercised a two-way influence, restraining her brother, the Shah, on the one hand, and advising Humāyūn to be flexible on the other.² Even Alqāṣ Mirza, stationed on the western frontier, is said to have written to his brother the Shah to treat Humāyūn well and to let him depart.³ In Bahrām Mirza, Humāyūn found a strong supporter and a congenial friend. The Mirza has been accused by several later authorities of having been instrumental in turning the Shah against Humāyūn. There is, however, conclusive evidence to the contrary. (See Appendix E). His powerful influence was thrown in Humāyūn's favour. It is also likely that Kāmran Mirzā's reputation for anti-Shiite views inclined the Shah to help Humāyūn against the Mirza. The Shah has recorded his hearty dislike of the Mirza on that account.⁴

The day after the royal hunt, which marked the reconciliation, the Shah began arrangements for a fitting farewell to Humāyūn. Humāyūn had communicated through the Qādī Jahān his desire to depart.⁵ The preparations for the farewell festivities took seven days and the festivities themselves lasted three days.⁶ Jauhar, Amīr Maḥmūd and the author of the *Afḍalut Tawārīkh* have given detailed descriptions of the feast and the attendant ceremonies and of the numerous articles which the Shah presented to Humāyūn.⁷ The scale of the festivities can be guessed from the fact that according to Jauhar, who does not generally exaggerate, the number of the tents set up for the occasion was six hundred.⁸ The venue of these festivities was the neighbourhood of the Takht-i Sulaimān⁹ and they took place in the autumn of 951/1544.¹⁰

with Humāyūn during his stay in Persia as he did. For his letter to Humāyūn after the latter's return to Kābul, see below.

1. *Tab. Ak.*, II, p. 60. Firishta, I, p. 446; *Rauḍatut Ṭāhirīn*, f. 481; *T. Alfī*, f. 575a.

2. For Jauhar's evidence, see above. *Tab. Ak.*, II, p. 60; *T. Alfī*, f. 575a. Badāyūnī, I, pp. 444-5; Firishta, I, p. 446. She was extremely influential in Taḥmāsp's household. According to Gulbadan, she used to participate in royal hunts, on horseback (*Humāyūn Nāma*, p. 69, tr., pp. 169-70). Two Arabic works were dedicated to her (Storey, p. 1197), which shows her interest in learning. She died in A.H. 969 (*Ah. T.*, p. 418).

3. Sarhindī, King's, f. 68b.

4. See Taḥmāsp's letter to Humāyūn, *Af. T.*, f. 163b, wherein Kāmran is described as a *Khārījī* (extremist anti-Shiite); also see the Shah's letter to the Ottoman Sultan Sulaimān I, *Af. T.*, f. 194a-b. Also see Appendix C.

5. *Af. T.*, f. 124a-b.

6. Jauhar, f. 79a-b.

7. Jauhar, f. 79a-b; *T. A. M.*, f. 93a; *Af. T.*, f. 124b.

8. Jauhar, f. 79a.

9. Jauhar, f. 78a-b. For the Takht-i Sulaimān, literally "Solomon's Throne", situated on the western border of the old Jibal province, see Le Strange, p. 223.

10. *Af. T.*, f. 124b. Gulbadan, tr., p. 170, says the Shah's sister Shāhzāda Sulṭānam gave

The gifts presented to Humāyūn included drums, standards, carpets, horses, camels, tents, as well as money. In short, as Jauhar aptly remarks, all the paraphernalia of kingship (which Humāyūn had lacked for over four years) was now provided.¹ The total value of the presents is said to have been 20,000 *tūmāns*, while the cash amounted to 30,000 *tūmāns*. Humāyūn's followers were also provided with equipment and cash.² The Shah conferred the title of Khan on Bairam Beg.³ Further the Shah appointed his infant son Sultan Murād Mirza under the guardianship of Budāgh Khan Afshār, with 12,000 troops for the assistance of Humāyūn, and informed him that the equipment for the troops would be found ready in Sistān.⁴ According to Bāyazīd and Abul Faḍl, the muster roll of the troops and an inventory of all the articles presented to Humāyūn was also handed over to his representative.⁵ The commanders allocated to the auxiliary force were distinguished nobles and included several provincial governors.⁶

The three-day festivities closed on a note of good cheer and cordiality. Next morning Humāyūn went to see the Shah and found him seated on a folded carpet which left no room for him. The Mughul Emperor's dignity was saved by a servant of Mughul descent who at once tore off his quiver and spread it out for Humāyūn.⁷ After his generous presents and provision of military aid, this incident is rather an anti-climax. It is, however, in line with Ṭahmāsp's general attitude, for off and on he would do something to make Humāyūn feel his position of dependence and inferiority. The exiled monarch had still to endure one or two more rebuffs before his quitting Iran (see below). From the Takht-i Sulaimān the two monarchs moved and encamped at a place eight miles westward, for Humāyūn was now on his way to Tabrīz. The Shah attended a feast in Humāyūn's camp. This was a pleasant occasion, with wine and music and tasty Indian dishes enlivening every heart. From here the two monarchs marched to Miyāna (in Ādharbāijān) and encamped there.

a big party, with about 1,000 guests, in honour of Ḥamīda Bāno Begum. The venue and the date of the party are not indicated.

1. Jauhar, f. 79a-b; also see *T.A.M.*, f. 93a; Bāyazīd, p. 75.

2. *Af.T.*, f. 124b. Ray, p. 41n, has mistranslated the figure.

3. See discussion above. The *M.R.*, II, pp. 19-20, makes out that Bairam who was then known as Bairam Khan was given the title of *Khān-Khānān* by both the monarchs at the instance of Ṭahmāsp.

4. Jauhar, f. 79b; S.O.A.S. MS, pp. 135-6; the figure 12,000, is generally given by all sources; Bāyazīd, p. 35, and the *T.I.N.S.*, f. 59b, put the force at 10,000.

5. Bāyazīd, p. 35; *A.N.*, I, p. 218; the *M.R.*, I, p. 19, says that the troops and the articles were handed over to Bairam Khan.

6. Bāyazīd, pp. 35-6; *A.N.*, I, pp. 218-19; *T.A.M.*, f. 93b. According to Jauhar, f. 79b, Ṭahmāsp remarked that the help offered by him was small and that Humāyūn in the largeness of his heart would not mind.

7. Jauhar, ff. 79b-80a; Manucci, I, p. 114, also mentions this incident.

Ṭahmāsp now bade Humāyūn a touching farewell and commanded Bahrām Mirza to escort Humāyūn back to his camp. The latter gave the Prince a ring, saying it was a memento from his own mother, and expressed his regrets at having to part with him. They bade good-bye to each other in affectionate and touching words.¹

Humāyūn's visit to North-West Persia

According to the *Ma'āthir-i Raḥīmī*, whose author over-emphasises the undoubtedly important role of Bairam Khan, it was through the latter that Humāyūn secured the permission of the Shah to visit Ardabīl; the Shah ordered one Ḥaider Beg Anīs to escort Humāyūn to Tabrīz and Ardabīl.² The contemporary *Tārīkh-i Ilchī Nizām Shāh* says that the Qādī Jahān was appointed to accompany Humāyūn, and this seems more likely in view of the Qādī Jahān's friendship and close association with the Mughul ruler.³ Jauhar has nothing of this, but gives an interesting reason for Humāyūn's visit to Ardabīl. He says that the Shah's niece, that is the daughter of Ma'sūm Beg Ṣafavī, had been betrothed to Humāyūn; so it was considered desirable that he should go to Ardabīl to pay homage to the ancestors of the family.⁴ Ma'sūm Beg Ṣafavī was then the *ḥākim* of Ardabīl and officially received Humāyūn there.⁵ Subsequently we hear nothing more of this alleged betrothal. The real reason for Humāyūn's visit to Ardabīl, the city of Ṭahmāsp's ancestors, was, as can be easily perceived, to please the Shah. Under the Shah's orders the governor of Tabrīz extended a royal welcome to the visiting monarch and the whole city went *en fete* to receive him.⁶ From Tabrīz Humāyūn moved to Ardabīl, where he visited the tombs of Shah Ismā'il I, the founder of the Safavid monarchy, and of his ancestor Shaikh Ṣafīuddīn Ishāq,⁷ from whom the dynasty takes its name. After a week's sojourn at Ardabīl, Humāyūn proceeded to view the Caspian Sea.⁸

After his tour of North-Western Iran, Humāyūn returned eastward and on his way stopped at Qazvīn. Several Safavid chronicles try to give a

1. Jauhar, f.81a-b. Faiḍi Sarhindī, f. 72a, (but none of the MSS of Jauhar seen by the present author) says that Ṭahmāsp chose Bahrām Mirza to escort Humāyūn as he knew of the Mirza's sincere friendship for Humāyūn.

2. *M.R.*, II, p. 20.

3. The *T.I.N.S.*, f. 59a, is followed by the *R. Ṣafaviyya*, f. 189b and the *F. Ṣafaviyya*, f. 264.

4. Jauhar, f. 82a; Sarhindī, f. 73a; *S.O.A.S. MS*, p. 141; Dr. Ḥaq, p. 111.

5. *Af.T.*, f. 125a.

6. *T.I.N.S.*, f. 59a; *A.A.A.*, p. 74; also Jauhar, ff. 81b-82a.

7. Shaikh Ṣafīuddīn Ishāq, born 650/1252-3, died 735/1334-35. For Humāyūn's offering a golden ewer and an ornamental casement to the tombs of Shaikh Ṣadruddīn and Shah Ismā'il respectively, see Ray, p. 42n.

8. Jauhar, f. 82a-b; Stewart's translation, p. 75.

pleasant report of this second visit of Humāyūn to the capital and make out this to be the occasion of the final farewell by the Shah and of handing over the Persian auxiliaries.¹ Jauhar, however, reports the truth. By an unfortunate coincidence, Humāyūn and the Shah entered the city on the same day. The Shah was displeased to know that Humāyūn had not yet left the country. He ordered one of his officers to direct Humāyūn twenty-four miles away from the capital.² This unpleasant experience was soon followed by another. One of Humāyūn's men was murdered by four Persian horsemen who, when pursued by Humāyūn, pleaded that they had only carried out the Shah's orders.³

SEC. III: HUMĀYŪN AT QANDAHĀR AND KĀBUL

Humāyūn now marched eastward towards Qandahār. On the way he paid a visit to Mashhad where he offered thanks to Imām 'Alī b. Mūsā al-Ridā for his profitable visit to Persia. His next halt was at Jām; its date is given in his inscription on the tomb of Shaiḫ Aḥmad Jām as 14 Shawwāl 951/29 Dec. 1544.⁴ At Sīstān Humāyūn stayed for a fortnight to inspect the Persian contingents and the supplies which had been provided for him.⁵ Jauhar says that while the number of troops in the muster roll was twelve thousand, the actual number assembled at Sīstān turned out to be fourteen thousand.⁶ The force included a contingent of 300 *qūrchīs*⁷ whose addition to the troops was obviously meant as a token of personal favour from the Shah. (For the commission and the role of the Persian troops, see Appendix D.)

After capturing Bust,⁸ Humāyūn marched to Qandahār. 'Askari Mirza, encouraged by Kāmrān Mirza's promise to come to his aid in person,⁹ defended the fort stoutly.¹⁰ As the siege dragged on, and as there was no landslide of Chaghataïs in favour of Humāyūn, the Persians became dispirited

1. *T.I.N.S.*, f. 59a-b; *T.A.M.*, f. 93b; *Ah.T.*, p. 310; *A.A.A.*, p. 76; *F. Šafaviyya* f. 25a-b; *R. Šafaviyya*, f. 189b. The *Af.T.* f. 125a-b, and the *M.R.*, I, p. 593, make bare mention of Humāyūn's visit to Qazvīn. The *Nasab Nāma-i A'lā ḥadrat-i Shāhi*, Panjab University MS, f. 45b, mentions the final farewell at Miyānīj (same as Miyāna) after Humāyūn's return from Tabriz.

2. Jauhar, f. 82b; Stewart, p. 76.

3. Jauhar, ff. 82b-83a, describes the incident in detail. Sarhindi, f. 73b.

4. For the inscription, see *J.R.A.S.*, 1897, pp. 47-8; *Vahid* (Monthly, Tihān), Shahrivar 1348/Sept. 1969, p. 781; also cf. *M.R.*, I, p. 588, which inaccurately associates the inscription with Humāyūn's first visit to Jām. Humāyūn alludes to himself in the inscription as an "empty-handed wanderer".

5. Jauhar, f. 83b-84a. We have already discounted the statement of some Persian chronicles that the Persian troops accompanied Humāyūn from Qazvīn to Qandahār. See above.

6. Jauhar, f. 84a, *S.O.A.S.* MS, pp. 144-5; Sarhindi, f. 74b. The estimates in other sources vary between 10,000 and 12,300. The figure of 20,000 in the *T. Khāndān-i Timūriya* (see Ray, p. 48n) can be easily ignored.

7. *Af.T.*, f. 125a; *T. Šulṭāni*, f. 325a; *Maqāl*, f. 125a. For *qūrchīs*, see p. 23, n. 4 above.

8. Jauhar, f. 84a (written as Biṣ); Bāyazīd, p. 39; *A.N.*, I, p. 227; *M.R.*, I, p. 595.

9. *M.R.*, II, p. 22.

10. Jauhar, f. 84b.



اے رحمت تو عذر پذیر ہمہ کس
 درگاہ و در تو قیام گاہ ہمہ خالق
 ظاہر بجناب تو ضمیر ہمہ کس
 لطف بکرشمہ دست گیر ہمہ کس
 سر گشته بادیہ بی سر انجامی
 محمد ہایون
 ۱۴ شوال سنہ ۹۵۱

Plate IA. Humāyūn's inscription at the Turbat-i Jām, dated 14 Shawwāl 951.
 (See p. 40 n4)

and wanted to return.¹ Fortunately for Humāyūn the situation soon took a favourable turn both on the political and the military fronts. He had sent Bairam Khan as his envoy to Mirza Kāmrān at Kābul.² The Khan carried letters and gifts from Humāyūn and from Shah Ṭahmāsp for Mirza Kāmrān and the other Mirzas.³ He managed his diplomatic assignment with great skill and succeeded in secretly weaning away the leading Chaghataī princes from Kāmrān to Humāyūn's side. Several of them absconded from Kābul and joined Humāyūn.⁴ Mirza Kāmrān's position at Kābul was thus gravely undermined and he could not leave for Qandahār. On the military front, too, Humāyūn's situation improved, and it is notable that the first success was achieved through the bold enterprise of his personal followers; the Persians followed up the advantage. From the fort itself men began to desert and join Humāyūn. So after suffering a siege of about six months, 'Askarī Mirza sued for peace and surrendered the fort on 25 Jumādā II 952/3 Sept. 1545. Humāyūn placed the Mirza under surveillance.⁵

It had been arranged between the two monarchs that the treasures of Mirza 'Askarī in Qandahār should belong to the Shah.⁶ Humāyūn remained faithful to the arrangement, though the way the Persian commanders demanded the treasures certainly displeased him. (See Appendix D on the Persian auxiliaries.) Shah Ṭahmāsp, on receiving the treasures, sent robes and some gifts to Humāyūn.⁷

Seizure of Qandahār from the Persians

After the surrender of Qandahār by Mirza 'Askarī, the fort was handed over to the Persians in accordance with Humāyūn's understanding with Shah Ṭahmāsp.⁸ Budāgh Khan, the *lalla* or tutor of the infant Prince, Sultan Murād Mirza, took over the fort and allowed three days for the Chaghataīs to clear out.⁹ Of the Persian expeditionary force, only a small portion stayed at Qandahār; the rest retired to their homes in Iran, without obtaining

1. *A.N.*, I, p. 233; *Tab. Ak.*, II, 62; Badāyūnī, I, p. 446.

2. Jauhar, f. 84b; *Tab. Ak.*, II, p. 61; Badāyūnī, I, p. 446; Firishṭa, I, p. 447. The *M.R.*, I, p. 596, says the *Khān-i Khānān* went of his own accord.

3. Bāyazid, p. 44f; *M.R.*, I, pp. 596-7, II, pp. 21-2. Bāyazid, who went with Bairām Khan to Kābul, says the Khan's men were dressed in the Persian style complete with the *tāj*.

4. Bāyazid, pp. 48-50; *M.R.*, I, 598, II, 21-2.

5. *A.N.*, I, p. 235; *T. Ibrāhīmī*, f. 238b. The period of siege varies from three to eight months in different chronicles. See Ray, p. 521.

6. *T.A.M.*, f. 94a; *R. Šafaviyya*, f. 191a.

7. Jauhar, ff. 85a-86b; Sarhindi, f. 75b-76a. See also Appendix D on the Persian Auxiliaries below.

8. The understanding about Qandahār is mentioned by Bāyazid, p. 171; *Af. T.*, ff. 125a, 126a; *Tab. Ak.*, II, pp. 62-3; Badāyūnī, I, p. 447; *A.N.*, I, p. 239; *R. Šafaviyya*, f. 191a.

9. Badāyūnī, I, p. 447.

Humāyūn's permission.¹ Their relations with the latter had indeed become considerably strained. (See Appendix D on the Persian Auxiliaries.) The Emperor, according to Jauhar, stayed outside the fort for a month more; Budāgh Khan issued orders to stop the passage of supplies to Humāyūn's camp.² He took this action as a precaution against the Mughuls playing him false,³ as they ultimately did.

Humāyūn was indeed in a desperate situation. With Persian help he had taken Qandahār only to hand it over to the Persians themselves. A large number of Chaghatāis had joined him before and after the fall of Qandahār, expecting a favourable turn in his fortunes. But now the Persian auxiliaries had departed and Kāmrān was still in possession of Kābul and Ghaznī. With his followers⁴ Humāyūn was perched in an insecure camp at some distance from Qandahār, and winter was fast approaching. The prevailing insecurity had been emphasised by the attempted flight of 'Askarī Mirza.⁵ Humāyūn had no stronghold where he could leave his family, his treasures if any, and his precious prisoner. His followers grew restive and some of them even deserted⁶ for the sake of their families which were so many hostages in the hands of Mirza Kāmrān at Kābul.

Some of his counsellors suggested to Humāyūn the seizure of Qandahār from Budāgh Khan. The prospect of such a coup were not unfavourable as the latter was without adequate military strength to defend the fort. According to Bāyazīd, who was in Humāyūn's camp at this time, the Mughul commanders advised the Emperor to take the fort, dismiss the Persians, and to write to the Shah that as Kābul and Ghaznī had not yet been recovered and he had no place to leave his family and retinue, Qandahār should be given to him provisionally, that any misrepresentation (of his action in taking the fort) by the Persian commanders, who had left without his (Humāyūn's) permission, should not be heeded; and the pledge and provisions of their friendly understanding stood unimpaired.⁷ According to Abul Faḍl, Budāgh Khan oppressed and persecuted the people of Qandahār who appealed to Humāyūn to save them,⁸

1. This is mentioned by Indian as well as Iranian sources. See Appendix D on the Persian Auxiliaries.

2. Jauhar, f. 86a.

3. *Tab.Ak.*, II, p. 63.

4. The *Ah.T.*, p. 311, gives their number as 5000. The *T.A.M.*, f. 94a, an earlier work, gives Humāyūn only 320 ill-equipped followers, which appears to be too low an estimate.

5. *Tab.Ak.*, II, p. 63; *Badāyūnī*, I, p. 447; *T. Alfī*, f. 578b; *A.N.*, I, p. 241; *Firishta*, I, p. 447.

6. *Tab.Ak.*, II, p. 62; *Badāyūnī*, I, 447; *Firishta*, I, p. 447; *Rai Bindraban*, *Lubb. T.*, f. 72a; *T. Alfī*, f. 578b.

7. Bāyazīd, pp. 50-1. Barārī (*Mujmal*, f. 75a) gives a very detailed version, see below.

8. Barārī, *Mujmal*, f. 75a, places special emphasis on this point as a justification for Humāyūn's subsequent action.

but the latter withheld any action as it would have displeased the Shah.¹ However, says Abul Faḍl, in view of the impending Kābul campaign, the Emperor had to ask Budāgh Khan for accommodation in the fort for his women-folk and his possessions, but the Persian commander refused to oblige;² "the chief (Mughul) officers represented that they had a great enterprise in hand and that there was nothing for it but to seize Qandahār."³ About this time Prince Murād, the Shah's infant son and the nominal governor of Qandahār, died.⁴ The officers again pressed Humāyūn to take the fort.⁵ Jauhar and Bāyazīd, the contemporary witnesses, briefly state that the proposal to seize the fort was mooted after the demise of the Prince.⁶ It is more likely that the plan was already under discussion and the removal of the Prince by death hastened the Mughul designs on Qandahār. Niẓāmuddīn, a judicious chronicler, says that the Chaghatai leaders decided to seize the fort and by a coincidence the Prince died the same day.⁷

Humāyūn, however, felt qualms of conscience in what was treachery against his erstwhile allies. He suggested the use of stratagem which might achieve the object expeditiously and without resort to arms.⁸ 'Askari Mirza came in very handy here as a Trojan horse. A message was now sent to Budāgh Khan asking him to accept 'Askari Mirza as his own prisoner at Qandahār,⁹ "for one does not carry in one's pocket a snake dragged out of its hole."¹⁰ Budāgh Khan thought the proposal advantageous to himself and agreed.¹¹ Arrangements were now taken in hand to seize the fort by a ruse. Ḥājī Muḥammad Khan, Ulugh Mirza (a descendant of Sultan Ḥusain Mirza Baiqarā) and Bairam Khan played the leading role in the attack on the fort.¹²

1. *A.N.*, I, pp. 238-9.

2. *A.N.*, I, p. 239; *Tab.Ak.*, II, p. 63; *Badāyūnī*, I, pp. 447-8. The *Mujmal*, though very detailed, makes no mention of this move. The *Qīṣaṣ*, f. 12b, says that Budāgh Khan refused to comply without the Shah's orders. Rāi Bindrāban, *Lubb.T.*, f. 72a, commenting on Budāgh Khan's refusal, says he was justified. The last two works say that Humāyūn asked for a temporary occupation of Qandahār, which seems unlikely.

3. *A.N.*, I, tr., p. 472 (Persian text p. 239); *Mujmal*, f. 75; *A.A.A.*, p. 69.

4. All authorities, except one or two, agree that the infant Prince died about this time: Jauhar, f. 87a; Bāyazīd, p. 50; *A.N.*, I, 239; *Tab.Ak.*, II, 63; *Badāyūnī*, I, p. 447; etc. The *Af.T.*, f. 125b, is the only work to say that the death of the Prince occurred at Garmsir, before the arrival of Humāyūn and the Persian contingents at Qandahār. *Firishṭa*, I, p. 447, says that the Prince died when Humāyūn was on his way to Kābul and the latter returned and took possession of the fort.

5. *A.N.*, I, pp. 239-40; *Mujmal*, f. 75a-b.

6. Jauhar, f. 87a; Bāyazīd, p. 50; also Barari, *Mujmal*, f. 75a.

7. *Tab.Ak.*, II, p. 63; also *Badāyūnī*, I, p. 447.

8. *A.N.*, I, p. 240; *Mujmal*, f. 75b.

9. *A.N.*, I, p. 240.

10. *Mujmal*, f. 75b.

11. *A.N.*, I, p. 240, tr. p. 473; *Mujmal*, f. 75b.

12. Jauhar, f. 86b-7a; *T.A.M.*, f. 94a-b; *Mujmal*, f. 75b.

Budāgh Khan had an inadequate force and was overwhelmed by a well-co-ordinated surprise attack. With only a slight loss on the Persian side the fort passed into Mughul hands.¹

Authorities differ as to Humāyūn's subsequent treatment of Budāgh Khan. Jauhar says Humāyūn sent him a message rebuking him for not having informed him (Humāyūn) of the death of Sultan Murād Mirza, who had been entrusted to him (Humāyūn) by the Shah; Humāyūn ordered Budāgh Khan to leave the fort by stealth, lest he should be killed by the Chaghatāis.² On the other hand, many Indian and Iranian chronicles state that Budāgh Khan came to offer submission and that Humāyūn dismissed him ceremoniously.³ The evidence of Jauhar, supported on a point of significant detail by Bāyazīd,⁴ another contemporary witness, appears to be more reliable than the statement of chroniclers like Abul Faḍl and Amīr Maḥmūd of Herāt, who were interested in putting a gloss over any unsavoury incidents in Mughul-Safavid relations.

For the governorship of Qandahār Humāyūn chose Bairam Khan, as he was likely to be more acceptable to Shah Ṭahmāsp.⁵ Humāyūn "wrote to the Shah that as Budāgh Khan had acted contrary to the Shah's orders, he had taken away Qandahār from him and made it over to Bairam Khan and (the fort) remains a dependency of the Shah."⁶ To this statement of Abul Faḍl, the *Mujmal-i Mufaṣṣal* adds that "as soon as a trusted servant of the Shah arrives, Bairam Khan would hand over Qandahār."⁷ Abul Faḍl, in his account of Qandahār in the early years of Akbar's reign, twice recalls Humāyūn's intention of restoring the fort to Persia after conquering India.⁸ It is not unlikely that the idea was loosely entertained at that time, but allowed to be forgotten as time passed.

The Shah under the circumstances had no choice but to accept the

1. Jauhar, f. 87a. Bāyazīd, p. 51, explains the absence of fighting by saying that as the Persian army was an auxiliary force, it had no orders to fight against Humāyūn. The *Qīṣa*, f. 12b, offers a similar explanation. Badāyūnī, I, p. 448, alone says that the seizure of Qandahār was followed by a massacre of the Qizilbāsh by the people of the town.

2. Jauhar, f. 87b; Sarhindī, f. 77b; Stewart, p. 80.

3. *T.A.M.*, f. 95a; *Ah.T.*, p. 312; *A.N.*, I, p. 241; *Tab.Ak.*, II, p. 64; Badāyūnī, I, p. 448; *Mujmal*, f. 75b; *Af.T.*, f. 126b; *Qīṣa*, f. 12b.

4. Bāyazīd, p. 51, says that the Persians left the fort from the other side.

5. Sukumar Ray, p. 56, quotes 'Arif Qandahārī to this effect. The *A.A.A.*, p. 76, as well as the *Qīṣa*, f. 12, describe Bairam Khan, in this context, as a well-wisher of both the parties. According to Abul Faḍl the *vilāyat* (as distinct from the fort and the city) was divided among several nobles. It appears from Bāyazīd, p. 52, that there was some discontent among the followers of Yādgār Nāṣir Mirza at the assignment of Qandahār to Bairam Khan.

6. *A.N.*, I, p. 241 (Beveridge's translation is slightly different. See Ray, p. 57n.); *Mir' āt-i Jahān Numā*, f. 324a.

7. *Mujmal*, f. 75b.

8. *A.N.*, II, pp. 53, 79; also *Tadh. Salāṭīn-i Chaghatā* (R.A.S. MS), p. 457f.

fait accompli.¹ A campaign to recover Qandahār would have been expensive and exacting and would have on the one hand made bitter enemies of the Mughuls, and on the other encouraged the Ottomans on his western frontiers. It goes to the Shah's credit that he accepted the situation with grace, for in the subsequent correspondence² between the two kings, we do not come across any note of bitterness or any reference to Qandahār. Indeed, there is evidence to the contrary. There is an undated letter in the name of the Qāḍī Jahān and addressed to Humāyūn. The contents of the letter indicate it to be in reply to one from Humāyūn in which the latter (judging from the Qāḍī Jahān's reply) had expressed some anxiety about Shah Ṭahmāsp's attitude to him. The Qāḍī Jahān's letter assures Humāyūn that nothing whatsoever had recently taken place to affect the Shah's goodwill for him, especially as his (Humāyūn's) envoys had explained to the Shah his sincere loyalty to the latter.³ It is highly likely that Humāyūn wrote the above-mentioned letter soon after his seizure of Qandahār in order to forestall any unfavourable reaction on the part of the Shah.

It is evident that Humāyūn seized Qandahār by necessity and under strong pressure from his leading commanders. However, of the pleas made on his behalf by the Mughul chroniclers, the premature withdrawal by the Persian contingents alone carries conviction. The Persian assistance had been a disappointment to Humāyūn, and he had been left to fight Mirza Kāmrān without any secure base. It is interesting to observe that pro-Safavid chronicles in general do not take a strong view of Humāyūn's action. Indeed some of them tend to explain it in terms of Humāyūn's utter necessity and relate it to the premature and unauthorised retirement of the Persian auxiliaries. The absence of strong criticism of Humāyūn's conduct in the Safavid chronicles⁴ can be explained as being in line with Ṭahmāsp's own attitude.

Subsequent Relations Between Humāyūn and Ṭahmāsp

Humāyūn's seizure of Qandahār from the Persians did not interrupt his friendly and cordial relations with Shah Ṭahmāsp. After Humāyūn had conquered Kābul and established himself there, several embassies were ex-

1. The *Tārīkh-i Sulṭānī*, f. 325a alone says (inaccurately, of course) that Ṭahmāsp himself took away Qandahār from Budāq (*sic*) Khan and gave it as a favour to Bairam Khan. The statement of the *M.R.*, II, p. 23, that the Shah felt extremely happy to learn of the change at Qandahār, and ordered the transfer of the people of the Bahārlū (i.e., Bairam Khan's) clan in Persia to Qandahār, lacks confirmation and sounds unconvincing, especially as coming from a work written under the direct patronage of Bairam Khan's own son.

2. For this correspondence, see below.

3. *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, f. 127a-b. Calendar No. H. 11.

4. *Ah.T.*, pp. 311-12; *T.A.M.*, f. 94a-b; *A.A.A.*, p. 69. Only the *Af.T.*, f. 126b, directly accuses Humāyūn of violating his pledged word.

changed between the two kings. The first mission, it seems, came from the Shah. He sent Walad Beg Taklū with a number of *qurchīs* to congratulate Humāyūn on his victory at Kābul. The embassy arrived at Kābul in 953/1546. Walad Beg attended Humāyūn's campaign in Badakhshān and the *qurchīs* fought bravely on Humāyūn's side. The embassy was dismissed the same year and on their way back to Persia came to Kābul, which in the meanwhile had passed once more into Kāmran Mirza's hands. Walad Beg's brother suggested to him that as an act of loyalty they should kill the rebellious Mirza. But Walad Beg, being a diplomat, observed it was none of their concern. Walad Beg carried back a letter from Humāyūn to Ṭahmāsp and an invitation to Khwāja 'Abduṣ Ṣamad, the famous Persian painter, and to others to join his service.¹

In 955/1548 Humāyūn sent Khwāja Jalāluddīn Maḥmūd, his *Mir-i Sāmān*, as envoy to Persia, but he had to stay at Qandahār for certain reasons and was called back next year to Kābul.² In 956 or 957 (1549-50), Humāyūn sent his Minister of Revenue, Qāḍī Shaiḫ 'Alī, to the Shah with a letter giving a fairly detailed account of Kāmran Mirza's rebellion. This letter also condoled upon the death of the Shah's brother, Bahrām Mirza.³ (See Appendix E.) Shah Ṭahmāsp sent a cordial reply to this letter with Kamāluddīn Ulugh Beg 'Arabgīrlū, advising Humāyūn against clemency to Kāmran Mirza and making an offer of military help if needed.⁴

Subsequently Humāyūn sent from Kābul early in 958/1551 Khwāja Ghāzī⁵ as ambassador to Persia. The latter stayed in Persia for a couple of years and returned in 961/1554. Sometime during his stay in Persia, Ṭahmāsp despatched a brief autograph letter to Humāyūn which mentions the suppression of the rebellion of Alqāṣ Mirza in Iran (956/1549)⁶ and refers to the renewed revolt of Kāmran Mirza and its defeat.⁷

1. Bāyazīd, pp. 64-5; *A.N.*, I, pp. 249, 252, 252, 259. Humāyūn's letter per Walad Beg is mentioned in his next letter to the Shah, B.M. Add. 7654, f. 174a-77a. The number of men with Walad Beg was about thirty.

2. *A.N.*, I, pp. 284, 292; also *T. Dilkushā*, f. 495a.

3. For the letter see B.M. Add. 7654, ff. 174b-77a. Bahrām Mirza's death occurred in Ramaḍān, 956 (*Ah. T.*, p. 342). Humāyūn's next letter is dated 958 (*A.N.*, I, p. 311). So the present letter was written in 956 or 957. Calendar No. H. 12.

4. *J.I.*, B.M. Or. 1702, ff. 259a-262b; also the text and tr. in Ray, pp. 78-86. It mentions Humāyūn's letter brought by Qāḍī Zainuddīn Shaiḫ 'Alī. Calendar No. H. 13.

5. The Khwāja had been recipient of punishment as well as favour from the Shah during Humāyūn's stay in Iran. Gulbadan, tr. p. 174; Jauhar, ff. 754, 786; Bāyazīd, pp. 83, 179; *A.N.*, I, p. 333.

6. *Ah. T.*, pp. 339-40, 342.

7. The *Af. T.*, f. 163, gives the text of the letter and places it in 959. The dates of the defeats of Kāmran Mirza's rebellions are 954, 955, 957, 959. See Erskine, II, pp. 343-4, 357, 397, 405-6. The rubric of this letter to the effect that it was enclosed by Shah Ṭahmāsp in the

The last recorded embassy from Ṭahmāsp arrived in the early summer of 960/1553. Bāyazīd has given a first-hand and intimate account of this embassy as he took part in its reception. The embassy was led by Ulugh Beg who brought gifts for Humāyūn and a robe for Bairam Khan. The arrival of this mission at a time when Humāyūn was making preparations for the conquest of India, was most welcome to him.¹ We do not hear of any further exchanges of diplomatic missions between the two kings. During the years 960-63/1553-6, Ṭahmāsp was waging wars on his western frontiers while Humāyūn was occupied with the recovery and consolidation of his Indian dominions. And, finally, in 1556 Humāyūn died at Delhi and was succeeded to the throne of Delhi by his fourteen-year old son, Akbar.

previous letter creates chronological difficulties. For a full discussion of the matter, see Calendar No. H. 14.

1. Bāyazīd, pp. 173-5; *A.N.*, I, p. 335. A reading of Bāyazīd's account leaves little doubt that his date, 960, is more reliable than Abul Faḍl's (961).

CHAPTER IV

AKBAR AND IRAN

SEC. I: AKBAR AND SHAH ṬAHMĀSP

THE reign of Akbar opens on a note of discord with Persia regarding Qandahār. Humāyūn had not redeemed his promise, if ever he had intended it, to restore Qandahār to Persia.¹ His death in 963/1556 was certain to reopen the question of Qandahār. The outcome was precipitated by the folly of Bahādur Khan, Mughul commander of Zamīn-Dāwar, in trying to seize Qandahār from its Mughul governor, Shah Muḥammad Qallāṭī. The latter, in his predicament, wrote to Shah Ṭahmāsp for help, and recalling Humāyūn's intention of surrendering Qandahār to Persia, made an offer of the fort to the Shah. Persian forces expelled Bahādur Khan from Zamīn-Dāwar, only to find Shah Muḥammad ready to defend Qandahār against them. This is agreed to by all Indian and Iranian sources,² except the *Afḍalut Tawārīkh* which reverses the roles of the two Mughul officials.³ This, however, is inadmissible in the face of unanimity of evidence for the other version.

Persian and Indian accounts vary regarding subsequent events. According to Safavid sources, on Shah Muḥammad's refusal to keep his word, Shah Ṭahmāsp sent a large force which reduced Qandahār after a short siege.⁴ The Indian accounts make out that Shah Muḥammad defeated two consecutive Persian attempts to capture Qandahār, whereupon Akbar ordered Shah Muḥammad to surrender, recalling Humāyūn's intention of restoring the fort

1. For Humāyūn's promise, see above; also *A.N.*, II, pp. 53, 79; *Tadh.S.Ch.* pp. 457-8; *A.A.A.*, p. 70.

2. *Ah.T.*, pp. 395-6; *A.N.*, II, 52-4; *Qisṣa*, f. 14a; Khāfi Khan's account is cryptic and partially incorrect, *K.K.*, I, p. 134.

3. *Af.T.*, f. 209a-b. According to this work, it was Bahādur Khan who offered to hand over Zamīn-Dāwar and to assist the Persians in seizing Qandahār from Shah Muḥammad, but on the advent of the Persian contingent went back on his offer and was defeated by the Persians.

4. *Ah.T.*, pp. 40-5; *Af.T.*, f. 223a-b; *Qisṣa*, f. 14a-b.

to Persia.¹ This looks like a gloss to cover an unpleasant situation. In 965/1558, when these events were taking place, Akbar was hardly in a position to fight for Qandahār, and in any case it was impossible to send reinforcements in time from Delhi to the far-off fort. Ṭahmāsp appointed his nephew Sultan Ḥusain Mirza (Ṣafavī), son of Bahrām Mirza, to the governorship of Qandahār.²

A direct result of Ṭahmāsp's action was a cooling off of Mughul friendship for the Safavids. Shah Ṭahmāsp sent an embassy in 969/1562 to Akbar to express condolence on his father's death and to congratulate him on his accession.³ It was also aimed, as Khāfi Khan observes, at removing the misunderstanding on account of the recent clash over Qandahār.⁴ The embassy was led by Sayyid Beg Ṣafavī, son of Ma'ṣūm Beg Ṣafavī.⁵ The royal descent and the high status of the envoy are emphasised in the letter brought by him. The letter is composed in a cordial vein. Ṭahmāsp therein recalls his intimate friendship with Humāyūn. The letter also mentions an embassy recently received in Persia from Bairam Khan, Akbar's Khān-Khānān. That the latter had kept himself in touch with Persia is evident from other sources as well.⁶ Ṭahmāsp's letter requested an early dismissal of his envoy and resumption of diplomatic relations.⁷

The embassy from Persia made no impression on Akbar, probably because of the recent Persian action on Qandahār. Nor did he send any reply to the Shah. Unruffled, however, the Shah despatched another embassy a few years later. The occasion for this embassy is rather interesting. Sultan Maḥmūd of Bhakkar,⁸ in his desire to be appointed the Khān-Khānān of the Mughul Empire, sent in 971/1563-4 money and gifts to Shah Ṭahmāsp in order to seek his support. Ṭahmāsp wrote a recommendatory letter to Akbar. The latter wrote back that Mun'im Khan was already Khān-Khānān and the Mughul Empire as a rule had only one person holding that title, that the title of I'tibār

1. *A.N.*, II, pp. 78-9; *Tadh.S.Ch.*, pp. 457-8. Firishta, I, p. 465, says the Persians captured the fort after a strenuous siege. Also see the fanciful account of *M.R.*, II, pp. 32-3, which says that Ṭahmāsp sent the army to protect Bairam Khan's *jāgīr* of Qandahār.

2. *A.A.A.*, p. 70; *Af.T.*, ff. 223b-25a, also quotes Ṭahmāsp's *farmān* of appointment. Calendar No. A. 16.

3. The *Af.T.*, f. 208a, alone mentions an embassy from Ṭahmāsp immediately after Humāyūn's death. The evidence is incorrect on the authority of Ṭahmāsp's own letter; see below.

4. *K.K.*, I, p. 161.

5. Ma'ṣūm Beg was Humāyūn's host at Ardabil. See Chapter III above.

6. *K.K.*, I, p. 143; *Badāyūnī*, II, pp. 40-41. Bairam Khan's fall from power and his subsequent murder had already taken place a year and a half before the arrival of the embassy in India. Ṭahmāsp evidently did not know of it when he despatched the embassy. Also see Beveridge's footnote, *A.N.*, tr., II, p. 263.

7. *A.N.*, II, pp. 170-3; *Badāyūnī*, II, 52; *A.A.A.*, p. 290; *Bod.* 101, f. 325a. The text of Ṭahmāsp's letter is given in the *A.N.*, II, pp. 170-3, tr., pp. 263-7; and in *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688 f. 109b-10a. Calendar No. A. 17.

8. See reference to him in *M.U.*, III, pp. 240-5; *Ma'sūmī*, pp. 224, 235-36.

Khan had been conferred on Maḥmūd and that he would receive further royal favours in future. Ṭahmāsp again wrote that conferment of honours on Maḥmūd in consequence of his recommendation would demonstrate to the world the close accord between the two Houses. Abul Faḍl assumes a rather high tone in the *Akbar Nāma* and says that as under Akbar's regime merit and not recommendation governed appointments, the Persian envoys were dismissed with suitable excuses in 972/1564.¹

We do not hear of any further diplomatic exchanges between the two monarchs during the rest of Ṭahmāsp's reign. But in Jumādā II 980/October 1572, Prince Sultan Muḥammad *Khudābanda*, eldest son of Ṭahmāsp and Viceroy of *Khurāsān*, sent one Yār 'Alī Beg as his envoy to Akbar.² The object of the mission is nowhere stated: probably it had no immediate and specific purpose. For embassies from princes of one country to the ruler of the other were a usual feature of Indo-Persian relations. (See Appendix H.) The purpose generally was to cultivate relations with an eye to support in case of disputed succession.

Ṭahmāsp died in Ṣafar 984/May 1576 after a long and eventful reign. His second son succeeded to the throne as Shah Ismā'il II after twenty years of imprisonment. His brief and bloody reign was marked by troubles, which arose partly from his pro-Sunnī attitude.³ There is no record of any diplomatic relations with Akbar. But he did send a letter to Akbar's brother Mirzā Muḥammad Ḥakīm at Kābul. The Mirza is therein addressed as an independent king,⁴ which he was for all practical purposes. The letter recalls friendly relations between their respective ancestors, and asks Mirza Ḥakīm to send his envoys to Persia. It also assures him that the way was now open and secure for pilgrims to Mecca and asks him to encourage them to set out.⁵ The question of the freedom and security of pilgrims passing through Persia was always an important issue between the Safavids and their Sunnī neighbours, and we will hear of this matter more frequently later on.

1. *A.N.*, II, p. 237, tr., p. 358. The Persian chronicles refer to the coming of Maḥmūd's emissaries but say nothing more: *A.A.A.*, p. 89; *Ah.T.*, p. 422. The B.M. Add. 7654, ff. 177b-79a, gives a copy of Ṭahmāsp's second letter which contains a reference to his earlier letter as well as to the contents of Akbar's reply. See Calendar No. A. 18, which also gives a short note on Sultan Maḥmūd Bhakkārī. Briefly, Sultan Maḥmūd Khan (born 1493, died 1574) gained power at Bhakkar in 1555 and played an active part in the politics of Sind till his death. According to *Ma'sūmī*, p. 224, Ṭahmāsp twice sent his envoys to Sultan Maḥmūd and even conferred on the latter the title of *Khān-Khānānī*. Also see *Ma'sūmī*, pp. 235-36.

2. *A.N.*, III, p. 5; Nūrul Haq, *Zubd. Tawārīkh*, f. 138b; 'Arif Qandahārī, f. 45a-b.

3. *A.A.A.*, pp. 153-6; Falsafi, *Abbās-i Awwal*, I, pp. 20-33.

4. The words in the original are: *Pādshāh-i masnad-nishīn*.

5. *N.J.M.*, B.M., Add. 7688, f. 128; Bod. 2711, ff. 61a-62a; the letter occurs in several other MSS. See Calendar No. A. 20. Ismā'il II also offered support to the Timurid Sulaimān Mirza in the latter's bid to re-establish himself in Badakhshān. The former's early death cut the matter short.

Ismā'il II was succeeded by his blind brother, Shah Muḥammad Khudābanda¹ in Ramaḍān 985/November 1577. His was a troubled reign: nobles were all-powerful, provincial governors acted independently, the inherent jealousy between the leading Qizilbāsh tribes increased, and, in consequence, the royal authority became virtually paralysed.² The Turks took advantage of the situation and repeatedly invaded Iran.³ Khudābanda in his predicament sent an embassy to India headed by Sultan Qulī Chandān Oghlī asking for help. Akbar meditated sending one of his sons to Persia with the professed intention of punishing the Qizilbāsh nobles for their unruliness and truculence and even thought of going in person to Khurāsān to help the Shah against the Turks, but nothing actually came out.⁴

SEC. II: THE UZBEGS

A new factor now affected Indo-Persian relations. This was the rise of 'Abdullah Khan Uzbek. Born in 940/1533, he was by 968/1561 when he became master of Bukhārā, already a power to reckon with; in the same year he proclaimed his father, Iskandar Khan, Khan or the chief overlord of Tūrān. From then onward he steadily expanded his power and territory. He seized Balkh in 1572-3, occupied Badakhshān in 1584; and in 1588 invaded Khurāsān most of which passed into his hands. By 1583 he had already been proclaimed Khan of Tūrān on the death of his father.⁵

The emergence of 'Abdullah Khan as a power affected Akbar in two ways: first, by the threat to Akbar's western marches and the death-knell to his designs of occupying his ancestral lands in Central Asia;⁶ and secondly, by 'Abdullah's persistent proposal of forming an alliance against Persia and of launching a joint invasion with a view to occupy and partition the country. It is this second aspect with which we are primarily concerned, but it is inextricably linked up with the first. The confusion which followed Ṭahmāsp's death and continued for some two decades,⁷ formed the background to 'Abdullah

1. The *Enc. Islam* (New Ed.), p. 8, ascribes (inaccurately) the blinding of Khudābanda to 'Abbās I. Cf. *A.A.A.*, p. 96, which says he became blind during his boyhood.

2. See *A.A.A.*, section on Khudābanda, and p. 273; Falsafi, *'Abbās-i Awwal*, I, p. 53f.

3. Falsafi, *op. cit.*, p. 47f, gives a detailed account.

4. See Akbar's letter to 'Abdullah Khan Uzbek, *A.N.*, III, pp. 497-501; Tūsi, ff. 366-44a; Falsafi, *'Abbās-i Awwal*, I, pp. 216-17. The date of the embassy from Shah Khudābanda is nowhere recorded.

5. The *'Abdullah Nama* and the *Tawārikh-i Badī'a* are the best authorities on 'Abdullah Khan, see the Note on sources. For modern accounts, see Vambéry's *History of Bokhara* and Howorth's *History of the Mongols*.

6. For Akbar's designs on Central Asia, see *A.N.*, III, pp. 211-12, tr., p. 296; also see Abul Faḍl's letter to Ḥakīm Humām, *Mukātabāt* (Nawalkishore edition), p. 197.

7. Ṭahmāsp died in 984/1576. 'Abbās I came to the throne in 996/1588, freed himself from the tutelage of the nobles in 998/1590, and concluded peace with the Ottomans the same year. He recovered Khurāsān from the Uzbeks in 1598. Browne, IV, pp. 98-104; Falsafi, *'Abbās-i Awwal*, I, pp. 133, 145.

Khan's ambitious territorial designs on Persia.

Let us now briefly review Akbar's diplomatic intercourse with 'Abdullah Khan from the angle of Indo-Persian relations. In 980/1572-3, when 'Abdullah's conquest of Balkh had pushed his frontiers closer to India, he sent an envoy to Akbar. As the Emperor, says Abul Faḍl, was then meditating conquest of Tūrān, he received the envoy coldly and, in order to discourage further diplomatic exchanges, merely sent a reply by the Uzbeg envoy.¹ The nature of the proposals brought by the envoy is not revealed but it may be surmised from subsequent developments that they were directed against Persia.²

Five years later 'Abdullah Khan sent his second embassy. By 1577 his own power had greatly enhanced and Shah Tahmāsp was dead. The situation had changed favourably for 'Abdullah and he designed to re-establish Uzbeg power in Khurāsān. He, therefore, proposed to Akbar a joint invasion of Persia. This time Akbar sent a return embassy under Mirza Fūlād with a letter to the effect that "the (Persian) dynasty was specially connected with the family of the Holy Prophet, and that on this ground he could not regard a difference in law and religion as sufficient reason for conquest. He (Akbar) was also withheld from such an enterprise by old and valued friendship."³

The selection of Mirza Fūlād for this embassy is not without significance, for he was a fanatical Sunnī⁴ and was likely to suit the orthodox Tūrānians. Akbar's attitude towards 'Abdullah Khan had changed since the last Uzbeg embassy. 'Abdullah's power could no longer be ignored. Indeed his proposal for a joint invasion of Persia seems to have considerably exercised Akbar's mind, for a further expansion of 'Abdullah's territory was sure to disturb the balance of power to the disadvantage of Akbar.

Akbar's letter sent by Mirza Fūlād deserves close study. It also gives a clear indication of the points raised by 'Abdullah Khan in his letter, no copy of which is known to exist. 'Abdullah had referred to the difficulties faced by pilgrims to Mecca as a justification for taking action against Persia. Akbar replied that with the conquest of Gujārāt, a new route had been opened⁵.

1. *A.N.*, II, p. 368, tr., 534, III, p. 211, tr., 296-7.

2. It would be going a bit too far to infer that the proposals contained a scheme for the partition of Persia (Cf. R. C. Varma, 'Akbar and 'Abdullah Khan,' *I.C.*, 1947, p. 381). In 1572 Tahmāsp was still alive.

3. *A.N.*, III, tr. p. 297 (also see Beveridge's footnote, p. 297), text, pp. 211-12. For details, see Calendar No. Tx. 327.

4. *A.N.*, III, p. 527, tr., 803-4; Badāyūnī, II, p. 364. Mirza Fūlād murdered Mullā Aḥmad Thattawī, a Shi'a and one of the main compilers of the *Tārīkh-i-Alfi*, in 996/1588 at Lahore.

5. It is a matter of curious interest to recall Mullā Badāyūnī's story that Maḥdūmul Mulk, Akbar's *Shaiḥkhul Islām*, gave a legal injunction against proceeding on pilgrimage to Mecca through Persia on the ground of that country being in Shi'ite hands. Badāyūnī, II, p. 203.

'Abdullah had suggested to Akbar the recovery of his hereditary Mughul domain of Qandahār. Akbar replied that as the Persian rulers (i.e., the Mirzas of Qandahār) had been sending submissive embassies and had been mindful of maintaining security of roads for merchants, they had been left alone and undisturbed even after Ṭahmāsp's death, but if they departed from this norm, the Mughul armies could take Qandahār without difficulty. Akbar parried Abdullah's plea to launch a holy war against the "heretical" Safavids, by referring to his wars against the infidels in India and to his intended crusade against the Europeans (i.e., the Portuguese). Finally, Akbar objected to 'Abdullah's insulting reference to the Safavids and said they were Sayyids and sovereigns.¹

It is obvious from the tenor of Akbar's reply, and more especially from his disdainful rejection of 'Abdullah's proposal about Qandahār, that he wanted to deter the Khan from his aggressive designs on Persia.

The next embassy from 'Abdullah Khan arrived in 994/1586. The intervening decade had witnessed two important developments. 'Abdullah Khan had taken Balkh from the Timurid Shāhrukh Mirza in 991/1583;² and after Mirza Ḥakīm's death in 993/1585, Akbar had established a firm and direct control over Kābul.³ 'Abdullah's annexation of Badakhshān had brought him to the threshold of the Mughul Empire; Akbar's direct control of Kābul meant a nearer approach to the theatre of 'Abdullah's ambitious designs. Without Akbar's benevolent neutrality, it would have been risky for 'Abdullah to launch an invasion of Khurāsān. Akbar, as we have seen earlier, had no desire to see the Uzbegs gain at the expense of Persia. His real concern was, however, not Persia but the security of his north-west frontier and for that purpose the acquisition of Qandahār.

'Abdullah's letter brought by Mīr Quraish in 994/1586, gives no clue to the purpose of the embassy.⁴ The *'Abdullah Nāma* says he was instructed to inform Akbar of the projected Uzbeg campaign in Khurāsān and to invite the latter to join it in order to break the heretical Safavid power and open the way for pilgrims to Mecca.⁵ This certainly contains an element of truth, for the

1. Akbar's letter appears in the *Jāmi'ul Inshā*, B. M. Or. 1702, ff. 196b-199a; also in F.Q., ff. 177-81, and in the *Majma'ul Inshā*, B.M. Or. 1599, f. 196f. Calendar No. Tx. 327.

2. *'Abdullah Nama*, ff. 435f. Shāhrukh was grandson of Sulaimān Mirza who was son of Khan Mirza, for whom see Chapter II above. Shāhrukh, his grandfather, and his son Muḥammad Zamān Mirza (pretender) had a long wrangle with 'Abdullah Khan as well as among themselves. See A.N., III, pp. 148-57, 210-11, 267, 287-9, 434, 491-2; Badāyūnī, II, 343-4, 346, 355, 394-5. Also see Calendar No. Tx. 328 which is Abul Fadl's letter to Shāhrukh Mirza.

3. A.N., III, pp. 466-86; Firishta, I, p. 505.

4. F.Q., I.O. MS., pp. 181-5; also in the *Jāmi'ul Inshā*, B.M. Or. 1702, ff. 199a-201b. Calendar No. Tx. 329.

5. *'Abdullah Nāma*, f. 463b. The *Akbar Nāma* is only partially correct in ascribing the Uzbeg embassy to 'Abdullah's grave apprehension from Akbar's presence in the north-west

reply sent by Akbar through the return embassy led by Ḥakīm Humāmī, answers the points mentioned in the 'Abdullah Nāma. It says that though the Safavids were not Sunnīs, they were nevertheless Sayyids and had hereditary friendship with the Mughuls, and that some of the Persian nobles had been guilty of insubordination towards their sovereign, and the Ottoman Sultan, taking undue advantage of the weak state of Persia, had repeatedly invaded it; and that he (Akbar) felt duty bound to go to the aid of Persia, especially as a Persian embassy was on its way to India.¹ Further, Akbar requested 'Abdullah Khan to proceed to Khurāsān so that they could meet and jointly devise appropriate measures to assist the ruler of Iran.²

Akbar's proposal disguised a plan to accommodate rival interests in Persia, even though the suggestion is cast in the form of a proposal to help that country. This, of course, was diplomacy. The fact of the matter is that Akbar very much wanted the possession of Qandahār and was not altogether averse to 'Abdullah Khan taking a slice of Persia. The latter's enhanced prestige and the interminable confusion in Iran had made Akbar change his attitude realistically towards Uzbek territorial ambitions in Persia.

While Akbar's envoy, Ḥakīm Humāmī, was still on his way, 'Abdullah Khan had already invaded Khurāsān (995/1587) most of which he eventually occupied.³ Ḥakīm Humāmī's embassy was directed at arranging some settlement with 'Abdullah regarding Persia. The latter's march into Khurāsān made matters still more urgent; so we find Abul Faḍl urging Ḥakīm Humāmī to expedite a satisfactory settlement with the Uzbek chief.⁴ The resulting pact fixed the Hindūkush as the boundary between the two dominions.⁵ In regions of his empire. *A.N.*, III, pp. 486, 491, 496.

1. It is not clear which Persian embassy is meant. The next embassy from Persia came in A.H. 999; the previous embassy was from Prince 'Abbās Mirza in A.H. 991 or soon after. (See below).

2. There are two versions of this letter, both similar in substance. Ḥakīm Abul Faṭḥ Gilānī prepared the first draft; Akbar then asked Abul Faḍl to redraft it. (See note in *J. Inshā*, B.M. Or. 1702 ff. 201a-2a and in *F.Q.*, pp. 185-6). Surprisingly, the draft which is ascribed to the former appears in the *Akbar Nāma*, III, pp. 497-501. Both drafts are given in the *Mukātabāt-i 'Allāmī*, B.M. Add. 6548, ff. 14b-19b, Calcutta Ed. pp. 9-20. The *A.N.* version is given in Tūsi, f. 36b-44b and in B.M. Or. 3482, ff. 283b-86a. For further details see Calendar No. Tx. 330.

3. The 'Abdullah Nāma, ff. 465a-96b, gives a very detailed account of the siege and capture of Herāt; it also describes a *darbār* held by 'Abdullah Khan Uzbek at which Ḥakīm Humāmī and the Ṣadr-i Jahān were present.

4. *Mukātabāt-i 'Allāmī*, pp. 197-8 (Nawalkishore Ed.). Calendar No. Tx. 331.

5. *A.N.*, III, p. 705; Calendar No. Tx. 334, Akbar's letter to 'Abdullah Khan Uzbek. *Baḍī'a*, ff. 138b-9a, quotes 'Abdullah's *farmān* to his commanders not to invest Qandahār:

چہ ما را با اکبر بادشاہ نسبت قرابت سابق و رشتہ صداقت در میان است . . . بین الجانیین
مصلحت و قرار داد بران اتفاق افتاد کہ ہندو کوہ و قندہار فاصلہ و واسطہ حدین

effect it gave Badakhshān and Khurāsān to 'Abdullah Khan, and Kābūl and Qandahār to Akbar. The agreement involved an undertaking not to interfere in each other's sphere of influence. The undertaking was not always respected by the parties. 'Abdullah Khan and his ambitious son 'Abdul Mu'min Khan did not altogether give up their interest in Qandahār, though they avoided a clash over it.¹ Nor did Akbar forsake his interest in Badakhshān,² but when the hereditary head of Sistān, which was threatened by the Uzbeks, sent urgent appeals to Akbar for help (1005/1697), the latter abstained from intervention and sent orders to the Mughul governor of Qandahār to keep clear of any collision with the Uzbeks.³

Akbar also evinced interest in having diplomatic relations with Kāshghar and China⁴.

SEC. III: AKBAR AND SHAH 'ABBĀS I

Prince 'Abbās Mirza, Shah Muḥammad Khudābanda's son and Viceroy of Khurāsān, attempted to establish diplomatic relations with Akbar. He and his advisers sent an envoy, Murshid Tabrīzī, in or after 991/1583, to seek assistance from Akbar to consolidate their shaky position in Khurāsān.⁵ According to Abul Faḍl, Akbar did not consider the embassy worthy of reply as 'Abbās Mirza was then in revolt against his father.⁶ Persia was then in a state of turmoil and Akbar could disdainfully ignore an embassy from a boy-prince in his early 'teens. Moreover, Akbar had been angry with the Safavids since Ṭahmāsp's capture of Qandahār. Indeed, as the Safavid chronicles point out and as Shah 'Abbās later complained in a letter, Akbar did not even care to send a condolence embassy on Shah Ṭahmāsp's death.⁷

The reign of Shah Khudābanda was marked by foreign incursions and internal revolts. For a time he was at war with the powerful nobles of Khurāsān and with his own son, 'Abbās Mirza, Viceroy of the province. Later in 995/1587, when 'Abbās marched to Qazvin, his blind father abdicated the throne in his favour. Shah 'Abbās formally ascended the throne in 996/1588.

ملکین باشد .

Akbar also in a subsequent letter to Shah 'Abbās I refers to the Hindūkush as the boundary of his empire: *A.N.*, III, p. 657.

1. *A.N.*, III, p. 669; *A.A.A.*, p. 331; Badāyūnī, II, p. 402; *Badi'a*, f. 138a-b.

2. Dr. Jahangir Khan has dealt with this in detail in his unpublished thesis, p. 99n; also see R. C. Varma's art. in *Islamic Culture*, 1947, p. 387.

3. The *Ihyā'ul Mulūk*, a contemporary history of Sistān, gives a detailed and first-hand account, ff. 156b-7a.

4. See Akbar's letter to the ruler of Kāshghar, Calendar No. Tx. 336. *Mukātabāt-i 'Allāmi*, pp. 25-26.

5. *A.N.*, III, p. 588, places it after Shah Khudābanda's return from Herāt which took place in early summer, Jumādā I 991/1583; Falsafi, *'Abbās-i Awval*, I, p. 77.

6. *A.N.*, III, pp. 587-8; the *Ma'dan-i Akhbār-i Ahmadi* (Ethé 121), f. 334a-b, gives a confused paraphrase of the *A.N.*

7. *A.A.A.*, pp. 290-1; *Khuld*, IV, f. 212b; for the Shah's letter, see below.

By 998/1590 he had freed himself from the tutelage of the nobles; the same year he concluded peace with the Ottomans at the price of Tabrīz. Thus freed from his main worries, he turned to consolidate his position at home and abroad.¹

In 999/1591 Shah 'Abbās I took the initiative in re-establishing diplomatic relations with the Mughul empire on a formal basis. He sent an embassy led by Yādgār Sultan Rūmlū.² The Shah was then hard pressed by the Uzbegs who were in occupation of the major part of Khurāsān; he requested Akbar's support against them.³ The royal letter brought by Yādgār Sultan is a fairly long one and in the traditional style of oriental diplomatic epistolography, with an elaborate beginning and a long string of titles. After referring to the friendship between their respective ancestors, the letter recalls Shah Ṭahmāsp's solicitude for maintaining cordial relations with Akbar (the addressee) and his embassy to India on the death of Humāyūn, and contrasts this with Akbar's failure to send a condolatory embassy on the death of Ṭahmāsp or that of Sultan Ḥamza Mirza (elder brother of Shah 'Abbās and Safavid crown-prince, who was murdered in 994/1586). The letter concluded by expressing a hope for reciprocity of goodwill from Akbar's side.⁴

According to Abul Faḍl, Akbar held a council to consider the question of aid to Shah 'Abbās; some of those present counselled him to send one of his sons to liberate Khurāsān from the Uzbegs, but the suggestion was rejected in view of the frequent friendly embassies sent by the Uzbeg ruler.⁵ 'Abdullah Khan and his son, 'Abdul Mu'min Khan, did send some embassies in 999/1591 and the following years.⁶ The presence of the Persian envoy at the Mughul court was itself a sufficient reason for the Uzbegs to renew their diplomatic activity. But the real cause for the negative decision on the aid to Persia was that Akbar's understanding with 'Abdullah Khan on the question of mutual frontiers and respective zones of special interests still held good, in spite of minor violations by both sides (see above). Subsequently Akbar wrote to 'Abdullah Khan, in reply to one of his embassies, that Shah 'Abbās had sent Yādgār Sultan to seek Mughul aid (against the Uzbegs), but that he (Akbar)

1. For details, see *A.A.A.*, p. 279ff, and Falsafī, '*Abbās-i Awwal*, I, pp. 142-50; also see Browne, IV, pp. 100-2; von Hammer, VII, pp. 222-3.

2. Also called Shāmlū, *A.N.*, III, 656, 705, tr., p. 893n. I prefer Rūmlū, see *A.N.*, III, 588; *A.A.A.*, p. 291; *Khuld*, IV, f. 212b; Falsafī, '*Abbās-i Awwal*, I, p. 218.

3. *A.A.A.*, p. 291; *A.N.*, III, pp. 588, 705; *Badi'a*, f. 138a, says that Shah 'Abbās proposed joint military action against the Uzbegs. The Shah's letter (see below) contains no request for help, which was evidently communicated orally.

4. *N.J.M.*, B.M., Add 7688, ff. 202b-205a: part of the letter is given in Falsafī, pp. 218-21. Calendar No. A. 25. For Ḥamza Mirza, see *A.A.A.*, p. 253-5.

5. *A.N.*, III, p. 588.

6. *A.N.*, III, pp. 573, 583-4, 703-4, 706; also see R. C. Varma's art. in *Islamic Culture*, 1947, pp. 387-8.

had turned down the request.¹

Akbar recovers Qandahār

The project of taking Qandahār had never been absent from Akbar's mind. In its account of the year 982/1574-5, the *Akbar Nāma* enumerates Qandahār as one of the as yet unrecovered provinces of the empire.² The death of Ṭahmāsp and of Sultan Ḥusain Mirza Ṣafavī, Viceroy of Qandahār, in the same year (A.H. 984)³ afforded an opportunity to Akbar to retrieve the fort, but he deferred action. The reason advanced by Abul Faḍl, that Sultan Ḥusain Mirza had been sending emissaries with submissive messages, is not altogether convincing.⁴ However, it is possible that Sultan Ḥusain Mirza's submissive attitude during his lifetime weighed with Akbar in leaving Qandahār for a while in the hands of the Mirza's sons after his death. But the main reason for Akbar's inaction was that his task of consolidating his empire in India was still far from complete: Sind and Kashmīr were still beyond the pale of the empire while Kābul was in the hostile hands of Mirza Ḥakīm.⁵

In 995/1587 or soon after, Akbar arrived at an understanding with 'Abdullah Khan Uzbek over Qandahār (see above). Still action was deferred. The official explanation for this is given in Akbar's *farmān* dated 37th regnal year/1592, to Rājī 'Alī Khan of Khāndēsh.⁶ It says that one of the purposes of his (Akbar's) prolonged sojourn in the Panjab was the recovery of Qandahār; but as Shah 'Abbās was then involved in difficulties, he (Akbar) had left the fort with the Mirzas (sons of Sultan Ḥusain Mirza Ṣafavī).⁷ Perhaps the real reason was the preoccupation of Mughul armies in the conquest and consolidation of the frontier regions to which Akbar gave priority.⁸ Moreover, he wanted to avoid the use of force; and judging by subsequent developments, a campaign to win over the Mirzas of Qandahār through the agency of the

1. See Akbar's letter, *A.N.*, III, pp. 704f; Atakī, f. 175a-6a. Calendar No. Tx. 334. For a fuller discussion, see A. Rahim, *I.C.*, 1937, pp. 89-90.

2. *A.N.*, III, p. 117.

3. *A.A.A.*, pp. 93, 148.

4. Indeed, Abul Faḍl's mention of the arrival of an embassy from the Mirza in A.H. 985 is self-contradictory and incorrect, for the Mirza's death in A.H. 984 is recorded in the *Akbar Nāma* itself. *A.N.*, III, pp. 209, 645; also see *A.A.A.*, p. 148.

5. Kashmīr was annexed in 994/1586, Sind in 999/1590-1; for Kābul, see p. 53 above.

6. He represented the Fāriqī dynasty of Khāndēsh, see Smith, *Akbar, the Great Mogul*, pp. 246 and 270. His name is written generally (and inaccurately, we believe) as Rājā 'Alī Khan. Thus Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 247n, approvingly cites Haig, "The title of Rājā, which was inoffensive to Akbar, had been used by the founder of the dynasty, Rājā Aḥmad or Malik Rājā." (Haig, *Indus Delta Country*, 1918, p. 144).

7. For the *farmān*, see *Mukātabat-i 'Allāmi*, Calcutta Ed., pp. 52-7. Calendar No. A. 34.

8. The *Akbar Nāma*, III, gives a detailed account of these campaigns; also Dr. Jahangir Khan, Chapter IV.

Mughul governors of Kābul and of other neighbouring areas, was already under way.

The first definite move over Qandahār was made as early as 997/1589. According to the *Akbar Nāma*, the Emperor decided to send an expedition to Qandahār in 999/1591, and appointed *Khān-Khānān* 'Abdur Raḥīm to lead it.¹ But Abul Faḍl's letters show that the task was assigned to the *Khān-Khānān* in 997/1589, for as early as Šafar 998/December 1589 we find Abul Faḍl already urging the *Khān-Khānān* not to postpone the Qandahār campaign.² The method to be followed by the latter is also clearly indicated in one of Abul Faḍl's letters: The *Khān-Khānān* was first to win over the Balūchs and Afghānis of the tract between the Mughul frontier and Qandahār "with the tongue of assurance and the hand of bounty." Next he was to advance rapidly on Qandahār, as a situation so favourable might not reoccur. Once more he was to try the golden key rather than the sword.³ The advice is understandable, for any overt military pressure might have turned the Mirzas of Qandahār towards the Uzbeks who were still very much interested in this region. (See above.) The same letter contains a curious sentence to the effect that the reduction of Qandahār would be a prelude to the conquest of Persia.⁴ This was perhaps a literary flourish. However, the idea of conquering Sistān (where Persian authority had become more or less ineffective since Ṭahmāsp's death)⁵ did exercise Akbar's mind for some time.⁶

'Abdur Raḥīm *Khān-Khānān*, on the advice of his counsellors, decided to eschew the Qandahār campaign and to turn to the conquest of Thatta as it promised more booty. This brought on him Akbar's censure and Abul Faḍl wrote to him a number of letters reflecting the Emperor's displeasure.⁷ The appointment of Mirza Dāniyāl (Akbar's son) in early 1000/late 1591 to head the Qandahār expedition led to nothing.⁸

The Mirzas of Qandahār, Muẓaffar Ḥusain Mirza and Rustam Mirza,⁹

1. *A.N.*, III, pp. 584, 601.

2. *Mukātabāt-i 'Allāmī*, Calcutta Ed., pp. 95-7; the letter is dated Jalālābād, Šafar, 998. Calendar No. A. 23.

3. *Mukātabāt-i 'Allāmī*, pp. 97-8. Other letters in the same work, pp. 99-102, are also relevant. Calendar Nos. A.26 *et seq.*

4. *Mukātabāt-i 'Allāmī*, pp. 97-8. Calendar No. A. 31.

5. The *Ihyā'ul Mulūk*, a contemporary history of Sistān, gives a detailed account, ff. 99a ff.

6. Akbar's *farmān* to Rājī 'Alī Khan, cited above mentions it. Calendar No. A. 34.

7. There are several letters in the *Mukātabāt-i 'Allāmī* (Calcutta Ed.) to this effect, see pp. 92-100; Akbar's anger, however, subsided the same year, see *op. cit.*, pp. 100-2, letters dated Ramaḍān, 999/June-July, 1591, and Ābān, 36th regnal year/Oct. 1591. Also see Beveridge's footnote, *A.N.*, tr., III, p. 917. The *Ma'āthir-i Raḥīmī* (II, pp. 345, 357) understandably avoids all mention of the royal displeasure. Also see Calendar Nos. A. 29 and 30.

8. *A.N.*, III, pp. 503-4.

9. See notices of their careers in *M.U.*, III, pp. 296f., 434f.

sons of the late Sultan Ḥusain Mirzā Ṣafavī, were in an unenviable position. The two brothers were at loggerheads and were constantly wrangling for each other's possessions. Their relations with their neighbours in Sīstān were none too friendly. The Uzbegs, now in possession of Khurāsān, could at any time seize Qandahār. The Mirzas could not expect any help from Shah 'Abbās who was still struggling to overcome Persia's domestic and foreign troubles. The Mirzas probably knew of the understanding between 'Abdullah Khan and Akbar regarding Qandahār,¹ and in any case were conscious of the latter's determination to acquire the fort.² Rustam Mirza, the younger brother, was the first to succumb to the pressure of the circumstances and to decide to go to India. His affairs of late had been going badly and his main stronghold, Zamīn-Dāwar, had been the target of repeated attacks by the Uzbegs who eventually occupied it.³ Rustam Mirza opened negotiations with Sharīf Khan, the Mughul commander of Ghaznī, and also sent an offer of submission to the Mughul court. Circumstances suggest that the Mughul commander had been already in communication with the Mirza for some time. In Muḥarram 1002/September 1593, Rustam Mirza arrived at the Mughul court where he was accorded a splendid reception. He was given the rank of 5000 and the governorship of Multān.⁴ Akbar now had the gratification of having a Safavid prince in his service. The deliberate magnitude of Rustam Mirza's reception ceremonies and of his emoluments were aimed at influencing Muẓaffar Mirza.⁵ The latter indeed could not long resist the temptation of exchanging the trouble-ridden, uncertain governorship of Qandahār for a comfortable, high-salaried sinecure in the Mughul empire.⁶ And he knew that in any case the Mughuls would not leave him in peace at Qandahār.⁷ 'Abdullah Khan Uzbeg, coming to know of Muẓaffar Mirza's intention, sent him a message assuring him of his own friendship, advising him not to give up his ancestral domain of Qandahār to the Chaghataīs, and offering to molest him no longer. The Mirza, however, refused to trust the Khan's assurance in view of recurrent Uzbeg attacks. Akbar sent him assurances of high honour and big rewards. An old seryant of Muẓaffar Mirza's father acted as a go-

1. See *Badī'a*, f. 138b.

2. See *A.N.*, III, pp. 646, 650.

3. *A.N.*, III, p. 669; *Badī'a*, f. 138b.

4. *A.N.*, III, pp. 645-6; *Tab.Ak.*, II, p. 423; *Badāyūnī*, II, p. 338; *Firishta*, I, p. 511; *Dhakhīratul Khawānīn*, I, (Karachi Ed.), p. 99. Rustam Mirza's arrival at the Chenāb in 1001/1592-93, is noted in the *M.U.*, tr., II, p. 633.

5. *A.A.A.*, p. 331. As the *M.U.* (tr. II, p. 633) points out, high favours were shown to Rustam Mirza "as it was desired to encourage his elder brother."

6. *Khuld*, IV, f. 237b.

7. See *A.N.*, III, p. 650.

between and arranged matters smoothly.¹ The Mirza decided to proceed to India and sent his mother and son in advance to the Mughul court where they arrived in Jumādā II-Rajab 1002/April 1594. Akbar appointed Shah Beg to take over Qandahār. Muẓaffar Mirza, it appears, had second thoughts about giving up the fort, but by that time the Mughuls had arrived in force and he had to vacate it. The Mughuls entered Qandahār in March 1595 (Rajab-Sha'abān 1003).² They soon recovered Zamīn-Dawār and Garmsīr from the Uzbegs; the Uzbek governor of Herāt, Qul Bābā, thought it prudent to make friendly overtures to the Mughuls.³ Muẓaffar Mirza who arrived at the court in 1004/August 1595, was placed in the rank of 5000 and appointed governor of Sambal.⁴ It might be added that while Rustam Mirza had amiable relations with Akbar and his successors, Muẓaffar Mirza had soon unpleasantness with the court and desired to leave the country; he died in 1012/1603-4.⁵

That Uzbek pressure on Qandahār and its neighbourhood was one of the main factors which undermined the position of the Mirzas and made them vulnerable to the tempting offers from the Mughul side, is abundantly clear from the *Akbar Nāma*, the *Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī*, and the *Tawārikh-i Badī'a*, written respectively from the Mughul, the Safavid and the Uzbek points of view.⁶ Shah 'Abbās could hardly have liked the passing of Qandahār into Mughul hands. His immediate reaction is not recorded in the *Ālam Ārā*, though the *Khald-i Barīn*, a later work, has a hint of his displeasure.⁷ Perhaps in the context of the entire situation on Persia's eastern border, the Mughul occupation of Qandahār would have appeared to the Shah as the lesser evil; the greater evil would have been the passing of Qandahār into Uzbek hands, which would have made the Uzbek power more deeply entrenched in *Khurāsān*. It is significant that in his reply to Akbar's letter which had explained the Mughul position vis-à-vis Qandahār, the Shah makes no comment

1. *A.A.A.*, pp. 331-2; *Badī'a's* account, ff. 138b-39a, is partial and inaccurate.

2. *A.N.*, III, pp. 668-9; *Badāyūnī*, II, p. 402; *A.A.A.*, pp. 326-32 (its date of Mughul entry as A.H. 1000 is inaccurate); *Khald*, IV, f. 233a-28b (follows the *A.A.A.*); I, *M.U.*, II pp. 299-300; *Badī'a*, ff. 138b-39a. The recent capture of Siwī by the Mughuls (Jumādā II 1003/Feb. 1595) may also have influenced Muẓaffar Mirza not to hold out at this stage against the Mughuls. Abul Faḍl has, however, exaggerated the importance of Siwī in relation to Qandahār; *A.N.*, III, p. 666, *Beveridge's* footnote, p. 1021.

3. *A.N.*, III, p. 669; also *Badī'a*, f. 138b-39a; *Badāyūnī*, II, p. 402.

4. *A.N.*, III, p. 671; *A.A.A.*, p. 332; Du Jarric, *Histoire*, p. 64 (also see p. 236) gives a description of Muẓaffar Mirza's presentation at the court.

5. *A.N.*, III, pp. 711-12, 743, 823, *A.N.*, tr., p. 1234. *A.A.A.*, p. 332, gives the date of death as 1008; the same in *M.U.*, tr., II, p. 354, but see *loc. cit.*, n. 3.

6. *A.N.*, III, pp. 669, 671; *A.A.A.*, p. 331; *Badī'a*, ff. 138a-39a, also *M.U.*, III, pp. 298-9.

7. For references, see n. 1 above.

about the fort. Any demand for the restoration of Qandahār, so long as Khurāsān was in alien hands, would indeed have looked ridiculous. One of the first things Shah 'Abbās did after recovering Khurāsān was to ask Akbar for the restoration of Qandahār.¹

Embassy of Mirza Diyāuddīn

Akbar had detained the envoy of Shah 'Abbās, Yādgār Sultan Rūmlū, for more than four years.² It is significant that the envoy was not given leave till the acquisition of Qandahār had become a certainty. Some time after Muẓaffār Mirza had communicated his desire to come to India, Akbar decided to dismiss the Persian envoy, and sent along with him Mirza Diyāuddīn as his ambassador and Abū Naṣr Khawāfi as the keeper of gifts for the Shah (1003/Nov. 1594).³ The ambassador carried a royal letter drafted by Abul Faḍl. It is a fairly long letter and deserves close attention. Akbar therein admits the justice of the Shah's complaints regarding his being remiss in his relations with the Safavids and proceeds to give reasons. After mentioning his recent preoccupation with the conquest of Kashmīr and the pacification of the Afghāns and the Balūches, who were "a thorn in the path of the Persian travellers,"⁴ Akbar says that in view of the commotion and anarchy in Persia following Ṭahmāsp's death, he had felt that a merely formal embassy of condolence would be out of place, and therefore, he wanted to send aid; this, however, was held up due to the situation in Qandahār. Akbar gives an interesting explanation of his position regarding Qandahār: the Mirzas of Qandahār had been of late not so loyal to their Safavid sovereign as they should have been; so he decided to send his own contingent to take over Qandahār, so that if the Mirzas agreed to serve the Shah, the combined forces of the Mughul expedition and the Mirzas could proceed to help the Shah in any manner he liked. But as he (Akbar) had not previously consulted the Shah on the matter, he stayed action lest people might misunderstand it. In the meanwhile Rustam Mirza submitted and Muẓaffār Mirza sent his mother and son as a preparatory step to his own coming to India. Referring to reports of continued disturbances in Persia, Akbar advised the Shah to labour for the welfare of his people, asked him to keep him (Akbar) posted about the situation there, and counselled him to follow a policy of religious toleration—the letter

1. See p. 64 below.

2. According to the *A.N.*, III, p. 588, the Persian envoy arrived at the Mughul court in 999 and left in 1003; the *A.A.A.*, p. 361, says that he left Persia in 999 and arrived back in 1005.

3. The *A.N.*, III, pp. 656f., names them Diyāul Mulk and Abū Naṣr; the *A.A.A.*, p. 361, calls them Diyāuddīn Kāshī and Abū Naṣr Khawāfi, and notes that both were Persian. Cf. Dr. Rahim'a art., *Islamic Culture*, 1934, pp. 471, 472.

4. *A.N.*, III, tr., p. 1010 (text, p. 658).

here gives a closely reasoned argument in favour of toleration. Akbar also cleverly dropped a hint of his friendship with 'Abdullah Khan, thus forestalling any possible request from Shah 'Abbās for help against the Uzbegs. Finally, Akbar accounted the delay in dismissing Yādgār Sultan to the Mughul campaigns in Thatta and Sind whose conquest, Akbar says, opened up a closer and safer route to Persia.¹ This explanation was partially true, as the Uzbek control of *Khurasān* and their marauding activity in the Qandahār-Sistān region, had made the overland route to Persia unsafe.² The retiring Persian ambassador and the accompanying Mughul envoys were directed to proceed to Lāhōrī Bandar in Sind and from there to sail to Hormuz in Persia.³ Yādgār Sultan Rūmlū and the Indian envoys left the Mughul court in October 1594 (early 1003) and their arrival at the Persian court is recorded in the '*Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī*' in the year 1005/1596-7.⁴ As to why they took such a long time to reach their destination is not clear; it may possibly be accounted to a discrepancy in the chronology of the *Akbar Nāma* and the '*Ālam Ārā*', of which there are other examples as well.⁵

This was the first full-fledged embassy from the Mughul Emperor for more than four decades and Shah 'Abbās naturally made much of it. He warmly received the envoys at Qazvīn. The city was illuminated and various festivities were held in their honour.⁶ Abul Faḍl says the Shah received Akbar's envoys as a dutiful son.⁷

The affairs of Shah 'Abbās I had been proceeding favourably. He had concluded peace with the Turks, though at the cost of some territory.⁸ He had broken the power of the nobles and firmly established his own personal authority.⁹ But in *Khurasān* the Uzbegs were still strong. The Shah would have preferred a closer alliance with the Mughuls against the Uzbegs, but he knew this was impossible on account of Akbar's understanding with the Uzbek chief. Despite this, he considered friendship with the Mughuls valuable so as to forestall a closer alliance between the Uzbegs and the Mughuls. Such

1. The letter appears in: *A.N.*, III, pp. 656-61; *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 205a-6b; *Tūsī*, ff. 135b-42b; and several other collections of correspondence. Calendar No. A. 36. For date of the Sind campaigns, see p. 57 n. 5 above.

2. *Ihyā'ul Mulūk*, a contemporary history of Sistān, gives a detailed account, ff. 114ff.

3. *A.N.*, III, p. 656; the *A.A.A.*, p. 361, and the *Khuld-i Barīn*, IV, f. 257a, say the envoys came by way of Kij, Makrān and Kirmān.

4. *A.N.*, III, p. 656; *A.A.A.*, p. 361.

5. *E.g.*, Akbar's occupation of Qandahār, see p. 60 n. 2 above.

6. *A.A.A.*, p. 361; *Khuld*, IV, f. 257b.

7. For Abul Faḍl's fanciful account of Akbar's slippers being received by the Shah (text, III, p. 745), see Beveridge's footnote, *A.N.*, tr., III, p. 1112.

8. *A.A.A.*, pp. 350, 372; Falsafī, '*Abbās-i Awwal*', I, 147-50.

9. Falsafī, I, pp. 142-7; Browne, IV, pp. 104-6. Also see Savory, *The Principal Offices of the Safawid State*, B.S.O.A.S., Vol. XXIV, Part 1, p. 84.

an alliance had been frequently mooted by the Uzbek leaders who tried to play on the theme of anti-Shiism as a force binding the two powers against the Safavids. Little wonder, therefore, that Shah 'Abbās was so well pleased by the arrival of the Mughul embassy. His early dismissal of the Indian envoys also indicates a desire to improve relations with Akbar.¹

Next year (1006/1598) Shah 'Abbās dismissed the Indian envoys and appointed Minūchihr Beg, *Eshik Āqāsī Bāshī*,² to accompany them to India as Persian ambassador. The Shah entrusted to him a letter addressed to Akbar. The *Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī* makes a brief reference to its contents and says it solicited Akbar's blessings for the Shah's intended campaign against the Uzbeks.³ Besides, there are two versions of the text of the letter; both seem to be genuine; both deal with the points contained in Akbar's letter. One of them, we maintain, was a draft which was not sent, while the other represents the letter actually brought by Minūchihr. Both of them are important for the purpose of understanding the way Shah 'Abbās's mind was working on Perso-Indian relations. The version which is evidently the unused draft, as it employs the word *fulān* (such and such) a number of times, is written in a more assertive spirit, places Shah 'Abbās on a footing of equality with Akbar and forcefully asserts the truth of the revealed Faith against the religious eclecticism and the doctrine of "Peace with all" commended by Akbar.⁴ The other letter which we believe was actually sent has a different tone: it assumes Akbar's seniority and his established position as a great ruler. Referring to Akbar's enquiries about the disturbed situation in Persia, it offers a long explanation,⁵ going over the whole epoch of confusion since Ṭahmāsp's death. It devotes a folio and a half to high praises for Akbar's letter and the counsels contained therein on religious and secular matters. It also seeks Akbar's blessings for the intended campaign against the Uzbeks. The presence of the second version in a number of collections of correspondence (while the former version appears only in one collection) makes it likely to be the one that was actually sent to India. At the same time the rubrics, and even more so the internal evidence of the two drafts, leaves little doubt that both were prepared for the same occasion, i.e., the embassy of Minūchihr Beg.⁶ The preference of the more moderately worded draft for despatch is obviously not

1. See Appendix on Diplomatic Usage, for significance of early dismissals.

2. Grand Usher, or Lord of the Gate.

3. *A.A.A.*, p. 372.

4. See Akbar's letter *A.N.*, III, p. 659, tr., p. 1012.

5. This portion also appears in the unused draft.

6. The draft which we believe was not used appears in the so-called *Ṭahmās Nāma*, Ethé 2067, ff. 41b-54b. The other version appears in: Ethé 2067, ff. 269a-78a; *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 206a-9b; Bayāḍ, 1995, Bankipore, ff. 135b-37a; Tūsi, ff. 142b ff., ascribes it to the composition of I'timādudaula Ḥātim Beg; also see Falsafī, I, pp. 232-41. Calendar Nos. A. 38 and 39.

without significance.

Minūchihir Beg arrived at the Mughul Emperor's court at Lahore in 1007/October 1598. He brought with him a large number of gifts and had 500 Persian warriors in his train. The embassy was well received by Akbar.¹ The foreign situation had undergone a complete change recently. The headstrong 'Abdul Mu'min Khan had fallen out with his father, 'Abdullah Khan. The Uzbek chief died a broken-hearted man in Rajab 1006/February 1598. His death was quickly followed by the assassination of his son and successor, 'Abdul Mu'min Khan, during the same year. Shah 'Abbās acted promptly and marched into Khurāsān most of which he occupied by the end of A.H. 1006. In Muharram 1007/August 1598, he victoriously entered Herāt.² From here he sent an envoy named Mirza 'Alī Beg with a letter to Akbar, announcing his great victory. All the lost parts of his empire, observed the Shah in his communication, had now been recovered except Qandahār, and he hoped that Akbar would not mind returning the fort to him.³

The end of the Uzbek domination of Khurāsān, with all the threats it involved for the Mughul position in Kābul and Qandahār, came as a great relief to Akbar. For fourteen years⁴ he had been staying close to the north-west borders of his empire, keeping a vigilant watch over the intense Uzbek activity across the frontier. It was only after the death of 'Abdullah Khan and of his son that he decided to leave the Panjab and return to Agra.⁵ But while the Persian rule in Khurāsān was likely to be less disturbing than the Uzbek power had been to the Mughul position at Kābul, the situation in regard to Qandahār was different; the Safavids, with their long connection with Qandahār, were bound to attempt its recovery.

Akbar ignored Shah 'Abbās's request for Qandahār. Evidently he counted on his strong position and on the Shah's discretion, and expected no rash Persian move on the fort. His return from the Panjab to Agra (late in 1598) shows that he apprehended no trouble on account of Qandahār. His calculations did not prove wrong. Shah 'Abbās kept his hands off Qandahār. The troubles of the last year of Akbar's reign, however, did encourage the Persians to launch an attack in this area.

High ranking Persian officials, including the commander of Farāh and the viceroy of Khurāsān, with the assistance of pro-Persian elements in

1. *A.N.*, III, p. 745; see Du Jarric, *Histoire*, pp. 177-8, where Minūchihir Beg is said to be a Georgian and a concealed Christian.

2. *A.A.A.*, pp. 375-95; *A.N.*, III, pp. 736-7.

3. *A.A.A.*, pp. 405, 683; *Khuld*, IV, ff. 316b, 450a; *A.N.*, III, p. 749, makes no mention of the request for the restoration of Qandahār; the *Mā'āthir-i Quṭb-Shāhi Maḥmūdi*, Ethé 463 f. 149, follows the *A.A.A.*

4. 993/1585 to 1007/1598. *A.N.*, III, pp. 465, 747-8; Smith, *Akbar*, pp. 456-8.

5. For Akbar's subsequent though futile, interest in Khurāsān, see Calendar No. Tx. 338.

Zamīn-Dāwar combined in a considerable invasion and succeeded in capturing Bust. Shah Beg, the Mughul governor of Qandahār, fought intrepidly and successfully but, as even the Mughul accounts admit, all did not go well with the Mughul arms in this encounter. The Persian attack, involving as it did a major aspect of Persian's foreign relations, could not have been launched without the approval of the Shah. It is quite likely that the troubles of Akbar's last years, especially the revolt of Prince Salīm, encouraged the Shah to permit a probing raid on the border. The 'Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī's laboured proof of the Shah's innocence in the affair is not convincing.¹

Embassy of Mīr Ma'sūm

The Persian envoy, Minūchihr Beg was detained, like his predecessor, for four years at the Mughul court. These long detentions were rather unfriendly,² and we come across complaints on this score in the Safavid chronicles³ as well as in Shah 'Abbās's letter to Mirza Salīm (Akbar's son).⁴ In March-April 1601 (A.H. 1009), Minūchihr was given permission to make preparations for his departure. But it was not till October 1602 (A.H. 1011) that Akbar finally dismissed him. He entrusted him with many gifts for the Shah and the envoy was himself given a reward of more than four lac *dām*⁵ (= ten thousand rupees). Mīr Ma'sūm of Bhakkar, a Sayyid of Sind, who was a distinguished man of letters and an able administrator,⁶ was chosen by Akbar as his ambassador. He left for Iran in December 1602 (Rajab 1011).⁷ The royal letter Mīr Ma'sūm carried to Shah 'Abbās contained a tribute to the remarkable achievement of the Shah in having defeated the Turks on the west and the Uzbeks on the east and in having dealt successfully with domestic troubles. It also gives an account of Akbar's own victory at Asīrgarh and his success in dealing with the rulers of the Deccan.⁸ Mīr Ma'sūm arrived at the camp of Shah 'Abbās when the latter was besieging Erivān then in Turkish hands. Outwardly there was nothing unfriendly in his reception at the Shah's camp. The *Akbar Nāma* (supplement) gives a pleasant account of how the Shah received the envoy warmly and made res-

1. *A.A.A.*, pp. 468-70; *Khuld*, IV, ff. 328b-30a; *T. Sulṭānī*, f. 391b; *A.N.*, III, p. 828. For the revolt of Prince Salīm, see Beni Prasad, pp. 46f. For Shah Beg Khan Arghūn, see *M.U.*, tr., II, pp. 740-43.

2. For detention of envoys, see Appendix: Diplomatic Usage.

3. *Khuld*, IV, f. 315b; the *A.A.A.* (pp. 291, 361, 448) says of Yādgār Sulṭān as well as of Minūchihr that they returned seven years after their departure from Persia.

4. *N.J.M.*, B.M. Or. 3482. f. 224a-b; also in Tūsi, f. 225a f. Calendar No. A. 41.

5. *A.N.*, III, pp. 787, 815.

6. For Mīr Ma'sūm, see *M.U.*, III, p. 326 f.

7. *A.N.*, III, p. 825, 27 *Ādhar* 47th r.y. The *A.A.A.*, p. 448, says that Mīr Ma'sūm arrived with Minūchihr. But the *A.N.*'s careful chronology makes this unlikely.

8. B.M. Or. 3482, ff. 214b-16b; also in *Bayāḍ* 1995 (Bankipore), f. 133b f.

pectful enquiries about "the Emperor my father".¹ It appears, however, from the Safavid chronicles that Mīr Ma'sūm did not meet the same enthusiastic reception as his predecessor.² Shah 'Abbās saw the envoy soon after his arrival, but made the siege of Erivān a reason for not having a look at the large number of Mughul gifts, excepting a sword which he received as a good omen for the campaign in hand. The author of the *Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī* describes with malicious pleasure how the envoy piled up the gifts outside the royal pavilion and how for four months his servants had a difficult time looking after the stock in snow and cold (early 1604). After the reduction of Erivān (Muḥarrum 1013/June 1604), Shah 'Abbās had his first view of the gifts and distributed them all to his nobles.³

Shah 'Abbās I's position had improved greatly since the arrival of the first embassy from Akbar seven years ago, and he could now well treat the second embassy with a little less ceremony and cordiality. Akbar's long detention of Persian envoys and his continued hold on Qandahār were sufficient to cause annoyance to the Shah,⁴ as the *Khuld-i Barīn* observers, and Mīr Ma'sūm had to exercise his poetical faculty as well as conversational talent to humour the Shah.⁵ At the same time 'Abbās was enough of a realist to avoid doing anything positively unpleasant, beyond showing a certain amount of indifference to the Mughul embassy.¹ He dismissed Mīr Ma'sūm in the summer of 1604 (1013) without much ceremony. It is also notable that he sent no return embassy to Akbar on this occasion.⁶

Mīr Ma'sūm returned to the Mughul court in early 1605 (1013). He brought with him a letter from the Shah for Akbar, describing the Persian

1. *A.N.*, III, p. 825. The *Dhakhīratul Khawānīn*, I, (Karachi, 1961), p. 204, briefly mentions the Mīr's excellent performance as ambassador at the Persian court.

2. *I.e.*, Mirza Dīyāuddin, see pp. 62-3 above.

3. *A.A.A.*, 448, 455 (for date of capture of Erivān); *Khuld*, f. 316b, also f. 309a, for date. The contemporary Persian poet Taqī Kāshī's favourable account of Mīr Ma'sūm's reception at the Persian court seems to be marked with poetic licence and needs to be considerably discounted. For a different view, cf. Dr. H. M. Siddiqi, 'Taqi-ud-Din Kashi's account of Mir Muhammad Ma'sum Bhakkari', *Journal of the Panjab University Historical Society*, Lahore, vol. XIV, 1962, pp. 27-28.

4. *Khuld*, IV, f. 315b.

5. *A.A.A.*, p. 461; *Khuld*, IV, f. 323a.

6. The chronicles do not mention any further diplomatic exchanges between Akbar and Shah 'Abbās I. But there exists (in a collection of letters in the personal library of Aqai Mahdi Bayānī, Tihiran) a letter of Shah 'Abbās to Akbar, sent with Mahdi Qulī Khan Turkmān, reporting his victories over the Ottomans. The Shah also expresses his intention to send a trusted dignitary to the Mughul court with articles from Turkish spoils as gifts.

It is uncertain whether Mahdi Qulī Khan ever came to India. Neither the Mughul nor the Persian histories make any mention of him. The news of Akbar's death (Jumādā II 1014/Oct. 1605) may have led to the cancellation of Mahdi Qulī Khan's mission.

For details of the letter entrusted to Mahdi Qulī Khan, see Calendar No. A. 44.

victories at Erivān and elsewhere. Mir Ma'sūm also brought a letter from the Shah's aunt to Akbar's mother, Maryam Makānī Begum (Ḥamīda Bāno Begum).¹

1. *A.N.*, III, p. 836. The Shah's letter to Akbar exists in three versions: 1, *N.J.M.* B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 209b-111b; 2, *op. cit.*, ff. 211b-12b; 3, *Ethé* 2067, ff. 85a-8b, Tūsī, ff. 154b-7b and in other collections. The last version is claimed by Tūsī to be his own; the heading in *Ethé* 2067 making it addressed to Jahāngīr, is incorrect. For further details, see *Calendar* No. A. 43.

Maryam Makānī died in August 1604 (*A.N.*, tr., III, p. 1245), that is several months before Mir Ma'sūm's return.

CHAPTER V

JAHĀNGĪR AND SHAH 'ABBĀS I

PRINCE SALĪM (i.e., Jahāngīr before his accession) had friendly relations with Shah 'Abbās I during Akbar's lifetime and the Shah had already started addressing him as brother.¹ Despite this early friendship Jahāngīr's accession² was soon followed by a Persian attack on Qandahār. Thus the reign of Jahāngīr, like that of Akbar, begins with an Indo-Persian clash on Qandahār. This is not a coincidence but one more example of the importance attached by both sides to this key stronghold. To place this Persian attack on Qandahār in its proper perspective, we must recall the last years of Akbar's reign. Akbar, as we have seen, had ignored Shah 'Abbās's request for the surrender of the fort. In the last year of Akbar's reign (1013/1604-5) there was an organised Persian attack in the Qandahār area.

Soon after his accession, Jahāngīr received a report from Shah Beg, his governor of Qandahār, that he was apprehending trouble from the neighbouring Persian commanders who were secretly in touch with Persian partisans in Qandahār.³ The death of Akbar certainly seemed to offer an opportunity to Persians for making another bid for the much wanted fort, as Jahāngīr himself fully realised.⁴ By Shawwāl 1014/February 1606, the Persians were already on the way to Qandahār.⁵ The rebellion of Sultan Khusrau, Jahāngīr's eldest son, (which began in April 1606) would have further encouraged the Persians in their venture.⁶ The expedition was organised by

1. *Tūzūk*, p. 349, last two lines. Several letters were exchanged between Shah 'Abbās and Prince Salīm, the most important of which are given in the *Munsha'āt-i Tūsi*, ff. 225a-29b and in *N.J.M.*, B.M. Or. 3482, f. 223af. For further details, see Appendix H.

2. 19 Jumādā II 1014/22 Oct. 1605.

3. The presence of pro-Persian elements in this area is also mentioned by *A.A.A.*, p. 466, line 11.

4. *Tūzūk*, p. 33; *I.N.J.*, pp. 17-18.

5. *Jalāl Munajjim*, f. 381b.

6. For Khusrau's rebellion, see Beni Prasad, p. 138f.

the governor of Herāt and the commanders of Sīstān, Farāh and other border areas.¹ Jahāngīr, on receiving the news, took prompt action and sent two considerable reinforcements one after the other under high-ranking nobles to Qandahār. In the meanwhile, Shah Beg defended the fort zealously, at the same time parading his studied unconcern for the Persians by holding convivial parties at the top of the citadel. The Persians retired when the first Mughul reinforcement under Mirza Ghāzī Beg Tarkhān arrived at Qandahār on 12 Shawwāl 1015/31 January 1607.²

According to the *Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī*, Shah 'Abbās communicated his displeasure to the commanders and ordered them to retreat, and despatched one Husain Beg with a message of assurance to Shah Beg and a letter of explanation to Jahāngīr.³ The latter mentions in his *Tūzuk* the arrival of Husain Beg at Lahore and takes the view that the attack had been unauthorised, but notes with satisfaction that the Persians had already fallen back under Mughul pressure before the Shah's order reached them.⁴ The facts of the situation, however, leave little doubt that the attack on Qandahār was launched with the Shah's knowledge. Indeed the Shah could not have possibly remained ignorant for almost a year through which the Persian siege of the fort lasted. Further, there is definite and authentic evidence in the *Tārīkh-i 'Abbāsī* of Jalāl Munajjim that the Persian commanders were in touch with the Shah throughout the campaign.⁵ The expedition was conveniently disowned as it had miscarried. The two consecutive Persian attacks in this area, in the last year of Akbar's reign and in the first regnal year of Jahāngīr's, should be regarded as manifestations of a steadfast policy of recovering Qandahār. The failure of the direct attack on the fort showed to the Shah that the time was not yet favourable for the fulfilment of his policy. This largely explains the zealous friendliness he displayed towards Jahāngīr for the next decade and a half. It was not till the Mughul empire was once again on the verge of a

1. *Tūzuk*, p. 33; *I.N.J.*, pp. 17-18; Jalāl Munajjim, f. 387a, says the nobles of Khurāsān and the *Maliks* of Sīstān organised the expedition.

2. *Tūzuk*, pp. 33, 41, 60; *I.N.J.*, p. 18. *M.U.*, II, p. 349. The *Dhakhīratul Khawānīn*, I, (Karachi, 1961), p. 235, adds an interesting detail: When an emissary of the Persian commander arrived inside the fort, Shah Beg successfully concealed the scarcity in the fort by temporarily stocking the bazaar shops with provisions drawn from his own stores.

Cf. *Islamic Culture*, 1934, p. 649, where Ghāzī Beg has been confused with his father Mirza Jāni Beg who died in Akbar's reign.

3. *A.A.A.*, p. 683; *Khuld*, IV, f. 450a-b; *Tūzuk*, p. 53; *I.N.J.*, p. 18. For the text of the letter, see *N.J.M.*, B.M. Or. 3482, f. 238a; also see *Calendar* No. J. 51.

A letter ascribed to Jahāngīr and its reply from Shah 'Abbās I reproduced in Schefer's *Chrestomathie Persane*, II, pp. 224-28, seem to be spurious. Their contents do not fit in with the authentic accounts of the relations between the two monarchs. The text of the two letters appears in 'Abdullah Efendi's *Dastūrul Inshā*, Flügel 316, ff. 25b-27a. *Calendar* Nos. J. 54 and J. 55.

4. *Tūzuk*, pp. 41-2; *I.N.J.*, p. 18.

5. Jalāl Munajjim, f. 381b, 387a, 393a-b.

serious upheaval that Shah 'Abbās launched his next attack on Qandahār.

The reply which Jahāngīr sent by Ḥusain Beg to Shah 'Abbās provides some useful evidence. Jahāngīr therein complains of delay on the part of the Shah in opening regular diplomatic relations and notes that the despatch of a major Persian embassy had been further postponed.¹ It is quite likely that the fiasco of the Qandahār expedition had left the Shah a little disconcerted and he took some time to overcome it. The first major embassy from Iran arrived at the beginning of Jahāngīr's sixth regnal year.

In 1018/1609-10, Shah 'Abbās despatched Yādgār Sultan 'Alī Ṭālish on a condolatory-*cum*-congratulatory mission to India.² The envoy reached the Mughul court in Muḥarram 1020/March 1611.³ The royal letter cites the campaigns of the Shah in the western provinces as an excuse for delay in sending a regular embassy.⁴ Jahāngīr records his great pleasure on the arrival of the Persian ambassador whom he amply rewarded. The envoy was recipient of various favours at the hands of the Emperor during his two and a half years' stay in India.⁵ He was dismissed with honours and rewards in August 1613 (A.H.1022) to accompany the Mughul envoy, Khan 'Ālam, to Persia.⁶ During the two and a half years that Yādgār 'Alī Sultan was in India, there were further diplomatic exchanges between the two monarchs.⁷ In one of these, the Shah sent a note recommending one Salāmullah 'Arab for promotion. Jahāngīr at once increased his *manṣab* and *jāgīr*.⁸

The pattern of subsequent diplomatic relations is an almost one-sided succession of envoys and emissaries from Persia to India. Jahāngīr sent only one major embassy, but the Shah despatched two major (besides that of Yādgār Sultan) and numerous minor missions.⁹ The Shah spared no effort to con-

1. J.L., B.M. Or.1702, ff. 230b-32b; another draft version of the same letter occurs in the same MS, ff. 266b-69a. Calendar Nos. J. 52 and 53.

2. A.A.A., p. 552; *Khuld*, IV, f. 377b.

3. *Tūzūk*, p. 93; *Khaki Shirazī*, *Muntakhabat Tawārikh*, f. 409a.

4. *Tūzūk*, pp. 94-5; this letter is purely congratulatory; a condolatory letter, given in the *Munsha'āt-i Ṭāsi*, ff. 158a-59b, and claimed by the compiler as his own composition, was also brought by the same envoy; this second letter is also given in *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, f. 214a-b, and in some other collections. Calendar Nos. J. 59 and J. 60.

5. *Tūzūk*, pp. 93, 99, 100, 116; *L.N.J.*, pp. 69, 71.

6. *Tūzūk*, p. 121; *M.J.*, f. 99a.

7. This refers to the missions of Chalabi Beg from India and of Uwaisi Beg from Persia, for which see below p. 71f.

8. *Tūzūk*, p. 117; R. and B., I, pp. 158, 448.

9. Besides the missions mentioned in the text, there were several others of which there is no mention in the chronicles; they are referred to only in the collections of correspondence in connection with the letters brought by them. See: *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 216b-17a, for a letter brought by Muḥammad Sharif Mashhadī; Ethé 2067, ff. 133b-4a, for a letter brought by Kamālūddīn Aqā Beg Aqāsī Shāmlū in 1029/1620 with some Turkish gifts; Ethé 2067, f. 63a, for a brief letter from the Shah written in the motive of love. The *Fayyāḍul Qawānīn* (I.O.MS), pp. 269-70, gives a letter from Jahāngīr to the Shah, mentioning the arrival and departure of a Persian envoy, not named.



Plate I. Emperor Jahāngīr and Shah 'Abbās I standing in mutual embrace: Painted by Abul Hasan Nādiruz Zamān b. Āqā Riḍā after a dream seen by Jahāngīr. Courtesy, Freer Gallery of Art, Washington D C.

vince Jahāngīr of his deep friendship and goodwill; the latter records his great pleasure at receiving the Shah's letters and presents. There is, indeed, a note of pride in Jahāngīr's references to his friendship with the Shah.¹

Royal Purchases

It would be interesting to pursue in some detail an aspect of relations which is generally ignored. From time to time Jahāngīr and Shah 'Abbās exchanged what may be described as royal purchasing missions. The objects sought after by these missions were "trifling and splendid"² — paintings, manuscripts, astrolabes, curiosities of all kinds.³ Their procurement and supply is described in the correspondence of the East India Company as "toy trade".⁴ The first mission of this kind was sent by Jahāngīr some years before his accession. His agent was a trader, *Khawāja* Burj 'Alī *Nakhchiwānī*, with the title of *Zubdatut Tujjār*.⁵ Shah 'Abbās intervened and supplied his requirements from the royal stores, and wrote a letter to Jahāngīr (i.e., the then Prince Salīm) complaining that he should have entrusted his needs to traders rather than have written to him direct. The Shah further requested the Prince to notify him of whatever else of Persian goods he required. Shah 'Abbās sent this letter through *Khawāja* Muḥammad Bāqir, an Indian trader who seems to have been in Persia on trade purposes.⁶

In 1022/1613 Jahāngīr despatched Muḥammad Ḥusain Chalabī on a purchasing mission to Constantinople via Persia. This Chalabī was an expert in jewellery and curiosities and originally belonged to Tabriz.⁷ As he was to pass through Persia, Jahāngīr gave him a letter and some gifts⁸ for Shah 'Abbās. The Shah pressingly obtained the list of royal requirements from Chalabī and said he would order their procurement as they were not available in the market. He commanded Uwaisī Beg *Topchī* to procure these articles and later on sent him with these and a letter to India.⁹ The impression which the personal

1. E.g., *Tūzūk*, p. 273, tr., II, 93-4.

2. Moreland, *India at the Death of Akbar*, p. 196.

3. J. A. Pope, *Chinese Porcelains from the Ardebil Shrine* (Washington, 1956), pp. 56-57 and 146, refers to inscribed porcelain gifts from Jahāngīr to Shah 'Abbās I preserved at the shrine. Comparing them with other specimen, he observes, "these Mughul inscriptions were cut with a finer and more delicate line" (p. 57). Also see Plates No. 6 and 114 in Pope, *op. cit.*

4. Moreland, *Akbar to Aurangzeb*, pp. 68-71.

5. See Calendar No. J. 49.

6. *Munsha'āt-i Ṭāsi*, ff. 225a-29b; it is an important letter and contains considerable historical material. Calendar No. J. 47.

7. *Ihyā'ul Mulūk*, f. 215b; this work describes Muḥammad Qāsim Beg (see below) as Chalabī's brother.

8. *Yādbūd*, mistranslated in R. and B., I, p. 238, as memorandum of requirements.

9. The *Tūzūk* is not clear on the last point, and R. and B., I, p. 238, have translated it in a way to suggest that Chalabī was sent back to India. The latter actually stayed in Persia (see below), and (U)waisī Beg's arrival at the Mughul court in 1022/1613 is reported in *M.Ĵ.*, f. 95b.

interest taken by the Shah created in Jahāngīr's mind is fully reflected in the reply which he sent back with Uwaisī Beg. The letter overflows with thankfulness and with joy at the Shah's consideration.¹

Muḥammad Ḥusain Chalabī's mission is referred to at length in the Shah's letter brought by Muḥammad Riḍā in 1025/1616 and recorded by Jahāngīr in his Memoirs.² One of the articles (says the letter) on Chalabī's list was a set of jewels one of which was engraved with the names of Jahāngīr's ancestors. These jewels were the property of a religious foundation and were taken out from there after a consultation of 'ulamā and ṣadrs. The Shah in his letter praised Muḥammad Ḥusain Chalabī as an able agent and asked for an extension of his stay, or his replacement by someone equally suitable.³ Jahāngīr in his reply approved Chalabī's prolonged stay in Persia, but added that it would be more appropriate if he were allowed to come back for a while to India to reimburse himself and then proceed to Persia again.⁴

When certain articles asked for by Jahāngīr were not available in Persia, the Shah ordered them from Venice and other parts of Europe.⁵ At Jahāngīr's request, the Shah also sent the original astrolabe of Ulugh Beg, the celebrated Timurid Prince,⁶ keeping for himself only a copy.⁷ The Shah in his turn purchased rarities and other requirements from India. In 1024/1615, he despatched Khwāja 'Abdul Karīm Gilāni, a Persian trader, with a letter and with certain rarities asked for by Jahāngīr. The Khwāja is described therein as a trusted servant of the court, and Jahāngīr is requested to appoint his own agents to assist the Khwāja.⁸ Another Persian trader, Muḥammad Qāsim Beg, came, probably with the Persian ambassador Muḥammad Riḍā Beg, on a commission from the Shah.⁹ Yet another commercial mission from Persia is mentioned in one of Jahāngīr's letters to the Shah.¹⁰

1. Ethé 2067, ff. 54b-6a. Calendar No. J. 61. Also see No. J. 62.

2. *Tūzūk*, pp. 165-6; R. and B. have omitted this letter from their translation. Calendar No. J. 70. Also see No. J. 71.

3. There is another version of this letter (B.M.Or. 3482, ff. 235b-36a), which says that a bill (*qimat-nāmcha*) for these jewels, according to the value assessed by the 'Ulamā, was also being sent. But probably the bill was kept back on second thought and reference to it was dropped. Calendar Nos. J. 70 and J. 71.

4. *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 217a-18a; other copies also. Calendar No. J. 78.

5. *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, f. 218b. Calendar No. J. 77.

6. Ulugh Beg, Timurid prince and astronomer, died 853/1449, was son of Shah Rukh, Tīmūr's son and successor.

7. *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, f. 218 a-b. Calendar No. J. 75.

8. *N.J.M.*, B.M.Or. 3482, f. 236a-b. Calendar No. J. 69.

9. *Tūzūk*, p. 166. Qāsim Beg was a brother of Muḥammad Ḥusain Chalabī, see *Tūzūk*, p. 166; the *Ilyā'ul Mulūk*, f. 215b, has also a reference to him.

10. *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 216b-17a.

It appears that Muḥammad Ḥusain Chalabī, during his long sojourn in Persia,¹ acted there as a royal trade commissioner. An interesting point is Shah 'Abbās's insistence that Jahāngīr's orders should be sent to him direct and executed through Persian state officials; the articles thus procured were then handed over to Muḥammad Ḥusain Chalabī.² It is significant that the Shah's request for official assistance to his purchasing agent in India is in identical terms with the mention of help offered to Jahāngīr's trade commissioner in Iran.³

It may be added here that Shah Jahān also sent purchasing agents to Persia, Turkey and the Middle East⁴. These agents catered almost exclusively for royal requirements, most of which were in the nature of rarities; horses of superior quality for display purposes were also in demand at the Mughul court. Apart from these royal agents, venturesome private traders also received royal patronage. One Ḥājī Rafīq, for instance, went to Persia a number of times and made himself known to Shah 'Abbās I. Appreciating his initiative and tact, Jahāngīr conferred on him the title of *Malikut Tujjār* or Prince of Merchants. Ḥājī Rafīq carried letters between the Shah and Jahāngīr.⁵ Shah 'Abbās I also gave letters of recommendation addressed to Jahāngīr on behalf of some English traders who were proceeding from Persia to India, and appointed an officer to accompany them.⁶ The correspondence of the East India Company contains numerous references to the active part played by the Persian ambassadors in India in the Anglo-Persian trade.⁷

(Normal trade and commerce are discussed in Chapter IX, below.)

1. The last reference to his stay in Persia is dated 1026/1618, *Tūzuk*, p. 185; his return is nowhere mentioned.

2. *Tūzuk*, p. 166.

3. 'Abbās's letter in the *Tūzuk-i Jahāngīrī*, p. 166; another letter, in B.M. Or. 3482, f. 236a-b, has a more explicit reference. Calendar Nos. J. 69 and J. 70.

It is not quite clear as to whether the Shah was offering (and asking for) only facilities of purchase through official channels, or he desired the required articles to be exchanged as free gifts. The mention of bill in an unused draft (see p. 72 n. 3, above) would suggest that only purchasing facilities were intended.

Pietro Della Valle records how Shah 'Abbās asked Khan 'Ālam to purchase what he liked from a Venetian curio shop in Iṣfāhān, "promising to pay for them himself. But the Indian scornfully refused." (Quotation from Pietro in Blunt, p. 185.)

4. Lāhaurī, II, pp. 184-8, gives a detailed account; the agent's name was Mīr Zarīf; another agent, Mīr Humāī, was sent to Persia to purchase horses, see *Khuld*, V, f. 46a; *F. Ṣafaviyya*, f. 47a.

5. *Tūzuk*, p. 223; also see letters in *N. J. M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 218a-b. See Calendar Nos. J. 74 to J. 77.

6. *F. Ṣafaviyya*, f. 40b.

7. *E. I. Co. Letters*, Jan. to June 1617, pp. 322, 325-7, 329-30, 334; July to Dec. 1617, p. 75 (Sir T. Roe's letter to W. Robbins in Persia through Muḥammad Ridā, the Persian ambassador), 77; many other references.

Embassy of Khan 'Ālam

Jahāngīr selected Khan 'Ālam to lead the first major embassy of his reign to Persia. Khan 'Ālam was a Chaghataī Mughul and his family had a long and creditable record of service with the Timurids since the days of Timūr. He was an expert in hunting. Jahāngīr had a special liking for him and used to address him as brother. His name was Mirza Barkhurdār; in 1017/1608-9 Jahāngīr had given him the title of Khan 'Ālam. He was on duty in one of the Mughul areas in the Deccan, and was recalled from there to lead the embassy to Persia.¹

The embassy of Khan 'Ālam was a grand affair. He was accompanied by at least a thousand servants. A large variety of the Indian fauna, especially the rare ones, were placed in the charge of several hundred keepers to accompany the Khan. The gifts he carried were proportionately large. The embassy was meant to strike the imagination of the Persians; it also aimed at impressing 'Abbās with the wealth of India as well as the warmth of feeling Jahāngīr entertained for him. The impression it created in Persia is recorded by Iskandar Beg Munshī, author of the *'Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī*, who witnessed its entry into Qazvīn. He says that no embassy like this had ever come to Safavid court since the foundation of the dynasty.²

Khan 'Ālam had a magnificent reception at the Persian court.³ The first formal reception was held at Qazvīn,⁴ of which Iskandar Munshī has given a first-hand account. All the big nobles went out to receive him outside the city. The Shah showed him unusual honours and favours, much to the envy of the European ambassadors.⁵ He embraced Khan 'Ālam and addressed him as brother.⁶ A second and more impressive reception was held in the spacious *Maidān-i Shāh*⁷ at Iṣfahān, and was witnessed, among others, by the Italian traveller Pietro Della Valle and Shah Ḥusain b. Malik Ghiyāthuddīn

1. *Tūzūk*, pp. 74, 121; *A.A.A.*, p. 662; *A.N.*, II, 427; *M.U.*, I, p. 732f; also see reference to Khan 'Ālam in Shah 'Abbās's letter, Ethé 2067, ff. 90b-94a; *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 219b-20a. Shaikh Farid Bhakkārī who knew Khan 'Ālam personally, has a brief but interesting notice of the Khan and his embassy. See *Dhakhīratul Khawānīn* (Rāshdī MS), ff(p). 279-82. Also see *M.U.*, tr., I, pp. 389-92; Qazwīnī, *Pādshāh Nāma*, Or.173, f. 249a.

2. *A.A.A.*, pp. 661-2; *Khuld*, IV, f. 440a-b. For the letter sent with Khan 'Ālam, see Ethé 2067, f. 58b-61a; several other copies. Calendar No. J. 63, also J. 64.

3. *R. Ṣafawīyya*, f. 372a-b, also mentions elaborate official receptions at Herāt and Mashhad.

4. See Appendix G: Duration of Khan 'Ālam's stay in Persia.

5. The Spanish envoy felt particularly hurt. See reference to Pietro's account below.

6. *A.A.A.*, p. 662; *Khuld*, IV, f. 440a-b; *M.U.*, I, pp. 734-5, follows *A.A.A.*

7. Wilfred Blunt, pp. 123-30, gives a vivid description of the city of Iṣfahān as planned and built by Shah 'Abbās, of the *Maidān-i Shāh* and the place it occupied in the life of the capital.



Plate II. An imaginary painting showing Emperor Jahāngīr and Shah 'Abbās I attended by Khan 'Ālam and Āṣaf Khan. The inscription on the right of the Shah's head, meaning "the likeness of my brother Shah 'Abbās", purports to be in the hand of Jahāngīr. Unsigned. Courtesy, Freer Gallery of Art, Washington D.C.

Muḥammad, nobleman of Sistān and author of the *Ihyā'ul Mulūk*.¹ Both these observers have left interesting accounts of the Mughul embassy. Jahāngīr records his fulsome appreciation of the kindness and favours shown to his envoy by the Shah, including his visit to the envoy's quarters. Khan 'Ālam spent a good deal of time in the Shah's company.² Pietro describes how the Shah cut jokes with the Khan and allowed him a great deal of familiarity.³ The Shah took him in his train on his hunting tours to the north,⁴ for the Khan was a good hunter. He even had an interesting literary encounter with the Shah on the subject of the newly introduced tobacco.⁵ The Shah had banned the use of tobacco; the ambassador was, however, very fond of it and the Shah indulgently allowed him to smoke.⁶ The Shah gave him the title of Jān-i 'Ālam.⁷ He embraced Khan 'Ālam on the occasion of his *congé*, and came out of the capital to bid him farewell.⁸

During his long stay in Persia, Khan 'Ālam kept in touch with Jahāngīr.⁹ It can also be presumed that Muḥsin Fānī Kashmīrī who went as the official reporter with Khan 'Ālam was sending regular reports to the Emperor.¹⁰ Khan 'Ālam acquitted himself well of his duties in Persia. He left a very good personal impression on Shah 'Abbās, so much so that after his return to India, the Shah wrote an affectionate letter to him.¹¹ Jahāngīr accorded him an elaborate reception on his return in early 1029/1620, raised his *manṣab* to 5000 *dhāt* and 3000 *sawār*, and in 1030/1621 appointed him governor of Allahabad.¹²

1. Shah Ḥusain witnessed the reception at Qazvin as well as Iṣfahān, *Ihyā'ul Mulūk*, ff. 213b-15a. Pietro has given fulsome details of the ceremony at Iṣfahān, see Falsafī, *Rawābiṭ*, pp. 56-61; 'Abbās-i Awwal, IV, pp. 90-92.

2. *Tūzuk*, pp. 284-5; *I.N.J.*, pp. 131-2; *M.U.*, I, p. 734; *Dhakhīratul Khawānīn*, (Rāshdī MS), pp (f). 280-81; Kewal Rām, *Tadhkīratul Umarā*, B.M. Add. 16,703, f. 34b.

3. Blunt, pp. 185-6; Falsafī, *Tārikh-i Rawābiṭ*, pp. 56-61, esp. p. 60.

4. 'Abdul Fattāḥ Fūmīnī, *Tārikh-i Gilān*, St. Petersburg, 1858, pp. 171-3. This hunting party probably took place before the two formal receptions.

5. See *Tūzuk*, p. 183, where the verses composed by the Shah and Khan 'Ālam on the subject are given; R. and B., I, p. 371.

6. Blunt, 185. Pietro describes how Khan 'Ālam used to puff at his long pipe to the general discomfort.

7. The *Mir'ātuṣ Ṣafā*, f. 161a, gives a curious story in this connection; also see K.K., II, p. 202; *M.U.*, I, p. 734.

8. *Tūzuk*, p. 295; *I.N.J.*, pp. 131-2; *Dhakhīratul Khawānīn* (Rāshdī MS), p. 281.

9. *Tūzuk*, pp. 158, 183, 230, 238, 274, 280.

10. *Mir'ātuṣ Ṣafā*, f. 161a. This Muḥsin Fānī appears to be a different person from the reputed author of *Dabistān*, who died in 1081-2 (Rieu, p. 1081; Ethé, p. 1599).

11. See below for the contents of this letter. Calendar No. J. 81.

12. *Tūzuk*, pp. 284, 287, 288, 338; also see *M.U.*, I, p. 735; *I.N.J.*, p. 134.

Bishan Dās,¹ a Mughul court painter, who was sent with the embassy, brought a number of portraits. His portrait of Shah 'Ābbas immensely pleased Jahāngīr.² Another painting by Bishan Dās shows the Shah and Khan 'Ālam together.³ Of the gifts brought by Khan 'Ālam from Iran, the most valuable was a rare collection of the portraits of Timūr and his descendants, and of those nobles who had fought under his command against İletmish Khan. The collection contained 240 miniatures, each bearing the name of the person portrayed. The pictures were autographed by Khalīl Mirza Shāhrukhī. Jahāngīr, who was a discerning connoisseur of paintings, remarked that the miniatures bore a striking resemblance to the work of Bahzād but as Khalīl Mirza preceded Bahzād, there was a strong presumption that the latter was a pupil of the former.⁴

Missions from Persia

During the years that Khan 'Ālam was in Persia, the Shah preserved regular contact with Jahāngīr. When one of Khan 'Ālam's servant was coming to India, the Shah gave him a letter for the Emperor.⁵ Besides, he sent letters and gifts through several emissaries and traders who were proceeding to India.⁶ The first Persian envoy during this period was Muṣṭafā Beg. He arrived in early 1024/1615 and brought a letter⁷ with a report of Persian victories in Gurjistān (Georgia). The gifts brought by him included large European dogs which had been asked for by Jahāngīr. The envoy was dismissed a few months later with rewards and with a reply and presents for the Shah.⁸ Next year Muḥammad Riḍā Beg led a big Persian embassy to the Mughul court, arriving in Shawwāl 1025/October 1616.⁹ Sir Thomas Roe, English Envoy at the Mughul court, has recorded an interesting and detailed account of this embassy. Muḥammad Riḍā had a good reception at Jahāngīr's court, which was then at Ajmer. He was granted an audience the same day that he arrived, which itself was a mark of very special favour.¹⁰ He was probably the only

1. For Bishan Dās, see Percy Brown, *Indian Painting under the Mughals*, pp. 82, 126.

2. *Tūzuk*, p. 285.

3. The original painting is in the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston; see Plate III.

4. *Dhakḥiratul Khawānīn* (Rāshdī MS), p(f). 281.

5. *Tūzuk*, pp. 274, 275.

6. *Tūzuk*, pp. 152, 166, 223, 275, 274, 280; *M.J.*, f. 95b; also see pp. 70n. 9, 71, 72, above.

7. *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, f. 217a. Calendar No. J. 68.

8. *Tūzuk*, pp. 138, 139, 147 (also pp. 144-5, for Jahāngīr's conversation with the envoy regarding 'Abbās's disposal of his eldest son); *M.J.*, ff. 112a-b, 115b.

9. The embassy of Muḥammad Riḍā is mentioned almost casually in the *A.A.A.*, p. 655; the *Tūzuk* mentions it several times, see below.

10. Roe, p. 260.



Plate III. Shah 'Abbās I and the Mughul envoy, Khan 'Ālam. Painting by Bishan Dās.
Courtesy, Museum of Fine Arts, Boston.

Persian envoy who offered salutation after the Mughul court manners by prostrating himself and performing the *sijda*.¹ Jahāngīr conferred on him robes and rewards and honours and favours, which are recorded in the *Tūzūk* as well as in Sir Thomas Roe's journal.² It is not clear as to whether the embassy of Muḥammad Riḍā had any special purpose, apart from those stated in Shah 'Abbās's letter (see above, Royal Purchases). Roe heard reports that the envoy had ostensibly come "only to treat a peace for the Deccans" but that his real aim was to obtain monetary aid for his master in his wars against the Turks.³ This information of which Roe himself does not seem to be very certain, lacks substantiation. It was also during Jahāngīr's stay at Ajmer that Robert Sherley (one of the three famous Sherley brothers, who were so closely associated with Shah 'Abbās I) arrived in 1614 after considerable misadventures at the coast of Makrān and at Thatta. Jahāngīr received him "very favourably."⁴ According to one authority, he was on a mission from the Shah; he arrived back in Persia in Jumādā I 1024/June 1615.⁵

Muḥammad Riḍā Beg was dismissed with ample rewards from Māndū (in Mālwa)⁶ in Rabi I 1026/March 1617.⁷ Jahāngīr gave him a letter for the Shah, composed in the usual cordial vein, describing, *inter alia*, his recent tour of Mālwa and the successful campaign against the Deccan kingdoms.⁸ The envoy died in Shawwāl 1026/October 1617 at Agra and Jahāngīr ordered all his goods to be handed over to Muḥammad Qāsim Beg, a Persian merchant.⁹ About the middle of 1028/1619 another envoy, Sayyid Ḥasan, arrived from Iran with a crystal goblet and a letter giving an account of recent Persian victories.¹⁰

1. *Tūzūk*, p. 164; Roe, p. 258.

2. *Tūzūk*, pp. 164-6, 166, 169, 185; Roe, 264, 356; *E.I. Co. Letters*, 1616, p. 310.

3. Roe, pp. 258-9. The conjecture of Dr. Beni Prasad, p. 345, that "probably it had something to do with Qandahār," may be right, but there is no evidence, direct or indirect.

4. Penrose, *The Sherleian Odyssey*, pp. 191-5.

5. Falsafī, *Rawābiṭ*, p. 42.

6. For a short and good description of Māndū, see Beni Prasad, pp. 278-81.

7. *Tūzūk*, p. 185; *M. J.*, f. 130a. Roe (pp. 363-4) gives a curious story of the envoy's disgust with the Emperor because of the failure of his mission, and his diplomatic illness in order to avoid seeing the Mughul ministers. Roe's story of the bills sent by Jahāngīr to the envoy seems highly unlikely, both in view of Jahāngīr's generous temperament and his friendship with the Shah.

8. *N. J. M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 217aa-18a; for mention in it of Muḥammad Ḥusain Chalabī, see above, Royal Purchases. Calendar No. J. 78.

9. *Tūzūk*, p. 197; Qāsim Beg is mentioned as Chalabī's brother in the Shah's letter, see *Tūzūk*, p. 166.

10. *Tūzūk*, p. 273; for the letter, see *Munsha'āt-i Ṭūsī*, ff. 167a-69b. For further details, see Calendar No. J. 72.

*The Embassy of Zainal Beg*¹

The magnificence of Khan 'Ālam's embassy had impressed everybody in Persia. When dismissing him, Shah 'Abbās wanted to send an equally impressive return embassy. He entrusted this task to his *Tūshmāl Bāshī* (chief chamberlain), Zainal Beg, a man of strong character and steadfast loyalty who was not likely to be overawed by the munificence of the Mughul Emperor or the magnificence of his court.² Zainal Beg made elaborate preparations for his assignment, fully conscious that the prestige of his master was at stake. He collected a vast variety of valuables and rarities and was accompanied by a large train of servants and slaves. Besides the royal gifts, he carried presents from the Persian nobles and the high officials of *Khurāsān* for Jahāngīr.³ The embassy of Zainal Beg was the most impressive of all those sent by Shah 'Abbās I to India.⁴ His assignment was also an important one: he had to negotiate with Jahāngīr the question of Qandahār.⁵

According to the original arrangement, Zainal Beg was to accompany Khan 'Ālam to India, but he started later.⁶ He was received with due ceremony at the Mughul frontier and had a friendly reception all along the route.⁷ At Kabul Zainal Beg received a cordial letter from Jahāngīr, dated Urdūbihisht or April-May (1029/1620), inviting him to join the Emperor in Kashmīr; but (the letter goes on to say) if coming to Kashmīr was too much trouble, the envoy was free not to come; he (Jahāngīr) would himself come down from Kashmīr after the rainy season.⁸ When Zainal Beg reached Lahore, Jahāngīr sent him from Kashmīr a robe with 30,000 rupees for his expenses (October 1620/towards the end of 1029).⁹ Surprisingly, Zainal Beg did not go to Kashmīr. The rest of the account of the embassy will be given as an aspect of the Qandahār affair to which we now return.¹⁰

1. Zainal seems to be the correct form of the name. It has been written as Zambīl in the *Tūzūk*, p. 284, etc.; Beni Prasad, p. 346, etc. For another similar name, see p. 17 above for Zainal Khan of Ismā'il I's reign; also Falsafī, *'Abbās-i Awwal*, I, p. 109.

2. *R. Šafawiyya*, f. 372b.

3. *A.A.A.*, pp. 669-70, 699-700; *Khuld*, IV, ff. 443b-44a, 458a-59a; *M. Šafā*, f. 40a.

4. *M. Šafā*, f. 40a. Cf. Beni Prasad, p. 344, line 18.

5. See below.

6. *Tūzūk*, p. 320, also p. 284. The statement of the *A.A.A.*, p. 669, that Zainal Beg went with Khan 'Ālam up to Lahore, seems to be incorrect; *Khuld*, IV, *loc. cit.*, follows *A.A.A.*

7. *A.A.A.*, p. 669.

8. For the letter, see Ethé 2067, ff. 92b-3b. Calendar No. J. 85. Jahāngīr in his letter to the Shah (*Tūzūk*, p. 351) also mentions his invitation to Zainal Beg to come to Kashmīr, but places it somewhat later in the sequence of events.

9. *Tūzūk*, p. 315.

10. On Zainal Beg's dismissal, see p. 83 n. 4 below.

Qandahār

The failure of the Persian attack on Qandahār at the commencement of Jahāngīr's reign discouraged further attempts for the time being. Thereafter the policy of Shah 'Abbās had been to cultivate a close friendship with Jahāngīr and win his confidence. But Qandahār could not be dismissed from the Shah's mind¹ and he was bound to take up the question of its restoration sooner or later. It is not clear as to when he made the first definite request for its return. The Safavid sources state that all the Persian envoys who succeeded the embassy of Yādgār 'Alī Sultan Ṭālish broached the subject of Qandahār with the Mughul ministers but met with no response.² Despite the silence of Mughul accounts on these attempted negotiations, it is not unlikely that the Persian envoys did make approaches on the ministerial level. And in any case the Persian statement that the Shah spoke at length to Khan 'Ālam on this subject³ seems to be correct and is indirectly corroborated by the evidence of contemporary European visitors.⁴ The embassy of Zainal Beg was mainly concerned with reopening the Qandahār question. Jahāngīr's statement that no Persian envoy before Zainal Beg spoke to him on Qandahār,⁵ does not involve any contradiction of the extant Persian evidence. Both sides stated the truth, but in part. The fact that the letter⁶ brought by Zainal Beg himself contains no reference to Qandahār, is an indication of the circumspect way in which earlier Persian envoys might have sounded the Mughul court circles.

The Mughul and Safavid sources again differ in their account of Zainal Beg's embassy after his arrival at Lahore. Jahāngīr notices his presentation at the court at Lahore (where the emperor had moved down from Kashmīr) on 13 Muḥarram 1030⁷/28 November 1620. Subsequently there are several references to the conferment of favours on Zainal Beg, including the unusual bestowal of a village near Āgra (August 1621).⁸ The Safavid accounts give an entirely different picture of Zainal Beg's relations with Jahāngīr and his court. They say that the ambassador, after his formal appearance at the court at Lahore, started, with Khan 'Ālam's advice, a discussion with the Mughul

1. A.A.A., 676; *Khuld*, IV, f. 447a.

2. 'Abbās's letter, *Tūzuk*, p. 349; A.A.A., p. 683; *Khuld*, IV, f. 450b.

3. A.A.A., pp. 676, 683-4; *Khuld*, IV, ff. 450b-51a.

4. See quotation from Pietro Della Valle and the Spanish envoy, in Falasafī, *Rawābiṭ*, p. 61.

5. Jahāngīr's letter to the Shah, *Tūzuk*, p. 351.

6. *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 219b-20a. Calendar No. J. 84.

7. For the *Hijrī* year, see R. and B., II, 187n.

8. *Tūzuk*, pp. 321, 328, 333, 343, 351; *M.Ḥ.*, f. 170; *I.N.Ḥ.*, p. 183.

ministers on the subject of Qandahār, but finding no satisfactory response, intended to return to Persia. But in the meanwhile some gifts, including a large ruby inscribed with the name of Ulugh Beg, grandson of Tīmūr,¹ which were not ready at the time of Zainal Beg's departure from Persia, arrived and Zainal Beg had to proceed to Delhi for their presentation, and from there accompanied Jahāngīr to Āgra. He continued to press his point about Qandahār with the Mughul authorities but without success. According to the same sources, Zainal Beg was unbending at the Mughul court and firmly refused to offer court salutation in the degrading Mughul custom.²

The differing Persian and Indian accounts seem to be complementary rather than contradictory (and that is one reason for burdening this narrative with this discussion). It is quite probable that Zainal Beg conducted himself with more self-respect than his predecessor,³ and that he made forceful representations on the question of Qandahār. Jahāngīr, however, makes no reference whatsoever to these representations in his Memoirs (until after the fall of Qandahār, in his letter to the Shah). The reason perhaps was that Jahāngīr, in view of his close friendship with the Shah, did not anticipate that the latter would actually attack Qandahār. This inference is confirmed by the fact that when the Shah subsequently attacked Qandahār, there was only a garrison of 300 Mughul troops in the all-important fortress.⁴ From our point of view it means, above all, that Shah 'Abbās had succeeded in his policy of winning the complete trust of Jahāngīr and in his objective of taking the Mughuls unawares over Qandahār. So solicitous was the Shah to preserve Jahāngīr's confidence that between the arrival of Zainal Beg in India and his attack on Qandahār, he sent four or five emissaries with gifts and letters to Jahāngīr.⁵ Jahāngīr joyfully records their arrival and his favours to them and his return gifts to the Shah. And during all this period Jahāngīr continues to make the friendliest references to "his brother", the Shah.⁶ Certain acts of Jahāngīr,

1. For a description of the ruby and its subsequent conferment on Prince Shah Jahān, see *Tūzūk*, pp. 324-5; R. and B., II, pp. 195-6.

2. *A.A.A.*, p. 699-700; *Khuld*, IV, ff. 458b-59a, *Mir'ātuṣ Ṣafa*, f. 40a; *Burhānūl Futūḥ*, B.M. Or. 1884, f. 343b. For Zainal Beg's dismissal, see p. 83 n. 4 below.

3. I.e., Muḥammad Riḍā, see p. 77 above. Zainal Beg's proud demeanour was highly appreciated by the Shah who honoured him on his return and subsequently promoted him to very high status. *A.A.A.*, pp. 700, 717f.

4. *Tūzūk*, p. 343; *I.N.J.*, p. 129. Also see Calendar No. J. 92 which is Jahāngīr's *farmān* to Shah Jahān.

5. Their names are: Āqā Beg and Muḥibb 'Alī Beg (Calendar No. J. 86); Ḥājī Beg, Fāḍil Beg; and Qāsim Beg. The first two came together and brought the inscribed ruby, mentioned earlier. *Tūzūk*, pp. 324-5, 328, 332, 343; *M.J.*, ff. 159a, 166a-b; *I.N.J.*, pp. 177-8, 183; K.K., I, p. 330; Cf. K.K., I, p. 306, (regarding the ruby).

6. See page references to the *Tūzūk* in the preceding f.n.

however, do betray a lurking fear of Persian intrigue on the western frontier. On Mirza Ghāzi Beg's death [1018/1609] at Qandahār, he at once recalled the Mirza's *wakil*, Luṭfullah Bahāi Khan, "lest he should hand over Qandahār to the Qizilbāsh." About the same time Mirza 'Isā Khan Tarkhān (son of Jāni Bābā Tarkhān of Thatta) was selected for the governorship of Thatta and for the headship of the Tarkhān clan. On second thought, however, Jahāngīr not only cancelled the appointment but even did not allow the Mirza to go to Sind for fear that he might intrigue with Shah 'Abbās I and with the Persian authorities in the neighbouring territories of Kij-Makrān and Hormuz.¹

Jahāngīr, on coming to know of Shah 'Abbās's request for Qandahār, consulted his advisers. The chroniclers of the reign of Shah Jahān claim for him the credit of advising Jahāngīr to reject the Persian request.² In any event, the opinion that finally prevailed was that the surrender of Qandahār would be regarded as a sign of weakness. This is confirmed by the Persian sources as well, for they say that a group of mischief-makers at Jahāngīr's court prevented the settlement of the issue in accordance with the Shah's desire.³ Zainal Beg, then at the Mughul court, kept the Shah informed of the position.⁴ He also sent reports of movement of troops, especially the despatch of large Mughul forces to the Deccan under Shah Jahān (Dai 1030/Dec. 1620-Jan. 1621) to deal with renewed trouble organized by Malik 'Ambar.⁵ It can be safely presumed that his reports also covered the internal political situation of the Empire and the factious intrigues at the court. The alliance of Nūr Jahān Begum and Prince Shah Jahān, which had ensured the stability of the regime in the first half of Jahāngīr's reign, was in the process of dissolution; the masterful queen and the ambitious prince were heading for a conflict. By the year 1029/1620, the court had become a hot bed of intrigue and Jahāngīr's failing health made him increasingly unable to assert his authority. "The first open indication of the new shuffling of political parties was given in December 1620, when Shahryār was betrothed to Lādli Begum daughter of Nūr Jahān by Sher Afkun." Shahryār, Jahāngīr's incapable youngest son, hence-

1. *Dhakhīratul Khawānīn* (Syed Hussāmuddīn Rāshdī MS, Karachi), ff (p). 162, 286-7; *M.U.*, Tr., I, pp. 582, 689.

2. Lāhauri, II, p. 25; Šādiq, f. 82b; K.K., I, pp. 325-6, 553. Khāfi Khan's statement that Nūr Jahān and Āṣaf Khan advised acceptance of the Shah's request, lacks confirmation from earlier sources; Cf. *M.J.*, f. 173b.

3. *A.A.A.*, pp. 676, 684; *Khuld*, IV, f. 447a; Shah's letter in the *Tūzuk*, p. 349.

4. *A.A.A.*, p. 700; *Khuld*, f. 458b; Lāhauri, II, p. 26.

5. Lāhauri, II, p. 26; for date, see *Tūzuk*, p. 322. While knowledge of trouble in the Deccan would have certainly helped the Shah, there is no evidence that he instigated it or that it was in accordance with an arrangement with the Shah. For a different view, see Rahim, *Islamic Culture*, 1934, p. 656.

forward became Nūr Jahān's candidate for heirship to the imperial throne.¹ There can be little doubt that reports of these developments reached Shah 'Abbās I regularly through his ambassador and frequent emissaries as well as through other informants,² and encouraged him to decide on marching to Qandahār and choose his own time for it.

Shah 'Abbās I takes Qandahār

Shah 'Abbās set out from Isfahān in Rabī' II 1031/February 1622.³ Reports of this reached Jahāngīr next month when he was on his way to Kashmīr.⁴ He records his great surprise which appears to be genuine. He issued immediate orders to Shah Jahān to proceed to Qandahār.⁵ But the question of defending the fort soon became involved with high intrigue at the court and the political rivalry between Nūr Jahān Begum and Shah Jahān. The latter, feeling that his absence on a far off frontier might weaken his position in India, asked for virtually impossible conditions, which Nūr Jahān adroitly represented to Jahāngīr as refusal to obey. From this position, the next step was the denunciation of the prince as a rebel and his actual rebellion.⁶ This set at nought the elaborate preparations of Jahāngīr to organise a large force for the defence of Qandahār and an eventual invasion of Persia.⁷ The fort itself fell after a siege of five to six weeks on 11 Sha'bān 1031/11 June 1622.⁸ Jahāngīr's efforts to send an expedition for its immediate recovery and Nūr Jahān's procurement of its command for her incompetent son-in-law, proved

1. For details, see Beni Prasad, chap. XIV; quotation from p. 324.

2. For mutual espionage between India and Iran, see chapter X below.

3. *A.A.A.*, p. 679.

4. *Tūzūk*, p. 343, Jumādā I 1031/March 1622.

5. *Tūzūk*, p. 343.

6. *Tūzūk*, pp. 345-6; *M.J.*, ff. 171b-73b; *I.N.J.*, pp. 192-3; also see Beni Prasad, pp. 347-51. Also see Calendar No. J. 92 which is Jahāngīr's *farmān* to the rebel Shah Jahān.

7. *Tūzūk*, p. 345. The scale of preparation can be judged by the fact that the number of beasts of burden to be requisitioned exceeded a hundred thousand.

8. *A.A.A.*, p. 685.

The *'Ālam Ārā-i Abbāsī* gives a detailed account of the siege of Qandahār and of 'Abdul 'Azīz Khan's surrender. Its account of the Persian reduction of Zamīn-Dāwar suggests (though Iskandar Munshī tries to put a gloss over it) the employment by the Persian commander of the well-known stratagem of inviting the commanders of the fort to a feast and putting them to sword. Even Shah 'Abbās I expressed (or rather pretended to express) his disapproval of the affair.

Malik Shah Husain of Sistān, who joined the shah's entourage at Farāh and was with him throughout the Qandahār campaign, gives a first-hand account of the various phases of the siege in his *Ihyā'ul Mulūk*. He attributes the Shah's order to his men not to fire in the direction of the fort for seven days, to the need for building in the meanwhile covered passages (*siba*) leading up to the walls and bastions of the fort, and not to any consideration for the besieged, as in the *'Ālam Ārā*. Malik Shah Husain also gives an entirely different account of the reduction of Zamīn-Dāwar. The Chaghataī soldiers, says he, who lived in Zamīn-Dāwar, depending upon the

(Contd.)

abortive.¹ The rebellion of Shah Jahān lasting for about four years (1031-35/1622-26)² finished all hope of effectual Mughul action over Qandahār.

The diplomatic sequel

'Abbās I wished to preserve friendly relations with Jahāngīr and wanted to assuage his anger over the Qandahār affair. Soon after seizing the fort, he sent Jahāngīr two envoys, Mīr Walī Beg and Ḥaidar Beg, with a letter full of casuistical explanations and of assurances of friendship. The Shah's defence of his action agrees with that recorded in the *'Ālam Ḍar-i 'Abbāsī*: when his frequent requests for Qandahār availed nothing, he decided to pay a friendly visit to the fort to demonstrate to the world the complete accord of the two Houses, but on the stupid refusal of the commander of the fort to admit him as an honoured guest, he had no choice left but to force an entry and take the fort. The letter closes with the remark that their mutual friendship was too firmly founded to be affected by minor events.³

Jahāngīr's reply, sent with the retiring Persian envoys,⁴ is a letter of protest, couched in friendly but firm terms. He pointed out that the letter

support promised by the Uzbek Yalangtūsh, refused to submit and made sorties against the investing Persian forces. Finally, losing one thousand dead on the field, they made their way to India. Zamīn-Dāwar and the other forts of the neighbourhood now passed into Persian hands, and the Afghans and the Hazāras of the area all made their submission to Iran. (*Ihyā'ul Mulūk*, B.M. Or. 2779, ff. 185a-86b, Tihiran edition, pp. 441-45).

According to Lockhart (*The Fall of the Safavī Dynasty*, p. 96), the Abdālīs assisted the Shah in the siege.

Also See Calendar No. J. 87 which is Shah 'Abbās's *fath-nāma* of Qandahār; and Calendar Nos. Ott. 382, 383 and 384, which are Shah 'Abbās's letters to the Ottoman court, reporting his Qandahār victory.

1. *Tūzuk*, pp. 345, 352; *M.J.*, f. 173b.

2. For details, see Beni Prasad, pp. 348-95, 426-8.

3. The Shah's letter and Jahāngīr's reply are both given in the *Tūzuk*, pp. 348-52; their translation in R. and B., II, pp. 240-5; is not without a few mistakes. Two other letters from the Shah purporting to have been written on the same occasion are given in Ethé 2067, ff. 94b-95a, and B.M. Or. 3482, f. 238a, respectively. It appears that Mīr Walī Beg started earlier and was soon followed by Ḥaidar Beg with the letter given in the *Tūzuk*. The letter in Ethé 2067 was drafted by Iskandar Beg *Munshī*; it refers to the keys of the kingdom of Irān being sent to Jahāngīr which is also mentioned in *A.A.A.*, p. 686, lines 9-10. For further details, see Calendar Nos. J. 88, 89 and 90.

4. The returning Persian emissaries who carried Jahāngīr's letter to the Shah were Ḥaidar Beg and Walī Beg. See Calendar No. J. 91. Of the dismissal of Zainal Beg, the principal Persian envoy, there seems to be no clear mention in the *Tūzuk-i Jahāngīrī* which merely says (p. 348) that all the envoys that had come from Shah 'Abbās at short intervals (*ba daf'āt āmīda būdand*) were given robes and expenses (*khi'l'at wa kharchi*) and were dismissed at Lahore on *Ādhar*, 17th r.y. (the month and the year corresponding to November-December 1632). Zainal Beg was evidently one of them. The *'Ālam Ḍar-i 'Abbāsī*, p. 700, says that Jahāngīr became angry with Zainal Beg on account of the Qandahār affair, but later suitably dismissed him along with the other Persian envoys.

brought by Zainal Beg made no reference to Qandahār; that prior to the coming of Zainal Beg, he had never received any communication about Qandahār; and that Zainal Beg had made verbal representations to which he had given a hopeful reply. Jahāngīr makes the astonishing remark that as soon as he had ascertained the Shah's march to Qandahār, he at once issued orders to 'Abdul 'Azīz Khan "not to transgress the good pleasure of that prosperous brother."¹ Jahāngīr assures the Shah that he values his friendship above everything else.² But, adds Jahāngīr, it was not worthy of the Shah to have taken hasty action on Qandahār without waiting for the return of Zainal Beg and ascertaining whether he had succeeded in his mission.³

Jahāngīr's remark about his orders to 'Abdul 'Azīz Khan⁴ is certainly untrue and no more than a face-saving afterthought; it brings out clearly his weakness in relation to the Shah. When writing this letter Jahāngīr was planning a large scale expedition against Persia.⁵ Soon after this he projected an alliance with Tūrān against Persia, but about the same time he wrote a very friendly letter to the Shah.⁶ Undoubtedly Jahāngīr felt very strongly about Qandahār,⁷ but his failing health⁸ and mounting domestic troubles would have certainly brought home to him the impossibility of retrieving the lost fort. Shah 'Abbās made every effort to conciliate Jahāngīr and to assuage the legacy of bitterness over Qandahār. Apart from direct approach to Jahāngīr, he wrote to this effect to other influential personages: to Prince Shah

1. *Tūzūk*, p. 351; R. and B., II, p. 244. Apart from the *Tūzūk*, we have come across only one more reference to this in Van Den Broeck's chronicle which says that Jahāngīr's nobles opined that Qandahār "could not hold out against such a force and that reinforcements would not reach Qandahār in time. They therefore advised the king to present the town, which was the cause of war, to Shah Abbās and that as soon as the governor should receive the letter, he should hand over the town to the Shah. This was decided so that it might not appear that the town was won by force. 'Abdul 'Azīz Khan received the letter, but did not believe the contents." (*Journal of Bihar and Orissa Res. Soc.*, 1942, p. 236.) The chronicle is, however, full of mistakes and its evidence not altogether reliable.

2. The *A.A.A.*, p. 700, particularly notes this sentence.

3. *Tūzūk*, pp. 350-2; R. and B., II, pp. 242-5. Calendar No. J. 91.

4. 'Abdul 'Azīz Khan was later executed by drowning for having failed to defend Qandahār (*Tūzūk*, p. 386). The punishment was unjust, but it certainly disproves the issuing of surrender orders to him.

Surprisingly enough, Kewal Rām remarks that it was not known what happened to 'Abdul 'Azīz Khan in the end. *Tadhkirat ul Umarā*, B.M. Add. 16, 703, f. 69a.

5. *Tūzūk*, p. 352, gives details of promotions and appointments of nobles, under the command of Prince Shahryār, for the purpose of the campaign to recover Qandahār.

6. See below.

7. *Tūzūk*, p. 354; also see Jahāngīr's letter to Shah Jahān, B.M. Add. 16859, f. 122a-b.

8. For Jahāngīr's failing health, see Beni Prasad, pp. 319-22.

Jahan, Nūr Jahān Begum and Khan 'Ālam.¹

In 1033-4/1624-5, the Shah sent Jahāngīr an envoy, Āqā Muḥammad *Mustaufī-i ghulāmān*, with a letter reporting his recent capture of Baghdād² from the Turks and with gifts including some from the booty captured in the campaign³. The letter makes a careful and indirect reference to the unpleasantness over Qandahār and expresses the hope that the little misunderstanding has been condoned.⁴ Jahāngīr received the envoy cordially at Lahore (Muḥarram 1035/October 1625) and dismissed him six months later⁵ with large rewards and with a number of highly expensive gifts for the Shah.⁶ The reply which Jahāngīr sent by the returning envoy deserves a close study as reflecting his attitude towards the Shah. First, Jahāngīr makes no reference to Qandahār; secondly, the letter is full of the usual expressions of love and amity, without any reservation; thirdly, there is a tactful reference to the Imāms which is not a noticeable feature in Jahāngīr's earlier letters. It shows a desire on his part to pander to the Shah's sectarian prejudices. He also makes a passing reference to the troubles in the Deccan and Bengal (i.e., Shah Jahān's rebellion). Jahāngīr closes the letter with an affirmation of everlasting friendship for the Shah and requests further diplomatic exchanges.⁷

It is clear that Jahāngīr fully realised the weakness of his position; the prestige of the Shah had increased even further since his victory at Baghdād; so the emperor thought it advisable to disregard the Qandahār affront and to maintain the friendliest relations with the Shah. The distracted state of the Mughul empire indeed made it very vulnerable on its frontiers. The Uzbeks launched border attacks in 1033/1624 and again in 1035/1626,⁸ though their successive defeats and Mughul diplomatic action⁹ restrained them from further attempts.

1. Letter to Shah Jahān, in Ethé 2067, ff. 133b-4a; to Khan 'Ālam in Chandar Bhān Brahman's *Chahār Chaman*, Corpus MS (Cambridge), ff. 34b-5a. Calendar No. J. 81. See below for letter to Nūr Jahān.

2. Rabi' I 1033/Jan. 1624; see A.A.A., 706 ff. for other details.

3. A.A.A., pp. 712-13; *Khuld*, IV, f. 464b.

4. Ethé 2067, ff. 75b-8a; Tūsi, ff. 172a-4b, claims it his own composition. Calendar No. J. 94. Also see No. J. 93.

5. Jumādā II 1035/March 1626.

6. *Tūzuk*, pp. 399, 401; *I.N.J.*, p. 252.

Curiously enough, the A.A.A. (p. 750) observes that from the time that Zainal Beg returned from India no envoy was sent till the Shah decided to send Takhta Beg in 1036/1626-27. Does it mean that Āqā Muḥammad was not considered of ambassadorial rank?

7. Ethé 2067, ff. 78a-9b; also in *N.J.M.*, B.M. 7688, f. 223a-b. Calendar No. J. 95.

8. *Tūzuk*, pp. 386-7; *I.N.J.*, pp. 225-8, 250; *M.J.*, f. 194a f., 200b; Lāhauri, II, p. 148.

9. See below.

An abortive Persian embassy

Shah 'Abbās, on the death of Prince Parwez (7 Šafar 1036/18 Oct. 1626) son of Jahāngīr, decided to send Takhta Beg *Yūzbāshī* on a condolatory embassy to India.¹ The envoy was to carry, it seems, four letters. One letter, making a reference to Jahāngīr's enquiries about his (Shah's) welfare gives an account of his recent prosperous affairs.² Another was a formal letter of condolence to Jahāngīr.³ But the most interesting was the third despatch which was addressed to Nūr Jahān Begum.⁴ This letter makes a brief mention of recent Persian victories against the Turks, condoles Parwez's demise, and finally, making a reference to his (Shah's) close friendship with Jahāngīr, says, "If your majesty were to consider this House (i.e., dynasty or state) as your own and were to assign to servants of this dynasty any business at this end, it would further augment mutual amity and union." This is a unique letter, being addressed by a king to a foreign queen—the only one of its kind in Indo-Persian state correspondence. The letter also indicates Shah 'Abbās's understanding of Nūr Jahān's dominant position in the Mughul empire.⁵ The fourth letter was addressed to Prince Shahryār, youngest son of Jahāngīr and son-in-law of Nūr Jahān.⁶

Before, however, Takhta Beg could leave for India, news arrived of Jahāngīr's death and the despatch of the embassy was cancelled;⁷ the fact that the above mentioned letters were never issued, does not decrease their importance as historical evidence.

Jahāngīr and the Uzbeks

Jahāngīr's relations with Tūrān exhibit a different pattern from those of either his predecessor or his successor. The key lies in his relations with Persia, though there were other factors as well, namely, the lack of any ambition on Jahāngīr's part to invade Tūrān, and the absence of any threat from the Uzbek side such as that posed by 'Abdullah Khan Uzbek in Akbar's reign. As time went on, Jahāngīr became increasingly committed to a policy of friendship with Shah 'Abbās; complete accord with Persia became the corner-stone of his foreign relations. He therefore remained indifferent to his Central Asian neighbours beyond the Hindūkush.⁸ Speaking to Thomas Coryate, an Eng-

1. *A.A.A.*, 750; *Khuld*, IV, f. 484a; *T. Sulṭānī*, f. 421a.

2. *N.J.M.*, B.M. Or. 3482, ff. 241b-2a. Calendar No. J. 96.

3. *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 217b-18a. Calendar No. J. 97.

4. *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 219b-20a. Calendar No. J. 98.

5. For Nūr Jahān's dominance, see Beni Prasad, p. 194f., and chap. XIV.

6. Calendar No. J. 99.

7. *A.A.A.*, p. 750. Jahāngīr died on 27 Šafar 1037/28 Oct. 1627.

8. The only exception seems to be Kāshghar. See Jahāngīr's letter to Shujā'uddīn Aḥmad Khan, ruler of Kāshghar, *J.I.*, B.M. Or. 1702. Calendar No. Tx. 339.

lish traveller in 1616, he observed "there was no great amity betwixt the Tartarian Princes and himself" and his recommendations would not help the traveller at Samarqand.¹ Jahāngīr remained similarly indifferent towards the Ottomans, and for the same reasons as in the case of the Uzbegs. He simply ignored a tentative diplomatic approach made from the Ottoman side.²

In Tūrān the death of 'Abdullah Khan Uzbeg and the assassination of his son and successor 'Abdul Mu'min Khan resulted in general confusion. A new dynasty, the Astrakhanids³ or Janids, who were allied to 'Abdullah Khan's house through the marriage of Jānī Beg Sultan with the former's sister,⁴ supplanted the Shaibanids. The confusion in Tūrān enabled Shah 'Abbās to recover Khurāsān and even to capture Andkhud. But his advance towards Balkh ended in a disastrous defeat and flight.⁵ For sometime he tried to control Tūrān through partisans and obtained great influence there without actual occupation; he settled disputes among the Uzbeg factions and had Uzbeg chiefs of his own choice at several places. The Uzbegs never liked this position and could not tolerate it for long. About 1020/1611, Imām Qulī,⁶ grandson of Jānī Beg Sultan, defeated his uncle Walī Muḥammad Khan, the last nominee of Shah 'Abbās, and established Uzbeg independence. Imām Qulī Khan made Bukhārā his own capital and appointed his younger brother Nadhr Muḥammad as Khan of Balkh with practically independent status. Shah 'Abbās, with his ever waxing power and prestige, was a formidable neighbour and the two brothers were careful to maintain a façade of friendship with him.⁷

Jahāngīr had little contact with Tūrān during the first fifteen years of

1. *Purchas His Pilgrimes*, IV, p. 486.

2. There are references to a minor Ottoman mission to Jahāngīr's court in the *Tārīkh-i Na'imā*, I, p. 441; *The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe*, London, 1926, p. 92. Also see Faridūn, *Munsha'āt*, (1849), p. 142; *Tūzūk*, pp. 68-69. For a full discussion, see Calendar No. Ott. 385.

3. Jānī Beg and his father Yār Muḥammad had emigrated from Astrakhān which had passed into Russian hands about the middle of the 16th century. Lane-Poole, *Muhammadian Dynasties*, p. 274.

4. Zahra Khānum, daughter of Sikandar Khan. Surprisingly, the *A.A.A.*, p. 382, calls Jānī Sultan the nephew of 'Abdullah Khan.

5. Vambéry, *History of Bokhara*, p. 309.

6. Imām Qulī was son of Dīn Muḥammad Khan who was son of Jānī Beg by sister of 'Abdullah Khan Uzbeg. Dīn Muḥammad Khan had died of wounds in a battle against Shah 'Abbās at Herāt in 1007/1598 (*A.A.A.*, pp. 392-5) and was therefore considered a martyr by the Uzbegs.

7. For details, see *A.A.A.*, pp. 384-98, 407-23, 430, 495, 576-7, 588-99, 677-9, 700, 744; *R. Tahīrin*, f. 385a; *I.N.J.*, pp. 39-41; *Muqīm-Khānī*, ff. 34 ff; *Badi'a*, ff. 155b ff. Vambéry, *History of Bokhara*, pp. 304-16, is not without chronological and factual errors; Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, II, ii, pp. 739-51, generally follows Vambéry. For Shah 'Abbās I's friendly correspondence with Nadhr Muḥammad Khan, see *Tūsī*, ff. 268b-70a; also 272b-74a.

his reign.¹ This inactivity, however, ceased when Shah 'Abbās demanded Qandahār; Jahāngīr now realised the need of having one more string to his bow. The references to the initial diplomatic approaches to Tūrān are rather vague and become significant only in the light of subsequent developments. Mīr Baraka (originally of Bukhārā), who had been selected six months earlier to convey a sum of money to the highly influential Khwājas of Jūbār of Bukhārā,² was actually given leave to set out in Rabi' I 1030³/February 1621, that is, two months after Zainal Beg had his first audience with Jahāngīr. The *Tūzūk* says nothing about the real purpose of his journey for (as will appear presently) he was on a highly confidential mission to Imām Qulī Khan of Tūrān. The presence of Zainal Beg and other Persian emissaries at the court made secrecy all the more necessary — at least until something tangible resulted from the projected negotiations. The contemporary *Ma'athir-i Jahāngīrī*, however, does state that he was on a mission to Imām Qulī Khan.⁴

About three months after the departure of Mīr Baraka, an emissary from the mother of Imām Qulī Khan arrived with a letter and gifts for Nūr Jahān Begum.⁵ Jahāngīr, on behalf of the Begum, sent Khwāja Naṣīr, an old and trusted servant, on a return embassy with a reply and presents. These seemingly minor missions, we believe, were a cover for highly important and confidential negotiations between Jahāngīr and the Khan of Tūrān. Khwāja Naṣīr certainly played an important part in these proceedings. (See below.)

Mīr Baraka and Khwāja Naṣīr did their work well, for in November 1622, Jahāngīr sent a *nishān* to Mīr Baraka in reply to his *arḍ-dāsht* from Samarqand. The emperor therein commends the diplomatic skill of the Mīr and of Khwāja Naṣīr in securing the sincere loyalty of the "dutiful son", Imām Qulī Khan; as soon as, assures the emperor, the Khan revives the traditional ties of

1. A letter from Naḡhr Muḥammad Khan to Jahāngīr, written probably in or after 1012/1612, is given in the *Maktūbāt*, Ethé 2068, ff. 456-466. Calendar No. Tx. 340. This does not appear to have evoked any response on the part of Jahāngīr.

2. *Tūzūk*, p. 310. The Khwājas of Jūbār were a family of great piety, learning and influence. Jahāngīr notes their position of religious leadership in Tūrān. Khwāja-i Kalān or the Great Khwāja of Jūbār was the spiritual preceptor of 'Abdullah Khan Uzbeg. 'Abdur Raḥīm Khwāja, who later came to India as ambassador was his son. Also see *A.A.A.*, p. 674, for the part played by 'Abdur Raḥīm Khwāja in Tūrān-Irān relations; the *Munsha'āt-i Tūsi*, ff. 726-74a, gives a letter from Shah 'Abbās to his brother, Ḥasan Khwāja Bukhārī. Calendar No. Tx. 341. Also see Lāhaurī, I, i, pp. 193-5.

3. *Tūzūk*, p. 325; *I.N.J.* seems to make no mention of Mīr Baraka's going to Tūrān at this juncture.

4. *M.J.*, f. 159f.; also see *Tūzūk*, 416.

5. *Tūzūk*, p. 330; *I.N.J.*, p. 180. Imām Qulī Khan's mother was a Persian lady of noble descent. For her correspondence with Shah 'Abbās, see *A.A.A.*, p. 678; also Vambéry, *History of Bokhara*, p. 318n.

friendship and opens diplomatic relations, he (Jahāngīr) would confer unprecedented favours on him. The note proceeds to condemn Shah 'Abbās in very strong terms; it refers to Prince Shahryār's selection for the Qandahār campaign and the appointment of Rustam Mirza Šafavī and Khan Jahān (Lodī) to serve under him.¹ Finally, Mīr Baraka is directed to present the royal gifts to 'Abdur Raḥīm Khwāja (Jūibārī) who was then at Balkh, and to hasten back to the imperial court to receive his rewards.² The sending of gifts to the influential Khwāja also appears to be part of Jahāngīr's efforts to establish an *entente* with Tūrān.

The embassy from Imām Qulī Khan's mother and the missions of Mīr Baraka had cleared the ground for the restoration of full diplomatic relations. Imām Qulī now sent an embassy to India headed by Uzbek Khwāja with a letter and a highly confidential personal message whose purport can be easily traced from Jahāngīr's reply. The latter was then in Kashmīr where he summoned the Khan's envoy.³ Jahāngīr wrote a most cordial reply, declaring his staunch devotion to Sunnī orthodoxy and his hatred of Shiism; he expressed the hope that as soon as the ruler of Iran was destroyed, Shiism would disappear. Referring to the Khan's confidential message, Jahāngīr urged him to stand by his pledge to join him (Jahāngīr) in a campaign against Shiism (i.e., the Safavids) and thereby also to gain his long overdue revenge (for the death of his father, Dīn Muḥammad Khan).⁴ For his part Jahāngīr promised to start preparations without delay. Finally he requested the early *congé* of his envoy Mīr Baraka and the despatch from the Khan's side of a highly trusted ambassador who, Jahāngīr assured, would not be detained for more than a month.⁵ All this indicates that some big project was afoot.

Imām Qulī Khan now sent a major embassy headed by 'Abdur Raḥīm Khwāja of the Jūibār family of Buḡhārā. The very high status of the ambassador is an index to the importance attached by the Khan to his new found

1. This helps to fix up the approximate date of the letter. The date of these appointments are August and November, 1622. *Tūzūk*, pp. 347, 352.

2. Ethé 2068, ff. 321a-22b. Calendar No. Tx. 342.

3. The season mentioned by Jahāngīr is spring. The emperor was in Kashmīr from Šafar 1033/Dec. 1623 to Shahrīwar 1033/Aug. 1624, and again from Jumādā II 1034/March 1625 to Muḥarram 1035/Oct. 1625. *Tūzūk*, 373, 393, 396-8; *I.N.J.*, pp. 213, 229, 240-1, 246.

4. See p. 87 n. 6 above.

5. Calendar No. Tx. 343. The *Badi'a*, ff. 189b-92b, gives the text of this letter. It appears from the text that the letter was sent with Mīr Baraka. This, if accepted, would mean that the Mīr had returned from Transoxiana and again went there with the letter under reference. This, however, is not mentioned in the chronicles. The *Tūzūk-i Jahāngīrī* indeed contains a clear mention of Mīr Baraka's long and presumably uninterrupted detention at Imām Qulī Khan's court (*Tūzūk*, p. 416, lines 15 and 16) and of the envoy's return with the Uzbek ambassador 'Abdur Raḥīm Khwāja in 1036/1627.

friendship with the Indian Mughuls. Mīr Bāraka accompanied the Khawājā to India (1036/1627). Jahāngīr displayed excessive regard and reverence for the Khawājā. On his instructions, the Khawājā was received with great ceremony both at Kābul and at Lahore. Jahāngīr exempted him from the usual court salutations and seated him near the throne.¹ The royal letter brought by the envoy clearly states the purpose of the embassy. It recalls the accord between Akbar and 'Abdullah Khan Uzbek and attributes to it the victories of Tūrān over Iran, which ensured the security of the pilgrimage route to Mecca. Imām Qulī recalls his father's death² and says the opening of the road to Mecca and vengeance for his father's death made it doubly obligatory on him to lead an expedition to Persia. He urges Jahāngīr to join him in this holy war. Further the Khan makes a strong plea to Jahāngīr to forgive his son Shah Jahān and to appoint him to lead the Mughul forces against Persia.³ According to the *Ma'āthir-i Jahāngīrī*, which gives the text of the letter, the Khawājā's efforts to bring about complete reconciliation⁴ between the emperor and his rebel son were thwarted by Nūr Jahān.⁵ This is probably true, as Shah Jahān's restoration to a position of power in the state would have upset her plans.

A further motive for Jahāngīr's changed policy towards Tūrān was the necessity of forestalling possible Uzbek activity on his north-west frontier. The Mughul loss of prestige over Qandahār was bound to encourage, as it actually did, the free-booters beyond the Hindūkush.⁶ But the strength and alertness of the Imperial forces at Kābul and the Mughul diplomatic activity at Balkh and Bukhārā prevented further attacks from Tūrān. Nadhr Muḥammad Khan, who was certainly behind these attacks, himself sent emissaries to explain away the mishap.⁷

The Uzbeks had also been making approaches to the Ottoman Sultan (Murād IV) for an alliance against Persia. Imām Qulī Khan wrote to the Sultan after the Persian capture of Baghdād⁸ (Rabī' I 1033/January 1624).

1. *Tūzūk*, p. 416; *I.N.J.*, p. 286; Lāhaurī, I, i, pp. 193-204.

2. See p. 87 n. 6 above.

3. *M.J.*, ff. 220a-25a; also in Ethé 2068, ff. 322bff. Calendar No. Tx. 344. Lāhaurī's (I, i, pp. 232-3) and Kanbū's (I, p. 314) accounts of this communication make a more direct mention of the Khan's offer to invade Khurāsān for the recovery of Qandahār.

4. A partial reconciliation had already taken place in the second quarter of 1626, see Beni Prasad, p. 394. Even after this Shah Jahān carried on a desultory struggle and made an unsuccessful attack to capture Thatta.

5. *M.J.*, f. 219a-b.

6. For Uzbek attacks in 1624 and 1616, see p. 85 n. 8 above.

7. *M.J.*, ff. 200b, 211b, 216a, notes two emissaries in the 19th and the 21st regnal years/1033-4 and 1035-6; also see *Tūzūk*, pp. 406-7, 413; *I.N.J.*, p. 266.

8. Ethé 2068, ff. 40b-43a, gives the text of Imām Qulī's letter.

The Sultan sent an encouraging reply to Imām Qulī Khan through the Khan's uncle Ay Muḥammad Khan who had been staying in Turkey for a year. The Sultan's letter is marked by strong sectarian overtones. It assures Imām Qulī Khan of the Sultan's full support against Shah 'Abbās I and urges the Khan to launch an attack from his side to ensure the destruction of the Shah's power and to secure the liberation of the Islamic lands from Persian occupation.¹ As Ay Muḥammad Khan, to avoid passing through Persia where he had earlier encountered much trouble, was proceeding homeward via India, the Sultan also entrusted him with a letter for Jahāngīr.² The portion of this letter dealing with Iran is almost exactly the same as in the Sultan's letter to Imām Qulī Khan. The Sultan's exhortations, in identical terms, to the Uzbek and the Mughul rulers, suggest he was visualising a three-power alliance against Persia. These letters were issued in 1035/1625-26.³ Jahāngīr's death in the following year put an end to the plans for an alliance.

Tūrānī sources

It would be interesting to trace how the Tūrānīs, the third side of the triangle, regarded the duel between India and Iran. Unfortunately no contemporary accounts are extant, except the *Baḥrul Asrār*, which focusses its attention entirely on the author's patron Nadḥr Muḥammad Khan, to the exclusion of Imām Qulī Khan, and says little about the latter's negotiations with Jahāngīr. The *Tawārīkh-i Badī'a* and the *Tadhkira-i Muqīm-Khānī* are eighteenth century works and their accounts of Indo-Tūrān relations are anecdotal in character and the latter work makes grave chronological errors, placing events of one reign into another.⁴ The *Tawārīkh-i Badī'a*'s account of 'Abdur Raḥīm Khwāja's embassy makes out that as Imām Qulī Khan had recently arrived at a friendly understanding with Shah 'Abbās, he no longer wanted an alliance with Jahāngīr and sent the Khwāja to offer suitable excuses.⁵ This runs counter to the evidence of the contemporary *Ma'āthir-i Jahāngīrī* and the text of Imām Qulī's letters to Jahāngīr and the Ottoman Sultan (see above). Of course, both Imām Qulī Khan and Nadḥr Muḥam-

1. Farīdūn, II, pp. 144-45.

2. Farīdūn, II, pp. 142-3, gives the text of the Sultan's letter to Jahāngīr. Calendar No. Ott. 385.

3. Muṣṭafā Na'im, *Tārīkh-i Na'imā*, Constantinople, 1147/1739, I, p. 441.

4. Cf. *Islamic Culture*, 1937, pp. 92-3 where the account of diplomatic exchanges between Jahāngīr and Imām Qulī is based on the *Tadh. Muqīm-Khānī*, even to the exclusion of the *T. Badī'a*. The *Muqīm-Khānī*'s anecdote of Jahāngīr's envoy Ḥakīm Ḥādhiq (who actually went as envoy to Tūrān in Shah Jahān's reign) is fully reproduced, without, however, mentioning the envoy's name.

5. *Badī'a*, f. 189a-b.

mad Khan were careful to preserve a semblance of friendship with the powerful Shah.¹ But the *Tawārīkh-i Badī'a's* implied rejection of a treaty with Jahāngir is inaccurate. The agreement between Shah 'Abbās and Tūrān (by which the Shah removed his Uzbek *protégé*, Rustam Muḥammad Khan son of Walī Muḥammad Khan, from Herāt to western Persia, and the Uzbeks restored a Persian border post they had captured),² is dated 1032/1622-3, and would not have affected the Indo-Turanian negotiations that went on through 1034/1625. Nor is it convincing that Imām Qulī Khan would have sent a major embassy led by the venerated 'Abdur Raḥīm Khwāja merely to notify the Mughuls that he was no longer interested in forming an alliance with them.

The Deccan

Besides Qandahār and the frontier tracts, the Deccan was another area where Mughul and Persian interests collided; the conflict was both political and sectarian. The Bahmanī kingdom in the Deccan was founded about A.D. 1347 by Ḥasan Gangū Bahmanī. Towards the end of the 15th century, it broke up into five independent states: Berār, Bīdar, Aḥmadnagar, Bījāpūr and Golconda. We are here concerned with the 'Ādil-Shāhī dynasty of Bījāpūr, the Quṭb-Shāhīs of Golconda and the Nizām-Shāhīs of Aḥmadnagar. The Mughuls never recognised them as independent rulers and in Mughul state papers and official chronicles, they are described as 'Ādil Khans, Quṭbul Mulks and Nizāmul Mulks respectively. These Muslim kingdoms of the Deccan were targets of Mughul territorial ambitions from the days of Akbar. Looking around for support, they saw in Persia the nearest great power which could counterbalance the constant Mughul pressure upon them. Another tie which bound them to the Safavids was their common religious denomination. The 'Ādil-Shāhīs of Bījāpūr and the Quṭb-Shāhīs of Golconda were already Shī'a before the advent of the Chaghataī Mughuls into India, and the Nizām-Shāhīs of Aḥmadnagar adopted Shiism in 944/1537-8, that is about half a century before Akbar launched his aggressive policy in the Deccan. It is also remarkable that the first 'Ādil Shah adopted the Shī'a *khutba* immediately on hearing of Shah Ismā'il's promulgation of Shiism as the state religion in Iran, and that the Nizām Shah was converted to Shiism by a distinguished Persian *émigré*, Shah Ṭāhir Ḥusainī. This Shah Ṭāhir was indeed the Shiite apostle of south India and played a leading role in the spread of Shī'a beliefs

1. The *A.A.A.* has many references to envoys and emissaries exchanged between the Shah and the Khans of Tūrān. Those relating to the years under discussion here are: pp. 700 (1032), 715 (1033), 744 (1036). Also see Shah 'Abbās's letter to Ḥasan Khwāja Bukhārī, *Munsha'āt-i-Ṭūsī*, ff. 272b-74a. Calendar No. Tx. 342.

2. *A.A.A.*, pp. 692, 700.

there. Shah Ṭāhir also maintained active contact with the Safavid court¹. The 'Ādil-Shāhīs were Shī'as intermittently and there were periods when Sunnism prevailed as the state religion in Bijāpūr. It is, however, notable that the 'Ādil-Shāhīs maintained relations with Persia in their "Sunnī" as well as "Shī'a" periods.² The Mughuls regarded with suspicion and displeasure any ties between the Deccan kingdoms and the Safavids, and they strongly objected to the inclusion of the name of the ruling Safavid in *khutba* in Golconda, a practice which the Quṭb Shāhs had adopted soon after the rise of Shah Ismā'il in Iran.³

Diplomatic relations between the Safavids and the Deccan rulers date from the reign of Shah Ismā'il I; Shah Ṭahmāsp and Shah Ismā'il II continued these contacts.⁴ Shah 'Abbās I greatly strengthened these relations by frequent exchange of embassies; he also arranged for a matrimonial alliance with the Quṭb-Shāhī family.⁵ Persians were much honoured at the Deccan courts and some of them became highly influential in the royal councils.⁶ These close and growing contacts between the Safavids and the Deccan were unwelcome to the Mughul emperors.

Though mainly preoccupied with the affairs of northern India, neither Bābur nor Humāyūn were oblivious of the Deccan. They were in correspond-

1. For the 'Ādil-Shāhīs, see: *Basā'ir*, p. 20, *Firishta*, II, pp. 6, 18-20.

For the Quṭb-Shāhīs, see: Minorsky, B.S.O.S., 1955, p. 72; *Firishta*, II, pp. 329-30.

For the Nizām-Shāhīs, see: *Firishta*, II, pp. 198, 201, 212-28, 329-30.

For Shah Ṭāhir, see: Rieu, pp. 395-6; *B.N.*, Translator's note, pp. 879-80; *Firishta*, II, 198, 201, 215-28, 330; also see *Inshā-i Shāh Ṭāhir*, B.M. Harl. 499, for his correspondence with Persia. Calendar Nos. Dn. 293 and 294.

2. For sectarian changes in Bijāpūr, see: *Basā'ir*, pp. 49, 73, 77, 213, 275-6, 281; *Firishta*, II, pp. 50, 66, 82, 128.

3. *Firishta*, II, pp. 329-30.

4. There are numerous references to these diplomatic contacts, e.g., *Firishta*, II, pp. 32-3, 34, 277-8; *A.A.A.*, pp. 89, 148; *Maqāl*, f. 124a-b; *A.N.*, III, p. 539; *T.I.N.S.*, see Rieu, pp. 107-111. For the embassy sent by Shah Ismā'il I to Sultan Muẓaffar Shah of Gujarāt in 917/1511, see *Tab. Ak.*, III, pp. 173-74; also see 4n above. For the letters of Ibrāhīm Quṭb Shah and Muṣṭafā Khan Ardistanī to the Persian Court, see Calendar Nos. Dn. 295, 296 and 297; also see No. Dn. 298.

5. *A.A.A.*, 362, 612, 670, 679; *T. Q. Shāhī*, King's College, Cambridge, MS. 89, f. 26b f.; *Firishta*, II, p. 362, mentions the marriage proposal from Shah 'Abbās I and its acceptance by Quṭb Shah, but nothing more is recorded about it. See *N.J.M.*, B.M. 7688, ff. 229b-32b, for 'Abbās's correspondence with the Deccan rulers.

6. E.g., Muḥammad Amīn *Mir Jumla* (chief minister), *Tūzūk*, p. 224; Mir Muḥammad Mu'min, *Firishta*, II, p. 341; Shaikh Muḥammad Khātūn, *A.A.A.*, p. 663; Shah Qulī Gurjī, *A.N.*, III, p. 539; Mir Muḥammad Sa'id *Mir Jumla*, see below. For Shah 'Abbās I's correspondence with Mir Muḥammad Mu'min, see Calendar Nos. Dn. 299.1 and 299.2. Also see Mohi-uddin Qadri "Zor", Syed, *Mir Muḥammad Mu'min* [in Urdu], Hyderabad-Deccan, 1941, esp. pp. 339-58 which deal with the specially favourable treatment and welcome extended to the Persians in Golconda.

ence with Burhān Nizām Shah of Aḥmadnagar. Humāyūn occupied Gujarāt, though only for a short period, and was interested in Khāndesh as well.¹ Akbar was the first Mughul emperor to give serious thought to the Deccan kingdoms and to formulate a Deccan policy. He wanted the Deccan kingdoms to accept the Mughul emperor as their overlord. The anarchy and the mutual wars of the Deccan kingdoms also helped Akbar's design. With the conquest of Gujarāt and Mālwa (and of Orissa in 1592), Mughul pressure on the Deccan was bound to increase. From 1573 onward, Akbar sent a series of missions to the various Deccan kingdoms. Khāndesh (where Faiḍī,² the famous poet, had been sent as Mughul envoy) was the first Deccan kingdom to accept Mughul paramountcy. The other states—Aḥmadnagar in particular—resisted Mughul pressure. Mughul success in reducing the Aḥmadnagar fort compelled the Nizām Shāhī kingdom to negotiate a territorial settlement with the Mughuls (1600 A.D.). Early next year the Mughuls occupied and annexed Khāndesh. Thus by the end of Akbar's reign, the Mughuls were already a Deccan power.³

Coming to Jahāngīr's reign, Mughul pressure on the Deccan increased during the years 1608-17. 'Abdur Raḥīm Khān-Khānān and Prince Shah Jahān, one after the other, launched large scale offensives on Aḥmadnagar and Bijāpūr.⁴ The Deccan rulers asked Shah 'Abbās I to intercede. Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shah II (988-1037) sent Mir Khalilullah, a Persian *emigré*, on a mission to the Shah. Muḥammad Qulī Quṭb Shah (988-1020/1590-1611) also despatched an envoy to Iran and so did Malik 'Ambar,⁵ the able commander-in-chief of the Nizām Shah and the moving spirit behind the defence of the Aḥmadnagar kingdom and in fact of the entire Deccan, against Mughul encroachments. Shah 'Abbās's friendship with Jahāngīr was still in the ascendant; so he wrote to the emperor commending the Deccan rulers, especially the Quṭb Shah, to his consideration.⁶ He also sent reminders to Jahāngīr in one of which he offered him an area of Persia equal to the Deccan states, and in another he proposed that in case the Deccan rulers were again guilty of con-

1. For Bābur and Humāyūn's correspondence with the Nizām Shah, see Calendar No. Dn. 290, 291 and 292. *Inshā-i Shāh Tāhīr*, ff. 56-19a.

2. Faiḍī's reports from the Deccan (in the form of *'ard-dāshts*) to the Emperor are preserved in the *Lafīza-i Faiḍī*, Ethé 1479. For details, see Calendar Nos. A. 32 and A. 35.

3. For an excellent modern account of Akbar's intervention in the Deccan, see R. P. Tripathi, *Rise and Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Allahabad, 1956, Ch. XV.

4. Beni Prasad, pp. 262-83.

5. *A.A.A.*, p. 612. The Golconda envoy would have set out by 1020/1611, as Muḥammad Qulī Quṭb Shah died in that year.

6. *A.A.A.*, p. 612; Tusi, f. 165bf. gives the text of the letter. Calendar No. J. 65; also J. 66, and J. 73.

tumacy, their chastisement should be handed over to him.¹ Shah 'Abbās also wrote a letter to Muḥammad Quṭb Shah, the successor of Muḥammad Qulī Quṭb Shah, saying that he had written to Jahāngīr recommending clemency for all Deccan kingdoms, especially Golconda in view of its close relations with Persia. Further, the Shah says that probably his letter had not yet reached the emperor, so he is sending a reminder and as soon as his communications reached Jahāngīr, he hoped the Mughul aggression would cease.²

The protracted Mughul campaign against Aḥmadnagar and Bijāpūr terminated in 1026/1617 as a result of Khurram's (i.e., Shah Jahān's) overwhelming show of force and the success earlier achieved by 'Abdur Raḥīm Khān-Khānān. Peace was made whereby the Mughuls acquired some territory including the fort of Aḥmadnagar; 'Adil Shah agreed to pay a large annual tribute.³ Whether Shāh 'Abbās's repeated requests had any effect on the course of the Mughul-Deccan negotiations and the conclusion of peace, is difficult to say. Jahāngīr's Memoirs and the chronicles of his reign contain no mention of the Shah's letters in favour of the Deccan kingdoms. In Rabi' I 1026/March 1617, when Jahāngīr was at Māndū, Ḥusain Beg Qaichāji⁴ Tabrizī, the retiring Persian ambassador to Golconda, and Shaikh Muḥammad Khātūn, the Quṭb-Shāhī envoy to Persia, presented themselves at the court. The mere fact that the two envoys were officially received and that Jahāngīr mentions this in the *Tūzūk*,⁵ suggests lenience towards the Deccan kingdoms as well as condonation of their accord with Persia. In 1029/1620, when dismissing Shaikh Muḥammad Khātūn and other Deccan envoys, Shah 'Abbās sent three embassies to Bijāpūr, Golconda and Aḥmadnagar respectively.⁶ The envoy to Quṭb Shah, Qāsim Beg, commander of Māzandarān, was also entrusted with a letter to Jahāngīr. The Shah therein thanked Jahāngīr for having pardoned the Deccan kings on his recommendations. He further requested that Qāsim Beg should be dismissed after the presentation of the

1. Text of the two reminders is given in *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 229b-30a, and *Bayād*, 1995, Bankipore, f. 146b, respectively. Calendar Nos. J. 66 and 73. One of these three letters was probably brought by Shah Qulī in Ṣafār 1020/April 1611; see Atakī, f. 409a; Bod. 101, f. 370.

2. *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 230b-31b; the letter was brought by Shaikh Muḥammad Khātūn, the returning Golconda envoy. Calendar No. Dn. 300.

3. Beni Prasad, pp. 282-6.

4. This name is often written as Ḥusain Beg Qipchāqī. For the form adopted by us (Qaichāji), see note under Calendar No. Dn. 299. Also see *Dhail*, pp. 280-81 where Ḥusain Beg Tabrizī's son Ḥasan Beg is mentioned being *Ṣāhib-i Jam'* of the royal *Qibchāchī-khāna*.

5. *Tūzūk*, p. 184. The two envoys arrived in Persia in 1027-8/1618. *A.A.A.*, pp. 612, 663.

6. *A.A.A.*, p. 670; *Khuld*, IV, f. 444a.

royal letter so that he could proceed on his mission to the Deccan.¹ Jahāngīr merely notes the arrival of Qāsim Beg at his court at Āgra in Khurdād 1030/ May-June 1621.²

In spite of Shah 'Abbās's letter of thanks to Jahāngīr, and the claim of the '*Ālam Āra-i 'Abbāsī*' that the Mughul emperor called off his Deccan campaign on the Shah's request (which in any case is chronologically inadmissible³), the present writer is of the opinion that the Shah's *démarche* had no effect on the Mughul policy in the Deccan. His intercession on behalf of the Deccan kingdoms must have been unwelcome to Jahāngīr, and that is why, it seems, he omits all mention of it in the *Tūzūk*.

1. Ethé 2067, ff. 94b-5a, gives the text of the letter; also other copies. Calendar No. J. 80. Also see Calendar No. Dn. 301, from 'Abdullah Quṭb Shah to Shah 'Abbās I, for mention of Qāsim Beg's death in Golconda.

2. *Tūzūk*, p. 332; also see *I.N.J.*, p. 183 and *K.K.*, I, p. 323.

3. *A.A.A.*, 612 and *Khuld*, IV, f. 413b, claim this credit in the account of the year 1022, while the Mughul campaign continued for another four years.

CHAPTER VI

SHAH JAHĀN AND IRAN

BEFORE his accession, Shah Jahān had been in active correspondence with Shah 'Abbās I and the two had started calling each other uncle and nephew respectively. The wise Shah perceived in Shah Jahān the coming man, and assiduously kept in touch with him and his affairs.¹ Immediately on hearing of Shah Jahān's accession, he sent Bahrī Beg to congratulate the new emperor. The real purpose, of course, was to obtain a first hand report of the situation in India. The envoy travelled light, and was required to return immediately and report to the Shah. He sailed on an English ship and arrived at the court within three months of his departure.² While Bahrī Beg was on his way, Shah 'Abbās died, but the envoy continued on his appointed mission and was duly received and amply awarded. The royal letter contained an affectionate and mild rebuke for Shah Jahān's failure to send an immediate report of his accession.³ Bahrī Beg also announced that a major embassy would soon follow. He was dismissed in Rabi' I 1039/October 1629.⁴

Shah 'Abbās I's demise (Jumādā I 1038/January 1629), after a reign of over four decades, had left Iran in a state of confusion. The old Shah guarded against possible rivalry from sons and grandsons by the usual methods of a despot; Sām Mirza, son of the unfortunate Šafī Mirza⁵ (eldest son of Shah Abbās I), was the only one to escape unharmed, but the Shah kept him shut away from the world of men. His exclusive upbringing in the *anderūn* deprived him from all administrative experience, at the same time imparting to his character a strain of cruelty and callousness. The absence of any rival,

1. See Appendix H.

2. Šādiq, f. 14b; Kanbū, I, pp. 334-4; *English Factories*, 1624-9, p. 167 (March 1627) where Bahrī Beg has been called Lord Admiral of Persia, presumably because of his name.

3. *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, f. 229a, gives the text of this letter. Calendar No. Sh. 107.

4. Lāhaurī, I, i, pp. 261-2, 281; Kanbū, I, pp. 335-5; Qazvinī, ff. 176b-77b; Šādiq, f. 14a; K.K., I, pp. 410, 419.

5. For mention of his murder, see the previous chapter, p. 176, n. 8.

however, made his accession certain. He assumed his father's name as his title.¹ Thus, while in Persia a great ruler had been succeeded by an inexperienced youth, in India a faction-ridden, declining regime had been replaced by one which presaged leadership, vigour and ambition. A change in Indo-Persian relations was bound to ensue.

The embassy of Baḥrī Beg provided Shah Jahān with a suitable opportunity to open diplomatic relations with the new Shah. He chose as his envoy Mīr Baraka who had a good record as a diplomat. His embassy was very much the counterpart of Baḥrī Beg's mission: he was required to return quickly with a report of the situation in Persia, while a major embassy to Persia was to follow his return. Shah Jahān in his letter addressed Shah Šafī as his son, offered him any help he needed for the consolidation of his rule and advised him to observe justice and toleration.² Mīr Baraka left for Persia on 12 Rabī' I 1039/20 October 1629 in company with Baḥrī Beg, the retiring Persian representative. He was received with due ceremony at Shah Šafī's court and suitably dismissed after four or five months.³

With Persia's traditional enemies, the Turks to the north-west and the Uzbeks on the north-east, already active,⁴ it was but natural for Shah Šafī to desire friendly relations with Shah Jahān. Sometime before the arrival of Mīr Baraka at his court, he had already despatched a regular embassy led by Muḥammad 'Alī Beg Iṣfahānī to India. This Muḥammad 'Alī was a loyal and able servant and subsequently rose to a high position. He arrived at Lahore about *Dhul-Q.* 1039/June 1630. His embassy, being the first from the new Shah, was highly honoured in India; the governor of a province was appointed to conduct him to Burhānpūr in the Deccan where the emperor was then encamped. At Burhānpūr, he was ushered into royal presence by 'Allāmī Afḍal Khan, the Wazīr. Shah Jahān received him favourably, taking the royal letter⁵ personally from his hand, which was a special favour. He was amply awarded then and on several subsequent occasions, and his assistants too were not forgotten. In all, he is said to have received as reward 3,16,000 rupees in cash and one lac in kind. He was placed very high in precedence at court ceremonies, and was ceremoniously dismissed in Rabī' II 1042/October 1632.⁶

1. For details, see *Dhail*, pp. 6-10. The Mughul chronicles also give an account of these events, e.g., *Lāhaurī*, I, i, pp. 262-5.

2. *Lāhaurī*, I, i, pp. 281-7; *Qazvīnī*, ff. 183b-85b. Calendar No. Sh. 108.

3. The *Dhail*, pp. 72-3, places Mīr Baraka's arrival and departure in 1040-1/1631. The *Khuld-i Barīn*, V, f. 21b, and the *T. Sulṭānī*, f. 425b, make it a year later. Mīr Baraka arrived back at the Mughul court in *Dhul-H.* 1041/May-June 1632, see *Kanbū*, I, p. 492.

4. *Khuld*, V, f. 42aff.

5. The letter exists in four versions. Two of these—one mainly congratulatory and one condolatory—may have been actually sent. For details, see Calendar Nos. Sh. 109 to 112.

6. While the Safavid sources make only casual references to the embassy of Muḥammad 'Alī, the Mughul chronicles describe it in profuse detail: *Khuld*, V, f. 45a; *Dhail*, pp. 75, 199-200;

Tūrān

Let us now turn briefly to Shah Jahān's early relations with Tūrān. This ambitious Mughul emperor who came to the throne in the prime of life had three main objectives in foreign policy, each of which was related to Persia, directly or indirectly. He wanted to recover Qandahār, to re-establish the power of his house in his ancestral lands of Tūrān, and to assert his suzerainty over the Deccan kingdoms and destroy their alliance with Persia. It was naturally his aim to preserve friendship with Tūrān when striking at Qandahār and to keep Persia neutral when invading Tūrān. The last thing he wanted was an alliance between Iran and Tūrān, so he took the initiative in fostering close diplomatic relations with both sides, especially with Tūrān in the early years of his reign. The numerous references in the chronicles to large remittances of money to Shah Jahān's well-wishers in Tūrān and grants to the Tūrānīs who came to his court, indicate a definite design of encouraging a party in Tūrān favourable to his aims.¹ At the very outset of his reign there had been an unsuccessful attack on Kābul by the ambitious Nadhr Muḥammad Khan of Balkh.² Despite this Shah Jahān took advantage of the mission headed by 'Abdur Raḥīm Khwāja (who had died in India soon after Shah Jahān's accession) to send an embassy to Imām Qulī Khan at Bukhārā. Soon more missions were exchanged with Imām Qulī Khan as well as with his brother Nadhr Muḥammad Khan;³ the attack on Kābul was explained away by one side and tactfully forgotten by the other. In these diplomatic exchanges much emphasis was laid on Sunnī solidarity against the Shiite Persia. The Khans were alarmed by Shah Jahān's visit to Kābul and his obvious intention to invade Tūrān and tried assiduously to offset this by offering support for a campaign against Persia to recover Qandahār. The confusion in Iran following the death of Shah 'Abbās I offered the ambitious Nadhr Muḥammad Khan a wonderful opportunity of fishing in troubled waters, provided he could be sure of his own frontier on the Indian side. As a result of the diplomatic exchanges, some understanding on a common front against Persia was arrived at between Shah Jahān and the two Khans about 1635.⁴

B.M. Add. 7655 (Bijan's chronicle), f. 53a; Lāhaurī, I, i, pp. 304, 361-2, 365-7, 397, 422, 427, 429, 433, 441; Qazvinī, ff. 192, 222a-b, 224b, 246b, 250a-b, 225a; Jalāl Tabāṭabāī, ff. 4b-5a, 11a-b; Kanbū, I, pp. 425, 427, 480, 488, 491; Šādiq, f. 34a-b (gives a different name), 43b.

1. Of the many references, some are: Lāhaurī, I, i, p. 415; I, ii, pp. 8, 166, 243; II, pp. 91-3, etc.; Kanbū, II, pp. 412, 510; III, pp. 7, 22, etc.

2. Lāhaurī, I, i, pp. 206-16; Kanbū, I, p. 292ff; *Badi'a*, f. 193a-b.

3. Of the several missions exchanged between the Mughul and Uzbek courts, the more important are the Uzbek mission of Ḥājī Waqqāš (Lāhaurī, I, i, p. 431) and the Mughul embassies of Ḥakīm Ḥādhiq (*ibid.*, pp. 231-34) and Tarbiyat Khan (*ibid.*, pp. 465-66). Also see Calendar Nos. Tx. 345 and 346.

4. Lāhaurī, I, i, pp. 232-6, 318, 431, 465; I, ii, pp. 65-6; Kanbū, I, 314, 492-3, 536; see Šādiq, f. 11b, for Imām Qulī's offer regarding Qandahār; for Shah Jahān's letter to the Khans,

Embassy of Şafdar Khan to Persia

When dismissing Muḥammad 'Alī Beg, Shah Jahān selected Şafdar Khan as the next Mughul envoy to Iran. He was to proceed on a major embassy, and rarities and valuables worth four lac of rupees were entrusted to him for the Shah. The gifts included high quality textiles of Aḥmadābād, Banāras, and Mālāda (in Bengal). The Khan was thoroughly instructed in diplomatic etiquette and given leave to depart in Shawwāl 1042/April 1633, but he actually started two or three months later.¹ The royal letter he carried is an interesting document: with a formal word of praise for Şafī's letter (brought by Muḥammad 'Alī), there is also a note of censure, for Shah Jahān says, "It appears from reports of the conditions in Persia, that none of the wise counsellors of the late Shah 'Abbās survives to point out to you the deep accord of our two dynasties." The letter then proceeds to advise the young king at some length on government, commending kindness and generosity and deprecating cruelty and harshness.² Şafdar Khan, after his arrival in Persia, had to wait for about a year and a half for an audience, as Shah Safī was campaigning on his north-west frontier. After recovering Erivān from the Turks (Shawwāl 1045/March 1636), the Shah proceeded to the capital.³ The first audience to Şafdar Khan was given in Kashān whence he accompanied the Shah to Işfāhān (Rajab 1046/December 1636)⁴ Şafdar Khan's reception was on the whole very cordial and he was given precedence over other envoys at the various festivities and pleasure parties. Some time after the Nuārūz festival (March 1637), the Shah decided to dismiss Şafdar Khan and selected Yādgār Beg to accompany him to India. As a mark of special favour, the Shah paid a personal visit to Şafdar Khan's quarters to bid him farewell.⁵

see Lāhaurī, I, i, pp. 234-7, 466-72. Also see: Raḥīm, *Islamic Culture*, 1937, pp. 188-90; Saksena, *History of Shahjahan*, pp. 184-9.

1. Lāhaurī, I, i, pp. 477-8; Kanbū, I, pp. 550-1; K.K., I, p. 473.

2. Lahauri, I, i, pp. 478-86; the letter is also given in *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 255a-6b, and several other collections. Calendar No. Sh. 114.

3. While still on the way, the Shah sent a *nishān* to Şafdar Khan asking the ambassador to proceed to the capital to join him. *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, f. 278a-b. Calendar No. Sh. 116.

4. We have followed here the chronology of the *Tārīkh-i Sulṭānī*, (ff. 430b-33a) which is generally accurate. Also see: *Khuld*, V, ff. 5b, 61a-b = *Dhail*, pp. 149, 194; *English Factories*, 1634-6, p. 307 (says Şafdar Khan had to wait for three years for his first audience); see Şafdar Khan's report to Shah Jahān about delay in his audience, Lāhaurī, II, p. 15. Olcarius, secretary to the embassy of Frederick Duke of Holstein to Persia, says (Book V, pp. 199-200) that Şafdar Khan had to wait for three years for a royal audience and that the main purpose of his mission was to take away Mirza Bulāqī (grandson of Jahāngīr, see below for further details). According to Mendelslo (*Travels*, p. 17), Şafdar Khan's embassy had also to do with Qandahār. The *Dhakhīratul Khawānīn* (Rashdi MS), f (p). 461, records that even though Şafdar Khan was a Tūrānī, his embassy to the Persian court was highly successful.

N.B.—(=sign between *Khuld* and *Dhail* indicates identical passages. P. 146 onwards of *Dhail* is a reproduction of the *Khuld-i Barin*. See Note on the Sources.)

5. *Khuld*, V, ff. 611-63b = *Dhail*, pp. 194-200, gives a fulsome account; Bijan, ff. 67a-8a.

When Şafdar Khan was making preparation to leave for India, a quarrel arose between one of his servants and a Persian serving in the embassy of Frederick Duke of Holstein and soon developed into a pitched battle between the staffs of the two embassies. The incident occurred on 7 August 1637 and the fight lasted some four hours. The Indian staff was larger in number, and the Indian merchants in Işfahān rallied to their support. So they soon defeated the Europeans who fled to their quarters and began to defend themselves with fire-arms. Some Indians and Europeans as well as a few Persians were killed in this skirmish, which was soon subdued by a high-ranking Persian official appointed by the Shah, but not before the Indians had thoroughly looted the baggage of the European embassy. The Holstein embassy accounts say that the Shah was highly incensed at the outbreak of this unseemly quarrel in his capital, and wanted the head of Şafdar Khan: that is perhaps how the matter was put to them by the Persian ministers. According to the contemporary *Khuld-i Barīn*, the Shah conferred further favours on Şafdar Khan and finally dismissed him in early 1047/mid 1637.¹ Şafdar Khan, it appears, moved slowly in order to keep in touch with affairs in Persia. He reached Qandahār late in 1047/early 1638, after the Mughuls had seized it² (see below).

While Şafdar Khan was still at the Persian court, Shah Jahān despatched another envoy, Mīr Ḥusainī in *Dhul-H.* 1046/May 1637, with a letter giving an account of the submission of 'Ādil Shah and Quṭb Shah.³ The real purpose of sending him to Persia at this juncture was, however, to keep in touch with affairs in Persia after Şafdar Khan's return. The Shah received Mīr Ḥusainī with great cordiality. The Mīr had also brought some important verbal message which was to be delivered to the Shah through Şafdar Khan. But as the latter had left by this time, the message could not be delivered and its purport is not known. It is quite likely that it had something to do with Qandahār. Mīr Ḥusainī appears to have been dismissed before the Mughul entry into Qandahār (see below), for the Shah's reply sent through him makes no reference to Qandahār and is indeed in a highly cordial vein. Mīr Ḥusainī arrived back at the Mughul court in Rajab 1048/November 1638.⁴

1. *Khuld*, V, f. 64a = *Dhail*, pp. 202-3. Olearius, secretary of the Holstein embassy, gives a detailed account of the quarrel; according to him, five Europeans and twenty-four Indians were killed and the Holstein embassy suffered to the extent of 4000 crowns as a result of the looting. (Olearius, Book V, pp. 197-200). Mandelslo, who was in the Holstein embassy, had an unpleasant meeting at Āgra with someone whose kinsmen had been killed in the quarrel at Işfahān; see reference in Oaten, *Travels and Travellers in India*, pp. 177-8. For dismissal of Şafdar Khan, also see: *T. Sulṭānī*, f. 433b, Bijan, f. 68a; the chronology of these chronicles is not always clear.

2. *Lāhaurī*, II, p. 49.

3. See p. 117 below.

4. *Lāhaurī*, I, ii, pp. 257-66; II, p. 125; for the Shah's letter, see *N. J. M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, f. 254a-b. The *Khuld-i Barīn*, V, f. 66a, dates Mīr Ḥusainī's presentation ceremony 5

Embassy of Yādgār Beg to India

Yādgār Beg was despatched about the same time as Šafdar Khan was dismissed. According to a Safavid source,¹ he was sent on an urgent mission of enquiry, relating evidently to the Mughul designs on Qandahār. He certainly travelled fast, for he reached India earlier than Šafdar Khan. The royal letter he brought makes no mention of Qandahār;² this was, however, in keeping with current diplomatic practice whereby important messages were quite often delivered verbally. Yādgār Beg reached the Mughul court about a month after the Mughul troops had occupied Qandahār. His awkward position was assuaged by excessive favours from Shah Jahān who after dismissing him from Agra in Rabi' II 1048/August 1638, gave him another audience three months later at Lahore and redissmised him with fresh rewards.³

Qandahār

Shah Jahān had decided from the beginning to recover Qandahār, and he only awaited a favourable moment to unleash his offensive.⁴ As early as 1041/1632, he had accorded welcome to Shēr Khan Afghān of Fūshanj, a Persian tributary chief who had rebelled and fled to India.⁵ The welcome accorded to him was certainly a hostile act. In 1046/1636, Shah Jahān even wrote to the Ottoman Sultan, Murād IV, of his resolve to recover Qandahār and proposed a three-sided attack on Persia from India, Tūrān and Turkey.⁶ By this time some understanding with Turān had already been reached.⁷ Before, however, resorting to arms, Shah Jahān wanted to see if the object could be attained by other means. He instructed Sa'id Khan, governor of Kābul, to send an experienced diplomat to 'Alī Mardān Khan, the Persian governor of Qandahār, to induce him to join the Mughul service. Sa'id Khan sent Dhul Qadr Khan "with the utmost secrecy so that no one could know the purpose of the mission."⁸ The emissary was to sound 'Alī Mardān Khan as

Dhul-Q. 1047, that is a fortnight after the Mughul entry into Qandahār; the chronology of the *Khuld-i Barīn* is at fault here, as at many other places. Calendar Nos. Sh. 117 and Sh. 120.

1. *Qīṣaṣ*, f. 43a.

2. For the letter, see *N. J. M.*, B. M. Add. 7688, ff. 253b-54a. Calendar No. Sh. 118.

3. Lāhaurī, II, pp. 93, 95, 97, 99, 101, 103, 105, 124-5; Kanbū, II, pp. 290-1, 297; K. K., I, pp. 560-1; *T. Sulṭānī*, f. 433a; *F. Šafaviyya*, f. 50a; Šādiq, ff. 86a, 90b; *Khuld*, V, f. 73a=*Dhail*, p. 232.

4. Lāhaurī, II, p. 27.

5. Lāhaurī, I, i, pp. 419-21; *Khuld*, V, ff. 21b-22b; for further details of this incident, see the last chapter.

6. Farīdūn II, pp. 67-9; also Lāhaurī, II, pp. 184-8; for the Turkish response, see pp. 115-16 below.

7. See p. 99 above.

8. Šādiq, f. 83a. This secret mission was preceded by a friendly letter from Qilij Khan

well as to do the work of,ilitary espionage in Qandahār.¹ Dhul Qadr Khan was well-received by 'Alī Mardān Khan. The Mughul diplomat enlarged on two counts: the untold riches and the grandeur of the Mughul empire and, the high status and emoluments 'Alī Mardān Khan was sure to get there, and, secondly, the inevitability of Shah Jahān's conquest of Qandahār, if he did not make a willing submission. 'Alī Mardān Khan dismissed the emissary suitably and later sent a message firmly rejecting the Mughul offer.² Shah Jahān now determined on military steps and 'Alī Mardān Khan took defence measures and built a new strong citadel in the fort.³ Soon, however, the situation changed favourably for Shah Jahān.

'Alī Mardān Khan had his own troubles with the Persian court. While the Mughul accounts say that it was his defence preparations against the Mughuls which made the Shah suspect that he was aiming at increased power and ultimate independence, the Safavid version is that 'Alī Mardān Khan constructed the new citadel in fear of the Shah's wrath. It is certain that he had more enemies at the court than friends, and that the new powerful Wazīr, Taqī Sāru, was hostile to him and poisoned the Shah's mind against him. News of the secret mission from Kābul was also reported to the Shah in a manner prejudicial to 'Alī Mardān Khan. He was now ordered to proceed to the court. Shah Šafī's capricious callousness and murderous cruelty made him a dangerous master to deal with, and 'Alī Mardān Khan was naturally loth to go to the court. He tried to conciliate the Shah by offering to pay higher annual revenues and sent his son to the court as a token of loyalty. Evidently 'Alī Mardān Khan had no intention of going over to the Mughul side at this stage. But he was in mortal danger of his life from the Shah, and when the latter persisted in the demand for his personal appearance at the court and appointed Siyā'ūsh Qullar Āqāsī⁴ with large forces to enforce this command, he had to make a choice between life and loyalty, and chose the former.⁵

'Alī Mardān Khan now made approaches to the Mughuls. The know-

to 'Alī Mardān Khan which was evidently sent without any secrecy. *Bahār-i Sukhūm*, B.M. Or. 178, f. 45a-b. Calendar No. Sh. 115.

1. Lāhaurī, II, p. 28.

2. Šādiq, f. 83b.

3. Lāhaurī, II, p. 29.

4. *I.e.*, Master of Slaves. "Qullar-Āqāsī is the most important of the pillars of the state after the *Qurchi-bāshī*." *T.M.*, tr., p. 46.

5. Mughul sources: Lāhaurī, II, pp. 29-32; Kanbū, II, pp. 271-86; K.K., I, pp. 554-9; Šādiq, f. 83b. Šādiq's account of these events is independent and very useful. Persian sources: *Khuld*, V, ff. 65b-67a = *Dhail*, pp. 208-12; Bijan, f. 68a-b; *Qiyās*, f. 43a. The Safavid chronicles naturally try to put the entire blame on 'Alī Mardān Khan, but it is evident even from their own accounts that the Shah had already determined to do away with him before the latter decided to overthrow allegiance.

ledge that Shah Jahān was before long to launch an offensive on Qandahār was one of the considerations that influenced his mind.¹ The first approaches were tentative and it is also clear that 'Alī Mardān Khan passed through a period of hesitation. The division of opinion in his camp also affected his position, for there was a strong pro-Persian party in the fort. His first request to the Mughul authorities at Kābul and Ghaznī was to hold their troops in readiness:² he thus kept the initiative in his own hands. He also sent an *'arīḍa* to Shah Jahan, and waited impatiently for a reply, desirous to know what he was to expect by throwing in his lot with the Mughuls. It appears that Siyā'ūsh's further advance towards Qandahār and the danger from the Persian partisans inside the fort made 'Alī Mardān Khan's position precarious, for he sent frantic messages to the Mughul commander at Ghaznī and the governors of Kābul and Multān to hasten with their troops "without waiting for imperial orders."³ The Mughul commanders, however, hardly needed any prompting, for they had already planned to march on Qandahār as soon as they heard from 'Alī Mardān Khan. On 21 Shawwāl 1047/26 February 1638, the first Mughul contingent entered Qandahār and soon more troops poured in. Qilij Khan, governor of Multān, was transferred to the governorship of Qandahār. In view of the threat from Siyā'ūsh who was encamping only twelve miles away, and was in touch with partisans inside the fort, Sa'id Khan, governor of Kābul, personally came to Qandahār. The pro-Persian party was suppressed.⁴

The accession of Qandahār to the Mughul empire was good fortune, as Khafī Khan observes.⁵ For Shah Ṣafī, the event occurred at a singularly inopportune moment. The news of 'Alī Mardān Khan's disaffection and of the Turkish advance on Baghdād reached the court about the same time.⁶ The Shah was in no position to send the much-needed reinforcements to Siyā'ūsh, and Mughul numerical superiority forced the latter to beat a retreat.⁷ Soon Mughul forces seized Bust and Zamīn-Dāwar (Rabī' II 1048/August 1638).⁸ A couple of months later the Turks captured Baghdād.⁹

1. Lāhaurī, II, p. 30.

2. Lāhaurī, II, p. 32.

3. Lāhaurī, II, p. 33.

4. Lāhaurī, II, pp. 30-40; Ṣādiq, f. 84a; Kanbū, II, pp. 272-6; K.K., I, pp. 554-7; *Khuld*, V, ff. 66a-67b = *Dhail*, pp. 209-13; *Qisas*, ff. 43a-5a. According to Bijan, f. 69a, 'Alī Mardān Khan had second thoughts even after the entry of the first Mughul contingent, but his account is rather anecdotal. Also see Shah Jahān's *fathnāma* of Qandahār, Calendar No. Sh. 119.

5. K.K., I, p. 552.

6. *Khuld*, V, ff. 66b-7a = *Dhail*, pp. 211-12; *T. Sulṭānī*, f. 433b.

7. *Khuld*, V, ff. 67b = *Dhail*, pp. 213.

8. Lāhaurī, II, pp. 40-62.

9. *T. Sulṭānī*, f. 434b; Hammer (Fr. tr.), IX, p. 337.

Of the numerous Persians and Tūrānīs who joined the Mughul service, none was so profusely rewarded and so highly honoured as was 'Alī Mardān Khan. The chronicles of Shah Jahān's reign abound with references to the favours conferred on him. He was awarded the rank of 5,000 *dhāt* 5,000 *Sawār*, and was appointed governor of Kashmīr and later transferred to the more important governorship of Kābul. After the death of Āṣaf Khan,¹ Shah Jahān's father-in-law, he was promoted to the unique position of *Amīrul Umarā*. His relatives and followers were all notably rewarded. 'Alī Mardān Khan, of course, proved a very able civil servant and military commander.²

After the occupation of Qandahār and other forts, Shah Jahān sent a letter to Shah Ṣafī (with Yādgār Beg³), expressing the hope that recent events would not cloud mutual relations and offering to pay every year a sum equal to the revenues of Qandahār.⁴ Ṣafdar Khan, who arrived at Qandahār from Persia, brought reports of Shah Ṣafī's determination to recover the fort.⁵ Shah Jahān, apprehending a quick Persian move, ordered necessary defence preparations and precautionary measures at Kābul and Qandahār. Shah Ṣafī's worries on his western frontiers prevented any immediate move on Qandahār. But by Jumādā I 1049/September 1639, he had made peace with the Ottomans at the cost of Baghdād and soon after ordered elaborate preparations for an expedition to Qandahār. After two years of preparations, he set out from Iṣfahān but fell ill on the way and died at Kāshān on 12 Ṣafar 1052/2 May 1642. Shah Jahān expressed unconcealed joy at his death, and ascribing it to the good fortune of Dārā Shukoh, who had been entrusted with the defence of Qandahār, conferred on the latter the title of *Shāhzāda Buland Iqbāl* or Prince of High Fortune. The Shāh-Jahānī chronicles, indeed, make highly uncharitable references to Shah Ṣafī after his death.⁶

Mughul Frontier Diplomacy

Shah Jahān's policy towards Persia, after the occupation of Qandahār, was governed by his ambition to conquer Tūrān. At first, he tried to win the cooperation of the Persian authorities at Herāt in his projected invasion of Tūrān. A local conflict between the Mughuls and the Persians on the borders

1. 17 Sha'bān 1051. Lāhaurī, II, p. 257.

2. Of the numerous references, some are as follows: Lāhaurī, II, pp. 92, 95, 100, 123-5, 128-30, 168f., 222, 321; Kanbū, II, 304; Ṣādiq, f. 90b.

3. See p. 102 above.

4. *Khuld*, V, f. 73a = *Dhail*, p. 232; *F. Ṣafaviyya*, f. 50a.

5. Lāhaurī, II, p. 49.

6. Lāhaurī, II, pp. 291-7; Kanbū, II, pp. 303, 363-71; K.K., I, pp. 589-91; Ṣādiq, ff. 91a, 101a; *Khuld*, V, ff. 78a-80b = *Dhail*, pp. 247-56; *T. Sulṭānī*, ff. 434b-35b; Hammer (Fr. tr.), IX, p. 350. *English Factories*, 1642-5, p. 83: Ṣafī "died there (at Kāshān) unworthily, whilst overmuch drinking and other ryots hastened his end..."

of Qandahār and Khurāsān led Ḥasan Khan, Persian viceroy of Khurāsān, to lodge a protest with Qilīj Khan, Mughul governor of Qandahār. The latter offered an explanation as well as help to Ḥasan Khan against the Uzbegs.¹ The weakness of the central Persian government caused the Khurāsān authorities about this time to be particularly vulnerable to Mughul diplomatic pressure as well as to Uzbek inroads. An actual large scale Uzbek invasion of Mārū-chāq on the Persian frontier enabled Qilīj Khan to propose joint military measures against the Uzbegs (Muḥarram 1050/April-May 1640).² Ḥasan Khan communicated his acceptance of the proposal.³ Āṣaf Khan, the *Amīrul-Umarā*, now wrote a letter, on Shah Jahān's command, to confirm this agreement. Ḥasan Khan was notified that the emperor would soon appoint a prince to lead a Mughul expedition to Balkh and that he should hold his forces in readiness to attack certain Uzbek positions. The letter expresses much solicitude for the people of Khurāsān and enlarges on the theme of the Uzbek menace to their security.⁴ In early 1641, Mughul preparations to invade Balkh were under way.⁵ Ḥasan Khan died about this time. The Mughuls tried to win over Ḥasan Khan's son and successor to the idea of an anti-Uzbek alliance.⁶ But Shah Ṣafī's resolve to recover Qandahār forestalled all Mughul-Persian cooperation.

Revealing light on the Mughul and the Persian frontier diplomacy of this period is thrown by the correspondence between the Mughul and the Persian high officials. A large number of the letters sent from the Persian side are contained in a rare manuscript in the British Museum.⁷ Some of the letters sent from the Mughul side are also extant, though they are not all to be found in any single collection of letters. The Mughul game, this correspondence shows, was to convince the Persians that their common enemy were the Uzbegs and that it was in the interest of the Persians to cooperate with the Mughuls to crush the Uzbegs. The Mughuls from time to time expressed willingness to depute an imperial prince to lead the attack on the Uzbegs. They also alluded to Shah Jahān's firm resolve to recover the ancient Mughul hereditary dominions in Central Asia. With Qandahār already lost to the Mughuls, the Persians naturally felt indirectly threatened by the prospect of increased

1. See Qilīj Khan's letter in *Bahār-i Sukhūn*, B.M. Or. 178, ff. 48b-51a. Calendar Sh. 123.

2. *Bahār-i Sukhūn* ff. 45b-8b. Calendar No. Sh. 126.

3. Shāmlū Letters, B.M. Add. 7802 ff. 76a-79a. Calendar No. Sh. 127.

4. *Bahār-i Sukhūn*, Or. 178, ff. 36a-40b. Calendar No. Sh. 132.

5. Lāhaurī, II, pp. 222-6.

6. *Bahār-i Sukhūn*, ff. 40b-42b. Calendar No. Sh. 133.

7. B. M. Add. 7802. The MS is untitled. Rieu attributes its authorship to one "Āftāb", a Khurāsānī poet attached to the provincial Shāmlū court at Herāt. For a fuller account of the work, see Rieu, p. 817; and comment under Calendar No. Sh. 121. Also see the present author's forthcoming article, "Shāmlū Letters."

Mughul activity close to their north-eastern frontier. The Persian government, it seems, gave instructions to the concerned Persian officials to carry on a seemingly and vaguely friendly correspondence with the Mughuls without committing the Shah to any particular course of action, and in the process, to learn as much as possible of Mughul plans and troop movements in the frontier regions. The Persian government was not particularly strong in the last years of Shah Ṣafī's reign. But because of Shah Jahān's action on Qandahār, the Persian government could not make any direct approach to the Mughuls. Hence this circuitous diplomacy was adopted. Also Shah Ṣafī was anxious to remain aware of the Mughul position as he was himself planning to invade Qandahār. After Shah Ṣafī's death (while on the way to invade Qandahār) and the accession of the minor Shah 'Abbās II, the Persian government still remained weak, faction-ridden and unstable. So the diplomatic device of correspondence between the frontier officials of the two empires was continued. It is most interesting to detect signs of change of policy in the letters sent from the Persian side, from one of seeming friendship to an unambiguous assertion of Persian position vis-à-vis the Mughuls.¹

Mughul Invasion of Tūrān

Shah Jahān's understanding with the Khans of Tūrān had served him well in the recent conflict with Persia. The Khans were in fact apprehensive, and rightly so, of Shah Jahān's intentions in regard to Tūrān, and tried to mollify him by offering cooperation in any Mughul campaign against Khurāsān.² After the occupation of Qandahār, Shah Jahān tried to win Persian support against the Uzbeks but, as seen above, the Persians refused to oblige the Mughuls. Shah Jahān now resolved to invade Balkh without Persian assistance. Internal events in that region seemed to favour his plans. Imām Qulī Khan lost his sight and abdicated in favour of his brother, Nadhr Muḥammad Khan, who now became sole Khan of Tūrān (Sha'ban 1051/November 1641). Imām Qulī's rule had been popular in Tūrān; he controlled his nobles tactfully, and the people respected him for his piety and wisdom.³ Nadhr Muḥammad Khan was headstrong and more despotic in his ways and soon aroused considerable opposition which eventually found leadership in the person of his eldest son, 'Abdul 'Azīz. In the encounter with his opponents, Nadhr Muḥammad Khan steadily lost ground till he was forced to seek aid from Shah Jahān.

1. For a fuller account of the matter see Riazul Islam, *Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations*, where letters belonging to the correspondence mentioned in the text, occur from Nos. Sh. 121 to Sh. 139.

2. Lāhaurī, II, p. 152, 1049/1639; *Baḥrul Asrār*, f. 239.

3. Lāhaurī, II, pp. 251-6; *Badī'a*, f. 200 ff.; *Muqīm-Khānī*, f. 466ff; Vambéry, *History of Bokhara*, pp. 313-14, 318-19.

His envoy Nadhr Shawāyat arrived at the imperial court at Lahore in Dhul-Hi. 1055/January 1646.¹ Soon Mughul forces were marching to Balkh under the guise of going to the Khan's help (early 1056/1646).²

Mughul Embassies to Shah 'Abbās II

Since the Mughul occupation of Qandahār, there had been no diplomatic relations between the Mughul and the Safavid courts. Shah Ṣafī had been succeeded by his ten-year old son Shah 'Abbās II (Ṣafar 1052/May 1642). In an exchange of letters between Ṣafdar Khan, governor of Qandahār (February 1640-March 1644), and Mirza Taqī, the Persian Wazīr, the latter had complained about the delay in sending a Mughul embassy to the new Shah.³ The invasion of Tūrān made it highly desirable for Shah Jahān to improve relations with Persia. Jān Nithār Khan was chosen for this purpose and was permitted to leave on the same day that Shah Jahān set out from Lahore for Kābul in order to be near the theatre of operations (18 Ṣafar 1056/26 March 1646).⁴ The royal letter entrusted to him makes some critical references to the late Shah Ṣafī, congratulates Shah 'Abbās II on his accession and offers him any help he needed to strengthen his rule.⁵ The real purpose of the mission was, however, transparently obvious, and the Persians did not fail to discern it.⁶

Within three months of Jān Nithār Khan's departure (and before his arrival at the Persian court), the Mughul forces victoriously entered Balkh and Nadhr Muḥammad Khan in this extremity decided to seek asylum in, and help from, Persia—a step which was certainly distasteful to him.⁷ Two more Mughul emissaries were now sent to Persia. One was Mir 'Azīz who was accredited to Nadhr Muḥammad Khan in Persia and carried a letter which gave a facile explanation of the Balkh campaign, without, however, offering any promise or solace to the Khan.⁸ The other envoy was Arslān Beg who conveyed a letter of victory to Shah 'Abbās II, announcing the conquest of Balkh and expressing the hope that this was a prelude to the conquest of Samarqand and Bukhārā. An appeal was made to the Shah's sectarian feel-

1. Lāhaurī, II, pp. 479, 491. The envoy is also mentioned in Shah Jahān's letter to Nadhr Muḥammad Khan, though here his name is given as Nadhr Bī. *Op.cit.*, p. 531.

2. Lāhaurī, II, pp. 435-56; Saksena, *History of Shahjahan*, pp. 189-91. On the subject of Mughul invasion of Tūrān, also see Calendar Nos. Tx. 347 to 356.

3. *I.T.V.*, pp. 168-70. Calendar No. Sh. 139. The statement in *Qiṣaṣ*, f. 49a, that an Indian embassy came in the first year of 'Abbās II's reign, probably refers to a Deccan embassy.

4. Lāhaurī, II, pp. 493, 500.

5. Lāhaurī, II, pp. 493-500; also given in the *F.Q.*, I.O. MS, pp. 62-8, and other collections. Calendar No. Sh. 140.

6. See references on p. 109 n. 5 below.

7. Lāhaurī, II, pp. 548f., 558-63; Kanbu, II, pp. 528-32. Nadhr Muḥammad Khan's bitterness at having to go Persia is reflected even in the Persian accounts, see *Khuld*, V, f. 111b.

8. The letter is given in Lāhaurī, II, pp. 572-6. Calendar No. Tx. 350.

ings by setting forth the protection of the Sayyids of Balkh as one of the reasons for the Mughul invasion. A request to permit Nadhr Muḥammad Khan to proceed to Mecca was in fact a thinly veiled suggestion that he should not be allowed to return to Tūrān.¹

Nadhr Muḥammad Khan was given a royal reception in Persia. But he failed to obtain effective help against the Mughuls. He was not able to get along well with the Persian authorities due to the traditional hostility of his race to his host country, as also to his own sullen temperament. The Persians did not offer him help for a variety of reasons. For one thing they were not sure, as the Persian Wazīr pointed out, if the Khan had sufficient following among his own people to make it worthwhile to support him. Another reason was the minority of the Shah and the consequent weakness of leadership at the centre, which made it risky to engage in hostilities with the Mughul forces. Nadhr Muḥammad Khan left Persia rather disgruntled.²

The three Mughul envoys arrived at the Persian court after the Khan had left for his homeland. Mīr 'Azīz, who evidently travelled post-haste, was the first to arrive. He wanted to follow the Khan and deliver to him Shah Jahān's letter, but Shah 'Abbās II prevented this.³ Jān Nithār Khan arrived before long (close of 1056/early 1647), and was soon followed by Arslān Beg.⁴ The purpose of their mission is plainly described by the Safavid sources as securing Persian neutrality in the current Indo-Turanian conflict. The envoys were well-received and Jān Nithār Khan, the principal emissary, was duly honoured. The Shah assured him of Persian neutrality and dismissed him suitably (Dhul-Q. 1057/December 1647). Autār Khan was appointed to accompany him to India, but for some reason did not proceed.⁵ The Shah in a skilfully drafted letter, sent with Arslān Beg, told Shah Jahān that, out of consideration for the weak condition of the Uzbeks, he had not deemed it proper to interfere in Tūrān, and that Nadhr Muḥammad Khan had no

1. See Shah Jahān's letter in Lāhaurī, II, pp. 595-602. Calendar No. Sh. 141. Shah Jahān also wrote a letter to Khusrāu Sultan, son of Nadhr Muḥammad Khan, inviting him to come to India. See *Badi'a*, ff. 225b-27a. Calendar No. Tx. 348. For Khusrāu Sultan's advent to the Mughul court, see Lāhaurī, II, pp. 515-20.

2. Lāhaurī, II, pp. 658-63; *Khuld*, V, ff. 109b-12a; 'Abbās *Nāma*, ff. 41a-6b; *Qīṣaṣ*, ff. 52a-3b; *Badi'a*, ff. 228b-50b, 252a-7a. The claim of the Safavid sources that Nadhr Muḥammad Khan went back highly satisfied, is contradicted by their own accounts.

3. Lāhaurī, II, pp. 576-7. Of the Safavid sources, the 'Abbās *Nāma*, f. 46b, alone mentions Mīr 'Azīz's arrival briefly, and places it (inaccurately) with that of Jān Nithār Khan.

4. For the sequence of the envoys, see rubric of Calendar No. Sh. 143.

5. 'Abbās *Nāma*, ff. 46b-9a; *Khuld*, V, ff. 112a-13b; *Qīṣaṣ*, f. 53b; *Zubd. Tawārīkh* of Kamāl Munajjim, f. 101b; *F. Ṣafaviyya*, f. 53b; *Badi'a*, f. 240b-41a. A *ḥasbul ḥukm* written by Sa'dullah Khan contains a mention of Shah 'Abbās II's insulting treatment of Jān Nithār Khan in having the latter seated on the left and the Uzbek envoy on the right. Calendar No. 146. *Munsha'āt-i Sa'dullah Khān*, ff. 42b-45a. This, however, is not mentioned in the chronicles.

intention to proceed to Mecca and had already left for Tūrān.¹

Meanwhile the Mughuls found it increasingly difficult to hold Balkh. Long lines of communication, hostility of a warlike population, severity of climate and the staggering cost in men, money and material, made it impossible for them to stay there for long, and Shah Jahān, much against his will, had to negotiate a settlement with Nadhr Muḥammad Khan and evacuate the country (Ramaḍān 1057/October 1647). The retreat from Balkh to Kābul was a very painful affair, costing untold losses and suffering. It is interesting to note that the Mughul chronicles describe the evacuation as a generous conferring of Balkh and Badakhshān on Nadhr Muḥammad Khan, while the Safavid sources claim for the Shah the entire credit of his restoration to his Khanate.² As a matter of fact, the termination of the conflict was a disappointment to the Shah,³ for Persia stood to gain by its prolongation.

Shah 'Abbās II's capture of Qandahār

The Mughul occupation of Qandahār was a sore wound to Persian pride. During the minority of the Shah 'Abbās II, who was ten years old at his accession in 1052/1642, its recovery was impracticable. Early in his reign, his Wazīr, Taqī Sārū, had in fact started preparations for a Qandahār campaign, but these were soon abandoned.⁴ Taqī Sārū's bid for sole power led to his assassination by his rivals. Khalifa Sultan, who had been a minister under Shah 'Abbās I, succeeded as the chief minister (1055/1645). These convulsions, and the intrigues that went with them, were sufficient to keep the court preoccupied with internal problems. Before long, however, the chances of the recovery of Qandahār became more favourable. The Mughul arms touched the apex of military glory when Balkh was captured; the anti-climax followed soon after with the ignominious retreat from Balkh. Mughul prestige suffered an unprecedented setback, which quickly resulted in the revival of Uzbek hostility on the north-west frontier and of Afghān tribal unrest.⁵ Thus the Mughul retreat from Balkh paved the way for a Persian advance on Qandahār.

By this time Shah 'Abbās II had attained majority⁶ and assumed full royal authority. The Persian government also succeeded in arriving at an

1. See Calendar No. 143.

2. Lāhaurī, II, pp. 700ff.; Warith, ff. 390b-97a; Kanbū, III, pp. 3-17; *Khuld*, V, ff. 111b-12; 'Abbās Nāma, ff. 45b-6a.

3. *Qipchāq-Khānī*, II, f. 151.

4. *Khuld*, V, ff. 97b-8a; Saksena, pp. 220-1.

5. See Kanbū, III, p. 63, for appointment of additional forces to Kābul.

6. Shah 'Abbās II was sixteen years old about this time. He was born in 1042/1632-3. *Dhail*, p. 119.

amicable settlement with the Ottoman Sultan Ibrāhīm. On the other hand, Shah Jahān had offended the Sultan with a tactless letter (see below). The reports which Shah 'Abbās II received through his spies about the internal situation in Qandahār and the ineptness of its commander, Daulat Khan, were also encouraging.¹ The decision to march on Qandahār was taken while the last Mughul ambassador, Jān Niṭhar Khan, was still at the Persian court.² The Mughul envoy was, however, dismissed before active preparations began. Other steps were also taken to prevent leakage of news to India.³

The Shah left Iṣfahān in Rabī' I 1058/April 1648. As he proceeded to Khurāsān, Nadhr Muḥammad Khan of Tūrān thought it prudent to send an embassy to him.⁴ When the Shah reached Buṣṭām, a friendly embassy also arrived from the Ottoman Sultan Ibrāhīm, thus assuring the Shah of greater security on his western frontiers.⁵ It was during his seven-week sojourn at Buṣṭām that Shah 'Abbās II sent Shah Qulī Beg as an envoy to Shah Jahān, with a letter praising his generosity in restoring Balkh to Nadhr Muḥammad Khan, and asking him to show the same spirit in the case of Qandahār.⁶ The mission amounted to no more than a diplomatic formality, for the war preparations were already at an advanced stage.

Shah Jahān received the first reports of the Persian preparations towards the end of Ramaḍān 1058/October 1648, at Delhi. He ordered immediate reinforcements to be sent to Qandahār and himself set out for Kābul. The winter was fast approaching and the Mughul nobles did not relish the prospect of a march to the northern highlands at this time of the year. They discounted the possibility of Shah 'Abbās himself marching to Qandahār in this inclement weather, and suggested a winter sojourn at Lahore. So the march to Kābul was postponed.⁷

In the meanwhile, the young Shah 'Abbās II, undaunted by the weather, reached the outskirts of Qandahār in Dhul-Ḥ. 1058/December 1648.⁸ His enterprise and his deliberate choice of the winter for this arduous campaign paid him well, for it was not till four months later that the first Mughul conting-

1. *Lubbut Tawārikh* of Rāi Bindrāban, f. 94a. For Daulat Khan, also see below.

2. *Khuld*, V, f. 115b. Thevenot (*Indian Travels*, pp. 87-9) relates a curious story that the Shah's grandmother received money from Shah Jahān and opposed 'Abbās's expedition and so he killed her. For a different account of her death, see *English Factories*, 1646-50, p. 218.

3. Kanbū, III, p. 66.

4. Calendar No. Tx. 357, which is a friendly letter from an Uzbek noble to Mihrāb Khan, Persian governor of Qandahār, dealing with the question of facilities for traders and pilgrims, evidently belongs to this period.

5. *Khuld*, V, f. 117a-b; 'Abbās Nāma, f. 53a-b.

6. *I.T.V.*, pp. 30-4. *Qīṣaṣ*, f. 53bf. 'Abbās Nāma, ff. 54b-6b; Kamāl Munajjim, f. 103a. Calendar No. Sh. 144.

7. Wāriṭh, f. 412a; Kanbū, III, pp. 65-6; K.K., I, pp. 684-5.

8. Wāriṭh, f. 412a; *Khuld*, V, f. 120b, places it a little later.

ent arrived from India. The Shah set about his work with great energy. Bust was the first fort to fall; Zamin-Dāwar was blockaded but was spared a frontal attack as the commander offered to surrender as soon as Qandahār was taken. Qandahār itself did not resist for long. Daulat Khan,¹ the aging Mughul governor of Qandahār, proved utterly unequal to cope with the difficulties that inevitably arise in a besieged fort; he could deal effectively neither with internal discontent and treachery, nor with the military situation. Daulat Khan succumbed too soon to the pressure of circumstances and, after standing a siege of less than two months, surrendered the fort (Şafar 1059/February 1649). He still had 7,000 troops and adequate provisions at the time of surrender, and his losses had not been heavy. In the final analysis, the indolence of Shah Jahān, the procrastination of his advisers, and the ineptness of Daulat Khan were responsible for the loss of Qandahār.²

From Qandahar the victorious Shah 'Abbās II sent an envoy, Shah Verdī Beg, with a letter offering an explanation of his invasion and expressing the hope that this would not affect mutual amity. It is interesting to recall that 'Abbās II proffered an excuse similar to that given by 'Abbās I: that he had come to visit Qandahār but as the governor disloyally refused admission, he (the Shah) had to take punitive measures. Shah Verdī Beg arrived in Rajab 1059/July 1649 at the Mughul court when it was on its way to Kābul. The envoy was duly entertained and rewarded, but he was not granted an audience and his letter was not accepted.³ He was given a curt verbal message for his master and was dismissed with an escort. Muḥammad Qulī Beg (who had been sent by the Shah earlier from Buṣṭām) was also dismissed in a similar fashion without being granted a royal audience.⁴

1. For Daulat Khan, see *M.U.*, II, pp. 24-30; he had received his first preference in service due to good looks rather than valour. For Shah 'Abbās's *raqam* to Daulat Khan, see Calendar No. Sh. 147.

2. The campaign has been described in great detail by the Safavid sources: *Khuld*, V, ff. 120b-24a; *'Abbās Nāma*, ff. 50b-69b; *Qīṣaṣ*, ff. 74a-77a. For the primary Mughul authorities see: Wārīth, ff. 412a-15b; Kanbū, III, pp. 70-81; K.K., I, pp. 688-90. Also see the *Qīpchāq-Khānī*, II, ff. 151b-2a; the author's grandfather, Qīpchāq Khan, was in Qandahār and among those who intrigued with Shah 'Abbās for the surrender of the fort. Shah 'Abbās II's *farmān*, Calendar No. Sh. 153, *Qīṣaṣ*, ff. 73b-74b, contains a reference to Qīpchāq Khan's submission to the Shah at Qandahār.

3. K.K., I, p. 93. The *'Amal-i Šāliḥ* (III, p. 93), however, seems to imply that the letter was accepted.

4. There is some confusion about these Persian envoys. Thus Šāliḥ Kanbū seems to describe three envoys: Shah Qulī son of Maqṣūd Beg, Shah Beg Ustājlu and Shah Verdī Beg. The *Khuld-i Barīn*, a contemporary authority, surprisingly makes Shah 'Abbās II send Shah Qulī son of Maqṣūd Beg from Buṣṭām and again from Qandahār. For Safavid sources, see: *'Abbās Nāma*, ff. 69b-71a; *Khuld*, V, ff. 118a, 123b; *Qīṣaṣ*, f. 71bf.; Kamāl *Munajjim*, f. 103a. For Mughul authorities, see: Wārīth, ff. 409b, 410a, 422b-23a; Šādiq, f. 166b; Kanbū, III, pp. 66, 93-4, 99; K.K., I, pp. 684-5, 693, 699. Shah 'Abbās II's letter occurs in the *'Abbās Nāma* (*loc. cit.*),

The Mughul army, under the command of Prince Aurangzēb and Sa'dullah Khan, the Mughul Wazīr, arrived in the vicinity of Qandahār in Jumādā I 1059/May 1649. They were able to get the better of a Persian force outside Qandahār, but this had little impact on Qandahār itself which remained firmly in Persian hands. Two more Mughul expeditions to recover the fort were sent in 1062/1652 and 1063/1653 under the command of Aurangzēb and Dārā Shukōh respectively. But neither bribery nor blockade made any impression on the Persian garrison.¹ The difficulty of maintaining regular lines of supply through mountain passes and hostile regions was insuperable. Not one of the three Mughul expeditions, each of which was undertaken at a huge expense, could carry on the siege for more than a few months; each had to retire with the advent of winter to avoid the risk of complete isolation from its supply bases. Thus at the end of the third campaign, the Bust fortress, which had been seized by the Mughuls, had to be abandoned and the supplies therein destroyed, as no Mughul commander was willing to stay there after the main army had retired.² The Mughul artillery and siege trains proved particularly deficient in these expeditions. The Persian personnel of the Mughul army was not enthusiastic about these campaigns, and according to Bernier, was responsible for the failure of the second expedition.³ Heavy bribes were paid to the Uzbegs,⁴ and measures were taken to prevent them from attacking the Mughul frontiers during the course of the expeditions to Qandahār.⁵ But these were ineffective, and a marauding Uzbek raid on Ghaznī was another factor responsible for the withdrawal of the second Mughul expedition.⁶ The

I.T.V., pp. 34-6, and in several other works. See Calendar No. Sh. 152. For Shah Qulī Beg, also see Calendar No. Sh. 146.

1. The three Mughul campaigns are described in great detail by the chronicles on both sides: Wārith, f. 409b ff., 451b-60b, 464a-77a; Šādiq, f. 162a-67a, 170a-72a; Kanbū, III, pp. 81-92, 138-49, 155-73; K.K., I, pp. 690-700, 708-13, 716-28; *Khuld*, V, ff. 125a-27b, 130a-b, 133b-35b; *Abbās Nāma*, ff. 74a-7a, 84a-5b, 90b-3b. The *Qisās* gives a very detailed account of all the three campaigns, ff. 75a-87a, 91b-106a, 111a-130b. The *Latā'iful Akhbār* (B.M. Add. 24089), 234 folios, is entirely devoted to the third campaign led by Dārā Shukōh. For modern accounts, see Sarkar, I, pp. 138-49, 150-69, 165-9; Saksena, pp. 223 ff.; the best account is that given by Dr. Jahangir Khan who has devoted two chapters in his unpublished thesis to these campaigns. Copies of a large number of documents—letters, *arq-dāshts*, *fath-nāmas*, *fārmāns*—relating to the first, second and the third Mughul campaigns are extant. These are given in the *Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations* under Calendar Nos. Sh. 145 to 228. Also see Calendar No. Dn. 313, and Nos. Ott. 393 and 398.

2. *Latā'iful Akhbār*, f. 108a.

3. Bernier, p. 184, calls it the first expedition but he is really referring to the second. Also see Bernier, p. 185; *Qisās*, f. 75b; *Latā'if*, f. 103a-b. The proportion of Persians in the Mughal expeditions to Qandahār was deliberately kept low; see Šādiq, f. 159a; K.K., I, p. 584.

4. See Calendar No. Tx. 358.

5. Kanbū, III, pp. 98, 111, 122, etc.

6. Šādiq, f. 173a; *English Factories*, 1651-4, p. 173.

third expedition, commanded by Dārā Shukōh, suffered from poor and incompetent leadership. The ludicrous blunders of Dārā Shukōh are recorded in the *Perian* as well as the Mughul sources.¹ A fourth expedition to Qandahār was projected by Shah Jahān in 1656, but the Mughul commanders were unwilling to undertake it and the Persian nobles at the Mughul court advised against it; the project was abandoned.²

In this long-drawn-out conflict of two empires for just "a mass of rock,"³ the sufferings of the people should not be forgotten. The Persians carried out a scorched earth policy in the region around Qandahār and as far as Bust; the Mughul force, on its arrival, seized whatever was left. As a result, large tracts became waste and desolate. The inhabitants were driven from their homes, and their cattle seized by the commissariat.⁴ A contemporary has recorded how the people at Lahore were compelled to drag heavy guns from the Lahore fort across the Rāwī; houses on the way were demolished, ostensibly to make way for the cannon—unless the owners paid a bribe.⁵ Another contemporary Mughul chronicler thus sums up the second Qandahār campaign: "In short nothing resulted from this expedition except the shedding of blood, the killing of thirty to forty thousand of people, and the expenditure of three crore and fifty lac rupees."⁶

During the nine or ten years between 'Abbās II's capture of Qandahār and the dethronement of Shah Jahān, there was no resumption of relations with Persia; as the latter himself remarked to one of the last Persian envoys, diplomatic exchanges were pointless under the circumstances.⁷ Shah Jahān now tried to improve relations with the Uzbeks, partly in order to prevent Uzbek hostility, and partly to win their support in any further campaign against Persia. He sent an embassy to 'Abdul 'Aziz Khan who had in 1660/1650 finally deposed and supplanted his father Nadhr Muḥammad Khan.⁸ But recent events had greatly enhanced Persian prestige, and Shah 'Abbās II had attained something of the influence over Tūrān once enjoyed by Shah

1. The *Laṭā'iful Akhbār* (an eye-witness account) and the *Qīṣaṣ* are full of it; see p. 113 n. 1 above for folio references.

2. Bernier, p. 185, ascribes the abandonment of the project to the advice of Mīr Jumla and 'Alī Mardān Khan; also see Manucci, I, pp. 237-8. *The English Factories*, 1655-60, p. 173, says that Shah Jahān fell from his horse, and the nobles found this a good excuse to abandon the expedition, treating the occurrence as a bad omen.

3. K.K., I, p. 325; Cf. Bernier's phrase: "rocks of Kandahār," Bernier, p. 22. Shah 'Abbās II in his *raqam* to Daulat Khan (Calendar No. Sh. 147) disparagingly called Qandahār a '*tūda-i khāk*' or a mere mound of earth.

4. Kanbū, III, p. 85; *Laṭā'if*, f. 8a; *English Factories*, 1651-4, p. 194.

5. *Laṭā'if*, f. 76.

6. Ṣādiq, f. 173a.

7. Kanbū, III, pp. 93-4.

8. Nadhr Muḥammad Khan proceeded to Mecca, but died soon after entering Persia. For details, see *Khuld*, V, f. 129a.

'Abbās the Great. 'Abdul 'Azīz Khan was himself in trouble from his brother Subhān Qulī Khan and from the latter's father-in-law, Abul Ghāzī Khan, ruler of Khwārizm who was under Persian influence.¹ 'Abdul 'Azīz Khan, therefore, rejected the Mughul overtures and reported them to the Shah (1066-7/1656) in order to gain the Shah's support against his own enemies in Khwārizm and Tūrān.² The Shah was in active correspondence with 'Abdul 'Azīz Khan and occasionally prompted him to attack Kābul.³

Shah Jahān also tried to strengthen diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Turks. His earlier attempt to form an alliance with Sultan Murād IV (1623-40) and his present approach to Sultan Muḥammad IV (1648-87) proved equally fruitless.⁴ Two factors were mainly responsible for this. The Ottomans had always taken much interest in the Uzbeks, and maintained numerous diplomatic contacts with them.⁵ Reports of the Mughul invasion of Balkh had displeased the Sultan, and Shah Jahān's explanation⁶ did not satisfy him.⁷ Secondly, the Ottoman assumption of superiority (as the leading Muslim power and as Caliphs) did not please Shah Jahān, and twice he protested, rather strongly, against the tone of the Ottoman despatches to him; twice he sent manuals of correspondence to instruct the Ottoman secretaries in the etiquette

1. *Khuld*, V, ff. 150a-51a.

2. See 'Abbas II's letter to 'Abdul 'Azīz Khan, *I.T.V.*, pp. 37-40; for the date, see *Khuld*, V, ff. 150a-51a.

3. The *I.T.V.*, pp. 19-30, 37-40, 41-5, 51-2, gives more than ten letters from Shah 'Abbās II to 'Abdul 'Azīz Khan; reference to the attack on Kābul occurs on p. 21; pp. 22-35 of the *I. T. V.* give a draft treaty of defensive alliance between the Shah and 'Abdul 'Azīz Khan.

4. For embassies sent to and received from Turkey, see: Lāhaurī, II, pp. 184-8, 197, 199, 216, 218; Kanbū, II, pp. 319-21, 325, 326, 333; Kanbū, III, pp. 116, 130-2, 179, 185-6, 190-2, 196; K.K., I, pp. 574-5, 729-31. Saksena, pp. 299ff., gives a good account of Mughul-Ottoman relations. The best modern account is given in A. Rahīm, *Mughal Diplomacy*, Ph.D. thesis, London, Unpublished. For an excellent brief account, see: Bernard Lewis, 'The Mughals and the Ottoman,' *Pakistan Quarterly*, Karachi, Vol. III, No. 2, summer 1958.

For the letters exchanged between the Mughuls and the Ottomans, see Riazul Islam, *Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations*: Calendar Nos. Ott. 386, Shah Jahān to Sultan Murād IV with Mīr Zārīf, 1046/1636; Ott. 387, Murād IV to Shah Jahān with Mīr Zārīf; Ott. 388, Sultan Ibrāhīm to Shah Jahān; Ott. 389, Islām Khan, the Mughul Wazīr, to the Grand Wazīr Muṣṭafā Pasha with Arslān Āghā, 1050/1640; Ott. 390, Muṣṭafā Pasha to Islām Khan; Ott. 391, Dārā Shukōh to Muṣṭafā Pasha with Mullā Shauqī; Ott. 392, Muṣṭafā Pasha to Dārā Shukōh with Mullā Shauqī; Ott. 394, Sultan Muḥammad IV to Shah Jahān with Sayyid Muḥyi 'd-dīn 1059/1659; Ott. 395, Shah Jahān to Muḥammad IV with Sayyid Ahmad Sa'id, 1061/1651; Ott. 396, Muḥammad IV to Shah Jahān with Dhulfaqār Āghā 1063/1653; Ott. 397, Shah Jahān to Muḥammad IV with Qā'im Beg; and Ott. 399, Muḥammad IV to Shah Jahān with Husain Āghā, 1066/1656.

5. The *Munsha'āt-i Farīdūn Beg* contains many letters exchanged between the Ottoman and the Uzbek rulers. Also see Howorth, II, ii, pp. 728-30.

6. See Shah Jahān's letter to Muḥammad IV dated 1061, in *F.Q.*, pp. 87-102, in Arabic with Persian translation. Calendar No. Ott. 395.

7. See Muḥammad IV's reply dated 1063, in *F.Q.*, pp. 102-8. Calendar No. Ott. 396.

of royal epistolography!¹ The great distance between the two countries also retarded the growth of closer relations between the Mughuls and the Ottomans. Thus Shah Jahān's efforts to win support from Tūrān and from Turkey against Persia failed.

The Deccan

Jahāngīr's continuation of Akbar's aggressive policy in the Deccan was stultified by weak leadership and the Mughul frontiers remained unchanged. Shah Jahān pursued a more determined and forward policy in the Deccan. The Deccan kingdoms continued to look to Persia for protection and for diplomatic support against Mughul aggression. 'Abdullah Quṭb Shah sent Khairāt Khan, a highly placed noble of Persian birth, as envoy to Persia. Muḥammad Qulī Beg, son of Qāsīm Beg, the deceased Persian ambassador,² was given leave to join Khairāt Khan.³ When they arrived at Sūrat, they received a summons from Shah Jahān to proceed to Āgra. He gave them a letter addressed to Shah 'Abbās I and dismissed them (August 1628). Evidently Shah Jahān did not object at this stage to diplomatic relations between the Deccan states and Persia; being new on the throne, he was himself in need of Shah 'Abbās's friendship. Khairāt Khan and Muḥammad Qulī Beg sailed for Persia on an English ship and arrived at Bandar 'Abbās (February 1629) to learn of the great Shah's death. Khairāt Khan's embassy was given a magnificent reception by Shah Ṣafī, full details of which are recorded by both Safavid and Deccanī chronicles.⁴ He was dismissed some years later and Imām Qulī was appointed to accompany him as Persian ambassador. The two envoys saw Shah Jahān in Ramaḍān 1043/March 1634, handed him a letter from Shah Ṣafī and proceeded on their way to Golconda, where they arrived about a year later. The Safavid envoy was received in Golconda with elaborate magnificence.⁵

One purpose of the Quṭb-Shāhī embassy to Persia was undoubtedly to obtain support against the expected Mughul aggression. Shah Ṣafī's rule was not, however, marked by a strong foreign policy and he could not offer to the Deccan kingdom support like that of his great predecessor.⁶ By 1633,

1. See letter from the Mughul Wazīr to the Ottoman Wazīr dated 1049, in Farīdūn Beg, II, pp. 62-5; and from Shah Jahān to the Sultan, dated 1064, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-7. Calendar Nos. Ott. 389 and 397.

2. See p. 96 n. 1 above.

3. For the letter to Shah 'Abbās I carried by Khairāt Khan, see *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 231b-32a. Calendar No. Dn. 301.

4. *Ḥadīqatus Salāṭīn* (Ḥaidarābad Ed.) pp. 69-71; *Khuld*, V, ff. 6b, 10b-11a; *Dhail*, pp. 28-9; Qazvinī, f. 164a; Kanbū, I, p. 312; *English Factories*, 1624-9, pp. 300, 302, 321.

5. Lāhaurī, I, ii, pp. 2, 8; Qazvinī, f. 307a; Kanbū, II, pp. 1-2; *Khuld*, V, f. 30a; *Dhail*, p. n. 101; *Ḥadīqatus Salāṭīn*, p. 132ff.

6. See 'Abdullah Quṭb Shah's letter to 'Abbās II, cited on pp. 119-20 below.

the Mughuls had extinguished the Aḥmadnagar kingdom; this weakened the position of the two remaining Deccan powers, Golconda and Bījāpūr. Shah Jahān did not like the political independence of the two kingdoms and he particularly objected to the inclusion of the name of the Shah of Persia in the *khutba* that was recited at Golconda in the Shī'a fashion. After making preparations on the grand scale which was usual with him, Shah Jahān moved to the south, crossed the Narbadā and sent *farmāns*, which were virtually ultimatums, to Quṭb Shah and 'Ādil Shah (Sha'bān 1045/January 1636). The *farmān* to Quṭb Shah demanded the replacement of the name of the Shah of Iran by that of Shah Jahān and recitation of the *khutba* in the Sunnī fashion.¹ Of the two kingdoms, Golconda was the wealthier as well as the weaker power. Its wealth, especially in gold and diamonds, which it used so often to corrupt the Mughul commanders, could not fail to affect the body-politic of the kingdom itself. Luxury and corruption had weakened all concerned, and the court was a centre of intrigue.² Golconda was in no position to resist Shah Jahān in the full plenitude of his power. 'Abdullah Quṭb Shah placed the matter before the 'Ulamā and they advised acceptance of the ultimatum.³ The *khutba* was read for the first time in the Sunnī fashion and Shah Jahān's name replaced that of the Shah. 'Abdullah Quṭb Shah had to swallow the further humiliation of being present in person when the new *khutba* was recited (Dhul-Q. 1045/April 1636). Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah offered some resistance, but the Mughuls inflicted heavy damages and laid waste parts of Bījāpūr. 'Ādil Shah soon had to sue for peace; as he was then a Sunnī, the question of change in the *khutba* did not arise. Both the kingdoms signed separate treaties with the Mughul government under the terms of which their independence was considerably curtailed and they became almost tributary vassal states.⁴ News of these 'victories' was fully reported in Shah Jahān's letter to Shah Ṣafī.⁵

In 1042/1632-3, Shah Ṣafī permitted a person who claimed to be Baisanghar Mirza, son of Mirza Dāniyāl son of Akbar, to go to the Deccan, presumably with the object of creating a distraction for the Mughuls. The Mirza, however, did not reach the Deccan; he was arrested in Thatta, declared to be an imposter and beheaded (1046/1636). *Dhail*, p. 125; Lāhaurī, I, ii, pp. 206-7.

1. For text of the *farmān*, see Lāhaurī, I, ii, pp. 130-33. Calendar No. Dn. 302.

2. See Bernier's account (pp. 194-6) of "the low state of degradation of this wretched king," i.e., Quṭb Shah; Tavernier, I, p. 121; II, pp. 352-4 (Appendix), for the wealth of Golconda, and I, p. 127, for the large number of public women in the capital; also see *The Indian Travels of Thevenot*, pp. 136-8.

3. *Ḥadiqatus Salāṭin* (Ethé 464), ff. 146a-7a. For the Quṭb Shah's *Inqiyād-nāma* (treaty) accepting the Mughul conditions, see Lāhaurī, I, ii, pp. 178-80. Calendar No. Dn. 303.

4. Lāhaurī, I, ii, pp. 124-215; Kanbū, II, pp. 147-50, 158-90; K.K., I, pp. 516-38; *Ḥadiqatus Salāṭin*, ff. 145aff.; *Ḥadiqatus Ṣafā*, ff. 124aff.; also see Sarkar, I, pp. 34-8; Saksena, Chap. VII.

5. *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 256b-8b, letter sent with Mīr Ḥusainī, see p. 101 above. Calendar No. Sh. 117.

Diplomatic exchanges between Persia and the Deccan kingdoms, however, continued. Both had ample reason to fear Shah Jahān's expansive imperialism. Shah Jahān's successful conclusion of the Deccan affairs presaged a more active policy on his north-west frontier and Qandahār was sure to occupy his mind in the coming years. (See above.) In late 1046/early 1637, Shah Šafī appointed Aḥmad Beg *Qūrchī* to proceed on a mission to Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah.¹ Shah Šafī also gave an early congé to the 'Ādil Shah's envoy, Raḥīm Muḥammad, and entrusted him with a letter.² In 1049/1639, 'Abdullah Quṭb Shah's aunt and some other ladies arrived at Qazvin and were granted a royal audience³—an opportunity for confidential communications. The Quṭb Shah was in correspondence with his aunt who conveyed confidential messages from her royal nephew to Shah 'Abbās II. In one of his letters 'Abdullah Quṭb Shah asks his aunt to request the Shah to make arrangements for his flight, in case of emergency, from Golconda to Iran.⁴ In 1051/1641, Ḥakīmūl Mulk, an envoy from 'Abdullah Quṭb Shah, arrived in Persia along with Imām Qulī Beg, the retiring Persian ambassador.⁵ Shah Šafī also sent traders on royal purchasing missions to Golconda with letters addressed to 'Abdullah Quṭb Shah.⁶ The Mughul authorities suspected that these diplomatic exchanges were directed against them, and they strongly objected to the despatch of Ḥakīmūl Mulk's embassy. As a result no further mission was sent to Persia for some years. Thus neither of the Deccan powers could send the usual congratulatory embassy on Shah Abbās II's accession.⁷

1. *Khuld*, V, f. 63b; *T. Sulṭānī*, f. 433a.

For the letter carried by Aḥmad Beg, see *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 259a-60b; Calendar No. Dn. 304.

2. The letter carried back by Raḥīm Muḥammad is found in a rare MS in the Majlis Library, Tihran, entitled *Majmū'a-i Makātib-i Mukhtalifa* by Muḥammad Šāliḥ. Calendar No. Dn. 305.

3. *Khuld*, V, f. 74a = *Dhail*, pp. 235-6 (A.H. 1050); according to the *R. Šafaviyya*, f. 50a, they were returning from pilgrimage and arrived in Persia in A. H. 1048. For the correspondence relating to the ladies' visit to Iran, see Calendar No. Dn. 306 (where detailed notice of the subject is given), Dn. 309, Dn. 314.1, Dn. 316.1 and Dn. 316.2.

4. See '*Arā'id wa ittiḥād nāmajāt wa farāmīn-i Sulṭān 'Abdullah Quṭb Shāh*, Persian MS, Anjuman-i Taraqqi-i Urdu, Karachi, ff (p). 83-89. Calendar Nos. Dn. 316.1 and Dn. 316.2.

5. *Khuld*, V, ff. 78b-9a = *Dhail*, p. 250; *T. Sulṭānī*, f. 435a-b; *F. Šafaviyya*, f. 51a; the Deccani envoy's full name is given as Ḥakīm Nizāmuddīn Maḥmūd.

A rare copy of the letter carried by the Ḥakīm is given in Muḥammad Šāliḥ, *Majmū'a-i Makātib-i Mukhtalifa*, Majlis Library, MS 2247; Calendar No. Dn. 310.

6. See Calendar Nos. Dn. 307 and 308. Cf. the section: Royal Purchases, in Chap. V above.

7. *Golconda Letters* (B.M. Add. 6600), ff. 70a-2b, Mīr Jumla's letter to the Persian *Wazīr*, *Khalifa* Sultan; for a summarized translation of this letter, see *Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, 1942, pp. 193-6, tr. by Jagdish Narain Sarkar. Calendar No. Dn. 312. Also see below for 'Abdullah Quṭb Shah's letter to 'Abbās II.

In 1650, however, a Persian envoy came to Golconda on an English boat.¹ The previous year Shah 'Abbās had captured Qandahār and he now stood in a better position to offer the Deccan kingdoms moral support, if nothing else.

Mir Jumla

One of the means by which the Shahs of Iran maintained their influence in the Deccan were the Persian immigrants who attained influential positions there.² Of these none rose so high in power and prestige as Muḥammad Sa'īd (hereafter called by his official title, Mir Jumla). He was a diamond merchant and found an appropriate field for his calling in the diamond-rich Golconda. Mir Jumla was undoubtedly one of the cleverest men of his time. His nimble intellect worked with equal ease in the diverse fields of trade, diplomacy, administration and war. He became the richest man in the Deccan and rose to be the chief minister of Golconda and the power behind the throne.³ He maintained close contacts with his homeland where too he had large interests and powerful friends as well as enemies. He was in correspondence with Shah 'Abbās II as well as his Wazīr, Khalifa Sultan, who appears to have been his personal friend. The Shah in his letter to Mir Jumla duly recognises the position of eminence attained by him in the Deccan.⁴

This Mir Jumla, however, brought great misery and ruin upon Golconda. Briefly, 'Abdullah Quṭb Shah became jealous of his 'overmighty subject' and wanted to destroy him. Mir Jumla turned to the Mughuls for help and ultimately entered Mughul service. Prince Aurangzēb was then viceroy of the Deccan and he considered Quṭb Shah's detention of Mir Jumla's son a sufficient ground to invade Golconda (early 1656). The invasion was later halted on Shah Jahān's orders, but not before a great deal of damage had been inflicted on the city of Ḥaidarābād and the kingdom of Golconda. But Mughul pressure on the Karnātak (which had been conquered for Golconda by Mir Jumla when Wazīr of that kingdom) continued and Aurangzēb maintained a harsh, almost threatening, attitude towards 'Abdullah Quṭb Shah. It was in this situation that 'Abdullah Quṭb Shah sent a letter to Shah Abbās II. The missive was communicated through some secret agent, for the

1. *English Factories*, 1651-4, p. 73.

2. John Fryer, *A New Account of the East Indies*, p. 86; Tavernier, I, pp. 138-9; also p. 93 n. 6 above.

3. For Mir Jumla, see *M.U.*, III, pp. 503-55; Jagdish Narayan Sarkar, *The Life of Mir Jumla*, Calcutta, 1951. Tavernier (I, pp. 132, 285-6), who knew him personally, as well as Bernier (pp. 16-17) make interesting observations on his remarkable ability and character. Also see Thevenot, *Indian Travels*, pp. 144-5; Sarkar, I, p. 216.

4. For Mir Jumla's letters to Khalifa Sultan, see Calender Nos. Dn. 312 and 314; for 'Abbās II's letter to Mir Jumla, see *I.T.V.*, pp. 81-2. Calendar No. Dn. 324.

emissary's name is not mentioned. Recalling ancient ties of friendship between the Safavids and the Qutb-Shāhī dynasty, it speaks of the powerful support Shah 'Abbās I used to extend to Golconda in its unequal fight with the Mughuls: there is an implied complaint that Shah Šafī abandoned this policy, but the point is put in a diplomatic way. The letter proceeds to denounce Mīr Jumla's defection, and gives harrowing details of the Mughul invasion of Haidarābād;¹ it adds that the conclusion of peace with the Mughuls was immediately followed by new threats from Prince Aurangzēb and Mīr Jumla. Then follows an importunate and desperate appeal for help. The letter requests the deployment of some Persian contingents on the Mughul frontiers and offers to pay the expenses of the expedition. It is hardly necessary to add that the sectarian motive is strongly emphasised throughout the letter: the Qutb-Shāhī kingdom is described as the only citadel of the true faith in India, surrounded on all sides by infidel enemies.² Shah 'Abbās II, as we have seen, had inherited some of the enterprise and vigour of his great-grandfather. This appeal from his closest ally in India would have certainly touched his heart. He received this letter together with news of the outbreak of the war of Succession in the Mughul empire.³

Mughul War of Succession

The English factories' records show that Shah 'Abbās II attempted to organise a group of partisans in India and was in correspondence with some nobles and princes. For this purpose he utilised the services of merchants as well as secret agents.⁴ He was fairly abreast with the state of affairs in the Mughul empire—the declining health of Shah Jahān, the rivalry among the royal princes and the expected war of succession.⁵ His closest relations were with Prince Murād Bakḥsh. Murād was undoubtedly inclined towards Shiism,⁶ though his exact position is not known. His governorship of Gujarāt placed him in a position of proximity to Persia. He started correspondence with Shah 'Abbās II well before the succession became a live issue. The Shah sent him a brief but highly complimentary reply.⁷ This correspondence was

1. The spoils alleged to have been removed by the Mughuls also included valuable manuscripts.

2. *Golconda Letters* (B.M. Add. 6600), ff. 141b-44a. Calendar No. Dn. 316.

3. Shah 'Abbās II refers to this letter in his own letter to Qutb Shah; *I.T.V.*, pp. 45-6; Calendar No. Dn. 319.

4. For secret agents, see Chapter X, below.

5. *English Factories*, 1655-60, p. 132.

6. See preface to the *Dastūr-i Kisrawī* (Corpus MS, Cambridge), ff. 3a, 5a, 6b. The work, a translation from Arabic, was dedicated to Murād Bakḥsh by the translator, Jalāluddīn Ṭabāṭabāī, a Shi'a scholar; also *Khuld*, V, f. 157b.

7. *I.T.V.*, pp. 52-3, gives the Shah's reply. Calendar No. Sh. 230.

probably secret, for the Emperor, since Shah Abbās II's capture of Qandahār, had been his implacable enemy.

Shah Jahān fell gravely ill in early September 1657 at Delhi and the rumour soon spread that he was dead. Of his four sons, Dārā Shukōh, the eldest son and heir-apparent, was with his father. Shah Shujā' was governor of Bengal, Aurangzēb of the Deccan and Murād Bakhsh of Gujarāt. Each one of them aimed at the succession. Aurangzēb suggested to Murād Bakhsh with whom he had entered into an alliance, that he should propose a Persian attack on Kābul in order to divert the imperial forces under Dārā Shukōh's command. After some hesitation, Murād Bakhsh fell in with the proposal.¹ This young and impetuous prince had already crowned himself in Gujarāt on 20 November 1656. He now sent two emissaries in succession to Shah 'Abbās II. One was Hakīm Kāzīmā-i Qummī, apparently a Persian, who was given the title of Taqarrub Khan; the other was 'Isā Beg. Through these emissaries, Murād Bakhsh reported the death of Shah Jahān (who had, in fact, not died) and his own accession, and asked for help and support. The Safavid chronicles contain long accounts of the arrival of these envoys; they assert that Murād Bakhsh had declared his acceptance of the Shī'a creed and on accession had recited the *khutba* in the Shī'a fashion.² The coins he issued on accession, however, bear the Sunnī legends.³

The Safavid sources give elaborate accounts of the preparations made by Shah 'Abbās II to despatch large reinforcements to Murād Bakhsh via Qandahār as well as by sea, and of the Shah's plan to proceed in person to the Mughul frontiers. He sent highly encouraging replies to Murād, describing his military preparations and plans which included the advance of a big Persian force on Kābul, with supplies enough to last five years.⁴ The Shah in a letter to the Ottoman Sultan Muḥammad IV informed him of the outbreak of the War of Succession in the Mughul empire and in particular mentioned his (the Shah's) "prior understanding and agreement" with Sultan Murād Bakhsh.⁵ Sultan Bulāqī, the real or false Mughul prince, who had been for many years living as a pensioner at Qazvīn, also hopefully moved about this time to the Shah's court at Isfahān.⁶

1. *F.Q.*, pp. 427, 430. According to the second letter which Murād Bakhsh sent to Aurangzēb in code letters (*khaff-i marmūz*), an embassy from Shah 'Abbās was already on the way to Gujarāt before Murād despatched his envoys to Persia. See Calendar Nos. 231 and 232.

2. For Taqarrub, Khan, see: *Khuld*, V, ff. 157b-58a; also mentioned in Shah 'Abbās's reply, *I.T.V.*, p. 14 (mis-written as Nuṣrat Khan); for 'Isā Beg, see *Qīṣaṣ*, f. 135a.

3. Dr. R. B. Whitehead, *Catalogue of Coins in the Panjab Museum*, II, pp. 213-14; *B.M. Catalogue of the Coins of the Moghul Emperors*, p. 136.

4. *Khuld*, V, ff. 158a-b, 160b; *Qīṣaṣ*, f. 134a-b; for letters see *I.T.V.*, pp. 9-10, 14-17. See Calendar Nos. Sh. 230, 233 and 234.

5. See *I.T.V.*, pp. 6-8. Calendar No. Ott. 400.

6. *Khuld*, V, ff. 159b-60a, also f. 32a-4a. According to Lāhaurī (I, i, pp. 70-9) and all

The Shah was not slow to seize the opportunity offered by the war of succession to inflame the kings of Bijāpūr and Golconda against the Mughuls. He wrote letters to both rulers, urging them to sink their differences and to take the utmost advantage from the confusion arising from the civil war. The Shah assured them that he was preparing to move his own forces against the Mughul empire. The letters to Quṭb Shah lay the inevitable emphasis on sectarian solidarity. They also contain references to the Shah's letters to 'Ādil Shah. Two of these despatches were carried by Mirza Muqīm, the royal librarian, who was accredited to both the Deccan courts.¹

It is difficult to say what effect these letters had on the Deccan kings. Possibly they waited to see how the war of succession proceeded. And they would have been wary of taking steps which subsequently might land them in difficulties. The only evidence we possess is a *farmān* of Quṭb Shah which refers to confidential arrangements for conveying a letter of Murād Bakhsh to Bengal, evidently to Shah Shujā'.² The rapid victories of Aurangzeb over Dārā Shukōh (April and May 1658)³ sufficed to keep the Deccan kings from acting upon Shah 'Abbās's counsel.

Aurangzēb, after his victories over Dārā Shukōh, secured the person of Murād Bakhsh and placed him in confinement (June 1658).⁴ Shah 'Abbās II, who had been closely following events in India, learnt of this through Dhulfaqār Khan, governor of Qandahār. This stopped all plans of military intervention, if they were seriously intended. Murād's envoy, Kāzīmā-i-Qummī, remained in Persia and probably never returned to India. The pretender Bulāqī too now retired from the Shah's court to Qazvīn.⁵

Dārā Shukōh, after his defeats by Aurangzēb, fled to the Panjāb and

Mughul sources, Bulāqī (i.e., Dāwar Bakhsh son of Khusrāu son of Jahāngir) was executed after Shah Jahān's accession. Tavernier (I, pp. 271-2), who saw him in Persia, affirms his identity as Bulāqī. Mendelslo also claims to have met him, see *Indian Travels of Careri*, pp. 231, 373. Probably he was a false claimant, maintained by the Shah for political reasons.

1. The *I.T.V.* has four letters, pp. 10-14, 45-51. Of these the first two appear to be drafts, though it is not unlikely that they were actually sent. The other two letters were sent with Mirza Muqīm. A summarized translation of these letters by Jagdish Narain Sarkar appeared in the *Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, 1942, pp. 65-74. Calendar Nos. Dn. 317-19 and 322. Later Shah 'Abbās also wrote an urgent note to Mirza Muqīm (*I.T.V.*, pp. 68-9; Calendar No. Dn. 323) asking him to send a report. Mr Sarkar's inference from this note that Mirza Muqīm was also accredited to Murād Bakhsh is, however, incorrect.

We have not been able to understand the significance of 'Abbās II's letter to Mīr Jumla (*I.T.V.*, pp. 81-2) asking him to assist Mirza Muqīm at the Golconda court, for Mīr Jumla had deserted the kingdom two years earlier. For a fuller discussion, see Calendar No. Dn. 324.

2. The *farmān* is given in the *Golconda Letters* (B.M. Add. 6600), f. 35a-b. Calendar No. Dn. 320.

3. For details, see Sarkar, II, chaps. XV, XVI.

4. For details, see Sarkar, II, chap. XVII.

5. *Khuld*, V, ff. 160a-61a.

thence to Sind. Most of his followers had deserted him by now, and his enemies were in relentless pursuit (November 1658).¹ He now contemplated seeking refuge in Persia and wrote to the Shah. It appears that he intended to go by sea to Bandar 'Abbās (Gombroon). The Shah made arrangements for his reception at the port and sent an encouraging reply to the prince.² But the temptation to make one more attempt with the proffered help of Murād Bakhsh's men took him to Gujarāt. His womenfolk were also reluctant to go to Persia.³ Finding no respite in Gujarāt, Dārā returned to Sind (May 1659),⁴ passed on to Balūchistān and again meditated escape to Persia. He wrote another letter to the Shah, and sent an urgent note to Dhulfaqār Khan at Qandahār asking for immediate despatch of a few thousand men to salvage his treasures at Bhakkar and to escort him to Persia.⁵ Walī Qulī Shāmlū, author of the *Qīṣaṣul Khāqānī*, who was personally present at Qandahār, gives an interesting account of the proceedings: Dhulfaqār Khan, who had already learnt of the situation of Dārā Shukōh from his spies, consulted his officers; some advised the immediate despatch of a contingent to Dārā's aid; others pointed out the risk of this course and advised Dhulfaqār Khan to obtain the prior approval of the Shah; the latter course was adopted.⁶ The Shah evidently did not approve of the idea of sending troops into Indian territory, for he wrote to Dārā Shukōh to abandon Bhakkar and come to Persia.⁷ In the meanwhile, Dārā Shukōh had been treacherously surrendered by his Afghān hosts to the imperial officers (June 1659), news of which soon reached Qandahār and was at once transmitted to the Shah.⁸ It is an interesting but moot point whether delay in arrival of help from Qandahār (owing to reference of the matter to the Shah) was responsible for Dārā Shukōh's final tragedy.⁹ Dhulfaqār Khan, under the Shah's orders, sent spies well-versed in Indian languages to keep in touch with the fate of the ill-starred prince.¹⁰

1. For details, see Sarkar, II, chap. XVIII.

2. *I.T.V.*, Lucknow, 1844, pp. 5-6. Calendar No. Sh. 235.

3. *Khuld*, V., 163a-b; *R. Ṣafaviyya*, f. 59b; *A. N. K.*, pp. 188, 204-5, 275. According to the last work, Dārā Shukōh wanted to proceed via Qandahār.

4. For details, see Sarkar, II, pp. 162-200.

5. *Qīṣaṣ*, f. 138b (quotes Dārā Shukōh's note to Dhulfaqār Khan); *Khuld*, V, 163b-4a; also see below for reference to Bhakkar in 'Abbās II's letter to Dārā. The fortress of Bhakkar was still holding out under Dārā's faithful servant, Basant; see Sarkar, II, p. 205.

6. *Qīṣaṣ*, ff. 138b-9a; according to the *Khuld-i Barīn*, V, f. 163b-4a, Dārā was now at Dūki and wanted a Persian force only for escort. The account of the *Qīṣaṣ* is, however, confirmed by the Shah's reference to Bhakkar in his reply to Dārā.

7. *I.T.V.*, pp. 5-6; the letter is in the form of a draft; probably it was actually despatched, but never reached Dārā. See Calendar No. Sh. 235.

8. *Qīṣaṣ*, f. 139a; *Khuld*, V, ff. 163b-4a.

9. Dārā Shukōh was executed in August 1659, under Aurangzēb's orders.

10. *Qīṣaṣ*, f. 139a.

CHAPTER VII

AURANGZEB AND THE SAFAVIDS

OF all the four contestants for the throne of Delhi in the recent war of succession, Aurangzeb was the least acceptable to Shah 'Abbās II because of his firm orthodoxy,¹ his hostility to the Deccan kingdoms especially Golconda, and his ability as commander and administrator. Yet he was the one to emerge successful from the struggle. Aurangzeb knew of Dārā Shukoh's negotiations with Shah 'Abbās II;² further the latter's correspondence with the Deccan states could hardly have remained concealed from him. This, of course, did not give him a justifiable ground for complaint, for he had been the first to suggest a Persian diversionary attack on the Mughul frontiers.³ On the other hand, once he was on the throne, Aurangzeb wanted, like all new Emperors, an early recognition of his accession through the usual congratulatory embassies from Persia and other neighbouring states. Aurangzeb all the more needed such recognition, partly since he had gained the throne after a hotly contested and long-drawn-out war of succession, and partly as his father, the erstwhile Emperor, was still alive; acknowledgment by Persia, the nearest great power, with which the Mughuls, despite quarrels and disputes, had had the longest and the closest relations, was all the more keenly desired. Aurangzeb, in fact, appears to have negotiated for an embassy of recognition from Shah 'Abbās II. A Persian trader who was *persona grata* with Aurangzeb and had high contacts in Persia, served as a go-between. He wrote to Dhulfaqr Khan, Persian governor of Qandahār, who forwarded his repeated communications to the Persian court.⁴ A friendly exchange of letters between the governor of

1. For Aurangzeb's attitude towards the Shī'as in general, see Sarkar's *Life of Aurangzeb* in *Anecdotes of Aurangzeb*, p. 16. Sarkar's observations are, however, partly contradicted by *Anecdotes*, p. 140; also see Sarkar, *Nadir Shah in Delhi*, pp. 3-5, and Tavernier, II, pp. 138-9. Also see ch. ix below.

2. See Aurangzeb's letter to Subhān Qulī Khan, *Bahār-i Sukhūn*, B.M. Or. 178, ff. 29b-34b. Calendar No. Tx. 374.

3. See p. 121 above.

4. *Qisas*, f. 142b; *Khuld*, V, f. 171b-2a, also asserts the point without giving details.

Multān and Dhulfaqār Khan also seems to belong to this period.¹ An emissary sent by Dhulfaqār Khan to Aurangzeb in 1070/1660,² was evidently a link in the chain of negotiations and could only have been sent with the Shah's approval.

It was two years after Aurangzeb's coronation (Dhul-Q. 1068/August 1658) that the Shah decided to send an embassy to India. Budāq Beg was chosen to lead it and was given his *congé* in 1070/1660. A contemporary Safavid chronicle records that the Shah visited the ambassador's camp in person to view the gifts and presents.³ The royal letter entrusted to Budāq Beg recalled ancient ties between the two Houses, made a special reference to Shah Ṭahmāsp's help to Humāyūn, gave the Persian version of the circumstances which had led him ('Abbās II) to capture Qandahār, and offered Aurangzēb any help he needed.⁴ In spite of its friendly tone, the contents of the letter were not likely to make pleasant reading for Aurangzeb.

News of the arrival of Budāq Beg on the Indian frontier reached the court in Jumādā II 1071/February 1661. A robe of honour was sent to him at once, a high-placed *Mehmāndār* was appointed, and instructions were issued to the governors of Multān and Lahore and other officials for his reception all along the route.⁵ A date for his presentation was fixed in advance before his arrival at Delhi—a unique favour.⁶ High officials received him outside Delhi. Bernier, the contemporary French traveller, gives a well-informed account: "On his entry into the Capital, the ambassador was received with every demonstration of respect. The *Bazars* through which he passed were all newly decorated, and the cavalry lining both sides of the way extended beyond a league. Many *Omrahs*, accompanied with instruments of music, attended the procession, and a salute of artillery was fired upon his entering the gates of the royal palace. *Aureng-zebe* welcomed him with the greatest politeness; manifested no displeasure at his making the *salam* in the Persian manner, and unhesitatingly received from his hands the letters of which he was the bearer; raising them, in token of peculiar respect, nearly to the crown of

1. See Dhulfaqār Khan's reply, *I.T.V.*, pp. 162-4. Calendar No. Ab. 237.

2. *A.N.K.*, p. 476.

3. *Khuld*, V, f. 171b-2a, gives a detailed account; also see *Qiyās*, f. 142b.

4. Ṭāhir Vahīd, *'Abbās Nāma*, ed. Dihgan, Tihran, A.H.S. 1329, pp. 290-95; *I.T.V.*, pp. 17-19, gives an incomplete text. The point has been discussed in detail in the Calendar No. Ab. 238. Manucci, II, p. 52, has mixed up the contents of this letter with the Shah's letter of 1666 (see p. 129 below); also see Bernier, p. 149.

5. *A.N.K.*, pp. 607-9; *K.K.*, II, p. 124; *M.A.*, 35, tr., p. 21. Professor Jadunath Sarkar's picture of "flutter" at the Mughul court at the news of the coming of the Persian ambassador, is considerably overdrawn. Sarkar, III, p. 121. *A.N.K.*, pp. 614-15, gives an account of the feasts held in the envoy's honour at Multān and Lahore by the respective governors Tarbiyat Khan and Khaliḷullah Khan. Both of them also offered presents to the envoy.

6. *A.N.K.*, p. 616; the date was 3 Shawwāl 1071 (22 May/2 June 1661).

his head."¹ The ambassador was lodged in a pleasant house near the Jamūna and various festivities were held in his honour. He was recipient of many favours at the hands of Aurangzeb.² Budāq Beg sent reports of his favourable reception to the Shah who in return expressed his pleasure at his representative's welcome in India³ and his appreciation of the arrangement made by Aurangzeb for the regular supply of *pān* (betel-leaves) for his personal use. In one of his reports, Budāq Beg petitioned the Shah to allow a relative of Fāḍil Khan,⁴ wazīr of Aurangzeb, to migrate to India. The permission, which had been earlier refused, was now granted in view of improved relations. The Shah gave, in his reply to Budāq Beg, a brief resumé of his recent victories, evidently for the benefit of his royal host.⁵

There is every indication that Aurangzeb was highly pleased by the advent of the Persian embassy.⁶ His desire to encourage further diplomatic exchanges is evident from the fact that he dismissed the envoy after a stay of only two months at the court⁷—an unusual favour. The ambassador was generously rewarded and it was announced that a Mughul envoy would soon follow to the Persian court.⁸ The supply of *pān*, to which the Shah had taken a fancy, was maintained and a special officer was appointed to look after it.⁹

After a delay of two years, occupied by illness and a visit to Kashmīr, Aurangzeb took steps to send a return embassy to Iran. Tarbiyat Khan,¹⁰

1. Bernier, p. 147. Cf. Manucci's fantastic story of Budāq Beg being forced by four strong men to bow his head, Manucci, II, p. 50.

2. *A.N.K.*, pp. 622-3, 624, 627, 628; *M.A.*, pp. 35-8; *K.K.*, II, p. 127; Bernier, pp. 147-9; Manucci, pp. 52-3.

3. This disproves Manucci's fanciful account of Budāq Beg's ill-treatment at the Mughul court, which according to Manucci (II, pp. 50-2, 129), displeased the Shah and caused him to ill-treat and insult the Mughul envoy.

4. Mullā 'Alā'ul Mulk Tūnī, entitled Fāḍil Khan, of Persian origin; died *Dhul-Q.* 1073/June 1663. See Kanbū, III, pp. 387-8; *M.U.*, Tr., I, pp. 550-53.

5. *I.T.V.*, pp. 82-5. Calendar No. Ab. 239.

6. In addition to the sources quoted above, see Bernier, p. 148.

7. He was received at the court on 3 Shawwāl, and dismissed on 10 *Dhul-H.* 1071. *A.N.K.*, pp. 621, 628. Bernier, p. 148, says he stayed for four or five months, which may be the total period between his entry into and exit from the country.

The Mughul *waqā'i* (reports) of the Deccan contain an entry dated Tuesday 11 Muḥarram 1072 [27 August 1661] to the effect that Muḥammad Muqīm, Persian envoy to Golconda, sent two of his men to the ambassador Budāgh Sultan with the assistance of the Mughul *dāk chaukī* couriers (see *Selected Waqā'i of the Deccan* (1660-1671), ed. Yusuf Husain, Hyderabad, 1953, p. 6). By that time Budāgh Beg had already left Delhi, but possibly he was still on the Mughul territory. The circumstance of the Persian envoy at Golconda sending a communication to his counter-part at the Mughul court is not without interest.

8. *A.N.K.*, p. 628. Bernier's story (p. 151) of the Persian envoy being intercepted on the frontier by Aurangzeb's order, seems rather improbable.

9. *A.N.K.*, p. 664; the appointment is dated Rajab 1072/Feb. 1662.

10. For Tarbiyat Khan and his career, see *M.U.*, I, pp. 493-7.

governor of Multān, was chosen to lead the embassy; his *manṣab* was raised before his despatch. He carried gifts worth seven lac of rupees (contrasting favourably with those brought by the Persian envoy valued at four lac),¹ and a royal letter characterized by friendly sentiments. The Qandahār affair, which the Shah had mentioned at some length in his letter, is treated as a closed episode, and the wars previously fought on that account are ascribed to fate, implying that neither party was responsible for them. With obvious reference to the Shah's offer of assistance, Aurangzeb says he relies solely on the help of God. There is a good word for Budāq Beg, and it is asserted that he was given leave to depart as soon as he wanted it and a similar early dismissal for Tarbiyat Khan is requested. Aurangzeb thanks the Shah for having opened diplomatic relations and hopes that mutual friendship and accord will continue to grow.²

Tarbiyat Khan left the court in Rabi' II 1074/November 1663, and two months later was joined by a special news-reporter sent by the emperor.³ There are varying and conflicting accounts of Tarbiyat Khan's reception in Persia. It appears that at the start he was received favourably. News of his appointment reached the Persian court while he was still in India, and the Shah issued instructions to accord him a reception at Qandahār, and appointed (Ramaḍān 1074/April 1664) a high-ranking officer of his personal staff to act as his *Mehmāndār* to welcome him at Yazd and escort him to the capital. Tarbiyat Khan entered Iṣfahān on 4 Shawwāl 1074 (20/30 April 1664) and after a few days was granted royal audience. He offered salutation (*taslīm*) in the Mughul fashion and presented the royal letter and gifts. The Shah received him favourably and later invited him to festivities.⁴ Shah 'Abbās II even sent an emissary, Najaf Qulī Beg, to Aurangzeb to announce Tarbiyat Khan's safe arrival at his court.⁵ Contemporary sources, Persian as well as European, testify to the magnificence of Tarbiyat Khan's reception.⁶ The Shah's graciousness towards the envoy, however, quickly underwent a change. He ridiculed the ambassador, made deprecatory remarks about Aurangzeb,

1. *A.N.K.*, p. 622.

2. For the letter, see *Bahār-i Sukhūn* (B.M. Or. 178), ff. 13a-24b; Calendar No. Ab. 240. For account of Tarbiyat Khan's congé from the Mughul court, see *A.N.K.*, pp. 844-5, 874; *K.K.*, II, pp. 176-7.

3. *A.N.K.*, pp. 844-5, 874.

4. *Qīṣaṣ*, f. 151a-b.

5. Chardin, *Voyages en Perse*, Tome III, 1711 Ed., p. 71. The coming of Najaf Qulī Beg is also mentioned in the *A.N.K.*, p. 940, which dates his arrival Sha'bān 1076/Feb. 1666, and says he brought 2000 melons for Aurangzeb and was duly rewarded. Chardin has a different story. The *Mir'āṭ-ūṣ Ṣafā* (B.M.), f. 28a, notes the arrival of a Persian envoy, 'Abdullah Sultan Fath Iwāghlī in 1077 with an insolent letter from the Shah, but no other source mentions this.

6. *Qīṣaṣ*, as cited above; Tavernier, I, p. 279. Manucci's account (II, p. 129) of the Shah's attitude being hostile from the beginning is incorrect.

his manner of obtaining the throne, and his title (i.e., 'Ālamgīr, literally, world-conqueror), and about Indians in general.¹ What is more, he even threatened to invade India.²

The cause of this change in the Shah's attitude is not easy to determine. The '*Ālamgīr Nāma* says the Shah's conduct had neither rhyme nor reason. *Khāfi* Khan severely indicts Tarbiyat Khan and holds him personally responsible for the deterioration in the Mughul-Safavid relations. The *Qīṣaṣul Khāqānī* says the Shah asked Tarbiyat Khan to join him on his visit to Māzandarān but the envoy, in his impatience to leave for India, declined; this incensed the Shah and he commanded him to be brought to Māzandarān.³ The accounts of Tavernier and Manucci⁴ of the Shah's vicious and highly insulting remarks to Tarbiyat Khan, of forcing drink on the envoy,⁵ and of shaving or singeing his beard,⁶ fantastic as they seem, may not be far from the truth, for *Khāfi* Khan and the *Ma'āthirul Umarā* both observe that the Shah's treatment of the ambassador was scandalous and unspeakable.⁷ It seems that the change in the Shah's attitude was mainly due to his uncontrollable temper when intoxicated,⁸ though Tarbiyat Khan's lack of diplomatic finesse may also have considerably contributed to his difficulties at a hostile foreign court.⁹

The Shah dismissed Tarbiyat Khan on the Naurūz (Ramaḍān 1076/ March 1666) at Farahābād in Māzandarān, with gifts including a large number of Persian horses,¹⁰ with an insulting letter, and an oral message challenging the Mughul emperor to a trial of strength with Persia.¹¹ The letter speaks of disorders in India due to Aurangzeb's ineffective government, taunts him for calling himself "world-conqueror", while he had only conquered his father, accuses him of fratricide, and announces the Shah's resolve to come with a

1. Tavernier, I, pp. 297-8; Manucci, II, pp. 129-31; also see further below.

2. *A.N.K.*, p. 974.

3. *A.N.K.*, p. 974; K.K., II, pp. 201-2; *Qīṣaṣ*, f. 153a-b. The *Mir'ātuṣ Ṣafā* (B.M.), f. 28a, says that Tarbiyat Khan accepted large bribes from the Shah and his nobles and so incurred Aurangzeb's displeasure, and (f. 165a) that Princess Zebunnisā was the cause of quarrel between the two kings; the account lacks corroboration and is unreliable.

4. See above for page references.

5. 'Abbās II's successor, Shah Sulaimān, treated his own chief minister no better. See Sir J. Chardin, *Travels in Persia* (1927 Ed.), pp. 56f.

6. For the alleged shaving of the Turkish envoy's beard by 'Abbās I's order, see B. Penrose, *Sherleian Odyssey*, p. 74.

7. K.K., II, p. 202; *M.U.*, I, p. 494.

8. See E. G. Browne, IV, p. 112; also *M.U.*, I, p. 496.

9. *M.U.*, loc. cit.; also see below.

10. *Qīṣaṣ*, f. 153b; this work says nothing about the Shah's insulting letter and describes Tarbiyat Khan's dismissal as a pleasant ceremony. Nor does it mention the Shah's preparations to invade India.

11. For the oral message, see Manucci, II, pp. 131, 146; also see Bernier, p. 149, and *Badi'a*, f. 165a.

large army to help to settle the disorders in India.¹

Reports of the hostile plans of the Shah and his intended march towards India via Khurāsān with a large force and heavy artillery, reached Aurangzeb while Tarbiyat Khan was still on his way home. The Khan sent reports to the same effect immediately on entering the frontiers. The news caused a great deal of commotion in Delhi and elsewhere. Aurangzeb ordered a large-scale movement of troops to the frontier. An embargo was immediately placed on all trade with Persia and the governor of Sūrat was ordered to stop all ships bound for Persia from sailing.² News of the Shah's death (Rabī' I 1077/September 1666) while on his way to Khurāsān, ended the anxiety as well as the military preparations in India. It is of interest to note Aurangzeb's reaction to the news: when the courtiers showed their pleasure, he frowned and expressed regret.³ This is in striking contrast with Shah Jahān's outburst of joy on the death of Shah Šafī.⁴

Tarbiyat Khan, who arrived at Āgra in Rabī' I 1077/September 1666,⁵ with the Shah's insulting letter, was forbidden attendance at court on account of the failure of his embassy. This displeasure, however, did not last long. A year later, his *manṣab* was restored and subsequently he served successively as governor of several provinces.⁶ Aurangzeb, one may surmise, realised that the failure in Persia was not entirely the fault of his envoy. According to Manucci's account, Aurangzeb was mainly displeased with his representative's lack of courage in tamely listening to the Shah's insulting remarks about his master.⁷

1. The letter from 'Abbās II, and Aurangzeb's strongly-worded but dignified reply, are given in the *F.Q.* (I.O.MS), p. 496f. For printed text of these letters, see *Indian Hist. Records Commission Proceedings*, Vol. II, 1920, pp. 8-18, Moulvi Zafar Hasan's article; also see this article for a controversy between Moulvi Zafar Hasan and Jadunath Sarkar as to whether these letters were exchanged with 'Abbās II or his son Shah Sulaimān. Without going into the details of the controversy, we are inclined to believe that it was Shah 'Abbās who wrote the insulting letter, and Aurangzeb's reply was addressed to Sulaimān, but was never despatched. For a fuller discussion, see *Calendar Nos.* Ab 245 and 246. The *Jung Ganj*, a manuscript in the Majlis Library, Tihiran, contains five drafts done by Mirza Muḥammad Riḍā wāqī'a-nawīs, for the Shah's letter to Aurangzeb. Though none of them was used for despatch, they do provide an interesting study. *Calendar No.* Ab. 243.

F.Q. (I.O.MS), pp. 389-98 has another letter from the Shah, in an equally hostile vein, proclaiming his superiority and the truth of Shiism, and casting aspersions on Aurangzeb and his religious beliefs. *Calendar No.* Ab. 244. Probably not genuine.

2. Ch. Schefer, *Estat De La Perse*, p. 315: letter dated April, 1667, Bandar 'Abbas.

3. *A.N.K.*, pp. 984-5; The *Qışqul Khāqāni* gives the date of 'Abbās II's death as 25 Rabī' I 1077; the *A.N.K.*, places it earlier in the same month.

4. See above, p. 107.

5. *A.N.K.*, p. 977; Manucci, II, pp. 146-7, places the ambassador's arrival at Delhi.

6. See *M.U.*, I, pp. 493-7, for Tarbiyat Khan's subsequent career.

7. Manucci II, pp. 146-7. Manucci's report of Tarbiyat Khan's death following his disgrace, is incorrect.

One episode relating to these events remains to be mentioned. Shah 'Abbās II had sent with Tarbiyat Khan¹ a number of horses as gifts for Aurangzeb. The emperor, it is said, ordered the horses to be slaughtered outside the houses of the Persian nobles in Delhi. The story is found in Persian as well as European accounts, and it seems there was some truth in it. Khāfi Khan records that the Mughul agent in Golconda was questioned as to why Aurangzeb, with all his piety and gravity, should have behaved in such a manner. The Mughul diplomat gave a highly ingenious reply; further he explained that the emperor ordered the horses to be slaughtered at different places in order to avoid congestion of the people waiting for the distribution of meat. "As Shahjahānābād [Shah Jahān's Delhi] was then newly settled," explained the diplomat, "every *muḥalla* [quarter] was named after a Persian noble and there was hardly any *muḥalla* which did not contain the mansion of a big Persian noble." Aurangzeb, says Khāfi Khan, was highly pleased with his agent's naive explanation.²

Aurangzeb was generally highly circumspect in his actions and one would not expect him to behave with such lack of self-restraint. Possibly it was a strong hint to the Persian nobles not to behave treacherously in an Indo-Persian conflict, as they are said to have done in Prince Aurangzeb's second Qandahār campaign³. In any case, Aurangzeb must have been highly incensed by the Shah's insults, and for once his feelings were too much for him.

Shah Sulaimān (1077-1105/1666-1694), who ascended the throne after the death of his father, Shah Abbās II, was an utterly incompetent ruler, having the weaknesses of his father but not his virtues.⁴ He was incapable of following an aggressive policy towards India. Aurangzeb, however, kept a watchful eye on the frontier; a strict surveillance was exercised over travellers and trade-caravans.⁵ Shah Sulaimān was succeeded by his son Shah Sultan Ḥusain (1105-35/1694-1722). Shah Ḥusain was free from some of the vices of his predecessors, but was too much given to piety and lacked all political sense and administrative acumen.⁶ There was, however, no resumption of diplo-

1. According to the *Mir'ātuṣ Ṣafā*, f. 28a, the horses were brought by a Persian envoy, 'Abdullah Sultān Faṭḥ Iwāghlī Ustajlū, along with an insulting letter in 1077/1666-7.

2. K.K., II, pp. 325-7; *M.U.*, III, pp. 689-90; *Mir'ātuṣ Ṣafā*, f. 28a; Manucci, II, p. 146 (but cf. John Campbell's eyewitness account, cited by Irvine, that "the horses were given away," *loc. cit.*, n. 2); Tavernier, I, pp. 298-9.

3. See previous chapter, pp. 113-14.

4. For Shah Sulaimān, see Sykes, *History of Persia*, II, pp. 212-13, and Sir J. Chardin's very interesting contemporary observations on Sulaimān's reign, *Travels in Persia*, London, 1927.

5. Sarkar, III, p. 129; also *Anecdotes of Aurangzib*, Nos. 49, 50, 52; Calendar Nos. Ab: 254 and 255.

6. K.K., II, pp. 403-4; Sykes, II, pp. 214, 224. For an excellent modern account of Shah Sultan Ḥusain, see Lockhart, *The Fall of the Safawī Dynasty*, pp. 35-43. According to this work, the Shah began as a puritan, but his courtiers and eunuchs saw to it that before long he took to drinking as well as to debauchery.

matic relations with Persia during the rest of Aurangzeb's long reign.¹ (Aurangzeb died in Dhul-Q. 1118/March 1707).

Aurangzeb, it appears, never seriously intended to recover Qandahār. Nobody knew better than he the difficulty of the task. In 1688, he gave some assistance to Ahmad Khan, the Persian governor of Herāt, who had rebelled against the Shah and had laid siege to Qandahār.² There are also references to Qandahār in Aurangzeb's correspondence with his son Mu'azzam, viceroy of Kābul. He taunts the prince for not having recovered the fort and skilfully parries the prince's request for permission to visit the court by writing to him, "You desire to come to the capital, and I want you to go to Qandahār."³ However, the assistance to the rebel governor of Herāt was little more than a gesture, and the reproaches to the Prince were just a piece of statecraft. Aurangzeb had indeed too much on his hands in India—the Afghan rebels on the north-west frontier, the Rājput malcontents, the Jāts, the Marathas and the Deccan states—to have much time for Qandahār.⁴ His hostility to Persia, however, continued. The escape of his son Muhammad Akbar (who had rebelled against him and crowned himself in 1681) to Persia in 1686, was another source of irritation.⁵ Shah Sulaimān received him most cordially⁶ and provided him with a comfortable living. The prince requested military help to invade India. The Shah politely put off the question of aid till after the death of his father and assured him of help in the likely contest for the throne with his brothers. Shah Sultan Husain continued the same policy towards Akbar. According to Khāfi Khan, Akbar once spread a rumour of Aurangzeb's death and wanted the Shah to give him military aid. The Shah, however, soon learned from his secret agents at Thatta and elsewhere of the falsehood of the report; this considerably affected Akbar's standing at the Persian court. He now obtained permission to stay in the neighbourhood of

1. According to Lockhart (*The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty*, p. 66), Aurangzeb sent an embassy to Isfahān in 1699, asking for the return of Qandahār but the demand was rejected by Shah Sultan Husain. Lockhart, however, has not cited his sources here.

2. Sarkar, III, p. 129.

3. *Ruq'at-i 'Ināyat Khānī* (B.M. Or. 1410), f. 37af. Calendar No. Ab. 250; also see Nos. Ab. 249 and 251. According to Lockhart (*Fall*, p. 65), Mu'azzam intrigued unsuccessfully with the Ghilzai Afghans dwelling in the Qandahār province, "in the hope of inducing them to revolt against the Shah and so make it possible for the Emperor to recover the lost territory." Also see *Fall*, p. 83.

4. According to Father Krusinski, I, pp. 143-4, it was Aurangzeb's sister who dissuaded him from making an attempt on Qandahār. The subsequent narrative of the Father shows that he was not well-informed on Indian affairs.

5. Manucci, II, p. 279, says that Aurangzeb wrote a provocative letter to Shah Sulaimān, demanding Akbar's return, but it was not despatched on the *Wazir's* advice.

6. See Shah Sulaimān's letter to Prince Akbar, Calendar No. Ab. 256; also Ab. 257 to 259.

Qandahār, so that in the event of a 'mishap' in India, he could immediately march and enter Kābul and Multān with Persian help. Akbar, however, died in 1706, shortly before Aurangzeb's death. Aurangzeb, it is said, praised him for having preserved his Sunnī faith in Shiite Iran.¹

Without taking overt action, which was indeed not called for, Aurangzeb remained vigilant of any Persian moves on the frontier,² and continued a cold war with Persia. He maintained active diplomatic relations with 'Abdul 'Aziz Khan and Subhān Qulī Khan of Tūrān.³ In these diplomatic exchanges, the community of religious (i.e., sectarian) beliefs and the common enmity to the Safavids was inevitably emphasised. A raid which the Uzbegs launched on Bālā Marghāb in or after 1096/1685, is attributed by the *Tadhkira-i Muqīm-Khānī* to Subhān Qulī Khan's promise to Zabardast Khan, envoy of Aurangzeb.⁴ The *Tawārīkh-i Badī'a*, giving an account of the Uzbek embassy of Nadhr Bī to India, says that the envoy on his return reported to Subhān Qulī Khan that Aurangzeb was just then unable to launch his promised invasion of Persia as he was preoccupied with hostilities with the rulers of Golconda and Bijāpūr, who had been instigated to revolt against him by the Shah of Persia.⁵ It is evident from these references that a vague talk of an anti-Persian alliance and a joint invasion of Iran continued between Aurangzeb and the Uzbegs, but nothing came of it, nor was it seriously meant. Indeed 'Abdul 'Aziz Khan also sought Shah 'Abbās II's friendship, reported to the Shah the Mughul diplomatic moves and even offered to make a military demonstration on the Mughul frontier.⁶ Tūrān lacked a great leader like

1. K.K., II, pp. 276, 284-90; *M.A.*, pp. 537-8, tr., pp. 320-22; *F. Šafaviyya* f. 62b; *Mir' atus Šafā*, ff. 165b-6a; Manucci, II, p. 323; IV, p. 267. Aurangzeb's remark is reported in the *M.A.*

2. See Calendar Nos. Ab. 254 and 255.

3. Aurangzeb even as a prince had maintained contacts with influential persons in Tūrān. See his letters to Khwāja 'Abdul Qhaffār and Khwāja 'Abdul Wahhāb, Calendar Nos. Tx. 359 and 364 to 366. He kept up these contacts after his accession. See Calendar Nos. Tx. 367 and 369. The ground for a full-fledged embassy from 'Abdul 'Aziz Khan was prepared through correspondence between Faḡīl Khan, Aurangzeb's wazīr, and 'Abdul 'Aziz Khan. For Aurangzeb's correspondence with 'Abdul 'Aziz Khan and the latter's brother Subhān Qulī Khan, see Calendar Nos. Tx. 372 to 374, 376 and 377.

After the exit of Nadhr Muḥammad Khan (see previous chapter), 'Abdul 'Aziz Khan ruled at Bukhārā as Khan of Tūrān, while his brother Subhān Qulī Khan ruled at Balkh. In 1091/1680, 'Abdul 'Aziz Khan abdicated and left for Mecca, and Subhān Qulī Khan succeeded to the throne at Bukhārā.

4. *Muqīm-Khānī*, ff. 91b, 98b. The Mughul embassy referred to here was led by Zabardast Khan in 1096/1685, see *M.A.*, p. 255, tr., p. 156. An earlier embassy to Tūrān was led by Yakkatāz Khan in 1080/1669-70, see *M.A.*, p. 104, tr., p. 65.

5. *Badī'a* f. 312b; Nadhr Bī's embassy arrived in India in 1100/1689 (see *M.A.*, p. 337, tr., p. 203, which dates it a year later); *Badī'a's* account is chronologically anomalous, as the Deccan kingdoms had been already annexed by that time.

6. See Shah 'Abbās II's letters to 'Abdul 'Aziz Khan, *I.T.V.*, pp. 20-22, 37-40 and 44-45; *Jung Ganj*, Majlis Library (Tihiran), MS 2506, f (p). 65. Calendar Nos. Tx. 360 to 363.

'Abdullah Khan Uzbeg, was torn by internal factions and constantly menaced by her neighbours, especially Urganj or *Khawārizm*, while Aurangzeb was too preoccupied with internal problems. An effective alliance against Persia was not an imperative necessity, for the Safavid monarchy was itself in a state of slow but sure dissolution. Since the death of Shah 'Abbās II, the last effective ruler of the dynasty, Persia had been in no position to pose a threat to India or to offer even diplomatic support to the Deccan kingdoms. By 1687 Aurangzeb had finally destroyed the two remaining Deccan kingdoms of Bijāpūr and Golconda and annexed their territories.

The absence of any threat from Central Asia and Iran and the elimination of the Deccan kingdoms strengthened Aurangzeb's position at home and abroad, or so it appeared.¹ Evidently he felt no need, as Shah Jahān had at one stage felt, of cultivating relations with the Ottomans. Sultān Sulaimān II, on his own initiative, sent an ambassador to the Mughul court. The Turkish envoy, Aḥmad Āqā, arrived at the imperial camp at Galgala, near Bijāpūr, on 3 *Dhul-Q.* 1101/29 July 1690.² The Sultan in his letter mentioned the hostility of the Christian powers to the Ottoman empire and urged Aurangzeb to undertake the religious duty of *jihād*.³ About the same time the Sultan wrote to Subḥān Qulī Khan of Bukhārā to the same effect.⁴ The Sultan was evidently aiming at an alliance of the three Sunnī powers in order to forestall any Persian attempt to take advantage of the Ottoman empire's current troubles.⁵ As Professor Hikmet Bayur has pointed out, the Ottoman empire, after its defeat at Vienna in 1683, had been passing through a difficult period, while the prestige of the Mughul empire was then very high.⁶ The Sultan therefore took the initiative to reopen the long-suspended diplomatic relations with the Mughuls. Judging from the account of the reception of the envoy, Aurangzeb did not pay much attention to the Ottoman embassy.⁷

1. It may be doubted if the complete absence of any threat from across the north-west frontier was an unmixed blessing for the Mughul empire. The absence of such a threat left Aurangzeb free to pursue his interminable wars in the Deccan. His long absence from the north—which he could have ill afforded if the situation on the frontier had been different—weakened the administration in the northern provinces, the heart of the empire. His quarter of a century of campaigning in the Deccan exhausted the empire financially and weakened it politically.

2. *M.A.*, p. 337. The date is mentioned in the *Dastūrul 'Amal*, Ethé 432, f. 72b, which gives a more detailed account of Aḥmad Āqā's reception than the one found in *M.A.*

3. Calendar No. Ott. 402. Hikmet Bayur, 'Osmanlı, Padişahi II. Süleyman Guranlı Padişahi I. Alamgir (Evrenşir) e Mektubu', *Belleten*, Vol. XIV, 1950, pp. 269-87.

4. Rahim, 'Mughal Relations with Central Asia,' *Islamic Culture*, viii, 1934, p. 197.

5. It is unlikely that the projected alliance was directed against the European powers hostile to Turkey, for neither Aurangzeb nor Subḥān Qulī Khan could be expected to send material aid to Turkey.

6. Hikmet Bayur, *op. cit.*

7. *M.A.*, p. 337. For Aurangzeb's correspondence with Ḥusain Pasha of Baṣra (who later joined Mughul service) and with other Ottoman officials, see Riazul Islam, *Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations*, Nos. Ott. 401, Ott. 402.1, and Ott. 402.2. Also see *A.N.K.*, pp. 606, 619, 626, 636, 887; *M.A.*, pp. 34, 35, 37, 85, 86, 110; Hikmet Bayur, *Hindistan Tarihi*, II, pp. 252-53.

Nor did he send a return embassy or even a reply to the Ottoman *nāmā-i-humāyūn*. The assumption of superiority that characterised Sultan Sulaimān's letter—and indeed all Ottoman royal letters—may have been one of the causes of lack of response on Aurangzeb's part.

Thus by the end of Aurangzeb's reign, the Mughul empire had no diplomatic relations with either Iran or the Ottoman empire. The only sizable foreign embassy that came to India during the last decade of Aurangzeb's reign, was a minor one from Bukhārā (1109/1698).¹ Though Aurangzeb was not responsible for the breach with Iran in 1077/1666, he was certainly so for the continuation of the breach. His withholding of recognition from Shah Sulaimān Ṣafavī and Shah Sultan Ḥusain (by not sending congratulatory embassies)—as also his failure to send a return embassy to Istanbul—was a deliberate act of policy. The state of diplomatic isolation in which Aurangzeb left the Mughul empire was by no means enviable.

CHAPTER VIII

POST-AURANGZEB PERIOD

Sec. i: 1707 to 1792

THE relations between the Mughuls and the Safavids in the post-Aurangzeb period were spasmodic and inconsequential. During the years 1707-22 no regular Mughul embassy was sent to Iran, though one full-fledged embassy followed by one minor mission did come from Iṣfahān to Delhi. Bahādur Shah, son and successor of Aurangzeb, was desirous of reopening diplomatic relations with Iran. This may be partly accountable to his Shiite leanings.¹ (As a prince too, he had shown for the Persians a pronounced partiality which brought down on his head his father's censure.²) He sent messages of goodwill to Shah Sultan Ḥusain through traders and contemplated sending a regular embassy to the Shah.³

In the meanwhile important and portentous events were taking place in Qandahār. In 1703 the Persians had suffered a defeat in the course of a Balūch inroad on the Qandahār province. The Persian government, realizing the need of having a strong governor at Qandahār, appointed Gurgīn Khan (Georgi XI), a Georgian prince of Christian faith, to the post.⁴ Gurgīn Khan's coercive methods, the brutality of his troops in their dealings with the Afghans, and the difference of religion between him and his subjects, made him increasingly unpopular with the people, especially with the Ghilzais.⁵ In the

1. See *Siyarul Muta'akkhkhīrīn*, II, p. 7, for Bahādur Shah's religious views; and K.K., II, p. 645 for his friendship for the Safavids.

2. See *Raqā'im-i Karā'im*, f. 8b, where Aurangzeb criticizes the prince (Mu'azzam) for having left the management of his jāgīrs in the hands of the Persians. Cited in Athar Ali, *The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*, Aligarh, 1966, p. 88.

3. K.K., II, pp. 644-45.

4. Lockhart, *The Fall of the Safavī Dynasty*, p. 84.

5. Khalīl Mar'ashī, *Majma'ut Tawārīkh*, Tihiran, 1328 A.H.S., p. 4; also Lockhart, *Fall*, p. 85.

event, the Ghilzais raised the standard of rebellion under the leadership of their chief, Mir Wais. Gurgin Khan crushed the rebellion, arrested Mir Wais and sent him a prisoner to Iṣfahān. At Iṣfahān the wily Afghan chief ingratiated himself into favour with Shah Sultan Ḥusain and his courtiers. His shrewd eye also took full note of the poor state of the Safavid army and the political bankruptcy of the Safavid state.¹ After performing pilgrimage, he returned home by way of Iṣfahān. Shortly after his return to Qandahār, Mir Wais managed to lay his hands on Gurgin Khan and to murder him (1121/1709).²

Mir Wais recited the khutba in the name of Bahādur Shah, the Mughul Emperor, and forthwith sent his brother Hājī Nūr Muḥammad to Delhi with an 'arīḍa' protesting loyalty to the Mughul Emperor and soliciting the conferment of a high maṣṣab on himself and on his son, and his own appointment to the governorship of Qandahār. He further requested that the governors of Kābul, Multān and Thatta be commanded to send him reinforcements whenever needed by him. Mir Wais's move was obviously a tactical one and he had no intention of accepting Mughul vassalage after overthrowing the Persian yoke. Bahādur Shah's proceedings in this situation show the hollowness of Mughul power. He nominated the successful Afghan chief as Mughul governor of Qandahār and conferred on him a maṣṣab of 5000/5000 and the significant title of 'Alī Mardān Khan'.³ Simultaneously he sent a secret message to Shah Sultan Ḥusain to the effect that the emergence of the Afghan chief was a matter of great concern to the Mughuls and the consolidation of his power would spell danger to both the Mughuls and the Safavids; the Emperor requested the Shah to take prompt action against the rebel chief and assured the Shah that the Mir would not get any help from India.⁴

The danger to Persia from the Afghan rebellion was indeed very great. The Safavid monarchy was, however, in a rapid decline. Shah Sultan Ḥusain's preoccupation with theological matters on the one hand and the pursuit of pleasure on the other made him a singularly inept ruler in a period

1. Khalīl Mar'ashī, p. 5; also see Lockhart, *Fall*, p. 86, who cites other sources.

2. The circumstances of Gurgin Khan's murder are described variously in different sources. Father Krusinski (I, pp. 149-89) and Jones Hanway (1753 Ed., III, pp. 27-57) have given detailed accounts of the events. Also see Khalīl Mar'ashī, pp. 5-7; Malleson, *History of Afghanistan*, pp. 211-26; Lockhart, *Fall*, pp. 84-87.

3. Qipchāq-Khānī, II, f. 247b and K.K., II, pp. 644-45; the former work places the events in 1120, the latter in 1119. Khalīl Mar'ashī, p. 18, gives the Afghan envoy's name as Hājī Amku (? AMKW), brother of Mir Wais (Uwais in Mar'ashī) and says the presents sent with the envoy included coins struck in the name of Farrukh Siyar (?). According to this source, the title conferred by the Mughul Emperor on Mir Wais was Hājī Amīr Khan. Khalīl Mar'ashī is certainly wrong in naming the emperor Farrukh Siyar who came to the throne four years after the Afghan rising at Qandahār.

4. K.K., II, p. 645.

of crisis.¹ Judging from his conduct, "one would have thought that Qandahār, Herāt and the Afghans had never existed."² It appears that the dangers inherent in the successful Afghan revolt were fully realized at the Persian court. But the measures taken were not commensurate with the situation. The expeditions sent to Qandahār proved disastrously unsuccessful.³

For the first time since Bābur's conquest of Qandahār in 1522, the fort had passed into the hands of a third party (*sc.* a party other than the Mughuls and the Safavids). Bahādur Shah, judging from the import of his secret message to Shah Sultan Ḥusain, was not happy at the passing of the fort into the hands of the troublesome Afghans. Shah Ḥusain realized the urgent need of resuming diplomatic relations with the Mughuls so as to forestall an Afghan-Mughul accord. The Shah sent an envoy by the name of Mīr Murtaḍā Khufāf, wazīr of Yazd, with many gifts and a letter addressed to Bahādur Shah. The letter is a long one, more than half of it being devoted to platitudes and religious and ethical observations. It makes a brief reference to the ancient ties of Mughul-Safavid friendship and recalls how Emperor Aurangzeb had put an end to this accord for a trifle and had withheld diplomatic intercourse from Shah Sulaimān and sent no embassy on his own (Shah Ḥusain's) accession. The Shah notes with satisfaction that Bahādur Shah had been secretly friendly towards Iran during his father Aurangzeb's reign, and he expresses his immense pleasure to learn of Bahādur Shah's accession.⁴

Sayyid (or Mīr) Murtaḍā was sent sometime about the year 1121/1709, that is, the year of the Afghan rebellion. He left Iran by sea and appears to have met with some serious accident on his voyage so that he had to proceed to Bengal. From Hugli he sent an *'arīḍa* to inform the Mughul court of his situation. Farrukh Siyar, who was now on the Mughul throne, sent orders to the officials of the provinces on the way to provide 70,000 rupees to the envoy for his expenses and directed Diyāuddīn Khan, *faujdar* of Hugli, to escort him (or provide an escort for him?). Mīr Murtaḍā reached Delhi in the company of Taqarrub Khan in 1124/1712. In spite of the envoy's serious mishap on the way during which he lost some of his goods, the gifts brought by him are attested by Khāfi Khan to have been notably large and of high value. The rewards given him by Farrukh Siyar exceeded one lac of rupees in worth.⁵

1. Hanway's *Travels*, London, 1753, III, pp. 30-31; K.K., II, p. 645.

2. Muḥammad Muḥsin, *Zubdatut Tawārikh*, f. 206b, cited in Lockhart, *Fall*, p. 126n.

3. Krusinski, I, pp. 188-200; Hanway, III, pp. 48-57; Lockhart, *Fall*, pp. 88-91.

4. *F.Q.*, India Office MS 3901, ff. 242a-47a, gives the text of the letter. For a summary, see Calendar No. Post-Ab.260. The envoy's full name as appearing in the text of the letter is Mu'taman Mirza Sayyid Murtaḍā Ḥusaini.

5. K.K., II, pp. 736-37. Details regarding Mīr Murtaḍā's *'arīḍa* and Farrukh Siyar's orders thereupon are found in a tract appearing at the end of the Cambridge *King's*

Meanwhile the news of Bahādur Shah's death and of the accession of Farrukh Siyar reached Shah Sultan Husain who immediately sent Mir Aṣba'uddīn, nephew of Mir Murtaḍā, with a letter to the new Emperor, saying that the Perrian envoy had been ordered to present his credentials to the new Emperor. Mir Aṣba'uddīn also brought a verbal message from the Shah for the Emperor.¹ There is no mention of a return Mughul embassy to Iran.

Presumably the purpose of Mir Murtaḍā's mission as well as the purport of the personal message brought by Mir Aṣba'uddīn, related to the recent trouble at Qandahār and the need of Mughul cooperation with Iran to deal with the trouble. The Mughul power, however, was itself afflicted with all the maladies of a vast empire in a state of disintegration. The Emperor was losing grip over the affairs of the empire and the court was the battle ground of the various factions of the nobility. Muḥammad Shah who came to the throne in 1131/1719 as the nominee of the faction then dominant at the court, was a feeble representative of a decaying dynasty. In such a situation no one could think of fitting out an expedition to assist the Shah of Iran. It appears that in consequence of the missions sent by Shah Sultan Husain, the question of military aid to Iran did come up for discussion. Niẓāmul Mulk, the leading noble of Muḥammad Shah's court, was the only one to press for aid to the Safavids. In 1135/1722 (the year of the Afghan invasion of Iran), he proposed that a Mughul contingent be sent to the aid of the Safavids to repay the debt of Safavid succour to Humāyūn given in similar circumstances. He even offered his own services in case no other noble was willing to undertake the task. This proposal (and others that he made for internal reforms) made him immediately unpopular with the nobles and he lost favour with the Emperor himself. Before long he had to leave the court.² In 1722 the Afghans invaded Persia, and Shah Sultan Husain surrendered his throne to the invaders. In that fateful year the Safavid dynasty came virtually, though not completely, to an end. Two more princes, Tahmāsp II (1722-31) and Abbās III (1731-36), are counted in the list of Safavid Shahs. The envoys sent in their names to India were, however, in reality representatives of Nādir.

manuscript of the *Bahādur Shāh Nāma* of Ni'mat Khan 'Alī. (These details do not appear in Khāfi Khan.) The tract could not have been a part of the *Bahādur Shāh Nāma* which covers only the first two years of Bahādur Shah's reign, nor could it be from the pen of Ni'mat Khan 'Alī who died in 1121/1710.

For Diyāuddīn Khan, *faujdar* of Hugli, see Abdul Karim, *Murshid Qulī Khan and His Times*, Dacca, 1963, pp. 31-34, 143-49.

1. F.Q., I.O.MS 3901, ff. 247a-49a, gives the text of the letter. Also see Calendar No. Post-Ab. 262.

2. K.K., II, pp. 948-49. Also see Yusuf Husain, *The First Nizām*, New York, 1963, pp. 184-85.

Sec. ii: Nadir Shah and the Mughul Empire

[NOTE:—There are several good accounts of Nādir Shah's invasion of India. In Irvine's *The Later Mughals*, the editor, Sir Jadunath Sarkar, has added three substantial chapters on Nādir Shah's invasion of India. The chapters, based on contemporary Persian sources and on foreign travel accounts, provide a comprehensive view of the events and their background. Laurence Lockhart in his *Nadir Shah* gives an excellent factual narrative of the invasion. Dr. Satish Chandra in his *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, 1707-1740*, sheds a revealing light on the inter-group politics of the period of Nādir Shah's invasion. It will be difficult to improve on these various accounts. We have therefore confined ourselves to giving an account of the diplomatic side of the events which has not thus far received full attention.]

Mission of 'Alī Mardān Khan

In the fight launched by Shah Tahmāsp II, the son of Shah Sultan Husain, against the Afghans, Nādir played a leading role. He also took, as pointed out by Lockhart, advantage of his position to promote his personal influence.¹ The expulsion of the Afghans from Iran in 1142/1729 greatly strengthened his position and enhanced his prestige. Nādir now resolved to smash the Afghan power in its homeland, in Herāt and Qandahār, where respectively the Abdālīs and the Ghilzai were still entrenched. In view of the proximity of Indian territory to Qandahār, Nādir, then at Shīrāz, decided to send an embassy to Delhi (late 1142/early 1730). He chose for this purpose 'Alī Mardān Khan Shāmlū *Eshik-āqāsi*, "a man who was entirely in his interest."² The embassy which was sent in the name of Shah Tahmāsp II, was also intended to announce the expulsion of the Afghans from Iran.³ The letter carried by the envoy highlighted the role of Nādir in the defeat of the Afghans. It also announced the resolve of the Persian government "to uproot the rebellious group from Qandahār and exterminate them for ever,"⁴ and the appointment of Tahmāsp Qulī (*sc.* Nādir) for this task. In the letter Shah Tahmāsp made a special request to Muḥammad Shah to appoint an army on the north-west frontier of India in order to prevent the Afghans fleeing from before the Persian attack, from escaping into India. The purpose of the embassy is well brought out in Nādir's own letter to 'Alī Mardān Khan, sent a year later as a reminder, wherein the former says, "It is possible that with the next Persian onslaught on the Afghans the latter might flee towards India: and their pursuit by the Persians might result in complications (with the Indian authorities). The

1. Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, p. 25; *Fall*, p. 339.

2. Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, p. 44.

3. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, p. 114; *Nadir Shah*, p. 46.

4. Calendar No. Post-Ab. 263. The text appears in Āshob, *Tārīkh-i Shahādat*, etc.; Ethé 422, ff. 140b-45b; and Untitled collection of Letters, R.A.S.M.S, Morley 212, ff (pp). 149-66.

ambassador should therefore request the Gorkānī Emperor to appoint a commander to forestall this eventuality.”¹

‘Alī Mardān Khan’s mission was the last major embassy that came to the Mughul court from Iran and we are fortunate to have more than one detailed account of its reception. The ambassador was received at Lahore by Zakariyyā Khan, nāzim of Lahore, who sent his men to escort him to Delhi.² The envoy was well received at the court where he performed obeisance in accordance both with Persian custom and Indian etiquette. Along with his brother, son-in-law and other members of his train, he offered presents at the royal court. They were all suitably rewarded. The ambassador and his associates were entertained by Sa‘ādat Khan Burhānūl Mulk at his house.³

In the meanwhile Nādir, after his victorious campaign against the Turks in 1730, marched to Khurāsān to crush the Abdālīs. He besieged Herāt for nine months, and it was during this period that he had sent the letter to ‘Alī Mardān Khan mentioned above. He finally captured Herāt on 1st Ramaḍān 1144 [16/27 February 1732].⁴ Nādir then proceeded to Farāh with plans to reduce Qandahār. But unfavourable developments on the western frontiers of Iran forced him to leave Khurāsān and march westward.⁵

At Delhi ‘Alī Mardān Khan was dismissed with rich presents and a letter from Muḥammad Shah for the Shah of Iran in Rabi‘ I 1145/August

1. Calendar No. Sh. 263.1. The text appears in the Letters of Mirza Mahdī Khan, published by Allah Qulī Khan, pp. 38-42.

2. There is no clear evidence relating to the date of ‘Alī Mardān Khan’s arrival at Delhi. The India Office manuscript of the *Tārīkh-i Shahādat* etc., f. 135b, Ethé 422, gives 19 Muḥarram 1150 [8 May 1737]. The B.M. manuscript of the same work (Or. 1832, 133a) has 19 Muḥarram 1180 [an obvious clerical error] in the 19th r.y. of Muḥammad Shah. The latter year corresponds to 1149-50/1737. But 1737 as the year of ‘Alī Mardān Khan’s arrival at Delhi is unacceptable for two reasons: first, we know he was sent from Iran in the summer of 1730. (See Lockhart, *Nadīr Shah*, pp. 46, 63.) The year 1730 corresponds to 1142-43 of the Hijrī era. In the *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, the despatch of the envoy seems to be placed in 1141-42, but for the early phase of Nādir’s career, Mirza Mahdī’s chronology is not particularly precise. Even making an allowance for the trouble that the envoy had in finding a boat for India (for details, see *Nadīr Shah*, p. 47 n.1), he could not have taken seven years to reach Delhi. Second, ‘Alī Mardān Khan’s dismissal from Delhi is placed in the *Tārīkh-i Shahādat* etc., Ethé 422, f. 146b-47a, in Rabi‘ I in the 14th r.y. which corresponds to 1145/August 1732. This is confirmed by the *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī* (p. 307 and p. 188) which states that ‘Alī Mardān Khan had arrived back in Iran before Muḥammad ‘Alī Khan was despatched to India in 1145/1732.

It seems to us that starting from Shīrāz in June or July 1730 (for he arrived at Gombroon in July-August 1730, see Lockhart, *Nadīr Shah*, p. 46, n. 4), ‘Alī Mardān Khan should have reached Delhi towards the end of 1730 or early in 1731, approximately in the second half of 1143 A.H. But if the month given in the *Tārīkh-i Shahādat*, namely Muḥarram, is to be accepted, it could only be the Muḥarram of 1144, corresponding to June-July 1731.

3. *Tārīkh-i Shahādat* etc., Ethé 422, ff. 135a-40b.

4. Lockhart, *Nadīr Shah*, p. 54.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 55-59.

1732.¹ Muḥammad Shah's letter begins with a mention of the circumstances of his accession. About the Afghans of Qandahār it says that they had wanted to join Mughul service but were refused service in view of the ancient bonds of friendship between the Mughul and Safavid dynasties. Regarding the Shah's request for measures to prevent the Afghans from fleeing into India, the Emperor says that 'Abduṣ Ṣamad Khan, governor of Multān, has been ordered to keep a watch on the Afghans to prevent their escape into India.²

Mission of Muḥammad 'Alī Khan

By 1145/1732 Nādir had greatly strengthened his authority in Iran. In Rabī' I 1145/September 1732, he had Ṭahmāsp deposed and replaced by the latter's seven-month old son 'Abbās III. Nādir, redesignated *Nā'ibus saltanat* and *Wakīlud dawla*, now ruled as regent on behalf of the infant, titular monarch. He now sent another mission to Delhi led by Muḥammad 'Alī Khan *Qullar-āqāsī*, governor of Fars. The author of the *Ḥadiqatul Aqālīm* gives a detailed eye-witness account of the reception of the Persian envoy at Delhi. The envoy and his associates were well received and thoroughly entertained. The author of the above-mentioned work heard the envoy remarking, "The Emperor of India rules like a god."³ The mission was intended partly to announce the change on the throne and the new position of Nādir as regent, and partly to remind Muḥammad Shah of the request conveyed earlier through 'Alī Mardān Khan.⁴ It was sent in the name of Shah 'Abbās III who in his letter alluded to Nādir as *abuwi-makān* ("one occupying the position of my father"). The Shah's letter announced the appointment of Nādir to the reduction of Qandahār, and repeated the request made through the earlier mission for the appointment of a Mughul commander on the frontier to stop the Afghans fleeing into India. Twice the letter warned the Emperor that the failure on the part of the Mughuls to stop the Afghans might result in unfriendly consequences (that is, the Persians might have to enter into Indian territory in pursuit of the Afghans).⁵

1. See above.

2. Calendar No. Post-Ab. 264. The text of the letter appears in India Office MS No. 4002; the Panjab University, Lahore, too has a copy of the letter. Both 'Alī Ḥazīn, *Tārikh-i Aḥwāl*, p. 265 and Ṭabāṭabā'ī, *Siyar*, II, p. 93, describe Muḥammad Shah's letter as evasive and useless. Aṣḥob mentions, without citing, an incomplete text of Muḥammad Shah's letter, *Tārikh-i Shahādāt*, Ethé 422, f. 145b.

3. Murtaḍā Ḥusain 'Uṭhmānī Bilgrāmī, *Ḥadiqatul Aqālīm*, Lucknow, 1879, pp. 43-44.

4. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, p. 188; *Siyarul Muta'akkhkhīrīn*, II, p. 93; *Ḥadiqatul Aqālīm*, pp. 41-44. The author of the last cited work, Murtaḍā Ḥusain 'Uṭhmānī (for whom see Storey, I, p. 142), was born in 1132/1719-20. He went to Delhi at the age of twelve years. It was on this occasion that he witnessed the presentation ceremony of the Persian embassy. He gives a vivid account of the ceremony, but nowhere mentions the name of the envoy.

5. For the text of the letter, see *Tārikh-i Shahādāt* etc., Ethé 422, ff. 147b-51b. For further details, see Calendar No. Post-Ab. 265.

Muhammad Shah's reply

According to Mirza Mahdī, Muhammad Shah in his reply reaffirmed the promise to close the frontier to the Afghans made in his previous letter.¹ However, the text of the letter as given by Mirza Muhammad Bakhsh "Ashob" is not so unequivocal on the subject. Unfortunately there is no other copy of the letter to check the accuracy of the text given by Muhammad Bakhsh in the *Tārīkh-i Shahādāt*. The letter of Muhammad Shah as appearing in this work is not in a particularly friendly vein. Recalling the repeated Persian request for the appointment of a Mughul commander on the frontier, it says a numerous Mughul army is already stationed at Kābul. How could the beggarly Afghans have the temerity to cross the border into India, it asks. It notes that owing to the prolonged Persian campaign against the Turks, no Persian commander has been appointed to reduce Qandahār: as soon as Nādir is free to turn to Qandahār, a Mughul commander would be appointed to assist him. But it recommends pardon for Mir Wais's son in view of the latter's having made his submission to the Mughul court. Further it says it is not appropriate for the Persian government to station more troops on the Indo-Persian frontier than the agreed number.² The Mughul army, it says, is currently engaged in fighting against the infields [the Marathas] in the Deccan.³

It is difficult to accept the accuracy of the text of this letter in its entirety. The text in the *Tārīkh-i Shahādāt* represents, in our view, either the first unrevised draft or the draft subsequently touched up (i.e., after its despatch, like the Mughul version of Shah Tahmāsp's farmān regarding Humāyūn's reception in Herāt⁴) but in no way the precise text of the letter sent to Iran. Such an unfriendly letter would have created at the Persian court a strong reaction which, if it had at all taken place, would have been surely reflected in Mirza Mahdī's *Jahāngushā*. The tenor of Mirza Mahdī's narrative makes it certain that Muhammad Shah's letter was in no way unfriendly. This view is further strengthened by the friendly tone of the next letter from Iran which was issued in Nādir Shah's own name.

Shortly after the victorious conclusion of his Turkish campaign of 1734-35, Nādir decided to set aside the Safavid dynasty and place himself on the throne of Iran. His coronation took place on 24 Shawwāl 1148 (26 February/8 March 1736).⁵ He was now more than ever determined to regain

1. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, p. 307, lines 3-4.

2. This would suggest the existence of an Indo-Persian agreement regarding the number of troops to be maintained on either side of the border. There is, however, nothing in the chronicles or in the record of correspondence, to corroborate this.

3. *Tārīkh-i Shahādāt* etc., Ethé 422, ff. 151b-55a. Calendar No. Post-Ab. 266.

4. Calendar No. H. 10.

5. Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, p. 101.

the only unrecovered Persian territory, namely Qandahār, and to put an end to the last remnant of the Afghan power that had once threatened the whole of Irān. Setting out from Isfahān in Rajab 1149/November 1736, he reached the environs of Qandahār in early April 1737. The Ghilzai Husain Sultan put up a stout defence, and the Persian siege of the fort dragged on for almost a year.¹

Mission of Muḥammad Khan Turkṁān²

Soon after opening the siege of Qandahār, Nādir Shah decided to send a fresh embassy to Delhi. The circumstances leading to this decision are as follows: A Persian contingent defeated a large Ghilzai force near the Qalāt (-i Ghilzai). Those who escaped the Persian sword fled in the direction of Ghaznī and Kābul. The Persian pursuers then discovered that, contrary to promise, the Delhi government had not appointed any contingent to close the frontier on the fleeing Afghans.³ Nādir Shah therefore depatched Muḥammad Khan Turkṁān, "the former Ṣafavi general", to Muḥammad Shah. This was, it may be remarked, the first mission to India sent *directly* by Nādir Shah. The envoy left Nādirābād (the new town built by Nādir outside Qandahār) on 15 Muḥarram 1150/4 May 1737 for India.⁴ His instructions were to raise the question of the Afghans fleeing to Ghaznī and Kābul, with the Delhi authorities, and not to tarry at Delhi for more than forty days.⁵

The letter carried by Muḥammad Khan Turkṁān,⁶ being the first communication from Nādir Shah to Muḥammad Shah, deserves a close examination. Of all the contemporary writers, Muḥammad Bakhsh Āshob is the only one to give the text of this letter. Nādir Shah therein recalls the earlier Persian request for the appointment of an Indian force on the Indo-Persian frontier and Muḥammad Shah's favourable replies. He now requested the Emperor to appoint a few trusted advisors who, after discussing the

1. The Persians entered the Qandahār fort on 3 Dhul-H. 1150 (13/24 March 1738). Mirza Mahdī and Muḥammad Kāzīm both give detailed accounts of the siege of Qandahār, the latter's account being more elaborate. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, pp. 299-305; *Ālam Ara-i Nādirī*, II, ff. 35b-75b. For an excellent modern account, see Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, chap. xi.

2. Between the missions of Muḥammad 'Alī Khan and Muḥammad Khan Turkṁān, Shaikh 'Alī Ḥazīn (*Tārīkh-i Ahwāl*, pp. 265-66) mentions another mission to Delhi. This was sent by Nādir and was led by a distinguished Qizilbāsh (name not mentioned) who was entrusted with letters for Muḥammad Shah and Burhānūl Mulk. On reaching India, says Ḥazīn, the envoy was looted by highwaymen but succeeded in preserving the royal letter which he presented to Muḥammad Shah. No other source, however, mentions such a mission.

3. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, p. 307.

4. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, p. 307. Lockhart's date: 11 Muḥarram 1150/11 May 1747, *Nadir Shah*, p. 116.

5. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, p. 307.

6. Muḥammad Khan Turkṁān was accompanied on the mission by Mirza Muḥammad Ridā, as mentioned in the letter from Nādir Shah.

matter with the Persian envoy, could advise the Emperor on the reply to be sent to Iran. An early congé for the envoy was also requested. It is remarkable that this letter contained no implied threat as the two earlier ones did. "It also contains a business-like proposition suggesting the procedure for negotiations."¹

The Mughul court made no reply to Nādir Shah's letter. The Persian ambassadors whose orders were to stay not more than forty days in Delhi, was detained there for a year. The Mughul government just could not make up their mind what to do. "As soon as this envoy arrived at Shāhjahānābād," observes Shaikh 'Alī Ḥazīn, "he delivered his letter and was told to wait: but they were silent as to any answer. Sometimes they were unable to agree in their own minds on the question of writing an answer at all; at other times they were perplexed [as to] what titles they should use to Nādir Shah... Thinking the detention of the ambassador a stroke of state policy, they awaited to see, if perchance Ḥusain, the Afghan, gained the victory over Nādir Shah, and destroyed him or put him to flight; on which event there would be no need of writing any answer to his letter."²

Muḥammad Bakhsh "Āshob" gives the draft of a reply by Muḥammad Shah to Nādir Shah's letter. The reply, *inter alia*, says that a Mughul noble was being appointed as requested by Nādir Shah.³ "Ashob" remarks that this letter of Muḥammad Shah could not be sent because of the emptiness of the treasury and the consequent lack of suitable gifts, the absence of an accomplished diplomat and, above all, because of the general engrossment at the Mughul court with carnal pleasures.⁴ The protracted Afghan defence of Qandahār may also have encouraged the Delhi court, as 'Alī Ḥazīn maintains,⁵ to put off taking a decision. The failure of the Mughuls to send a suitable reply and even more the detention of the Persian envoy at Delhi, were sure to incense Nādir Shah.

Failure of Mughul Diplomacy

Muḥammad Shah's conduct of diplomatic relations with Iran betrays utter lack of understanding and direction. His failure to send a congratulatory embassy on Iran's deliverance from Afghan occupation and the restoration of Safavid rule, his evasive replies to the letters of Shah Tahmāsp II and 'Abbās III, his detention of Nādir Shah's envoy and his silence over Nādir's letters—all this, apart from reflecting the incompetence and imbecility of the Mughul

1. Riazul Islam, *Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations*, Calendar No. Post-Ab. 268. For the text of the letter, see *Tārīkh-i Shahādāt* etc., Ethé 422, ff. 155a-57a.

2. 'Alī Ḥazīn, *Tārīkh-i Aḥwāl*, pp. 266-67; *Later Mughals*, II, pp. 321-2.

3. *Tārīkh-i Shahādāt*, Ethé 422, f. 159a-b. For details, see Calendar No. Post-Ab. 277.

4. *Tārīkh-i Shahādāt*, Ethé 422, f. 160a-b.

5. See 'Alī Ḥazīn cited above.

Emperor and his ministers, also put the Mughul government politically and diplomatically in the wrong. Sir Jadunath Sarkar is right in observing that Nādir, "a master of diplomacy and statecraft", "made out a strong case for declaring war [on India]. He proceeded in such a way as to ensure that neutral States and lovers of international law would not be able to condemn his invasion of India as an act of wanton aggression and spoliation."¹

Nādir Invades the Mughul Empire

After taking Qandahār in Dhul-H. 1150/March 1738, Nādir stayed in its vicinity for two months before marching on the Mughul province of Kābul. The governor Kābul sent urgent appeals for help and money to Delhi but to no avail. Besides the pusillanimity of the Delhi government, the inter-group rivalry of the nobles of the court was another cause of the forlorn position of the governor of Kābul.² The Delhi government indeed just could not make up its mind as how to deal with threat posed by Nādir Shah's success at Qandahār and his eastward march. The Emperor was a dissolute fool and the ministers were all divided into mutually hostile, self-seeking, incohesive groups.

Kābul fell easily to the Persians. On 24 Rabī' I 1151/7 July 1738, Nādir received at Kābul an 'arīḍa from Muḥammad 'Alī Khan saying that the Delhi government neither returned him a reply nor let him depart. Two days later Nādir Shah despatched a *chāhpār* (a fast travelling emissary) with a letter to Muḥammad Shah. The letter accused the Emperor of having gone back on his promise to close the frontier on the Afghans and of detaining the Persian envoy. The Afghans, it argued, had done more harm to India than to Iran and so the Delhi government should have cooperated with Nādir Shah in chastising them.³ This letter never reached the Mughul court. Its bearer was stopped by the governor of Jalālābād and later murdered by an Afghan.⁴

1. *Later Mughals*, II, (Sarkar's chapters), p. 320.

2. A full and revealing account of the party politics at the Mughul court of the period is given in Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, 1707-1740*, Aligarh, 1959, Ch. x: Mughal Politics and Nadir Shah.

3. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, pp. 310-12; *Munsha'āt-i Mirzā Mahdī Khān*, Manuscript in the Kitāb-Khāna-i Malik, Tihran, ff (pp). 66-67. For further details, see Calendar No. Post-Ab. 271, also 267.1. The *Calendar* also calendars some other letters purporting to have been sent by Nādir Shah to Muḥammad Shaha about this time. Much has been made in these letters of Nādir's desire to serve the cause of the true faith. Thus in one letter Nādir is made to say that "in subjugating Kabul he had no motive other than the zeal for Islam and the friendship of the Emperor, . . . and that he was waiting on this side of the Attock so that if the *kāfirs* (Marathas) made a move on Delhi, he would appoint a force of the Qizilbāsh to despatch the *kāfirs* to hell." This letter appears in *The History of Nadir Shah . . . the Present Emperor of Persia . . .*, by James Fraser, London, 1742, pp. 138-39. For further details, see Calendar No. Post-Ab. 272; also see Nos. 269 and 270. Not all these letters are worthy of credence.

4. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, p. 312; Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, p. 125. Mirzā Mahdī alludes to the murderer of the envoy as the son of Mir 'Abbās Afghan. Muḥammad Husain Quddūsi

Nādir now decided to go ahead with his Indian invasion.¹ He had already formed a well-founded impression about the weakness and the wealth of India.² A successful invasion of India was sure to bring fame, territory and a huge amount of wealth, so very much needed by Nādir for his western campaigns. It is a moot point whether any Indian noble was instrumental in inviting Nādir to India. Sa'adat Khan, governor of Awadh, and Nizāmul Mulk Āṣaf Jāh, are the two nobles who are alleged to be culprits in this connection. But their accusers were mostly partisan writers whose evidence is very much suspect.³ We are inclined to believe there was no collusion between Nādir Shah and any Mughul noble. Lockhart approvingly quotes Hanway who rightly remarked, "It appears to me highly probable that Nadir did not stand in need of such instruments (i.e., the Nizamu'l Mulk) for the execution of his ambitious designs."⁴

Nādir takes Lahore

The easy conquest of Kābul and the subsequent arrest of the Mughul governor of the province, Nāṣir Khan, led to Peshāwar surrendering to Nadir without any resistance (18 November 1738). On 12 December, Nādir resumed his march eastward. His next objective was the historic city of Lahore. Zakariyā Khan, governor of Lahore,⁵ showed neither lack of loyalty nor of spirit in defending his charge. But like Nāṣir Khan of Kābul, he too had received no help or encouragement from Delhi and his ill-equipped troops were

(*Nādir Nāma*, Preface, p. xxxi) calls him Mīr 'Abbās Afghānī. Ḥazīn's allegation that Muḥammad Shah conferred a *khiḷ'at* on the chief murderer of the Persian emissaries (*Tārīkh-i Aḥwāl*, London, 1831, p. 270) seems to be based on hearsay.

1. Muḥammad Ḥusain Quddūsī, *Nādir Nāma*, p. 132, says that at Jalālābād arrived a representative of Muḥammad Shah to enquire from Nādir Shah about the cause of the invasion, and Nādir Shah retorted he would himself render a reply to the Emperor at Delhi. Quddūsī has not cited his source for this episode. The whole story sounds unlikely.

2. Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, p. 123; Quddūsī, *Nādir Nāma*, p. 127, has followed Lockhart.

3. "The following contemporary authorities," says Satish Chandra, "repeat the charges against Nizam: *Jauhar-i Ṣamṣām*, f. 2b; [Rustam 'Alī] *Tārīkh-i Hindī* (599) qualified by words, 'some people thought'; *Hālāt-i Nādir*; *Nādir Var-Nijabat* (*Punjab Hist. Society* 1916); Trilok Das (Hindi poem, *J.A.S.B.* 1897), Fraser, 129-32; Hanway, iv 142. The *Risāla-i-Muḥammad Shāh* holds Sa'adat Khān responsible for inviting Nādir Shāh." *Parties and Politics at the Mughal court*, p. 249 n. 22

The contemporary James Fraser, *The History of Nadir Shah* etc., London, 1742, pp. 129-32 (also see Persian tr. in *Nādir Shāh*, ed. Riḍāzāda Shafaq, p. 212) indicts both Nizāmul Mulk and Sa'adat Khan of having invited Nādir Shah. The latter, he says, pointed out the difficulties of crossing the Indus, but the two Mughul ministers minimised these difficulties and assured Nādir Shah of utmost support; they also wrote to the governors of Kabul and Lahore urging them not to resist Nādir Shah. Also see Fraser, pp. 136-7.

4. Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, p. 124. Also see Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, p. 149. Also see Yusuf Husain, *The First Nizām*, New York, 1963, p. 187, who strongly rebuts the charge against Nizāmul Mulk of inviting Nādir Shah.

5. For Zakariyā Khan, governor of Lahore and Multān, see *M.U.*, tr. II, pp. 1028-29. Also see below.

in no position to resist Nādir Shah's grand army. Aware of the value of Zakariyā Khan as governor of the Panjab, the Persians had been in touch with him well in advance. The envoys that had come from Persia during the last two decades had been invariably well received by 'Abduṣ Ṣamad Khan and later by his son Zakariyā Khan, consecutively governors of Lahore. Nādir is even said to have sent a *raqam* to Zakariyā Khan in recognition of his excellent treatment of the Persian envoys.¹ Now when the Persian forces were nearing Lahore, 'Abdul Bāqī Khan, the Persian wazīr, sent a letter to Zakariyā Khan assuring him of Nādir Shah's affection (*shafaqat*) for him. The only reason for Nādir Shah's invasion of India, observed 'Abdul Bāqī Khan in his letter, was the Mughul Emperor's ill-treatment of the Persian envoys and his going back on his promise to close the Indian frontier on the Afghans. The right thing for Zakariyā Khan, counselled the wazīr, was to welcome the Shah's standards when these reached Lahore: this alone would ensure the Khan's welfare as well as the safety and honour of the people of Lahore. The wazīr enumerated all other alternatives for Zakariyā Khan: open war, standing a siege, and flight, and he pointed out the futility of each. If Zakariyā Khan came in person to offer his submission at the Persian camp, affirmed the wazīr, the Khan as well as the people of Lahore would be absolutely safe; but if he shut himself up in the fort, not one soul would be spared on the capture of the city.²

This letter, full of threats as it was, does not seem to have influenced Zakariyā Khan's proceedings. He put up a stubborn fight but was worsted by the far superior Persian army.³ Realizing the hopelessness of his position, Zakariyā Khan decided to make his submission, and went in person to the Persian camp (12 Shawwāl 1151/12 January 1739) and presented the conqueror gold worth twenty lac of rupees. Lahore was thus spared the threatened sack.⁴

Nādir Writes to Muḥammad Shah

During his twelve-day stay at Lahore, Nādir Shah learnt of the preparations that Muḥammad Shah and his ministers were making for a fight against

1. See 'Abdul Bāqī Khan's letter to Zakariyā Khan given in the *Taḏkīra* of Anand Rām Mukhlis, National Museum, Karachi, MS 443, ff. 6a-7a. Calendar No. Post-Ab.274.

2. Mukhlis, *Taḏkīra*, National Museum, Karachi, MS 443, ff. 6a-7a. For further details, see Calendar No. 274.

3. Cf. James Fraser, pp. 131, 132 and 137, who says that Zakariyā Khan, acting under the influence of Nizāmūl Mulk, put up only a nominal resistance. Fraser, p. 149, also mentions an exchange of emissaries between Zakariyā Khan and Nādir Shah prior to the Persian attack on Lahore.

Fraser's account, being throughout biased against Nizāmūl Mulk, needs to be discounted.

4. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, p. 318; Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, pp. 130-31; *Later Mughals*, II, Sarkar's chapters, pp. 332-32. I have followed Sarkar's dates. James Fraser, pp. 131-2, says that Zakariyā Khan, who had been earlier written to by Nizāmūl Mulk, put up a mere nominal resistance against the Persians and within a few days made his submission to Nādir. Also see James Fraser, tr. in *Nadir Shah*, ed. Ridāzāda Shafaq, p. 215.

the Persian invasion. Before leaving Lahore Nādir Shah sent a letter to the Emperor saying that as he himself and the Emperor were both of the same Turkmān race, there could be nothing but friendship between them. The Afghans had done more harm to India than to Iran. He had therefore sent ambassadors to Delhi to seek Indian cooperation against the Afghans and to request Delhi to close the frontier on the Afghans. The Emperor in his replies had repeatedly promised to do so. Nādir blamed the Mughul nobles for the failure of the Delhi government to honour that pledge and for the detention of the Persian envoys. But he blamed the Emperor himself for the war preparations. He concluded the letter with the observation that after the war was over, pardon for the Indian ministers would be granted only on the Emperor's recommendations.¹

This letter, or rather its summary, appears in Mirza Mahdī's *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*² Muḥammad Kāẓim in the '*Ālam Ārā-i Nādirī*' gives the text of another letter which according to him was written by Nādir to the Emperor after leaving Lahore. This letter also recounts the despatch of embassies to Delhi and the failure of the Delhi government to honour its pledge to prevent the Afghans from crossing into India. As the Emperor made no friendly response on Nādir's coming to Lahore, he had no choice but to march to Delhi. "This letter is being written," he concluded, "so that the Emperor may not later complain of lack of notice."³

Indo-Persian Negotiations

These two letters written consecutively at a short interval constituted a declaration of war on the Mughul empire.⁴ Nādir now advanced in the direction of Delhi. He met the Indian army under the command of Muḥammad Shah at Karnāl, and defeated it in the Battle of Karnāl on 15 Dhul-Q. 1151 (13/24 February 1738). Sa'adat Khan, who had fallen into Persian hands even before the main battle, advised Nādir Shah to summon Nizāmūl Mulk in order to arrange peace terms. Nizāmūl Mulk was well received by Nādir Shah. The Indian minister then discussed the matter with the Persian wazīr, 'Abdul Bāqī Khan, and was able to secure the latter's agreement to the Persian army withdrawing on promise of being paid fifty lac of rupees in instalments as follows: 20 lacs to be paid immediately, 10 lacs on the Persian army's arrival at Lahore, 10 lacs at Attock and the remaining 10 lacs at Kābul. The agreement was followed by Muḥammad Shah's visit to the Persian camp where he had a dinner with Nādir Shah. All reports agree that Nādir Shah

1. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, p. 319, also p. 327, first four lines. Calendar No. Post-Ab. 275.

2. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, p. 319.

3. *Nāmā-i 'Ālam Ārā-i Nādirī*, II, 193b-94a. Calendar No. Post-Ab. 276.

4. Could these two letters be two differently drawn up summaries of the same letter? Probably not. For a full discussion, see Calendar No. Post-Ab. 276.

showed on this occasion unreserved cordiality and graciousness to the defeated Emperor. He seated the Emperor besides himself on the throne and spoke to him with great consideration.¹ According to one well-informed source, Nādir Shah addressed him as *A'lā-ḥadrat* or "Your Majesty", and instructed all his ministers to address the Emperor likewise.² Muḥammad Shah was then allowed to go back to his camp. Just when things appeared to have been amicably arranged and the Indian soldiery was feeling relaxed and relieved, the situation took an unexpected turn. Sa'adat Khan, still in Persian custody, for reasons of purely personal jealousy against Nizāmul mulk, told Nādir Shah that he (Nādir) could obtain twenty crore of rupees if only he marched to Delhi; further the Khan advised Nādir Shah to imprison Nizāmul Mulk. When Nizāmul Mulk came to see Nādir Shah again, he was detained and was compelled to request Muḥammad Shah to visit the Persian camp again. When the Emperor did so, he too was detained. The situation had undergone a complete reversal. The Mughul Emperor and his senior most minister were now prisoners in Persian hands.³

Nādir at Delhi

Nādir Shah's visit to Delhi, the mob attacks on the Persians under the belief that Nādir was dead, the retaliatory general massacre in Delhi ordered by Nādir Shah, are well-known events and excellent modern accounts of these happenings are available.⁴ It is remarkable that on the 'Idul Aḍḥā (10 Dhul-H. 1151 = 10/21 March 1739) that occurred three days after his entry into Delhi, *khutba* was read in the name of Nādir Shah. Coins were also struck in his name in the Delhi mint.⁵ The Mughul monarchy was now virtually in a state of interregnum. After "having taken his toll of human lives," and "his tribute

1. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, p. 327. Also see Muḥammad Bakhsh Āshob, *Tārikh-i Shahādat* etc., B.M. Or. 1832, ff. 286b-89b. Calendar No. Post-Ab. 278.

2. Muḥammad 'Alī Khan Anṣārī, *Tārikh-i Muẓaffarī*, National Museum, Karachi, MS 428, f. 151b, B.M.Or. 466, f. 208a. The author's grandfather Shamsud Daula Luṭfullah Khan, was appointed commander (nāzim) of Delhi at Nādir Shah's order prior to the latter's visit to Delhi.

3. For details, see *Later Mughals*, II, chapter xii by Sarkar, pp. 352-60; Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, pp. 140-43. Unfortunately no record of the correspondence that must have passed between the various participants in the events at this stage, has so far come to light.

4. *Later Mughals*, chapter xiii by Sarkar, pp. 361-70; Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, pp. 144-50.

5. Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, p. 145; *Later Mughals*, II, chapter xiii by Sarkar, p. 373.

Also see Yusuf Husain, *The First Nizām*, New York, 1963, pp. 197-98, which cites letters of Dupleix, then governor of Chandernagore, and of the Supreme Council at Pondichery, mentioning receipt of coins struck in Nādir Shah's name. These letters also reflect the grave concern, caused by Nādir Shah's assumption of sovereignty over the Mughul empire, at such far-away places as Bengal and South India.

Rustam 'Alī, *Tārikh-i Hindī*, B. M. Or. f. 287b, states that on the first Friday after Nādir Shah's entry into Delhi, *khutba* was read in his name, and on the second Friday on his orders, in Muḥammad Shah's name. The second part of the statement is not acceptable.

of money and jewels,"¹ and demanded and obtained the hand of a princess of the imperial Mughul family for his second son Naṣrullah,² Nādir Shah prepared to leave for Iran. He now relinquished the sovereignty of Delhi which he had, though without any formality, assumed, and placed with his own hand the crown of the Mughul empire on the head of Muḥammad Shah.³

In gratitude for the restoration of his sovereignty, Muḥammad Shah, says Mirza Mahdī, offered Nādir Shah "the territories of the empire situated to the west of the Attock and the Indus, from the frontier of Tibet and Kashmir to the point where the Indus flows into the sea, together with the province of Thatta and the ports and fortresses belonging to it" (that is to Thatta).⁴ Nādir Shah accepted the offer, adds Mirza Mahdī, because the countries to the west of the river Attock, such as Ghaznī and Kābul, had always been regarded as forming part of the province of Khurāsān.⁵ Following this an agreement known as the Treaty of Shālīmār, was drawn up giving details of the new boundaries. (See below.) It was only after this cession of territory that sikka and khuṭba were restored in Muḥammad Shah's name.⁶ Before his departure from Delhi, Nādir Shah exhorted the Mughul nobles to be loyal to Muḥammad Shah and obey his orders.⁷ Nādir also issued farmāns to Niẓāmul Mulk's son Nāsir Jang, to Niẓāmul Mulk's uncle Nāṣirud Daula, (governor of Burhānpūr under Niẓāmul Mulk), to the Raja of Sitāra and to the Peshwā of the Marathas, to obey Muḥammad Shah.⁸ Nādir Shah left Delhi on 7 Ṣafar 1152 (5/16 May 1739) on way to Nādirābād (Qandahār).

*Treaty of Shālīmār*⁹

It may be taken for granted that the Mughul government did not voluntarily make the cession of territory. Notwithstanding the manner of its

1. Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, p. 150. For details of precious metals, jewels, other valuables and stores, removed by Nādir Shah from India to Iran, see *Later Mughals*, chapter xiii by Sarkar, pp. 370-74. In addition to the wealth taken from Delhi, Nādir obtained huge amounts from the ministers and the governors of provinces under the name of "presents" (*ba rasm-i peshkash*). Even the province of Sa'adat Khan who had died during Nādir's stay in Delhi, was not spared. Collectors (*muḥaṣṣils*) were sent to Lucknow and these collected therefrom a crore of rupees, many elephants and a large number of valuables.

James Fraser (p. 220) puts the total loss to the Mughul empire at "near one *Arrib* of *Rupees*" [i.e., one hundred crore], and total number of Indians who lost their lives in the course of Nādir's invasion of the Mughul empire at 2,00,000.

2. Naṣrullah was married to a great-granddaughter of Aurangzeb on 27 Dhul-Ḥ. 1151-27 March/6 April 1739.

3. *Jahāngushā-i Nādiri*, p. 334. Also see below.

4. *Jahāngushā-i Nādiri*, p. 334.

5. *Ibid.* 'Abdullah Anwār's text of *Jahāngushā* has *sharqī wa gharbi-i Āb-i Attak* (east and west of the Attock) which seems to be wrong.

6. *Jahāngushā-i Nādiri*, pp. 334-35; Quddūsī, *Nādir Nāma*, pp. 160-2.

7. James Fraser, *History of Nadir Shah*., p. 208.

8. *Later Mughals*, II, chapter xiii by Sarkar, p. 375. *Jahāngushā-i Nādiri*, p. 335. For Nāsir Jang, see *M.U.*, tr. II, p. 398. For Nāṣirud Daula, *ibid.*, p. 386.

9. Calendar No. Post-Ab. 279. Copies of the text of the treaty: Mukhlis, *Badā'i-i Waqa'i*, National Museum, Karachi, ff. 219a-21a; Mukhlis, *Tadhkira*, National Museum,

inception, the treaty of Shālīmār was virtually forced on Muḥammad Shah. Ānand Rām Mukhlīṣ leaves us in doubt on this count. Commenting upon the agreement, he observes, "The situation demanded that whatever the Persians said, should be forthwith accepted."¹ The draft of the treaty was indeed prepared by Mirza Mahdī, the Persian *Munshiul Mamālīk*, himself.² Subsequently certain other areas were also ceded to Iran. The main points of the territorial cessions, *taken as a whole*, are as follows:

First, all territories west of Indus were ceded permanently to Iran.

Second, for the province of Sind, the Nāla-i Sankra (identified by H.T. Lambrick as the Lower Hakra), and *not* the Indus, was made the line of partition between the Persian and the Mughul possessions. This arrangements ensured a much larger part of the province falling on the Persian side.³

Thirdly, certain *maḥāls* (see below for details) situated east of the Indus but administratively attached to the province of Kābul for the purpose of providing revenue for Kābul, and certain parganas in Sind, lying east of the new Indo-Persian frontier but traditionally considered part of the Thatta province, were also handed over to the Persians for a period of three years for financial purposes, though their administration remained in Mughul hands.⁴

Fourthly, it appears that in 1153/1740, the *maḥāls* and parganas mentioned in the foregoing sentence were permanently ceded to Iran. The *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī* recounts that when Nādir Shah was passing through Kābul on his way out from India, Nāṣir Khan, the governor of Kābul, pleaded with Nādir Shah for the permanent annexation of these *maḥāls* and parganas, but the Shah rejected the plea. The matter, however, reached the ears of Muḥammad Shah who, out of gratitude for Nādir Shah, issued orders to the governors of Lahore, Multān and Thatta, effecting the permanent transfer of the *maḥāls* and parganas to Iran. The deed of cession governing these areas, adds Mirza Mahdī, was sent by Muḥammad Shah through his envoy who met Nādir Shah at Mashhad in Shawwāl 1153/December 1740.⁵ That Mirza Mahdī's account is not without substance is borne out by a *farmān* of Muḥammad Shah to Zakariyā Khan to the effect that the *maḥāls* in question should in future be considered, like the trans-Indus (ceded) territories, a *qamima* (an adjunct) of the Persian empire. The *farmān* is dated Jamādā II 23rd r.y. of Muḥammad

Karachi, ff. 22b-23b; Ashob, *Tārīkh-i Shahādāt* etc., Ethé 422, ff. 312b-13b; and several other sources, all cited in the Calendar. James Fraser, pp. 223-6, gives an English translation of the Treaty. The terms of the treaty are also briefly mentioned in *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, p. 334; Hazin, *Tārīkh-i Ahwāl*, p. 283. Also see Calendar No. Post-Ab. 281.

1. Mukhlīṣ, *Badā'i-i Waqā'i*, National Museum, Karachi, ff. 218b-19a.

2. Ashob, *Tārīkh-i Shahādāt* etc., Ethé 422, f. 312.

3. Lambrick, *Sind*, Hyderabad, 1964, p. 190.

4. Mukhlīṣ, *Tadhkira*, ff. 25b-26a = *Badā'i-i Waqā'i*, ff. 225a-b.

5. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, p. 361.

Shah (=1153/1740), and has been recorded by Ānand Rām Mukhlīṣ.¹

Fifthly, the Treaty of Shālīmār included an injunction to the Mughul officials to accept the agreement implicitly and not to enter or in any manner interfere with the administration of, the ceded trans-Indus provinces. For the cis-Indus maḥāls and parganas ceded to Iran subsequently, the orders of the Emperor were that "under no pretext should the Mughul officials interfere in these areas which are to be left entirely to the care of the Persian officials."² The Mughul officials were, however, directed to give all assistance to the Persians in collecting taxes in these areas.³ This last provision suggests that the Mughul officials still had some kind of administrative role in these areas.

Ānand Rām Mukhlīṣ⁴ lists the areas subsequently ceded to Iran as follows: "Gujarāt, Siyālkot, Parasarūr [now called Pasrūr], and Auragābād,⁵ the revenue of these maḥāls having been (always) ear-marked for the expenses of [the provinces of] Kābul and Peshāwar; [and?] the jāgīrs of Nāṣir Khan, governor of Kābul, yielding four crore dams,⁶ and certain cis-Attock maḥāls belonging to the zamīndārī of Khudayār Khan 'Abbāsī and of Ghāzī Khan Dodhai,⁷ zamīndār of Multān." (Elsewhere, Mukhlīṣ, mentioning the cis-Indus areas in Sind ceded to Iran, says these areas had always been [financially?] attached to the province of Thatta.)⁸ All these areas, adds Mukhlīṣ, were assigned by Nādir Shah to Zakariyā Khan on Rs. twenty lac per year. The Khan, observes Mukhlīṣ, was reluctant to accept the assignment; and it was only in deference to the wishes of his well-wishers that he accepted it. One of the consideration that weighed with Zakariyā Khan was that if he had refused the assignment, Nādir Shah would have appointed a Persian noble with a strong contingent for the purpose of collecting revenues of the above-mentioned areas—an arrangement that would have resulted in serious distress

1. Mukhlīṣ, *Tadhkira*, ff. 32b-33a. Calendar No. Post-Ab. 285.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*

4. Mukhlīṣ, *Tadhkira*, ff. 25b-26a = *Badā'i-i Waqā'i*, f. 225a-b.

5. It is interesting to recall that ten years later (in 1162/1749) Emperor Aḥmad Shah ceded precisely these four districts to the victorious Aḥmad Shah Abdālī. See Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, I, Calcutta, 1964, p. 263. Gujarāt and Siyālkot are well-known. Pasrūr, "originally called Parasarur," is a tehsil and a town of the same name in the Siyālkot district of the Panjab. *I.G.I.*, xx, p. 23.

6. In a sentence which is not quite clear (the text may be corrupt), a place called Do-ungli (?) is mentioned as Nāṣir Khan's jāgīr.

7. Dodhai or Doda'i, a Baluch tribe of mixed Indian origin. For details, see H.A. Rose, *Tribes and Castes of the Panjab*, Lahore, 1914, II, p. 43; M. L. Dames, *The Baluch Race*, pp. 37, 39. The Ghāzī Khan Dodhai of our text may have been a descendant of Sohrāb Khan Doda'i (of 15th-16th century?) whose sons Ismā'il Khan and Faṭḥ Khan gave names respectively to Dera Ismā'il Khan and Dera Faṭḥ Khan. For Sohrāb Khan Doda'i and his sons, see *Tab. Ak.*, III, pp. 528-29, and *I.G.I.*, xi, pp. 261-62.

8. *Tadhkira*, f. 32b = *Badā'i-i Waqā'i*, 239b.

to the people of the areas.¹

The Mission of the Pānṣad-bāshīs

As the Persian army moved out from Delhi on its way out of the Mughul empire, many of the Persian soldiers deserted. Attracted by the climate of India, says the contemporary Ānand Rām Mukhlīṣ, these Qizilbāsh changed their appearance and attire to avoid detection, and sought refuge in sub-montane villages and far-off places.² The number of such deserters was evidently considerable, for Nādir Shah deputed two officers of the rank of 500 (*pānṣad-bāshī*), namely Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Beg and Muḥammad Karīm Beg Afshār, to search out and apprehend the deserters. Nādir Shah also sent farmāns (dated 12 Muḥarram 1153/29 March 1740) to Zakariyā Khan, and to the Mughul wazīr Qamaruddīn Khan, to help the *pānṣad-bāshīs* in the task.³

Zakariyā Khan sent instructions to all his subordinates including those at Multān to carry out the Shah's instructions. As a result of the search in the northern provinces, many Persian deserters were rounded up and sent back to Iran in chains.⁴ A large number of the Persian deserters, it appears, still remained in India. For six to seven thousand of them are said to have joined the army of Ṣafdar Jang, nephew of the late Sa'adat Khan and his successor in the governorship of Awadh.⁵

Commenting upon this mission, Ānand Rām Mukhlīṣ remarks that the real purpose of Nādir Shah in sending the two *pānṣad-bāshīs* to Delhi was to demand a sum of Rs. 25 lacs from Muḥammad Shah. There was no help for it: the impoverished Emperor had to borrow the sum from Hindu bankers and others. Along with the sum of money, Muḥammad Shah sent a full report of the straitened circumstances of the Indian empire, expressing the hope that Nādir Shah would spare India any further monetary demands.⁶ The *pānṣad-bāshīs* left the Mughul court in Shawwāl 1153/December 1740.⁷

Subsequent Correspondence and Diplomatic exchanges between Muḥammad Shah and Nādir Shah

Muḥammad Shah was in frequent correspondence with Nādir Shah. Several minor embassies were exchanged between them, but no major embassy

1. Mukhlīṣ, *Tadhkira*, ff. 25b-26a.

2. Mukhlīṣ, *Tadhkira*, National Museum, Karachi, 443, f. 31a; *Badā'i-i Waqā'i*, National Museum, f. 236a-b.

3. Mukhlīṣ, *Tadhkira*, ff. 30b-31a, = *Badā'i-i Waqā'i*, ff. 235a-36a. Calendar No. Post-Ab. 284.

James Fraser, pp. 210-11, puts the number of Persian deserters at 400, and reports that 60 of these who were apprehended were beheaded at Nādir's orders.

4. Mukhlīṣ, *Tadhkira*, f. 31a = *Badā'i-i Waqā'i*, f. 236a-b.

5. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, I, Calcutta, 1964, p. 15.

6. Mukhlīṣ, *Tadhkira*, ff. 31b-32a and 33a = *Badā'i-i Waqā'i*, ff. 237a-38a and 240b-41a.

7. Mukhlīṣ, *Tadhkira*, 34b-35b.

was sent by either side. Nādir's second son Naṣrullah Khan who had been married into the Mughul royal family, and Naṣrulla's son from this marriage, Timūr Khan, also wrote to Muḥammad Shah.¹ The ministers of Muḥammad Shah also sent letters and presents to Nādir Shah. Among these, none was so active in maintaining contacts with the Persian court as Zakariyā Khan.²

Not all the letters that were sent or received in the course of these diplomatic exchanges and ministerial correspondence are now extant. In the following narrative, we have attempted to bring together the scattered material on the subject from various sources.

When Nādir Shah was campaigning in Sind, Muḥammad Shah sent him an embassy led by Sayyid Muḥammad Khan with a letter and costly gifts.³ We have not come across any mention of the contents of this letter. Muḥammad Shah's fear lest Nādir's invasion of Sind should be the prelude to a fresh invasion of the country,⁴ seems to provide the clue to the motive behind this embassy. Nādir Shah dismissed the embassy with only a few horses and a consignment of freshly arrived Balkh melons, and a letter for the Emperor, from Larkānā on 9 Muḥarram 1153/26 March 1740.⁵ Another consignment of fruit for the Emperor was sent by Nādir Shah from Khurāsān. The consignment bearers were dismissed by Muḥammad Shah on 15 Shawwāl, 23rd r.y. (23 December 1740).⁶ As a mark of royal favour, Muḥammad Shah sent some of the fruit to Zakariyā Khan. A copy of the royal farmān sent to the Khan on this occasion is given in Ānand Rām Mukhlis's *Tadhkira*.⁷

When Nādir Shah returned from his successful Khwārizm campaign to Mashhad in Shawwāl 1153/December 1740, he found waiting there for him Ṣāfdar Muḥammad Khan, envoy of the Mughul Emperor, with a letter and many presents including a number of elephants, and emissaries bearing presents from the Mughul prime minister, Qamaruddīn Khan, the governor of Lahore and Multān and other Mughal nobles. Most importantly, the royal emissary had brought a deed of cession (*nawishta-i tafwīd*) to Iran of certain parganas east of the river Attock and also certain eastern parganas of Sind.⁸ The Mughul emissaries were all dismissed by Nādir Shah

1. See below.

2. See below.

3. 'Abdul Karīm, *Bayān-i Wāqī'*, Panjab University MS, 31b.

4. Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, p. 161 n. 6.

5. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, p. 345. This work does not mention the name of the Mughul envoy, but it may be presumed the *Jahāngushā* and the *Bayān-i Wāqī'* are alluding to the same mission. Also see Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, p. 161, who has rightly pointed out the paltriness of the Persian presents.

6. Mukhlis, *Tadhkira*, f. 34b = *Badā'i-i Wāqā'i'*, ff. 242b-43a.

7. Mukhlis, *Tadhkira*, f. 35a = *Badā'i-i Wāqā'i'*, ff. 243a-44a.

8. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, pp. 360-61. *Bayān-i Wāqī'*, Panjab University MS, f. 52a-b. The latter source mentions the name of the envoy. For the deed of cession, see above. Also see Calendar No. Post-Ab. 285.

before he left Mashhad for Dāghistān.¹

Before leaving Mashhad, Nādir Shah also sent his own envoy named Muẓaffar 'Alī Khan Bayāt Nīshāpūrī with gifts from the spoils of Turkistān and with 300 Qalmāq slave-girls, to Muḥammad Shah. The mission was intended to announce Nādir Shah's victory in Turkistān. On receiving the embassy, Muḥammad Shah ordered beating of drums for seven days and nights to celebrate Nādir's victory. The news of the victory was also relayed to various parts of the Empire through imperial *raqams*. After a stay of six months at Delhi, Muẓaffar 'Alī was dismissed with many presents. A Mughul envoy also accompanied him on a return embassy. Both the envoys waited on Nādir Shah when he was returning from the Dāghistān expedition.² The Mughul ambassador had an audience with him at Mariwān in Kurdistān in Rabi' I 1156/April 1743. Among the gifts he presented to the Shah was *yak bāb qizil uṭāq-i chūb-i sandal* (one piece of red-coloured chamber made of sandal wood) which, says Mirza Mahdī, was known in India as "*bangla*."³

The *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī* seems to contain no mention of any further diplomatic missions between Muḥammad Shah and Nādir Shah. One of the editions of Mirza Mahdī's letters, however, does contain a letter from Nādir Shah to the Emperor in which there is mention of a Mughul embassy led by Ḥasan 'Alī Khan. Nādir Shah's letter is in a friendly vein but contains no substantial matter. The context of the letter suggests it was sent about the years 1743-44.⁴ The chronicles we have examined do not seem to contain any reference to such an embassy.

The *Bayān-i Wāqī* of Khwāja 'Abdul Karīm Kashmīrī also contains the account of an embassy from Nādir Shah to Muḥammad Shah, led by Maḥmūd 'Alī Beg and Maḥmūd Karīm Beg. The matter appears in the India Office MS (Ethé 566) on ff. 98b-99a, but is missing from the Panjab University manuscript of the work which is an incomplete copy of the work.⁵ We reproduce below in full the translation of the account in Elliot and Dowson:⁶

"Embassy from Nādir Shah to the Emperor
Maḥmūd 'Alī Beg and Maḥmūd Karīm Beg,⁷ who had been sent by Nādir

1. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, pp. 361-62.

2. Muḥammad Kāzim, *Ālam Ārā-i Nādirī*, III, Moscow, 1966, ff. 47b-48a.

3. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, p. 383. The English word bungalow, it may be pointed out, is derived from the word *bangla*.

4. Letters of Mirza Mahdī Khan and others, Allah Qulī Khan's Press, A.H. 1275 (pp. 7-8 ?). The book is unpaginated.

5. See 'A Note on the Sources', below.

6. Elliot and Dowson, *History of India as told by its own Historians*, London, 1867, vol. viii, p. 132.

7. These names bear a certain amount of resemblance to those of the *pānshad-bāshīs*, namely Muḥammad Šālih Beg and Muḥammad Karīm Beg Afshār (see above) whose mission too had collection of money as one of its objects. Could the two accounts (in Mukhlis and in the *Bayān-i Wāqī*) refer to the same mission? Probably not.

Shah, arrived at the court, and had the honour of kissing the threshold of royalty. They brought with them one hundred elephants, and sword with golden handles, according to the custom of Hindustan, and gilt spears and other golden weapons which were foreign to Persia and not generally used there, as well as a letter full of expressions of friendship, and presented them before the enlightening eye of majesty. They were honoured by gifts of several precious robes of honour. After a few days, they said that Nadir Shah had sent a verbal message to the effect, that in consequence of his wars in Turan and Daghistān and Rum, and the large army he kept up, and his having remitted three years' revenue to all the population of Iraq, his treasury was empty, and if he (Muhammad Shah) would send fifty to sixty lacs as a help to him, it would be an act of great friendship and brotherhood, and he had sent the elephants and the golden articles for the purpose of getting money. As there was no mention whatsoever made in the letter about the money, Muhammad Shah cleared the account by his answer, which was this: 'When my brother the King of Kings was departing, he said to me, 'Everything that comes written in a letter is right and proper, but verbal messages are never to be depended on.' However, on account of the weakness of my kingdom, and the bad behaviour and evil doings of my rulers and rebellious zamindars, I get no revenues at all from my provinces, and my expenditure exceeds my income. This subject is not mentioned in your letter, and therefore a verbal answer is suited to a verbal message. The China vessels, sandal-wood, etc., which were written for in the letter, he sent with great care. Although he weighed out the money of his answer with words of circumspection, nevertheless, till the news of Nādir's death arrived, nobles, wazirs, the Emperor himself, and even beggars, were in an anxious state of mind.'

It appears from the context of this account that the embassy mentioned in the text was sent to India not long before the close of Nādir Shah's reign. We have not come across any copy of the royal letter brought by this embassy to Muhammad Shah. However, the *Nādir Nāma* of Muhammad Husain Quddūsī contains a letter from Nādir Shah to Muhammad Shah, sent with the Persian envoy named Muhammad Muhsin, stating that, among other things, one hundred elephants were being sent as a present for the Emperor.¹ The subject of this curious gift has been discussed at length in our *Calendar* (No. Post-Ab. 288.5). As remarked there, the appearance of the story in this letter as well as in the *Bayān-i Wāqī* "suggests there may have been some truth in the matter."²

Naṣrullah Mirza, (the second son of Nādir Shah) who was married into the imperial Mughul family of India, was also in correspondence with Muhammad Shah. It is evident from the only extant letter of this correspondence that Naṣrullah used to send as well as receive letters from the Emperor whom he addressed as Abuwī-Makān ("having the status of my father"). This letter also acknowledges the gifts sent earlier by Muhammad Shah.³ A letter was also

1. Muhammad Husain Quddūsī, *Nādir Nāma*, Khurāsān, 1339, A.H.S., pp. 566-67.

2. Riazul Islam, *Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations*, see comment under *Calendar* No. Post-Ab. 288.5.

3. The text of this letter in the *Munsha'āt* of Mirza Mahdī Khan (MS in the Faculty of

sent to Muḥammad Shah in the name of the infant Tīmūr Khan (born 1743), son of Naṣrullah Mirza from the Mughul princess. This interesting letter which was written probably when Tīmūr was only a few weeks old was meant to announce his emergence "from nothingness into the cradle of existence," and "to convey his respect and homage by the tongue of inarticulateness."¹

Nādir Shah's exercise of Sovereign Power on Mughul territory

On entering Peshawar, Nādir Shah (says James Fraser) "put on the Indian Dress and sat on the Throne in the Manner of the Indian Emperors."² After the capture of Lahore, Nādir Shah "behaved as though he were already master of India," as Lockhart has observed.³ Nādir confirmed Zakariyā Khan as governor of Lahore, appointed Fakhrud Daula, as governor of Kashmīr from which office he had been earlier dismissed by the Mughul authorities, and reinstated Naṣir Khan as governor of Kābul and Peshāwar.⁴ After the Battle of Karnāl, "the reins of authority over the entire Indian dominion passed into Nādir's hands," as remarked by Mirza Mahdī Khan.⁵ Muḥammad Shah, according to the same author, divested himself of sovereignty and abdicated his crown before going to Nādir Shah's camp at Karnāl for his first visit.⁶ From the moment of Muḥammad Shah's imprisonment on his second visit to the Persian camp, Nādir Shah assumed, without any formality or proclamation, full sovereign power over the Mughul empire; the Mughul monarchy was in consequence in a state of interregnum. He struck sikka and had the *khutba* recited in his name, issued administrative orders, made appointments, conferred honours and bestowed titles on Mughul nobles, increased the *manṣab* or rank of officers, and—above all—assigned Mughul territory to the administrative charge of his own nominees.⁷

The first act of exercise of supreme administrative authority on the part of Nādir Shah, after the Battle of Karnāl, was his *farmān* appointing Shamsud Daula Luṭfullah Khan Ṣādiq as *nāẓim* or governor of the Mughul capital, Shāhjahānābād. The *farmān* was issued from Karnāl (dated 17 *Dhul-Q.* 1151/15 February 1738) on the eve of Nādir Shah and Muḥammad Shah's

Letters, Tihran University, Dānishpizhūh List, pp. 469-70, ff (pp. 85-86) is incomplete at the end. It also makes a reference to Nādir Shah's recovery from illness. See Calendar No. Post-Ab. 288.4, for further details.

1. *Munsha'āt* of Mirza Mahdī Khan, MS in the Faculty of Letters, Tihran University, Dānishpizhūh List., pp. 469-70.

2. James Fraser, *The History of Nadir Shah*, London, 1742, p. 146.

3. Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, p. 131.

4. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, p. 318; Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, p. 318.

5. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, p. 327, lines 13-14.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 327, lines 5-6.

7. For details, see below.

marching together to Delhi. The farmān *inter alia* directed Luṭfullah Khan to hand over the keys of the fort of Delhi and of all the *kārkhānas*, (*sc.* stores and factories), to the Persian commander, Ṭahmāsp Khan Jalāyir.¹ It was a direct order and made no mention of Muḥammad Shah. With a view, evidently, to forestall any legal or administrative difficulty, Muḥammad Shah sent a covering farmān directing Luṭfullah Khan to comply with Nādir Shah's orders.² It is remarkable that when Ṭahmāsp Khan and the Mughul grandee Sa'ādat Khan Burhānūl Mulk, escorted by Luṭfullah Khan, arrived outside the fort of Delhi, the commander of the fort did not *at once* admit them into the fort. It was only when the above-mentioned farmān of Muḥammad Shah was shown to him that he opened the gate of the fort and welcomed the Persian commander.³

Nādir Shah continued to exercise the sovereign prerogative of issuing imperial farmāns even after he had formally reinstated Muḥammad Shah in his royal office and indeed even after he (Nādir) had left Delhi. While passing through the Panjab on his way back to Iran, Nādir issued three farmāns to Zakariyā Khan. The first farmān increased the Khan's manṣab (from 7000 to 8000). The concluding sentence of the farmān was to this effect: "The high officials of the Mughul empire, after submitting the matter to His Majesty Muḥammad Shah, should observe and enforce this order without fail."⁴ The Emperor subsequently not only increased Zakariyā Khan's manṣab to 8000 through a farmān but also made a proportionate increase in the Khan's jāgīr.⁵ By the second farmān, Nādir Shah assigned to Zakariyā Khan such territories of *Khudāyār Khan* (Miyān Nūr Muḥammad, the chief of Sind in vassalage to the Mughul Emperor) as lay on the east of the Indus. It is particularly noteworthy that the areas thus assigned were still part of the Mughul territories. This second farmān too contained a rider to the effect that it was to be shown to the Mughul Emperor before its enforcement.⁶ The third farmān directed Zakariyā Khan to keep himself in readiness to march to Multān in order to prevent *Khudāyār Khan's* men from crossing over the Indus into Mughul territory.⁷ This farmān contained no rider about its being submitted to the

1. Muḥammad 'Alī Khan Anṣārī, *Tārīkh-i Muẓaffarī*, National Museum, Karachi, MS 428, f. 152a-b; B. M. Or. 466, ff. 208b-9a. The author of the work was a grandson of Luṭfullah Khan Ṣādiq.

For the Mughul *kārkhānas*, "stores and factories," see Ibn Ḥasan, *The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire*, O.U.P., pp. 235-51. Also see I. H. Qureshi, *The Administration of the Mughal Empire*, Karachi, 1966, pp. 59-62.

2. *Tārīkh-i Muẓaffarī*, National Museum, Karachi, MS 428, f. 152b; B.M. Or. 466, f. 209a.

3. *Tārīkh-i Muẓaffarī*, National Museum, MS 428, f. 153a; B.M. Or. 466, f. 209b.

4. Mukhlis, *Tadhkira*, f. 26a-b = *Badā'i-i Waqā'i*, f. 226a-b. Calendar No. Post-Ab. 280.

5. Mukhlis, *Tadhkira*, f. 33a = *Badā'i-i Waqā'i*, f. 240a-b. Calendar No. Post-Ab. 285.

6. Mukhlis, *Tadhkira*, f. 26b = *Badā'i-i Waqā'i*, ff. 226b-27b. Calendar No. Post-Ab. 281.

7. Mukhlis, *Tadhkira*, f. 27a-b = *Badā'i-i Waqā'i*, f. 228b-29a; Maulvi Zafar Hasan's

Mughul Emperor prior to its execution. But the judicious Zakariyā Khan sent Nādir's farmān in the original to the Emperor's court along with a covering letter to the Mughul wazīr, Qamaruddīn Khan, requesting the latter to place the matter before the Emperor. Muḥammad Shah thereupon issued a farmān to Zakariyā Khan directing him to comply with Nādir Shah's farmān, seek the Shah's pleasure and be in his service till he gave the Khan permission to leave.¹ Zakariyā Khan thus secured the prior permission of his royal master before complying with Nādir Shah's order. This, as Maulvī Zafar Hasan has observed, "is indicative of a regular procedure which was apparently observed with strictness by the Mughal government even in those days of misrule and anarchy."² Besides these three farmāns, Nādir Shah also issued farmāns on the question of the Persian deserters in India to Zakariyā Khan, to Qamaruddīn Khan, the Mughul wazīr-i mamālik, and to Šafdar Jang, the governor of Awadh (see above).

In issuing farmāns to the Mughul officials including the wazīr, in conferring honours and titles on servants of the Mughul crown³ and in exercising supreme administrative power on Mughul territory in other ways, Nādir Shah was evidently wielding the authority that the act of conquest had undoubtedly invested him with. In the course of the campaign against Khudāyār Khan, Nādir Shah went up to 'Umarkot' which was about ninety miles within the Mughul frontier.

Nādir Shah-Muḥammad Shah Relationship

Nādir Shah's farmāns to Zakariyā Khan, his orders to his own commanders in Kabul, and the entries in the official history, *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, all contain very friendly references to Muḥammad Shah.⁴ It is repeatedly asserted therein that both Nādir Shah and Muḥammad Shah belonged to the same Turkmān race,⁵ that there was the closest personal friendship between the two monarchs and that the two kingdoms were so closely allied to each other that they were almost one body: the last point was put forward, by Nādir Shah as well as Muḥammad Shah, to justify the

article in *Proc. of the Indian Historical Records Commission*, IV, 1922, pp. 25-29. Calendar No. Post-Ab. 282.

1. Mukhlis, *Tadhkira*, ff. 27b-28b = *Badā'i-i Waqā'i*, f. 229a. Calendar No. Post-Ab. 283.

2. See Zafar Hasan's article cited above.

3. For Nādir Shah's conferment of title on Zakariyā Khan's son, see below.

4. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, p. 342. Also see Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, p. 160.

5. *Badā'i-i Waqā'i*, National Museum, Karachi, MS, ff. 220a, 226b-27a, 230a; for Nādir's orders to Tahmāsp Khan Jalāyir, see below. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, pp. 327, 328, 334-35.

6. The theme of racial community between Nādir Shah and Muḥammad Shah recurs frequently in Nādir's correspondence with India. For Nādir's Turkish descent, see Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, p. 17. Also see Calendar No. Post-Ab. 278.

former's issuing orders to Mughul officials.¹ But Nādir Shah's protestations of friendship for Muḥammad Shah were not altogether false. The maintenance of the status quo in India was obviously in Nādir Shah's interest. It suited him to have the docile Muḥammad Shah on the throne of Delhi. At the same time, a further decline in the authority of the Mughul Emperor or a rapid disintegration of the Mughul empire could react unfavourably on the security and integrity of the Persian territories in India. Nādir Shah therefore lent what support he could to the Mughul empire. He gave some useful advice to Muḥammad Shah on how to keep his empire intact and his authority strong. Before leaving Delhi, Nādir sent letters to the Mughul grandees and the Maratha chiefs enjoining upon them the need to serve the Emperor loyally.² When giving Zakariyā Khan and his son Ḥayātullah Khan leave to depart from Lārkāna, he urged both the father and the son to serve the Emperor devotedly.³ When he appointed Ṭahmāsp Khan Jalāyir as Viceroy of his Indian territories, he sent the Khan the following instructions: "If the Emperor were to ask the Sardār (Ṭahmāsp Khan) for any service, the latter should carry out the Emperor's wishes without the least delay."⁴ That this was no mere platitude is shown by the fact that when the authorities of the Kābul province arrested a rebel frontier chief, a farmān from Muḥammad Shah⁵ sufficed to secure his release. The Kābul authorities not only set him at liberty but dismissed him with honour and restored him to his chieftainship on the specific ground that they had orders from Nādir Shah to respect Muḥammad Shah's wishes.⁶

One of the objects of Nādir Shah in his diplomatic intercourse with Delhi was to keep up pressure on the Mughul government to pay him large sums of money from time to time. The huge spoils he had taken away from India had only whetted his appetite for more, and he seems to have taken the view that by a combination of threats and cajolery he could obtain more money from India. The mission of the *pānşad-bāshīs* had this purpose in view, as seen earlier. The embassy of Maḥmūd 'Alī Beg and Maḥmūd Karīm Beg (if different from the *pānşad-bāshīs*' mission) had the same object.⁷ Nādir Shah,

1. See Nādir Shah's farmān, *Badā'i-i Waqā'i*, f. 226a; Calendar No. Post-Ab. 280; Muḥammad Shah's farmān, *Badā'i-i Waqā'i*, f. 229; Calendar No. Post-Ab. 283. The following is a relevant extract from Muḥammad Shah's farmān: "As the union and accord of the two empires has reached a point where not even the slightest shade of otherness remains between them, Zakariyā Khan should consider it obligatory on himself to carry out the Shah's orders and to seek his pleasure like the Emperor's."

2. See above.

3. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, p. 344.

4. Muḥammad Kāzīm, *Ālam Ārā-i Nādirī*, III, f. 108a. Calendar No. Post-Ab. 285.2.

5. Calendar No. Post-Ab. 288.1. *Ālam Ārā-i Nādirī*, III, f. 125a-b.

6. *Ālam Ārā-i Nādirī*, III, ff. 121a-25b.

7. See above.

we are told by the well-informed Ānand Rām Mukhlīṣ, was not satisfied with the performance of the *pānṣad-bāshīs*. He was interested to know how much money was still hidden in the coffers of the Delhi government and the vaults of the nobles and the rich. Therefore when Zakariyā Khan sent Ḥājī Mudīr on some mission to Nādir Shah, the latter sent back the Ḥājī with instructions to go to Delhi, enquire into the wealth of the Emperor and the nobles and submit a report to the Shah. By the end of 1156/January 1744, the Ḥājī had gone once again to Iran, though we do not know what report he gave to Nādir Shah on his survey of wealth in Delhi.¹

Nādir Shah's intention, as reported by Muḥammad Kāzīm, to annex Lahore to his empire does not appear to have been seriously meant.²

The Mughul government on its part was all the time anxious to keep Nādir Shah humoured. This is fully borne out by the accounts of the frequent missions sent by Muḥammad Shah—and occasionally also by his ministers—to the Persian court. Understandably the Mughuls remained afraid of Nādir Shah. Thus the arrival of the two *pānṣad-bāshīs* of Nādir Shah at Delhi—ostensibly to apprehend the Persian deserters in India, but really to demand a large sum of money from Muḥammad Shah—caused, as Ānand Rām Mukhlīṣ has recorded, "a great consternation at Delhi where people feared the holocaust might start all over again."³ Similarly, "Muḥammad Shah is said to have become alarmed" observes Lockhart, "on receiving news of Nādir's campaign in Sind and of his summons to Zakariyā Khan fearing lest a second invasion of India might be impending."⁴ With fear went hatred. Muḥammad Shah, his ministers, and the people of Delhi had every reason to detest Nādir Shah. When an opportunity offered itself, Muḥammad Shah reactivated the long-suspended Mughul-Ottoman relations, with a view to forming an anti-Nādir Shah alliance.⁵

An Abortive Mughul-Ottoman Link-up

The Mughul government evidently wanted the Ottomans to keep Nādir Shah occupied on the Perso-Turkish frontier. Persian involvement on the west was certain to provide a relative security to her neighbours on the east. The Mughuls therefore turned to winning back Ottoman friendship and support. Muḥammad Shah informed the Ottoman Sultan Maḥmūd I,

1. See Mukhlīṣ, *Mirā'tul Iṣṭilāḥ*, Panjab University MS, ff. 65a-67b.

2. The *Ālam Arā-i Nādirī*, II, f. 256a-b, records that when Nādir Shah appointed Ṭahmāsp Khan Jalāyir viceroy of Kābul, he told the Khan of his intention to revisit Kābul and annex Lahore to his empire. Nādir was then at Balkh in the course of his march on Turkistān.

Nādir passed through Balkh in about July 1740, see Lockhart, *Nādir Shah*, p. 186.

3. Calendar No. Post-Ab. 284. *Badā'i-i Waqā'i*, f. 237a-b.

4. Lockhart, *Nādir Shah*, p. 161 n. 6.

5. See below.

through the Mughul ambassador, Sayyid 'Aṭāullah, that he had received a request from Nādir Shah to supply one hundred to two hundred boats, but on coming to know that the boats were needed for use against Turkey, he (Muḥammad Shah) declined to comply with the order.¹ In the correspondence that now ensued between Muḥammad Shah and the Ottoman Sultan, there was much talk of religious (that is, sectarian) solidarity and mutual accord between the parties.² One of the letters from the Ottoman Sultan even alludes to "the proposals that will be communicated orally by the envoy," and expresses the hope that these "will meet the Emperor's approval." It concludes by affirming that "the identity of religion and community entails (*lāzima-i ittihād-i madhhab o millat*) the maintenance of mutual accord and regular correspondence."³ Niẓāmūl Mulk Aṣaf Jāh also sent 'arīḍas to the Ottoman Sultan.⁴ Nothing substantial, however, resulted from this correspondence. In any case, the death of Nādir Shah in Jumādā II 1160/June 1747 "removed the main impulse behind the resumption of the long-suspended Mughul-Ottoman diplomatic intercourse."⁵ (Niẓāmūl Mulk's correspondence with the Ottoman court, on which we have found considerable unused material, has been fully covered in our *Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations*.)

Nādir Shah and Zakariyā Khan

Zakariyā Khan was undoubtedly one of the ablest officers of his time in the Mughul empire. He was a tough fighter, a shrewd politician, and a wise administrator. His father, 'Abduṣ Ṣamad Khan, had been the governor of Lahore since the beginning of Farrukh Siyar's reign. In the 7th r.y. of Muḥammad Shah (=1138/1726), 'Abduṣ Ṣamad Khan was transferred to Multān while the governorship of Lahore was conferred on his son Zakariyā Khan. The latter gave a good account of himself in his new assignment: he reduced the rebels and established law and order in the province. On his father's death in 1150/1737-38, the governorship of Multān was added to his charge.⁶

In the difficult period of Nādir Shah's invasion of the country, Zaka-

1. See Professor Hikmet Bayur's article in the *Belleten*, xiii, 1949, pp. 91-96. The article is entitled "Osmanlı Devletinin Nadir Şah Afşar'la barış yapmasını Onlemek Amacını Güden bir Gurkanlı Denemesi" [An Indian Move to prevent the Conclusion of Peace between the Ottoman Sultan and Nadir Shah Afshar]. Also see Calendar No. Ott. 44.

2. Calendar Nos. Ott. 406-411, based mainly on the *Tārīkh-i 'Izzī*, B.M. Or. 9318, ff. 14a-18a and 224a-26b.

3. *Tārīkh-i 'Izzī*, Or. 9318, ff. 17a-18a. Calendar No. Ott. 407.

4. *Tārīkh-i 'Izzī*, ff. 225b-26b. Calendar Nos. Ott. 409-10. The original Persian text of the first of these two letters appears in the *Munsha'āt-i Raḍī b. Nūrūddīn*, National Museum, Karachi, MS 1958-202/24, ff. 1b-4b.

5. Riazul Islam, *Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations*, see Comment under Calendar No. Ott. 408.

6. *M.U.*, tr.II, pp. 1028-29

riyā Khan's role was honourable as well as sensible. Ignoring the Persian wazīr 'Abdul Bāqī Khan's threats and cajolery,¹ he put up—without any support or aid from Delhi—a stubborn but unequal fight against the Persian invaders. When he realized the hopelessness of his position, he made his submission to Nādir Shah in time to save Lahore from the holocaust of a Persian sack.²

When leaving Delhi on his way out of the country, Nādir Shah sent an order through 'Abdul Bāqī Khan and Ḥayātullah Khan³ to Zakariyā Khan to raise for him a sum of one crore rupees from Lahore. The Khan complied with the orders promptly and collected more than one crore rupees and proceeded in person to present the sum to Nādir Shah.⁴ The Khan accompanied the Shah up to the Chenāb.⁵ It is evident that Nādir Shah was very deeply impressed with Zakariyā Khan's ability and devotion. Of all the Mughul officials, he was the one whom Nādir liked and trusted most. As a mark of special favour the Shah asked him to beg a boon from him. With characteristic nobility, Zakariyā Khan begged for and obtained the release of the Indian prisoners.⁶ Nādir Shah treated the Khan with great consideration, gave him his own sword and an elephant each to him and his son, Ḥayātullah Khan.⁷ Nādir dismissed Zakariyā Khan from the western bank of the Chenāb with honour.⁸

Between June 1739 and March 1740, Nādir Shah issued four farmāns to Zakariyā Khan: the first increasing his mansab to 8000; the second, adding certain areas of Sind to his gubernatorial charge; the third ordering him to be present at Nādir's camp in Sind; and the fourth, assigning him the task of rounding up deserters from the Persian army who had taken refuge in his provinces (Lahore and Multān).⁹ Zakariyā Khan also received a number of farmāns from Muḥammad Shah on matters arising from Nādir Shah's farmāns to the Khan.¹⁰

During the Persian campaign in Sind, Zakariyā Khan's son, Ḥayātullah Khan, joined the camp at Lārkāna, and accompanied it to 'Umarkot and back

1. See 'Abdul Bāqī Khan's letter to Zakariyā Khan cited above. Calendar No. Post-Ab. 274.

2. For details, see above.

3. Ḥayātullah Khan was the second son of Zakariyā Khan. For a notice of Ḥayātullah Khan—entitled Shāhnawāz Khan by Nādir Shah—see Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, I, Calcutta, 1964, pp. 118-21.

4. Mukhlis, *Badā'i-i Waqā'i*, f. 222a-b = *Tadhkira*, f. 24a-b.

5. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, pp. 335-36.

6. *Bayān-i Wāqī*, Panjab University MS, f. 25a-b; *M.U.*, tr., II, p. 1029.

7. *Badā'i-i Waqā'i*, ff. 224b-25a. The name of the elephant given to Zakariyā Khan is given as 'Mahā Sundar'.

8. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, pp. 335-36; Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, p. 156.

9. See above.

10. See Mukhlis, *Tadhkira*, ff. 27b-28b, 32b-25a, *Badā'i-i Waqā'i*, 229a-30b, 235a-44a. Calendar Nos. Post Ab. 283 and 285-88.

to Lārkhāna.¹ By this time Zakariyā Khan too in obedience to the farmān from Nādir Shah, had arrived at Lārkhāna and presented himself before the Shah.² The Shah treated him with great affection and honour, and conferred the title of Shāhnawāz Khan on his son, Ḥayātullah Khan.³

It is evident from the letters that are extant and from the references in the '*Ālam Ārā-i Nādirī*' that Zakariyā Khan remained in touch with Nādir Shah after the latter's exit from India. When in 1153/1740 Nādir appointed Ṭahmāsp Khan Jalāyir as viceroy of the Indian ceded territories, he sent a farmān to Zakariyā Khan to cooperate with the Persian viceroy "in the best interests of the two empires" (India and Iran).⁴ Zakariyā Khan complied with the Shah's orders and kept in touch with the viceroy. In about 1155, Zakariyā Khan had trouble with a hostile local chief, and finding himself unable to cope with the situation, he applied to Ṭahmāsp for help which was readily given. On Nādir Shah's orders a Persian contingent of 5000 is said to have been posted in the region, evidently to provide armed support to Zakariyā Khan.⁵

About the year 1740-41, Zakariyā Khan sent Ḥājī Mudīr, of Tūrānī origin, on some mission (not specified in the source) to Nādir Shah.⁶

When in 1742 Nādir Shah obtained 'hieratic approval'⁷ of his religious policy from the Persian '*ulamā*' in the form of a *maḥḍar* (signed statement) affirming the truth of the sunnī faith, he sent copies of the document to various countries including India. In India the copy was sent to Zakariyā Khan as "the well-wisher of both the empires."⁸

1. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, p. 344. Mukhlis, *Tadhkira*, f. 27a = *Badā'i*, f. 228a-b.

2. *Ibid.* Mukhlis gives the date of Zakariyā Khan's departure from Multan for the Persian camp as 23 Dhul-H. 1152/11 March 1740.

3. *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī* p. 344.

4. Muḥammad Kāzīm, '*Ālam Ārā-i Nādirī*', III, f. 108a; Mirza Mahdī, *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, p. 353. Calendar No. Post-Ab. 285.2.

5. Muḥammad Kāzīm relates a curious account of Zakariyā Khan's writing repeatedly, about the year 1155/1742, to Ṭahmāsp Khan Jalāyir that a Raja named Dā'ūd Wumra (?) had surrounded Multān with forty to fifty thousand troops and had reduced him to helplessness. As no commander was willing to undertake the difficult campaign, Ṭahmāsp Khan himself marched out with six thousand troops. Scarcity of water, however, compelled him to give up the expedition and return from midway. Badal Khan at his own request was assigned the task of securing the submission of the Raja. Badal Khan went out with only a few men. The Raja, having a deep regard for Badal Khan, made his submission to the Persians. Badal Khan then took him along to Multān and arranged an amicable settlement between him and Zakariyā Khan. In the meanwhile, on an order from Nādir Shah, Ṭahmāsp Khan appointed a force of 5000 men under Imāmverdi Khan to stay permanently in that region (sc. west of Multān) in order to provide a deterrent against rebels. '*Ālam Ārā-i Nādirī*', III, ff. 119a-21a.

We have not come across any other reference to this incident. The name Dā'ūd Wumra (the second part of it being written in the text as WMRH) is followed, in the index of the '*Ālam Ārā-i Nādirī*', by the form *Dā'ūdputra* within brackets.

6. Mukhlis, *Mir'ātul Istitāh*, Panjab University MS, f. 65a. Mukhlis has given a lengthy notice of Ḥājī Mudīr, *op. cit.*, ff. 65a-67b. For Nādir Shah's sending the Ḥājī to Delhi, see above.

7. Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, p. 224.

8. *Bayān-i Wāqī*, Panjab University MS, f. 60a.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII

Dr. A. K. Bhattacharyya in an article entitled 'A Qandahar coin of Muhammad Shah, the Mughal and later Indo-Afghan Relations' (*Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, Nagpur Session, 1950, published: Calcutta, 1952, pp. 188-91) mentions the discovery of coins of Muḥammad Shah, bearing the mint name of Qandahār and dated 27th, 28th, 29th and 30th r.y. of Muḥammad Shah. (The corresponding dates would be 1158-61/1745-48.) According to the author, the Hijrī year on the particular coin published in the paper is not clear. The author rejects the possibility of "Qandahar" being the town of that name in the Nander district in Hyderabad (Deccan), on two counts: first, the Qandahār of the Deccan "does not show much evidence of [being a] mint-town as is generally supposed"; and secondly, "the lettering of the legends on these coins shows the closest similarity to the Mughal issues of the Afghanistan mint-town." After pointing out that this latter Qandahār had been a mint-town in Shah Jahān's reign, the author goes on to say: "The successful attempt of Muhammad Shah to annex Qandahar to the Mughal Empire was marked by the revival of the mint at the town."

Dr. Bhattacharyya cites no evidence for Muḥammad Shah's annexation of Qandahār mentioned by him. Such an annexation indeed never occurred, nor was ever attempted. Not having examined the coin oneself, we are not in a position to express any opinion about the coin and its legend, except that it appears most unlikely to be that of Muḥammad Shah of Delhi. One possibility that suggests itself is this that if there was a revolt against Nādir Shah at Qandahār, the rebels would try to gain the sympathy of the Indian authorities by striking coins in Muḥammad Shah's name. Thus, when Mīr Wais rebelled against Iran in the reign of Shah Sultan Ḥusain, he is stated by one of the sources to have issued coins in the name of the Emperor of Delhi. (See p. 136 n. 3 above). Now, in 1158/1745, there was a serious rebellion against Nādir Shah in Sīstān, "and there were rumours that the people of Qandahār and Kabul would also revolt." (Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, p. 253). But the expected revolt did not come about, and there seems to be no indication in the sources of any trouble at Qandahār during the last years of Nādir Shah's reign. Further, even the Sīstān rebels do not appear to have been in contact with the Indian authorities.

CHAPTER IX

LITERATURE, ARTS AND COMMERCE

[This short account of culture and trade is based partly on Persian sources and partly on well-known English authorities; it has been added to fill in the picture of relations between the two countries].

TIMŪR and all Timurids were patrons of learning and culture.¹ Bābur, who was himself a poet of no mean order in Persian as well as Turkish, and a master of style in prose, was a patron of Persian poets; the great contemporary Persian historian, Khwand Amīr, joined his court.² Despite the unpleasant memories of Ghujduwān, Bābur had many friends in Persia whom he did not forget in his outburst of generosity after his memorable victory at Delhi.³ Humāyūn's visit to Iran further stimulated Mughul interest in Persian literature and art. It is evident from the accounts of Jauhar and Bāyazīd that the poets and painters who met Humāyūn in Persia were struck by his discriminate taste and attracted by his personal charm. As soon as Humāyūn had a throne at Kābul, he invited them to his court.⁴ In a remarkably worded letter to the Khan of Kāshghar, Humāyūn commends these Persian artists and comments on their work; the text of the letter is given in Bāyazīd.⁵ These Persian painters, notably Mīr Sayyid 'Alī and Khawāja 'Abduṣ Ṣamad, were among the founders of the Mughul school of painting in India.⁶ Many more Persians, including men of high education and scholarship, joined Humāyūn's service. Bairam Khan's liberal patronage also attracted many cultured Persians;⁷ the

1. For Timurid patronage of Persian literature, see E. G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia*, II, pp. 206-375, 421-548.

2. Storey, I, p. 101; also see Introduction to the new Tihiran edition of the *Ḥabībūs Siyar*.

3. *A.N.*, I, p. 99; also Firishta, I, p. 382.

4. Bāyazīd, p. 65f. For Persian poets at Humāyūn's court, see M. A. Ghani, *A History of Persian Language and Literature at the Mughal Court*, II, chapters III, VIII.

5. Bāyazīd, p. 68. Riazul Islam, *Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations*, Calendar No. Tx. 326.

6. Percy Brown, *Indian Painting under the Mughals*, pp. 53-4.

7. Dr. Azhar 'Alī, *Mirza 'Abdūr Rahīm Khan-i-Khanan*, unpublished thesis (Cambridge), pp. 81-2.

most notable of them was Mīr 'Abdul Laṭīf of Qazvīn who became Akbar's tutor. After Humāyūn's death, Akbar conferred favours on those Persians and their families who had been friendly to Humāyūn during his stay in Iran.¹ Special mention may be made of Ja'far Khan Taklū,² grandson of Muḥammad Khan Sharafuddīn Taklū, administrator of Herāt at the time of Humāyūn's visit to the city, and Khwāja Beg Mirza,³ son of Ma'ṣūm Beg Ṣafavī, Humāyūn's host at Ardabīl. Akbar showed a keen interest in attracting men of learning and scholarship from Iran and elsewhere to his court. The brothers Faiḍī and Abul Faḍl specially helped him in this task. Faiḍī who was sent on a diplomatic assignment to the Deccan gathered information from voyagers and sea merchants about foreign scholars. He sent reports giving bio-data of the various scholars with recommendations to the Emperor to invite them. He made a special recommendation in favour of Chalapī Beg of Shīrāz.⁴ Akbar accordingly sent a farmān to Chalapī Beg in which, after enlarging upon his patronage of learning, he requested the scholar to come over and join the Mughul court.⁵ Earlier Akbar had sent a similar invitation to Mīr Ṣadruddīn Muḥammad Naqīb of Iran.⁶ In both cases Akbar had made provision for travel expenses. Akbar and Abul Faḍl also maintained contacts with liberal elements in Iran. They were in correspondence with Amīr Aḥmad Kāshī of the Ḥurūfī order.⁷ Amīr Aḥmad Kāshī was one of the heterodox leaders who were later executed by Shah 'Abbās I. His close contacts with the Mughul court, evidenced by the discovery of Akbar's farmān in his papers, may have been the reason why the Shah killed him with his own hands.⁸ The persecution of liberal ideas in Iran made Sharīf Āmulī, an eminent scholar, to escape to India where he was warmly received at the Mughul court and became a close personal friend of Abul Faḍl.⁹

In Akbar's reign, Persian culture in India continued to flourish. Abul Faḍl and Faiḍī¹⁰ were pre-eminent in prose and poetry, while the Mughul school

1. *Maqāl*, f. 126a.

2. *M.U.*, I, pp. 507-9; joined service in 972/1564-5.

3. *M.R.*, II, pp. 514-15.

4. *Laṭīfa-i Faiḍī*, Ethé 1479, ff. 17ff. Calendar No. A. 32.

5. Akbar's letter is given in the *Mukātabāt-i 'Allāmī*, Lucknow, 1863, p. 77. Calendar No. A. 33.

6. Bodleian 2711, f. 234a-b. For details, see Calendar No. A. 24.

7. For text of the correspondence and comments thereon, see Calendar Nos. A. 21 and A. 22. *Ibid.* for Ḥurūfīs.

8. *A.A.A.*, p. 325.

9. *Ibid.* For Abul Faḍl's letters to Sharīf Āmulī, see *Mukātabāt-i 'Allāmī*, Dafatar ii, *passim*.

10. For Faiḍī's impromptu quatrain in reply to a Persian poet's verse in praise of Shah 'Abbās I, see M. A. Ghani, *A History of Persian Language and Literature at the Mughal Court*, Allahabad, 1930, III, pp. 64-65.

of painting which owed so much to Persia, blossomed under Akbar's liberal patronage.¹ "The Mughal emperors of India," says V. Smith, "looked to Iran for the graces of civilization, and it was natural that Akbar should desire to add the charms of Persian pictorial art to the amenities of his court."² Under the vigorous patronage of Akbar and his successor, an Indo-Mughul style, distinct from the purely Persian style, emerged and flourished.³ Persian artists and men of learning continued to arrive.⁴ The wealth of the empire, the liberal and tolerant policy of its government, and the prospects of profitable service in an everwidening administration were the main inducements. In Persia itself, on the other hand, an increasing emphasis on theology and scholasticism, the poverty of patronage and the fierce fanaticism encouraged by the early Safavids, were inimical to letters.⁵ Several distinguished Persian poets, notably Naẓīrī Nishāpūrī, 'Urfī Shīrāzī, Anīsī Shāmlū, Shikebī Iṣfahānī and Ṣāhūrī left their homes for India. The first four joined the entourage of 'Abdur Raḥīm *Khān-Khānān*, while Ṣāhūrī found a warm welcome at the courts of Aḥmadnagar and Bijāpūr.⁶ The *Khān-Khānān*'s liberal patronage attracted many Persian scholars, poets, and men accomplished in various crafts and minor arts.⁷ On the contrary, Shah 'Abbās I's patronage of letters (judging from the account of Professor Naṣrullah Falsafī) appears to have been fitful and ill-informed; several poets quitted his court.⁸

In Jahāngīr's reign, the influence of Nūr Jahān's family and his own regard for Shah 'Abbās I ensured that all Persians of real attainments would receive a welcome. The *Tūzūk-i Jahāngīrī* contains many reference to Persians who received preferment at Jahāngīr's court.⁹ There is no doubt that

1. For details, see P. Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-68; V. Smith, *A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, p. 205f.; Martin, *Miniature Painting*, I, p. 79f.

2. V. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

3. See reference to Martin above.

4. Of the many references in the *Akbar Nāma*, some are : *A.N.*, III, pp. 144, 217, 228, 232, 650, 712 etc.

5. See E. G. Browne, IV, pp. 24-8, especially Mirza Muḥammad Khan's letter to Browne, p. 26f.; Professor H. A. R. Gibb's note in Toynbee, *A Study of History*, I, pp. 400-2, especially paragraph No. 8. Mr. M. A. Ghani, Part II, chap. viii, says the main reason for the literary decline of Persia under the Safavids was lack of patronage, and in a foot-note on pp. 150-1, he makes an interesting comparison of the rewards and emoluments of poets in India and Iran. However, the fierce sectarianism of Safavid Persia was obviously an anti-liberal element and one calculated to retard cultural progress. Also see *A.A.A.*, p. 325.

6. Part II of Dr. Azhar 'Alī's thesis (cited above) deals with these poets; also see M. A. Ghani, III, p. 67f.

7. The *M.R.*, III, gives a long list.

8. Falsafī, *'Abbās-i Awwal*, II, pp. 27-41.

9. *Tūzūk*, pp. 76, 150, 162, 192, 193, 224, 246, etc.; *I.N.J.*, pp. 38, 283; *Lāhaurī*, II, p. 279.

Persian influence attained its peak in this reign. Khān-i A'zam Mirza 'Aziz Kokā (foster-brother of Akbar and father-in-law of Sultan Khusrāu) in a letter which he wrote in a bitter mood to Jahāngīr, accused him of ruining the empire by having placed all power in the hands of Khurāsānis who (according to 'Aziz Kokā) were highly mischievous and unreliable people.¹ Persian painters of note joined Jahāngīr's court.² 'Abdur Rahīm Khān-Khānān's entourage continued to attract Persian poets and scholars.³

Shah Jahān's cultured court continued to welcome Persians of merit.⁴ Many Persian poets and scholars flourished under his patronage.⁵ All three Amīrul Umarās in succession were Persians.⁶ 'Alī Mardān Khan's large number of followers (evidently all Persians) were suitably employed in various posts.⁷ But, on the whole, Shah Jahān had a preference for the Tūrānis: reference of favours and rewards to Tūrānis far out-number those relating to Persians;⁸ the reason for this has been mentioned elsewhere. But the Persians, with keener intellect and better qualifications for service, found their way everywhere, and the new city of Shāhjahānābād was full of them.⁹ The Persians excelled in all branches of service, especially in civil administration and accounts.¹⁰ The Uzbeks, it may be mentioned, made a very poor impression on Bernier,¹¹ a keen and judicious observer.

Aurangzeb's reign saw the decline of Persian influence in India. "To the ambitious and gifted Shi'a adventurers of Persia," says Jadunath Sarkar, "India ceased to be a welcome home, or a field where the highest career was

1. The letter is given in B.M. Add. 16859, f. 19a. Calendar No. J. 67. (For Jahāngīr's unpleasant relations with Mirza 'Aziz Kokā, see Beni Prasad, pp. 235-40). For Bābur's identical opinion about the Khurāsānis, see his letter to Kāmrān, J.A.S.B., 1919, pp. 329-34; Calendar No. B. 2.

2. Percy Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 75, 81-2.

3. See references to the *M.R.*, and to Dr. Azhar 'Alī's thesis above.

4. The following are some of the many references; Lāhaurī, I, i, p. 441, I, ii, p. 279, II, pp. 103, 303, 414, 432; Kanbū, II, p. 395, 471, III, pp. 385-95, 397-492, 435-46; many references in Khāfi Khan.

5. Kanbū, III, 385-95, 397-429, 435-46.

6. i.e., Āṣaf Khan, 'Alī Mardān Khan and Mīr Jumla

7. Some of the references are : Lāhaurī, II, pp. 130, 158, 211, 212, 417, etc.

8. The references of favours and rewards to Tūrānis are too numerous to be quoted; a few of these are: Lāhaurī, I, i, p. 475, ii, pp. 8, 166, 243, II, pp. 91-2, 93, 97, 99, 117, 123, 128, 129-30, etc.

9. K.K., II, p. 327; Bernier, p. 10.

10. The references are too numerous to be quoted. See Akbar's praise for his Diwān, Khawāja Shah Maṣṣūr Shirāzi (Ibn Hasan, *Central Structure of the Mughal Empire*, p. 169); for distinguished civil servants of Persian origin in Shah Jahān's reign, see Kanbū, III, pp. 385-95, 435-46. For Bābur's opinion of Khurāsānis and Tūrānis, see Calendar No. B. 2.

11. Bernier, pp. 120-3. For a more favourable view of the Uzbeks, see Annemarie Schimmel, 'Some Notes on the Cultural activity of the First Uzbek Rulers,' *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, VIII, 1960, pp. 149-66.

open to their talent.”¹ This, however, was not, we feel, the result of deliberate discrimination against Persians by Aurangzeb. Several of Aurangzeb’s leading ministers, including his first *Wazir*,² were Persians, and he continued to show favour to newly arrived Irānīs as well as to those already settled in India.³ But Aurangzeb’s reputation for rigid orthodoxy⁴ and the general neglect of fine arts and belles-lettres in his reign discouraged intending emigrants from Persia. Orthodox theological studies, which were high in favour in his reign, naturally excluded Persians who mostly belonged to the Shiite sect. Thus the infusion of fresh Persian blood into Indo-Muslim society, which had proceeded uninterruptedly since the days of Bābur, considerably decreased, though it did not entirely cease.

In addition to poetry and painting, architecture was another field where Persian influence notably enriched the Indo-Mughul tradition. The architect of Humāyūn’s tomb, Mirza Mīrak Ghiyāth, was, according to Percy Brown, “almost certainly of Persian origin.” “In spirit and structure,” says the same author, “Humāyūn’s tomb stands as an example of the synthesis of two of the great building styles of Asia—the Persian and Indian.”⁵ Havell describes Humāyūn’s tomb as “perhaps more Persian in character than any other important building in India.”⁶ At least two of the chief designers of the Tāj Maḥal were Persians.⁷ The design and the decoration of the Tāj Maḥal have undoubtedly certain pronounced Persian features—especially the *pietra dura*.⁸ With reference to Shah Jahān’s architecture in general, Vincent Smith says, “The style is essentially Persian, but . . . sharply distinguished from the fashions of Isfahan . . .”⁹ The brilliantly coloured glazed tiles which beautify so many of the Mughul buildings in the Panjab and elsewhere are another instance of the “cultural inspiration” from Persia; they are known as *kāshī*

1. Sarkar, *Nadir Shah in India*, p. 5, The remark refers to Aurangzeb’s reign; also see Sarkar, *Mughal Administration*, pp. 40-2. For Aurangzeb’s critical attitude towards certain Persian practices, see Calendar No. Ab. 252.

2. Fāḍil Khan of Tūn (in *Khurāsān*); see p. 126 above.

3. For Aurangzeb’s favours to individual Persians, some of the many references are: K.K., II, pp. 256, 456, 459; *A.N.K.*, pp. 270, 271, 463, 595, 567, 833, 851, 870, 918; *M.A.*, pp. 128, 130, 270, 434, 482, 513, 527; *Mir’āt-ūṣ Ṣafā*, B.M. Add. 6539, ff. 148b-9a. The last reference is to the descendants of Najm Thānī (see Chap. II, sec. i, above) in Aurangzeb’s service. Also see Faruki, *Aurangzeb and his Times*, p. 267.

4. See Tavernier’s account (II, pp. 138-9) of Shī’as simulating as Sunnis to court royal favour.

5. Percy Brown, *Indian Architecture, Islamic Period*, pp. 92, 93.

6. Havell, *Indian Architecture*, p. 163.

7. Sarkar, *Studies in Mughal India*, p. 30; Smith, *A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, pp. 182-5; *Legacy of Islam*, p. 112; Havell, pp. 34-5; *Islamic Culture*, 1934, p. 56.

8. Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 180; Havell, p. 34.

9. Smith, pp. 180-81.

work, "a name apparently derived from the town of Kāshān in Persia noted for its faience," and may have been imported in bulk from that country.¹ There are many references to Persian architects and engineers coming to India. 'Alī Mardān Khan was himself a builder of no mean attainments.² There is, though, an interesting entry in the *'Amal-i Šālīh* that certain edifices built by the Khan at Peshāwar were not approved by Shah Jahan as they were built in the Persian style.³

While the Persians contributed so much to enrich Indian culture in our period, the reverse is not true. The traffic in cultural influence was one way. The explanation probably lies in the higher material civilization attained by the Mughuls and the better opportunities of employment and preferment in India than in Safavid Persia; it was certainly not due to any marked inferiority of creative culture in India. Few cultured Indians, indeed, would have liked to leave their country and migrate to Safavid Persia, except for sectarian sentiments. But the fact that no *notable*⁴ cultural influence—literary,⁵ artistic or intellectual—flowed from India to Iran, is certainly a striking feature.⁶

Trade and Commerce

While the Persians became very influential in the politics and culture of the Mughul empire, the Indians attained a strong position in the economic life of the Persian capital and ports. Perhaps of all the foreign communities, they were the most important after the Armenians. According to Chardin, Shah 'Abbās I did not encourage their settlement in Persia, but they bribed his successor Shah Šafī with substantial gifts. However, Pietro Della Valle and Thomas Herbert, visiting Persia in Shah 'Abbas I's reign, found Indian merchants already well-established in Iṣfahān and Bandar 'Abbās (Gombroon). The Indians, says Chardin, exacted a high rate of interest [they were Hindus],⁷ exercised a restrictive and unhealthy influence on the money-market, and sent all their earnings in the form of precious metal to India. Little wonder

1. Percy Brown, *op. cit.*, pp. 109, 110; Smith, pp. 178, 199ff.

2. Smith, p. 183; many other references.

3. *'Kanbū*, II, p. 471.

4. There are, of course, many minor examples. E.g., Olearius (London, 1669), Book I, p. 206, notes the presence of a large number of Indian dancing women in Iṣfahān. Also see K.K., II, p. 290, for provision of Indian dress, perfumes and fruits for the refugee Mughul prince, Akbar, at Iṣfahān. See *Pietro's Pilgrimage*, p. 204, for a mosque at Shīrāz built by an Indian Muslim, Āqā Riḍā.

5. The *Akbar Nāma* of Abul Faḍl is, though, frequently mentioned with respect by Safavid chroniclers including the celebrated author of the *'Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsi*.

6. See the opening paragraph of "Persia and India" by H. Goetz in *The Legacy of Persia*, p. 89.

7. See *Khuld*, V, f. 175; it gives an interesting account of their successful appeal to Shah 'Abbās II against certain rules.

Chardin describes them as blood-suckers. Olearius places their number at 12,000, and says they were good-natured, pleasant and friendly but quick to take offence. Thomas Herbert described the "Banians" at Gombroon as unsociable, highly abstemious, strictly vegetarian, "of weak bodies and small courage, yet well enough agreeing with their conditions." The Indian merchant community at Iṣfahān kept in touch with the Mughul embassies that arrived from time to time.¹

A detailed investigation of trade and transport between India and Iran lies outside the scope of this work, but a word may be said about the essential features, especially in so far as these were affected by political relations. The main overland trade routes to the north-west were via Khaibar and Kābul, and via Bolān and Qandahār. The traffic along these routes was mainly in the shape of large caravans, sometimes escorted by armed guards, and their progress through the sparsely inhabited and waterless tracts and the tribal areas was not without hazards.² It was an essential duty of the governor of Qandahār to restrain the tribal free-booters and protect travellers and traders.³ It seems he was not always able to discharge this duty effectively. The Mughul-Safavid rivalry in the frontier regions meant that malcontents from one side were sure to find a welcome on the other.⁴ The sea trade-route between India and Iran, of which the main ports were Sūrat and Bandar 'Abbās (Gombroon), carried a very large proportion of the total trade between the two countries.⁵ The sea-route, which had been the monopoly of Arab merchants in the fifteenth century, gradually passed into the hands of Europeans, especially the Portuguese, in our period.⁶ Both routes, especially the land one, were subject to the strains of political relations. Thus in 1615, the volume of trade via Qandahār increased fourfold as a result of the sea-route being closed due to war between Persia and the Portuguese. On the other hand, Indo-Persian hostilities over Qandahār inevitably affected the overland

1. *Pietro's Pilgrimage*, pp. 129, 228; T. Herbert, *Travels in Persia*, pp. 48, 121; Olearius, Book I, p. 200; Tavernier, I, p. 74; *Indian Travels of Thevenot and Careri*, pp. 77, 79; Chardin cited in *T.M.*, Minorsky, Intr., p. 19; Raphael du Mans, *Estat de la Perse en 1660*, pp. 180-1; also see embassy of Šafdar Khan, Chap. vi above.

2. Moreland, *India at the death of Akbar*, pp. 219-21; *Baḥrul Asrār*, f. 406bf; *E.I. Co. Letters*, 1617, p. 325.

3. *A.N.*, III, p. 815; *Af. T.*, f. 224b (Tahmāsp's *farmān* of appointment of Sultan Husain Mirza as governor of Qandahār, Calendar A. 16); *F.Q.*, p. 177f., (Reference to Qandahār in Akbar's letter to 'Abdullah Khan Uzbeg, Calendar No. Tx. 327).

4. See the case of Sher Khan Afghan, cited in the next chapter; also see correspondence between the Mughul governor of Qandahār and the Persian governor of Herāt, *Bahār-i Sukkhan*, B.M. Or. 178, ff. 45b-51.

5. Moreland, *op.cit.*, p. 221.

6. Moreland, *op.cit.*, pp. 201-2.

trade and increased the traffic by sea.¹ But even the sea-trade was sometimes affected, though only temporarily, for at the outbreak of hostilities, the Mughul emperors would forbid ships at Sūrāt to leave for Persia.² The export of saltpetre was strictly banned by Shah Jahān in about 1648 so that it might not reach Persia.³ The Shahs of Iran similarly stopped or discouraged the export of horses to India when relations were strained.⁴

1. *English Factories*, 1637-41, p. 242; 1646-50, pp. 203, 207-8, 246, 261, 266, 307-8, etc., Also see Moreland, *Akbar to Aurangzeb*, p. 56.

2. *English Factories*, 1637-41, p. 242.

3. *English Factories*, 1646-50, p. 203.

4. Shah Jahān's *Wazir's* letter to the Ottoman Grand *Wazir* in Farīdūn Beg, II, p. 62f; Calendar No. Ott. 389. Olearius, Book I, p. 200; *English Factories*, 1637-41, p. 301.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

Factors of Amity

THE Mughuls and the Safavids had a long record of active relations. Tradition connects the forbears of the two lines, Tīmūr and Khwāja Sultan 'Alī, in the early fifteenth century, and as pointed out elsewhere,¹ there is some truth in the story. From the early fifteen hundreds, the two families, now both ruling dynasties, maintained political relations for over a century and a half — a complex of friendship, mutual vanity, rivalry and occasional hostility. Certain factors were conducive to friendship and co-operation, while certain others were inimical to good relations. There was the community of religion, but it must be admitted that Muslim States of that period were more often at war amongst themselves than with non-Muslim powers. Moreover, the community of faith was offset by sectarian differences (see below). Also the two empires shared a common culture. Persian civilisation had a high prestige in contemporary Muslim Asia, and the cultural frontiers of Iran extended far beyond her political boundaries. Muslim India, including the Deccan, stood closest to her in culture.

Then again the Persians accounted for a high proportion of personnel in all branches of service in the Mughul empire. From the days of Humāyūn (and even before), a steady stream of Persian soldiers, poets, painters, physicians, scholars, administrators, accountants, traders, engineers, mathematicians and craftsmen, entered India. As Bernier's account of the Persians at the Mughul court shows, they were very sensitive about the prestige of Persia,² and naturally hung together. "Persians," says Manucci, "are famed for favouring their own nation in the Mogul Empire, and the larger number of nobles

1. See Appendix A.

2. Bernier, p. 153.

are Persians."¹ The loyalty of these Persians to the empire was not always whole-hearted, and their numbers were deliberately kept low in the expeditionary force sent by Shah Jahān after Shah 'Abbās II's occupation of Qandahār.² According to Bernier and Manucci, it was the leading Persian nobles who counselled Shah Jahān against a fourth expedition projected against Qandahār.³ The Persians in India kept in touch with their connections in Persia, and many of them had large interests at home.⁴ As Mīr Jumla remarked in his letter to the chief minister of Iran, the Persians came to India in order to send their savings to their people at home.⁵ This large Persian element threw its weight against Indo-Persian conflict. There were, however, many influential Persians who, by the very logic of their position, merged their interests completely with the Mughuls. Persons like Rustam Mirza Ṣafavī, Nūr Jahān, Āṣaf Khan (father-in-law of Shah Jahān), Shah Nawāz Khan Ṣafavī (son of Rustam Mirza and father-in-law of Aurangzeb), and 'Alī Mardān Khan, became completely identified with the Mughul imperial interests. During Shah 'Abbās II's investment of Qandahār, no Mughul commander acted more energetically on the Indian side than did 'Alī Mardān Khan.⁶ And Nūr Jahān was willing to finance from her own private wealth an expedition to recover Qandahār after Shah 'Abbās I's seizure of the fort.⁷

The Uzbek free-booters were a menace to Kābul as well as to Khurāsān, and both powers had a common defence problem against the Uzbeks. This factor, however, had only a limited force, for the Mughuls from time to time sought alliance with the Uzbeks against Persia. Hostility between Persia and the Uzbeks was more enduring, but even in this case, it would be wrong to imagine a ceaseless conflict. Safavid Persia was a great power, and Shah 'Abbās I as well as Shah 'Abbās II, each in his own time, exercised a powerful influence over Tūrān and Khwārizm, and the Uzbeks generally sought to be on good terms with their mighty neighbour.

Omitting Qandahār, there was no immediate territorial incentive to conflict between the Mughuls and the Safavids, such as existed for the latter with the Uzbeks over Khurāsān or with the Ottomans all along the border from Baghdād to Erivan. The Mughuls and the Safavids never seriously thought of invading each other's dominions (see below).

1. Manucci, I, p. 177.

2. Ṣādiq, f. 159a; K.K., I, p. 684.

3. Bernier, p. 185; Manucci, I, pp. 237-8.

4. See Riazul Islam, *Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations*, Calendar No. Dn. 312. Also see Nos. Dn. 314 and 314.1 to 314.5, and No. Ab. 252.

5. *Golconda Letters* (B.M. Add. 6600), f. 71b; also see the letter of a Persian noble of Aurangzeb to his relatives in Persia, *Mufidul Inshā* (Bod. 1399), ff. 99b-102a. Calendar No. 253.

6. K.K., I, p. 685; also see Sarkar, I, p. 132f.

7. *I.N.J.*, p. 191.

Finally, the Mughuls and the Safavids were neighbouring great powers. Each realised the strength and importance of the other, recognised the value of mutual friendship (which is specifically emphasised in their diplomatic correspondence), and gave precedence to each other's ambassadors over all other envoys.

Factors of Conflict

Let us now turn to the factors favouring conflict between the Mughuls and the Safavids. The first and foremost was Qandahār. Qandahār was a fort of great strength. Man and nature had both contrived to make it well-nigh impregnable,¹ if resolutely defended. It fell to Nādir Shah, the greatest captain of his age, only after a whole year's siege. "Situated at the junction of roads leading to Kabul and Herat, Kandahar dominated the whole southern Afghanistan, and was a position of immense strategic importance. Easily defensible, with a good supply of water, an essential factor in eastern warfare, its garrison would not be called upon to endure great hardships."² The fort was of essential importance to the Mughuls; with Kābul and Ghaznī and part of Balūchistān in their empire, it made a great deal of difference to them whether they were in possession of Qandahār or not. The Kābul-Ghaznī-Qandahār line represented a strategic and logical frontier,³ beyond Kabul and Khaibar there was no natural line of defence. Moreover, the possession of Qandahār made it easier to control the Afghan and Balūch tribes. The Safavids, as successors to the Kingdom of Herāt, regarded Qandahār as belonging to them by right of inheritance. To Persia, however, Qandahār was more of an outpost, an important one no doubt, rather than a vital bastion in a defence system. From the view-point of strategic defence, the Mughul need of Qandahār was more imperative than that of Persia, but other considerations made the fort as desirable to the Persians as to the Mughuls. Qandahār was also an important trading centre (see below) and a prosperous

1. Manrique, II, p. 261: "This city is enclosed on the west by a lofty rugged, and precipitous mountain, on the south and east by a strong wide wall furnished with many powerful cannon." See *op.cit.*, p. 222, for Manrique's assessment of its strategic importance. For a description in Persian of the fortifications of Qandahār, see Khalīl Mar'ashī; *Majma'ut Tawārikh*, Tihiran, A.H.S. 1328, pp. 10-14.

Also see *A.N.*, I, p. 231. For a description of the ruins of Qandahār as seen in 1879, see *Babur-nama*, Mrs Beveridge's note, pp. 430-31.

2. Dr. C. C. Davies, *The Problem of the North-West Frontier*, p. 12. The British Indian forces captured Qandahār in 1879 in the course of the second Afghan war and remained in occupation for about two years. The question of holding Qandahār or retiring to Quetta, with all its strategic and financial implications, was then very thoroughly discussed in Parliament and elsewhere. *Op.cit.*, pp. 11-16; also see Holdich, *Indian Borderland*, p. 10f.

3. Dr. M. Jahangir Khan, in his (unpublished) thesis, *The North West Frontier Policy of the Mughals*, has fully examined the importance of the Kābul-Ghaznī-Qandahār frontier for the security of the Mughul empire, in chap. xii, pp. 255-61, and elsewhere.

province. But it seems to us that the outstanding feature of Indo-Persian rivalry over Qandahār was prestige, and prestige was vital for the medieval Asian monarch. Shah 'Abbās I's letter to Jahāngīr,¹ as well as the official account in the *Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī*, shows that the driving motive behind his seizure of the fort was prestige.² Persian occupation of Qandahār always raised the stock of Persia in the eyes of the neighbouring principalities, especially Tūrān. Ṭahmāsp's capture of Qandahār at once brought him Uzbek entreaties of friendship; as soon as Shah 'Abbās I occupied the fort, the Uzbeks retreated from menacing border outposts. An Indian victory at Qandahār always made the Uzbeks more amenable to Mughul influence; a Mughul defeat at Qandahār was a sure prelude to hostile Uzbek activity in the Kābul marches. In the rivalry over Qandahār, prestige came first, strategic considerations next, and economic and financial interests last. The incident of Sher Khan, the Afghan chief of Fūshanj³ (modern Pishīn), illustrates how economic and trade interests were sacrificed for the sake of prestige. Safavid, Mughul and Uzbek sources unanimously state that Sher Khan was looting Indian and Persian traders and travellers and that 'Alī Mardān Khan (then Persian governor of Qandahār) took punitive action against Sher Khan and provided protection to the trade-caravans. Sher Khan's incursions extended up to Sībī, a Mughul frontier outpost. Yet when Sher Khan fled, as a rebel against Persian authorities, he was received at the Mughul Court with open arms and variously honoured (A.D. 1632).⁴

In addition to Qandahār, there were two other areas on the frontier where there was occasional tension: Fūshanj, and the Kij-Makrān area. Fūshanj was a dependency of Qandahār and is sometimes described as Fūshanj-i-Qandahār (also perhaps to distinguish it from the Fūshanj near Herāt).⁵ It was governed by a vassal Afghan chief, who at times harassed and blackmailed travellers and traders on the road between India and Iran. Sher Khan's father was a dependent of Akbar but quarrelled with the Mughul governor of Qandahār and transferred his allegiance to Shah 'Abbās I. Sher Khan was himself a vassal of Persia, but, as mentioned above, transferred his loyalty to Shah Jahān. Sher Khan later assisted in the Mughul efforts to

1. *Tuzuk*, pp. 348-50; R. and B., II, pp. 240-2.

2. *A.A.A.*, p. 684.

3. See below.

4. *Khuld*, V, ff. 216-226; *Dhail*, pp. 73-5; Lahauri, I, i, pp. 419-21. The author of the *Bahrul Asrār* (Ethé 575), who was himself a victim of Sher Khan's raid and was saved by 'Alī Mardān Khan (1040/1631), gives a detailed and well-informed report in the account of his travels to India, f. 389 f.

5. Le Strange, p. 411.

recover Qandahār.¹ During his viceroyalty of Multān and Sind (1648-52), Prince Aurangzeb asserted Mughul authority in Balūchistān and the neighbouring districts².

The Kij-Makrān tract was regarded as a dependency of Sind, but owing to distance, unfavourable climate and unproductivity of the area, no attempt was made to exercise effective control there. In 1003/1595, Mughul occupation of Sibi brought this area under Mughul influence. In 1018/1609, that is a few years after Akbar's death, Shah 'Abbās I directed his commanders to "conquer" this area. The local chiefs submitted after a Safavid show of force. The region that passed into Safavid vassalage also included the port of Gwādar. It is interesting to note that soon after this victory Shah 'Abbās I sent an envoy, Husain Beg Qaichāji³, to Golconda (where he arrived in 1023/1614) with a letter for Muḥammad Quṭb Shah (1612-26), reporting the conquest of Kij-Makrān, and saying that this would facilitate the journey of envoys between Golconda and Persia.⁴ In 1030/1621, the chief of Makrān personally visited Shah 'Abbās I. The extent of authority exercised in this remote region is evident from the fact that when Robert Sherley, an English associate of Shah 'Abbās I, arrived accidentally at Gwādar in 1613-14, he found the local authorities entirely independent and escaped with great difficulty into Sind. During the next two reigns, the Persian authorities continued to exercise an uncertain hold on the region.⁵ The Mughuls do not

1. The material on Fūshanj is scattered and fragmentary. Our brief, consolidated account is based on: *A.A.A.*, p. 775; *Khuld*, IV, f. 487b, V, ff. 21b-22b; *Dhail*, pp. 73-7, 120; *Lāhaurī*, I, i, pp. 419-21; *Kanbū*, I, pp. 476-80; *Qazvinī*, ff. 245b-6b; *Jalāl Ṭabāṭabāī*, ff. 2b-4b. For the useful account in the *Baḥr al-Asrār*, see f.n. above. Also see: *Baluchistan Gazetteer*, vol. V, Quetta-Pishin Dist., p. 34; article on Quetta, *Enc. Islam*, 1st ed., p. 1083.

Shaikh Farid Bhakkārī, who knew Sher Khan Tarīn of Fūshanj personally, has a short but informative notice of the Khan in the *Dhakhīratul Khawānīn* (Rashdi MS, ff(p). 502-04). According to this source, Sher Khan sought Mughul protection only when Shah Ṣafī's summons to him made him feel insecure and when he realized that the Persian governor of Qandahār was after his life. Even at this stage Sher Khan had not committed himself finally to go over to the Mughul side. Presently the Persians made a raid on Fūshanj and carried away Sher Khan's womenfolk and children. His endeavours to rescue them having failed, he came over to India, joined the Mughul service and offered to assist in the recovery of Qandahār. Shah Ṣafī sent him a letter purporting to show him as his secret agent in India. As was intended, the contents of the letter came to the notice of Shah Jahān who forthwith deprived Sher Khan of his jāgīrs and *manṣab*. Before long Sher Khan died a broken-hearted man.

2. Sarkar, I, pp. 121-2.

3. See p. 95 n. above.

4. See Calendar No. Dn. 299; also No. J. 58.

5. The *Tārīkh-i 'Abbāsī* of Jalāl Munajjim, Bodleian, 288, ff. 467b-75a, gives a well-informed and very detailed account of 'Abbās I's conquest of Kij-Makrān; also see *A.A.A.*, pp. 609, 673. The Shah's letter to Golconda occurs in the *T. Quṭb-Shāhī*, C.U. King's, 89, ff. 243a-b, 245a-b. For subsequent accounts, see *Khuld*, IV, ff. 411b-12a, 446a, V, ff. 40a-b; *Dhail*, pp. 131-3; *Qīṣas*, f. 45a, 108b-11a. See *Sherleian Odyssey*, pp. 191-2, for Robert Sherley. Also see Curzon, *Persia*, I, chap IX; Le Strange, p. 329f.

appear to have made any attempt to counter Persian influence in the Kij-Makrān area, though they seem to have gained an ascendancy there, perhaps a short-lived one, about the years 1048-50/1638-40.¹ In any case, Fūshanj and Kij were of minor importance and their occupation by one party was no more than an irritation to the other.

We now come to the Deccan states in which both the Mughuls and the Safavids were interested, though in different ways. The Deccan kingdoms were variously connected with Persia. The Qutb-Shāhīs were descended from the Qarā-qoyūnlū (the Black Sheep) who ruled Persia, though only for a short period, in the fifteenth century.² The Qutb-Shāhīs, the 'Ādil-Shāhīs and the Nizām-Shāhīs had accepted Shiism and made it state religion under the inspiration of Safavid Persia.³ Exchange of embassies with Persia and the employment of Persians in high offices further strengthened the ties between the Deccan dynasties and the Safavid kingdom. When Akbar initiated his policy of aggressive imperialism in the Deccan, a clash with Persia was inevitable. The distance between Persia and the Deccan, and the fact that the former was not a naval power, precluded the possibility of her providing material assistance to the latter, though a powerful ruler like Shah 'Abbās I could offer diplomatic support. The diplomatic relations between Persia and the Deccan kingdoms and the recitation of the Shah's name in the *khutbā* in Golconda were highly irritating to the Mughuls, especially, to a strong emperor like Shah Jahān. Equally objectionable would have been Shah 'Abbās II's attempt to incite the Deccan kings against the Mughul empire during the War of Succession.

The Mughuls never seriously contemplated an invasion of Persia, while the Safavids, omitting the threat of 'Abbās II, never planned an invasion of Kābul or Sind. Yet as two powerful neighbours they were always apprehensive of each other's territorial ambitions. Vague references to designs on Persia, especially on *Khurāsān* (which had been under the Timurids before the rise of Shaibānī Khan and Shah Ismā'il I) are not lacking in the memoirs or chronicles of Bābur, Akbar, Jahāngīr, Shāh Jahān and Aurangzeb. Akbar even entertained the idea of conquering Sīstān where Persian authority had ceased to be effective after Ṭahmāsp's death.⁴ Then we find repeated mention in the East India Company records of Persian demand for the provinces

1. See *Gulshan-i 'Ināyat*, Bodleian 2709, ff. 12b-17a. For further details, see Calendar No. Sh. 125.

2. See V. Minorsky, 'The Qara-qoyunlu and the Qutb-Shahs,' *B.S.O.A.S.*, 1955, XVII/1, p. 50f., esp. p. 567.

3. See under 'The Deccan' in Ch. v above.

4. See Akbar's *farmān* to Rājī 'Alī Khan of *Khāndesh*, *Mukātabāt-i 'Allāmī*, pp. 52-7.

of Sind and Multān, and of intended Persian invasions of these areas.¹ Even Jahāngīr, despite his deep friendship with Shah 'Abbās, is said to have been considerably worried by a reported conversation at the Persian court concerning a proposed invasion of Lahore and Sind.² Imaginative people in both countries could seriously interpret such things as the Persian chronogram giving the date of Shah 'Abbās II's Qandahār victory:

آید کلید مملکت هند قندهار

(Qandahār came [into Persian hands] as the key to the empire of India).³

In periods of strained relations, there were apprehensions both in India and Persia of possible invasions from the other side. Both powers, therefore, maintained spies (*jāsūs*) and informers in each other's dominions.⁴ The services of traders and private travellers were occasionally utilised for this purpose. Even the prisoners of war acted as spies and sent secret reports to their respective governments.⁵ The Persian authorities maintained secret agents at Sūrat, Thatta and other places.⁶ Spies with a good knowledge of Indian languages were chosen for special missions.⁷ It is hardly necessary to add that it was part of an ambassador's business to keep a watchful eye and ear for any information that would be useful to his master at home.⁸ Some envoys were particularly deputed for this very purpose.

Sectarian considerations do not seem to have played a decisive part in Mughul-Safavid relations; such differences never stood in the way of friendship when other factors were favourable. At times of actual conflict the sectarian factor was emphasized but somewhat artificially and superficially. The Persian accounts thus describe Shah Jahān's army (the majority of whom were Muslim) in the Qandahār campaign as *junūd-i Hunūd*, i.e., the Hindu army.⁹ Similarly 'Abdul Ḥamid Lāhaurī talks of Shah Jahān's Qandahār campaign as directed towards uprooting *kufr*,¹⁰ even though the Indian army contained many non-

1. *E. I. Co. Letters*, 1602-13, pp. 278, 281. *English Factories*, 1622-3, pp. 99; 1655-60, p. 198; 1665-67, p. 165.

2. *Ihyā'ul Mulūk*, f. 215b; the reference relates to the period when relations between the two kings were very cordial.

3. *Khuld*, V, f. 124a. Cf. Abul Faḍl to *Khān-Khānān*: "the reduction of Qandahār will be a prelude to the conquest of Iran," see Ch. iv, Sec. iii above.

4. There are numerous references to spies in Safavid and Mughul chronicles; some of these are noted in the following footnotes, others have been noted in previous chapters.

5. E.g., K.K., I, p. 696.

6. K.K., II, p. 289; also see pp. 203-5; *Qīṣaṣ*, f. 138b.

7. *Qīṣaṣ*, f. 139a.

8. See Nizāmūl Mulk, *Siyāsat Nāma*, Tihiran, A.H.S. 1334, p. 101.

9. See in particular Muḥammad Sharif, *Zubdatut Tawārikh-i Sinandjī*, f. 136a.

10. Lāhaurī, II, p. 299.

Muslims and the adversary was a Muslim State. The author of the *‘Ālam Ārā-i ‘Abbāsī* rarely adduces the sectarian motive in his account of Mughul-Persian conflicts in the reigns of Ṭahmāsp and ‘Abbās I over Qandahār, but even he cannot help gloating over the replacement of the Sunnī by the Shī‘a *khutba* in the mosques of the fort.¹ Even Jahāngīr who was almost entirely free from religious intolerance and whose Memoirs give no hint of sectarian feeling, talked of a Sunnī alliance against Persia after Shah ‘Abbās’s seizure of Qandahār. But this propaganda was actually addressed to Tūrān where anti-Shiism was an active and living force.² Another area where sectarian considerations played some part was the Deccan. Here we should not forget that Shah ‘Abbās I lent his usual moral and diplomatic support to ‘Ādil Shah even when the latter had ceased to be a Shī‘a, though we admit that his relations with the Quṭb Shah who remained a Shī‘a were much closer. Incidentally, the tribes living around Qandahār were deeply divided on sectarian lines. Walī Qulī Shāmlū, author of the *Qışqul Khāqānī*, who served as a Persian officer in Qandahār, says that the Afghan tribes of Qandahār were extreme Sunnīs while the Hazāra tribes were extreme Shī‘as, and they were occasionally at each other’s throats.³ Thus in the Mughul-Persian conflicts over Qandahār, each side had partisans in the population in and around the fort.⁴

Political Relations: A Summing Up

Bābur, as king of the small kingdom of Kābul, entered into an unequal alliance with Shah Ismā‘īl I, the victor of Merv, and had of necessity to play a subsidiary rôle. His *entente* with Shah Ismā‘īl was, however, unproductive of any good for him or for Persia. But the “favours” of the Shah to Bābur gave the Safavid chroniclers a suitable theme to enlarge upon. Bābur’s capture of Qandahār and his conquest of India improved his status in relation to Persia. Bābur had amicable relations with Shah Ismā‘īl’s son and successor, Shah Ṭahmāsp. Ṭahmāsp’s victory over the Uzbegs at Jām was a resounding success. Bābur’s desire to take advantage of it by attacking the weakened Uzbegs was nullified by his death.

Humāyūn’s reign falls into two parts from the point of view of his relations with Persia. The first period is marked by mutual indifference, while the second is one of close co-operation and deep friendship between

1. *A.A.A.*, p. 686. Other works like the *Qışaṣ* and the *R. Şafaviyya* enlarge much more on the sectarian theme.

2. See preface to the *Sulūkul Mulūk*, and the *‘Abdullah Nāma*, ff. 498b-99a.

3. *Qışaṣ*, f. 106a; also see Nūrullah Shustarī, *Majālisul Mu‘minīn*, p. 163.

4. See: Bijan, ff. 69b-70a; *Qışaṣ*, f. 44b; *Khuld*, V, f. 125a; many other references.

Humāyūn and Ṭahmāsp.¹ Bairam Khan's distinguished Persian ancestry, his Shiism, his remarkable gifts as a diplomat and a negotiator and his urbanity and broad culture, enabled him to play a great role in Persia. It should not, however, be overlooked that Humāyūn's personal charm and innate goodness stood him in good stead in Iran. In spite of being a stranger in the land, he soon made powerful friends. Most of those with whom he came into intimate contact (like Bahrām Mirza Ṣafavī and the Qādī Jahān) remained his life-long friends. And many of the soldiers, poets, and painters, who met him in Persia, later came over to serve him loyally. As for Shah Ṭahmāsp, despite his sectarian fanaticism and his occasional insults to Humāyūn, the fact remains that the assistance he provided in men, money and material, was very substantial, and he showed a remarkable large-heartedness over Qandahār. Even though Humāyūn had to fight for the kingdom of Kābul and for the empire of India with his own men, it was Ṭahmāsp who set him on the way to it.

Kāmrān Mirza, the able and cultured but cruel and unfortunate second son of Bābur, also deserves comment. Whatever Mughul chroniclers and modern critics may say against Kāmrān in general (and he deserves a great deal, if not all, of it), his intrepid and ever-vigilant defence of Qandahār should have served as an example to the descendants of his royal brother. As defender of Qandahār, his achievements strikingly surpass those of Jahāngīr and Shāh Jahān whose resources were much greater than his.

During his long reign of half a century, Akbar was the contemporary of two great Persian monarchs, Ṭahmāsp and 'Abbās I. He also saw the rise and fall of the Uzbek power, close to his north-west frontier, under 'Abdullah Khan and 'Abdul Mu'min Khan. The interval of eleven years (1576-87) which intervened between the death of Ṭahmāsp and the accession of Shah 'Abbās witnessed a disastrous fall in Persian prestige, and the young Shah 'Abbās had to face great difficulties in the first decade of his reign. All this enabled the Uzbeks to build up their temporary hegemony in *Khurāsān*. Akbar had to deal with all these frontier problems and for full fourteen years he did not leave his north-western provinces in order to keep a close watch on the turbulent happenings beyond the border. Akbar's foreign policy was based on real-politik, with a single eye on his imperial dynastic interests. The care he professed for the sanctity of the Sayyid descent of the Safavids and for their welfare was inspired by self-interest, and his claim of fighting a holy war against the infidels of India and a crusade against the European (Portuguese), is cynically untrue to facts and was only intended for effect. His liberalism in

1. For a letter alleged to have been written by Humāyūn to the Ottoman Sultan Sulaimān, condemning Shah Ṭahmāsp in strong terms and proposing a joint invasion of Iran, see Riazul Islam, *Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations*, Calendar No. Ott. 380.

matters of religion and sectarian beliefs stands in direct contrast to the fanaticism of the early Safavids. It is notable that Professor Naṣrullah Falsafi, a leading scholar of modern Persia, has commended Akbar's policy in the following words:

"Jalāluddīn Akbar was a liberal-minded, sagacious and enlightened ruler, and unlike the early Safavid monarchs and most of the Ottoman Sultans, was free from religious fanaticism. He regarded with disapproval and disgust the battles of Shī'a and Sunnī and the carnage and despoilment which the Kings of Iran and Turkey inflicted in the name of *jihād* on the Christians in Georgia and the Balkans."¹

Akbar lost Qandahār after his accession, but he was fortunate to recover it later without striking a blow and at a time when Shah 'Abbās I was powerless even to protest. The power that the Mughul Empire attained under Akbar and the prestige that accrued from his unbroken succession of victories made Shah 'Abbās I, even after his great success in *Khurāsān* and elsewhere, cautious in his relations with Akbar. The Shah made no attempt to recover Qandahār during the latter's life-time beyond making a formal request for its restoration. Akbar was a thorough-going imperialist and there are indications in the *Akbar Nāma* that but for the emergence of 'Abdullah Khan Uzbeg, his own engrossing problems in India and the indolence of his crown prince Mirza Salīm, he would have attempted to conquer Tūrān.²

Jahāngīr was throughout in a weaker position than Shah 'Abbās I. The Shah had been on the throne for eighteen years when Jahāngīr began his reign. During all these years as well as the subsequent period, the Shah's prestige and power never ceased to grow. Jahāngīr had intermittent trouble in the Deccan and, as Dr. Beni Prasad has rightly pointed out, the Mughul victories in the Deccan were spectacular but unreal. Prince Shah Jahān's disaffection made things yet more difficult. Placed in this situation, Jahāngīr regarded his friendship with the Shah as good fortune. He was earnestly devoted to this friendship and spoke of it with pride and feeling in the *Memoirs*. He had the Shah's picture depicted with his own and those of Akbar and Humāyūn in his picture gallery, and speaks of this feelingly.³ He was, therefore, genuinely surprised and deeply shocked at the Shah's attack on Qandahār. His subsequent conduct does him hardly any credit. His letter of protest to the Shah, in spite of its air of dignity, is the whine of a weak man.⁴ His next letter verges almost on flattery.⁵ And yet during all this period he was making

1. Falsafi, *'Abbās-i Awwal*, I, p. 226. Compare with Jahāngīr's tribute to his father's liberalism in the *Tūzūk*, p. 16; R. and B., p. 37, 37n.

2. *A.N.*, III, pp. 211-12, 496-7, 738-9.

3. *Tūzūk*, p. 308.

4. Calendar No. J. 91.

5. Calendar No. J. 95.

what efforts he could for the recovery of Qandahār, though perhaps not without a sense of futility.

Shah Jahān's reign marks a turning point in Indo-Persian relations, and in fact in the story of the Mughul Empire. His over-weening ambition led him to attempt the impossible—to conquer and to rule Tūrān, with disastrous and far-reaching consequences. He was also responsible for a basic change in the pattern of relations with Persia. Qandahār had all along been a bone of contention between the Mughuls and the Safavids, but the good sense and forbearance of both parties had prevented its becoming a source of acute enmity. Seizure of Qandahār by one party at a favourable opportunity and temporary acquiescence by the other side had been the norm of Mughul-Safavid relations since the days of Bābur. The fort had changed hands in every reign, without involving any serious consequences to mutual understanding.¹ It was Shah Jahān who changed the norm by carrying the quarrel over Qandahār to its logical conclusion in bitter and prolonged hostilities. The drain on the Mughul resources, resulting from the Balkh campaign and the three fruitless Qandahar expeditions, was tremendous;² the loss of prestige was even greater. And in diverse ways did the empire suffer materially. For example, the supply of 'Irāqī horses, so essential for the cavalry, was completely stopped for some time. Even the English merchants were apprehensive lest their supplying Arab horses to the Mughuls should antagonise the Shah of Iran.³

Aurangzeb was wise enough to realise the need for restoring normal relations with Persia and he made all reasonable efforts in that direction. But for the impetuosity of Shah 'Abbās II, friendly relations could have been established. As Aurangzeb had no real desire to resume the struggle for Qandahār, there was no reason why such a friendship should not have lasted throughout his reign. Shah 'Abbās II, however, put an end to all this. We are inclined to believe that, in addition to the reasons enumerated earlier, the hangover of bitterness from the hostilities of the previous reign, in which Aurangzeb as a prince played a notable role, was also partly responsible for bad relations. The threat to India doubtless passed away with 'Abbās II's death, but nevertheless left a legacy of bad feeling. For the rest of his reign, Aurangzeb felt no need to reopen relations with Persia. 'Abbās II's successors were *rois fainéant* who were taken up with their own pursuits of pleasure or impolitic piety and with display of empty pomp which was all that was left to them of

1. See Hasan Khan's letter (prob. to Qilij Khan), *Shāmī Letters*, B. M. Add. 7802, ff. 87b-89b, wherein Hasan Khan says, "Occupation of Qandahār by one party or the other has never led to the termination of friendship between the two dynasties." Calendar No. Sh. 122.

2. Dr. Jahangir Khan who has carefully worked out the figures, places the total expenditure on these campaigns at twenty krons (200 million rupees), *N.W.F. Policy*, pp. 250-52.

3. *English Factories*, 1637-41, p. 301. For other references, see p. 174 n. above.

former Safavid greatness. It was not till after Aurangzeb's death (1707) that relations were resumed between the two courts,¹ but by that time both dynasties had lost much of their vitality and were certainly on the way to slow extinction. The end came much faster in Iran, with the Afghan invasion of the country in 1722. It is rather interesting that a contemporary European observer has remarked that the Persian occupation of Qandahār was a major factor in her misfortune, for "if Candahar had been in the Hands of Great Mogul, the Aghvans would never have attempted to conquer the kingdom as they have done."²

The Mughul empire of India and the Safavid empire of Persia alike showed signs of disintegration by the beginning of the eighteenth century. The tribes of western Afghānistān had come under Safavid rule but they turned the tables by invading Persia and sacking Iṣfahān under the Ghilzai leader, Maḥmūd Shah; Iran was ravaged and laid waste during the brief period of Afghan supremacy, 1722-29. To the east confusion was growing in the administration of the outlying provinces of the Mughul empire. At this juncture Nādir Shah appeared on the scene as an instrument of vengeance, a world conqueror. He turned the Afghans out of Persia, drove back the Turks and Russians from the Caspian marches, and seized the Persian crown. The invasion of India by Nādir Shah and the sack of Delhi administered the final blow to the tottering authority of the Mughul dynasty; henceforth the emperor ruled only in name. These events took place in the cold weather of 1151-2/1738-9, only thirty-two years after the death of Aurangzeb.

A Comparison of Mughul India with Safavid Persia

Broadly speaking, the Mughul empire compares favourably with contemporary Persia in material civilization, in the patronage of humanities and in a liberal policy in religious and sectarian matters. The Safavid regime suffered from intolerance which led to cultural deterioration and intellectual impoverishment in Iran. While the Indian Mughuls were inclined towards mysticism, the Safavids almost extinguished Sufism in Iran and thereby destroyed one of the main springs of Persian lyrical poetry.³ Persia had the advantage (comparatively speaking) in a more integrated population. The Turks who came into Persia with the rise of the Safavid political movement, became absorbed (though not completely) in the Persian social structure, most of them

1. See Ch. viii, Sec. i.

2. Father Krusinski, *The History of the Late Revolutions of Persia*, London, 1740, vol. I, p. 50.

3. See Professor Gibb's note in Toynbee, *A Study of History*, I, pp. 401-2, para. No. 8; E. G. Browne, IV, pp. 24-8. Professor Toynbee (I, pp. 347-402) considers the revival of Shiism in Iran and the violent conflicts it generated as the main cause of the decline of the world of Islam. For Shah 'Abbās I's persecution of liberal elements in Iran, see *A.A.A.*, pp. 323-25.

indeed in the upper strata.¹ The union of state and religion under Safavid auspices led to the birth of national consciousness in Persia, which was strengthened by recurring wars with the Sunnī powers on the east and the west.² In the vital matter of armed strength, Safavid Persia had an edge over Mughul India. Throughout our period, Mughul imperial forces never scored a military success at Qandahār. Bābur, Humāyūn, Akbar and Shah Jahān captured the fort by ruse or intrigue; it was left to the generally discredited Kāmran Mirza to score a straight military victory against the Persians. As it became strikingly evident in Shah Jahān's Qandahār campaigns, the principal inferiority of the Mughuls lay in artillery and siege-trains. According to Khāfi Khan, the Mughuls were inferior in artillery even to the Deccan kingdoms.³ The Safavids throughout their history had to contend with the Turks who were famous for their siege-trains and artillery, and had perforce to improve their own. Shah 'Abbās I employed European gunners and the famous Sherley brothers⁴ played a notable role in the improvement of Persian firearms.⁵ Shah 'Abbās I's far-reaching reorganisation of his armed forces made them much more unified and increased their striking power.⁶ His reforms also greatly strengthened the royal authority and weakened the power of the nobles. During the major part of the seventeenth century, the Mughul empire, despite its wide extent, its vast economic resources and its liberal cultural policy, remained militarily weaker than Safavid Persia.

The superiority of Persian arms under the command of Nādir Shah, one of the greatest generals in world history, over the Mughul forces, is only too obvious to be pointed out.

1. Professor Vambéry, in an illuminating article (*Asiatic Quarterly Review*, London, 1886, pp. 163-79) disproves the assumption that the Turks represented merely a small fraction of Persian population and came to Persia after the advent of Islam. He traces Turkish influx and settlement in Persia long before that. He also observes that the Persian Turks were more fanatic and rigid Shi'as than Iranian Persians. Also see Minorsky, *T.M.*, pp. 187-8. Prof. Minorsky points out that the Turkomans and the Persians remained distinct in many ways.

2. See Editor's Introduction to the *Silsilatun Nasab-i Safaviyya*, pp. 1-7.

3. K.K., I, p. 274. The presence of the Europeans in the neighbouring territories, says Khāfi Khan, ensured a good supply of guns, muskets and gun-powder in the Deccan.

4. Sir Anthony, Sir Robert and Sir Thomas Sherley.

5. See E. G. Browne (IV, pp. 105-6) who quotes from *Purchas His Pilgrims*. For 'Abbās II's employment of English and Dutch gunners in the siege of Qandahār, see *English Factories*, 1646-50, p. 262.

6. Minorsky, *T.M.*, Intr., p. 30.

APPENDIX A

TRADITION OF AMĪR TĪMŪR'S ASSOCIATION WITH KHWĀJA SULTAN 'ALĪ

The ancestors of Shah Ismā'il, the founder of the Safavid dynasty, lived at Ardabīl in Ādharbāijān and were celebrated for their piety and spiritual powers. The tradition of Amīr Tīmūr's association with one of these Shaiḵhs (saints and spiritual preceptors) is a recurring theme in Mughul-Safavid relations, especially in their mutual correspondence. The story has all the wonderful details of hagiological character. It occurs in many works with varying details. As Iskandar Beg *Munshī* (*A.A.A.*, p. 12) remarks, the Safavid saint popularly but erroneously associated with this story is Shaiḵh Ṣadrudīn Mūsā (son of Shaiḵh Ṣafīuddīn Ishāq, b. 650/1252-3, d. 735/1334-35, from whom the dynasty takes its name). According to the carefully worked out chronology of Dr. Ghulām Sarwar (*History of Shah Ismā'il Ṣafawī*, p. 110), Shaiḵh Ṣadrudīn Mūsā died in 794/1391-92, which excludes the possibility of his meeting Tīmūr after the latter's conquest of Turkey in the opening years of the fifteenth century.

The story, shorn of its various details, is that when Tīmūr was crossing the Oxus in order to conquer Khurāsān, his whip fell into the river. Taking it as a bad omen, he was going to abandon the campaign, when a holy man miraculously appeared and recovered the fallen whip. The holy man said he belonged to Ardabīl, foretold two more meetings with Tīmūr, and disappeared. The saint appeared once again before Tīmūr at a bridge over the river Dizful¹ when the latter was returning from 'Irāq into Fārs. When Tīmūr was marching back from his successful invasion of Asia Minor (804-5/1402-3), he stopped at Ardabīl. Having heard the fame of Khwāja Sultan 'Alī (son of Shaiḵh Ṣadrudīn Mūsā), he went to see him and found him to be the same

1. Dizful river and town of the same name in Khuzistān, Persia; see Le Strange, pp. 233, 238, 239.

holy man who had already appeared before him twice. On this occasion he witnessed a further exhibition of the spiritual powers of the saint and became deeply devoted to him. The Amīr importunately solicited the saint to demand something from him as a token of his saintly favour. The saint asked for the Turkish prisoners of war which the great conqueror had brought from Asia Minor. Tīmūr handed over the prisoners to him. Further he purchased extensive landed property near Ardabīl and elsewhere in Persia and made it an endowment to the Shaikh's family. The saint set free all the Turkish prisoners. Some of them settled at Ardabīl on the land provided by the Shaikh and came to be called *Şūfiyān-i Rūmlū*; while the rest, after accepting the religious leadership of the Shaikh, went back to Turkey. The saint exhorted the departing Turks to be the standard-bearers of his Order in Asia Minor. Tīmūr is also said to have issued an order to the Ottoman Sultan and the Ottoman officials not to molest these returning Turks, nor prevent them from visiting the saint as often as they liked.¹ These released Turkish prisoners became the spearhead of the religio-political influence of the Safavid family and thus laid the foundation of its future greatness.

The most detailed statement of the tradition, and also the earliest known to us occurs in the untitled and anonymous history of Shah Ismā'il I (C.U. Add. 200), composed in the reign of Shah Ṭahmāsp.² The *Ḥabībūs Siyar* does not seem to mention it either in the account of Tīmūr or of the ancestors of Shah Ismā'il. The author of the '*Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī*' (p. 12) judiciously remarks, "I have not come across this tradition in any historical work or any prose or versified account of this Holy Order (i.e., the Safavid saints), but have recorded it here because of its popularity and its currency." The *Ẓafar Nāma* of Maulānā Sharafuddīn Yazdī, written twenty years after Tīmūr's death, seems to make no mention of it, nor of Tīmūr's visit to Ardabīl in the account of his return from Turkey. But in the *Malfūẓāt-i Tīmūrī* (Stewart's

1. This account is based mainly on the C.U. Add. 200, ff. 8b-11a; the '*Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī*', p. 12; the *Tārīkh-i Sultānī*, ff. 229b-97a; the *Silsilatun Nasab-i Şafaviyya* by Shaikh Ḥusain Zāhidī, pp. 46-9; *Maqāl*, f. 33b-35a (follows A.A.A. word by word); *Nasab Nāma-i A'lā ḥaḍrat-i Shāhī*, Panjab University MS, ff. 7a-8a. Also see Sir John Malcolm, *History of Persia*, vol. I, p. 495 n, wherein the *Ẓubdatut Tawārīkh* is quoted, and Minorsky, *T.M.*, pp. 189-90.

Another work which gives a detailed account of the matter is the *Tārīkh-i Ismā'il*, Ethé 536. The manuscript is defective at the beginning and is also lacking in a subscription. Its authorship has not been thus far ascertained, but it appears to have been composed in the reign of Shah Sulaimān Şafavī (acc. 1077/1666) who is mentioned in the list of Safavid rulers. The work describes in great detail the story of the meeting of Tīmūr with "Sultan 'Alī Siyāh-pōsh", but seems to make no mention of Tīmūr's giving any lands to Sultan 'Alī.

2. 'Abdul Wahhāb in the *Shamsut Tawārīkh*, C.U.MS, f. 156a-b, cites an earlier work, the *Şifātūş Şafā*, as its source. If the *Şafwatūş Şafā* is meant, the work was written over half a century before Tīmūr's invasion of Turkey. 'Abdul Wahhāb may, however, have used one of the subsequently amended manuscripts. (See the *Post-script* at the end of this Appendix).

translation, pp. 7-8, also Appendix IV) whose genuineness is now generally discredited (see Rieu, I, p. 78; Storey, I, p. 280), Tīmūr is made to narrate his meeting with the Ardabil saint and the number of prisoners released by him is given as 40,000.

The tradition suited the purpose of the Mughuls as well as the Safavids. The Mughuls claimed that it was Tīmūr who set going the process that led to the foundation of the secular power of the Safavids. The latter described the great conqueror as a disciple of one of their ancestors. The story is, therefore, frequently alluded to in the Mughul-Safavid correspondence, each side placing more emphasis on the part that suited it. The most pointed references to it occur in Akbar's farmān to Rājī 'Alī Khan of Khāndesh, and in the letter which Aurangzeb wrote in reply to Shah 'Abbās II's insulting letter, wherein Aurangzeb says, "The benefits conferred by the *Sāhib Qirān* (i.e., Tīmūr) on your ancestors are inscribed in bold letters on the portico of time. (For you) to act ungratefully is to dig ditches in your own path."¹ The "good turn" done by Tīmūr was the obvious counterpoise on which the Mughuls had to fall back again and again in answering Safavid royal letters which so frequently referred to Shah Tahmāsp's help to Humāyūn.²

Let us now examine the historical authenticity of the tradition. The hagiological part can be at once dismissed, but it is not without significance. It was evidently added by the Safavid writers in order to counterbalance the other part of the story which laid the Safavids under obligation to Tīmūr. Coming to the core of the story, it is interesting to record that more than one Safavid historian has referred to the discovery of a document near Andkhud during Shah 'Abbās I's march to Balkh in 1010-11/1602-3. This document was said to bear Tīmūr's imperial seal (*āl-i tamghā*) and to record the endowment of certain properties in the name of the Safavid saint, and to describe the miraculous deeds of Khwāja Sultan 'Alī. (*A.A.A.*; *T. Sulṭānī*; *Silsilatun Nasab*; *Nasab Nāma-i Ā'lā ḥaḍrat-i Shāhī*).³ (A document answering this description is preserved in the Āstāna-i Quds Library, Mashhad, under the title of the *Shukūk wa Sijillāt-i Tīmūrī*, MS No. 69. The document forms the subject of a scholarly article by Dr. H. Horst, see the post-script to this Appendix.) Shah 'Abbās I in a letter to Prince Salīm (later Jahāngīr) mentions the discovery of this document at Andkhud during his march to Balkh and says he is sending a copy of the document with the bearer of the letter. (B.M. Or. 3482, ff.

1. For Akbar's farmān, see *Mukātabāt-i 'Allāmī*, Calcutta Ed., pp. 52-7; Calendar No. A.34. For Aurangzeb's letter, *F.Q.*, pp. 496-9; Calendar No. Ab. 246.

2. Jauhar *Āftābchī*, in his account of Humāyūn's visit to Ardabil, recalls that an ancestor of Shah Tahmāsp had ascended his saintly throne with Tīmūr's assistance. Dr. Haq's translation, p. 111; also see Stewart's note, p. 57.

3. For folio and page references, see p. 188 n. above.

223a-24b; *Munsha'āt-i Ṭūsī*, Bib. Nationale, ff. 225a-29b). There is, however, no reference to it in the *Tūzūk-i Jahāngīrī*, nor have we come across any mention of it in the chronicles of Jahāngīr's reign. Sayyid Ḥasan al-Ḥusainī, author of the *Tārīkh-i Sulṭānī*, claims to have seen the document, says it was dated A.H. 860 (*sic*) [806 in the *Shukūk*], and even quotes a part of it; the extract quoted contains the genealogy of *Khwāja* Sultan 'Alī, linking him directly to the Holy Prophet. The author puts the annual income of the endowment at 4,000 Tūmāns, says the endowment was known in his day as *mauqūfāt-i qadīmī-i Amīr Timūr* (ancient endowments of Amīr Timūr) and was administered under the trusteeship of the Safavid monarchs. However, the inclusion of the lineage of *Khwāja* Sultan 'Alī makes the genuineness of the document seen by Sayyid Ḥasan al-Ḥusainī very much open to doubt, for the prophetic descent, so fervently claimed by the Safavids, was questioned by some of their contemporaries (Sultan Sulaimān I once called Ṭahmāsp *siyādat iktisāb*, that is, Sayyid by acquisition) and is not considered now to be very well-founded. (See Falsafī, *Shah 'Abbās-i Awwal*, I, p. 3.) The document appears to be a fabrication. The author of the *Silsilatun Nasab* also mentions the discovery of the document and quotes 'Abbas I's remark that the properties mentioned therein were probably never actually handed over to the Shaikh as none of them had been inherited by his descendants.

Timūr was in his own way a religious man and showed veneration to holy men and their shrines, as is borne out by the *Zafar Nāma* of Sharafuddīn 'Alī Yazdī. It is not unlikely that he visited Ardabīl and paid his respects to *Khwāja* Sultan 'Alī, for the *silsila* (religious Order) and the town where it was located had already attained celebrity. (For the latter point, see *Şafwatus Şafā*, composed in 759/1358). There is nothing improbable too in the story of the holy man asking for the liberation of the Muslim prisoners of war. The subsequent history of the family and the widespread Turkish following it had in Asia and elsewhere (see Minorsky, *T.M.*, p. 188), tends to corroborate it. The liberated Turkish prisoners are generally considered to have provided the nucleus of a deeply devoted band of followers, whose progeny helped the saintly family of Ardabīl to attain political power towards the end of the XVth and the beginning of the XVIth centuries.

There is no contemporary evidence for the tradition. But the reverence shown to it by both the Mughuls and the Safavids and the recurring mention of it in one form or another in numerous works suggest that the tradition had a substratum of truth.

Post-Script

The Appendix above was written in 1957. It was several years later

that Dr. H. Horst's learned article, 'Tīmūr und Hōgā 'Alī: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Safawiden' (1958), came to my notice. Dr. Horst has marshalled all the evidence on the question of Tīmūr's *waqf-nāma* in favour of Khwāja 'Alī and has gone thoroughly into the problems arising from the document. In 1963 I also had an opportunity of examining at the Mashhad Library the document entitled the *Ṣukūk wa Sijillāt-i Tīmūri*, which forms the subject of Dr. Horst's article. The main points of Dr. Horst's article (if I have followed it correctly) relevant to our purpose are as follows:

The *waqf-nāma* is not a genuine document of Tīmūr. It was in all probability forged before 1011/1602-3. Regarding the claim of Safavid historians that the document was discovered in 1011/1602-3 at Andkhud during Shah 'Abbās I's campaign, Horst opines that either a document forged previously came to light on that occasion, or a document was forged for the occasion and put in the hands of the troops so as to give the whole thing the appearance of a discovery. The forger was not conversant with the art of drawing up documents; his knowledge of Arabic is poor and his Persian constructions are defective. A comparison of Tīmūr's seals given in this document with his authentic seals, as given for instance in his letter to Charles VI and in Ibn 'Arab Shah's *'Ajā'ibul Maqdūr*, shows the seals reproduced in the document to be false. The appearance of the word *al-'abd* before Tīmūr's name in the seal finds no support either in Tīmūr's known seals or in the chronicles of his period. On the other hand the word appears in Shah Ismā'il's seals. The seals of the *waqf-nāma* are indeed all in Shiite style. The prophecies given in the document regarding the future establishment of Safavid power by a descendant of Khwāja 'Alī in the fourth generation, and the subsequent expansion of the Safavid dominion by a descendant of that descendant, are the weakest part of the document and indeed go to prove its falseness. The legend about Khwāja 'Alī, as given in the *waqf-nāma*, started in Shah 'Abbās I's reign. The purpose of the forgery was to provide evidence (purporting to come from Tīmūr) for Safavid claims to descent from the Holy Prophet.

The genuineness of Safavid genealogies which connect the family to the Holy Prophet are very much open to doubt. The (original) genealogies were altered after the Safavids became a ruling power. E. G. Browne as well as Aḥmad Kisrawī holds that the Safavids were not Sayyids. Professor A. Z. V. Togan in his paper 'Sur l'origine des Safavides' has shown that the older manuscripts of the *Ṣafwat as-ṣafā* written before the Safavid accession to power, speak of the forebears of the family as Sunnīs, and that it is only in the MSS written after that event that the family is labelled Shī'a. Contemporary non-Safavid sources (says Horst) represent the Safavid ancestors to be Kurds of the Sunnī persuasion.

As regards the meeting between Tīmūr and Khwāja 'Alī, Horst says that no contemporary source mentions any such meeting, but, observes Horst, this is no proof that no meeting took place. Mentioning Tīmūr's respect for religious men, he says there was nothing improbable if Tīmūr gave endowments to Khwāja 'Alī.

It will be seen that there is no major difference between my conclusions and those of Dr. Horst.

APPENDIX B

BĀBUR'S CONVERSION TO SHIISM AND HIS VASSALAGE COINS

Did Bābur during his occupation of Samarqand (Rajab 917—Šafar 918/Oct. 1511—May 1512), strike money bearing Shī'a legends and the name of Ismā'il Šafavī? And did he accept the Shī'a creed as a condition of Persian military aid? These are allied questions.

There is sufficient historical evidence to show that Bābur actually issued coins as a vassal of Shah Ismā'il. The contemporary *Ḥabībūs Siyar* (III, iv, p. 66) says that Bābur offered to the Shah to recite the *khutba* and strike *sikka* in his name if the Shah would help him in Transoxiana. It further notes (p. 67) that after occupying Samarqand, Bābur fulfilled this promise. The C. U. Add.200 (f. 122b) follows the *Ḥabībūs Siyar* about Bābur's offer and states that he recited the *khutba* in the Shah's name and struck *sikka* with the name of the twelve Imāms (the same in the *Aḥsanut Tawārikh*, p. 128). The *Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī* (p. 30) and the *Khulāṣa-i Maqāl* (f. 70b) repeat the statement about the *khutba* but say nothing about the *sikka*. Turning to Mughul authorities, the earlier sources are silent on the subject; Firishta (I, p. 372) and Khāfi Khan (I, p. 43) assert that Bābur read the *khutba* and struck the *sikka* in his own name; the *Tawārikh-i Badī'a* (f. 113a-b), follows them. The *Tadhkira-i Salāṭīn-i Chaghātā* (p. 208) is the only Mughul work to state that Bābur read the *khutba* in the name of the Imāms.

The weight of historical evidence favours Bābur's having struck coins in the name of Shah Ismā'il or the Imāms or both. The contemporary evidence of Khwand Amīr, who is generally well-informed, impartial and reliable, cannot be lightly set aside. It is also reasonable that Shah Ismā'il would not have advanced substantial military aid without obtaining in return some such concession.

Let us now pass on to the numismatic evidence on this point. Dr R. S. Poole in the *B. M. Catalogue of the Coins . . . of Persia* (pp. xxiv-ix and pp. 210-11)

has ascribed to the Emperor Zāhīruddīn Muḥammad Bābur one gold coin with Shī'a legends and the name of Shah Ismā'il, and four silver coins with a Shī'a inscription and the name of Sultan Bābur *Bahādur*. The four silver coins are again described as Emperor Bābur's coins by S. Lane-Poole in the *B. M. Catalogue of the Coins of the Mughul Emperors* (p. 6). The coins have neither date nor mint. Sir Richard Burn, who found six more coins similar to the above-mentioned four (though varying in type), has discussed the problem in a paper in the *Numismatic Chronicle*, London (Vol. XVIII, 1938, pp. 176-8, 195) wherein he suggests that the silver coins were struck by Abul Qāsim Bābur of Herāt (A.H. 851-61).¹ He argues that "the epithet 'Bahādur' on them is more commonly used by the descendants of Tīmūr in Persia than by Bābur the Chaghatāi. The latter held Samarkand only from October 1511 to May 1512 and he is unlikely to have issued five different types of coins in that short space and in the very limited area which he held, while Abul-Kasim ruled precariously for much longer and over a wider territory." Moreover, these six coins were part of a single find, which (except for one coin of 1292/1875-6, presumably added later) "may have been deposited about 870 or A.D. 1465-1466."

The present writer has examined the gold coin and the four silver coins mentioned by Dr. R. S. Poole, and one more similar silver piece (bearing the Register No. 1921, 1118, 33 J. R. Scott) in the British Museum. The gold coin (*B. M. Cat. of the Coins. . . of Persia*, pp. 210-11, No. 625) bears an elaborate Shī'a legend² and the name of Shah Ismā'il but not that of Bābur; the other name on the coin which has been read as Sultan Muḥammad can by no stretch of imagination be identified as that of Emperor Bābur. It may also be pointed out that Dr. R. S. Poole (*op. cit.*, pp. xxiv-v) himself describes this coin as resembling in fabric the coins seen in Astrābād, Herāt and Merv — that is to say, outside the areas ever controlled by Emperor Bābur.

As regards the silver coins, we are inclined to uphold Sir Richard Burn's suggestion. The known coins of Abul Qāsim Bābur, it may be pointed out, bear a distinctly Sunnī legend,³ i.e., the names of the four Pious Caliphs. As to why he issued coins bearing Shī'a legends is another problem, but it lies beyond the scope of our subject. Some of his contemporaries too issued coins with Shī'a as well as with Sunnī legends. (See Sir R. Burn's above-cited article, pp. 180-92, *Coins of Jahān Shah*).

The conclusion to which we come is that Bābur did actually issue coins bearing Shī'a legends or the name of Shah Ismā'il or both, but no such piece

1. Also see: Rabino, *Coins. . . of Iran*, p. 27 n.

2. See Rabino, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

3. *B.M. Cat. of the Coinage of Bukhara*, p. 45, No. 121; also see Sir R. Burn's above-cited article, p. 176.

has yet been found. It would be reasonable to presume that Bābur struck such coins only to honour his pledge to the Shah and not with the intent of making them current tender in Samarqand. If so, Bābur would have struck them in very small numbers to send them as presents to the Shah as proof of his allegiance. This may also explain their total disappearance.¹

Conversion

We are not concerned here with Bābur's religious views in general. It may, however, be relevantly pointed out that there are several references in his memoirs showing his dislike of Sunnī renegades to Shiism.² At the same time Bābur was free from any morbid sectarian fanaticism such as characterised the early Safavids. He had amicable relations with many Shī'as. He had a cordial friendship with Amīr Ghiyāthuddīn of Herāt, whose promotion to the Ṣadārat³ of Khurāsān by Shah Ismā'il vouches for his strong Shī'a views.⁴ Bābur extended an invitation to Khwand Amīr, the famous universal historian of Herāt, a Shī'a, to join his court and the latter after some time did join his service.⁵ Bābur selected Bairam Beg (a Shī'a) to be the constant companion of Humāyūn.⁶

Lacking thus any strong fanatical antipathy towards Shiism, Bābur would not have found it very difficult, though by no means pleasant, to have accepted it for political reasons, especially when the stake was no less than the throne of Samarqand. It is certain that he actually accepted Shiism and even adopted the Qizilbāsh dress, and read the *khutba* in the Shī'a fashion at least in Samarqand. In addition to the *Ḥabīb* *Siyar* and the *Tārīkh-i Rashidī*, both contemporary sources, we have the very interesting evidence of the *Sulūk* *Mulūk* by Faḍlullah Rūzbihān, who was in Samarqand during the period of Bābur's occupation of the great city.⁷ He squarely blames Bābur of imposing on Transoxiana Shiism which had thus far remained confined only to the other side of the Oxus. He further observes that but for 'Ubaidullah Khan the fire of Shī'a heresy would have swept the whole of Transoxiana. The

1. The coins of Bābur bearing Sunnī legends, struck by him during his previous occupation of Qandahār (906/1500-1), have survived. See Dr. R. B. Whitehead, *Catalogue of the Coins in the Panjab Museum*, II, p. 4.

2. *B.N.*, pp. 258, 262; also see Bābur's remark on the "dubious" religious beliefs of the Khurāsānīs in his letter to Mirza Kāmārān, *J.A.S.B.*, 1919, pp. 331-4.

3. *I.e.*, the office of Ṣadr or chief of religious affairs.

4. *H.S.*, III, iv, pp. 98-9; Add. 200 ff. 175b-77a.

5. Khwand Amīr's *Nāma-i Nāmī*, ff. 17-18; Intr. to the new Tihiran Edition of the *H.S.*

6. *M.R.*, I, pp. 64-5; *Firishta*, I, p. 473.

7. *H.S.*, III, iv, 98-9; *T.R.*, pp. 246, 259, 261; *Sulūk* *Mulūk* f. 3b-8b. Also see 'Abdullah *Nāma*, ff. 34a-35a; *Tadh. Salāṭin-i Chaghātā* (R.A.S.MS), p. 208. For the author of *Sulūk* *Mulūk*, see Storey, I, p. 300.

preface of the work brings out clearly the strength of the Sunnī sectarian feeling among the people of Transoxiana as a factor in their ceaseless conflict with the Persians.

It hardly needs to be added that after his Transoxianian misadventure and his return to Kābul, Bābur quietly returned to his Sunnī faith. But he came back from Ghujduwān without being contaminated by the fanaticism of either his Persian allies or his Uzbek opponents.

APPENDIX C

HUMĀYŪN'S CONVERSION TO SHIISM

Humāyūn was a Sunnī Muslim. But he appears to have been, like his illustrious father, always free from strong sectarian prejudices. He and Bairam Khan (who was a Shī'a) were lifelong friends. The famous Persian historian, Khwand Amīr (also a Shī'a), remained in Humāyūn's service till his (Khwand Amīr's) death in 941-2/1534-6.¹ Firishta (I, p. 460) observes that Humāyūn, from his princely days, patronised Khurāsānīs and Persians of Shiite persuasion, and that after his accession many Persians came and joined his service. Humāyūn had a weakness for innovations and new ideas, sometimes with a touch of fantasy,² and this tendency seems to have found its way in religious matters also.³ All this shows him to be free from rigid orthodoxy. It is, therefore, not surprising that some people (including Kāmrān Mirza, who was firmly orthodox in his religious views) suspected him of Shiite leanings.⁴ As elsewhere stated, some of Humāyūn's own commanders deserted him after his defeat by Sher Shah, on the specific ground of his favouring the Shī'as.⁵

On his arrival in Persia, it was Humāyūn's policy to propitiate Shah Ṭahmāsp,⁶ without, however, in any way abandoning his own Sunnī faith. He must have been aware that the religious question was sure to come up during his stay in Persia, for at the first halt after entry into the Shah's dominions, we find him discussing religious beliefs with the first well-read Persian he met,

1. See Rieu, p. 1024; Storey, I, p. 101.

2. See Khwand Amīr's Qānūn-i Humāyūnī, also known as *Humāyūn Nāma*, Bib. Indica, 1940, tr. Dr. Bani Prasad, Bib. Indica, 1940; Banerji, *Humayun Badshah*, II, pp. 332-40.

3. See Ṭahmāsp's draft letter, *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 80a-81a, quoted earlier; *Badāyūnī*, I, p. 446.

4. *Badāyūnī*, I, p. 453; *Firishta*, I, p. 446, 460; *Bāyazid*, p. 100.

5. *Firishta*, I, p. 424; also see a contemporary reference cited in Appendix F below.

6. See Humāyūn's letter asking the Shah's permission to visit Mashhad, *Tūsī*, f. 132f; *Calendar No. H. 9*; and Jauhar's account of Humāyūn's visit to Mashhad, *Jauhar*, f. 67a-b, Stewart, pp. 59-60.

namely, Husain Qulī Sultan, brother of Aḥmad Sultan, *ḥakīm* of ʿĪstān.¹ But in spite of Humāyūn's sectarian liberalism and his long and pleasant association with Shī'as, Ṭahmāsp's demand for explicit acceptance of the Shī'a faith, came as a shock to him. He felt miserable and demurred, but ultimately agreed under the pressure of circumstances and for political reasons.²

After his return from Persia, Humāyūn reverted to his Sunnī faith, as is evident from his coins.³ The Shah still pretended to accept him as a Shī'a, for in a letter he emphasises their mutual identity of faith.⁴ In any case Humāyūn adhered to a liberal sectarian policy. Many Shiite Persians joined his service; some came at his invitation while others joined of their own accord, in some cases even without the Shah's permission.⁵ According to an anecdote related by Badāyūnī, Humāyūn's army at Kābul had a large proportion of Shī'as.⁶

1. For details, see Bāyazīd, pp. 9-10; *A.N.*, I, p. 204, tr. pp. 415-16; *M.R.*, I, p. 576. Husain Qulī Sultan later joined Humāyūn's service.

2. See pp. 31-2 above. According to Badāyūnī's highly coloured account, Humāyūn accepted the Shī'a creed including the *tabarrā*. Badāyūnī, I, p. 445.

3. Dr. R. B. Whitehead, *Cat. of the Coins in the Panjab Museum*, II, p. 11; *B. M. Cat. of the Coins of the Moghul Emperors*, p. 9.

4. See text and tr. of Ṭahmāsp's letter in Ray, pp. 82, 84.

5. E.g., *A.N.*, I, pp. 292, 334; Bāyazīd, pp. 65-9.

6. Badāyūnī, I, p. 468.

APPENDIX D

THE PERSIAN AUXILIARIES : THEIR COMMISSION AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH HUMĀYŪN

The Persian auxiliaries were commissioned to assist Humāyūn in the capture of Qandahār (which was to be handed over to the Persians) and the recovery of Ghaznī and Kābul; and their commanders were instructed to obey Humāyūn implicitly and not to leave without his permission. There is a general consensus of all authorities on these points.¹ The *Afḍalut Tawārikh* includes the conquest of India also in the commission, but this is perhaps an embellishment. Firishta similarly adds Badakhshān.²

The relations between Humāyūn and the Persian troops were not always cordial. This was only to be expected in a situation where one monarch was commanding armies that were paid by, and owed allegiance to, another. Jauhar alone records that the troops refused Humāyūn's command to attack and sack Bust on the ground of this being contrary to the Shah's orders.³ At Qandahār too when the siege dragged on, the Persian auxiliaries showed signs of restiveness and meditated a retreat to Persia. (See Chap. iii above). It appears that relations between Humāyūn and the auxiliaries became particularly strained after the capture of Qandahār from 'Askarī Mirza. According to Jauhar, the Persians claimed the treasures of 'Askarī by right of conquest and wanted to send the Mirza as a prisoner to the Shah. Humāyūn said the treasures would be sent as a (present) from himself and evidently opposed his brother's being taken in chains to Iran. The Persians then planned to seize both Humāyūn and his brother and to carry them away to Persia.

1. *T.A.M.*, f. 93b; *Ah.T.*, p. 310; *Af.T.*, f. 125a; *A.A.A.*, p. 76; *T. Sulṭānī*, f. 324b; also see Bāyazīd, p. 62.

2. *Af. T.*, f. 125a; Firishta, p. 446. The *R. Šafaviyya* says that Tahmāsp issued a *farmān* duly stamped with his seal, directing the expeditionary forces to recover Kābul, Ghaznī, Bhakkar and Sind; this evidence lacks confirmation.

3. Jauhar, f. 84a; Sarhindi, f. 74b. Bāyazīd has no mention of this. But then Bāyazīd omits all reference to Humāyūn's unpleasant experiences in Iran.

Humāyūn countered this by assembling his own artillery and troops. The Persians became apprehensive lest Humāyūn should play false like his father and immediately removed the treasures from Qandahār.¹

After this incident there could have been little love lost between Humāyūn and the Persian troops, and this explains why most of them returned from Qandahār without completing their commission and without taking Humāyūn's permission.

Some of the Persian auxiliaries elected to stay in Humāyūn's service. Of these Ḥusain Qulī Sultan (brother of Aḥmad Sultan Shāmlū, commander of Sīstān) distinguished himself by his devotion and sagacity. Humāyūn appointed him as his *Muhrdār* (Keeper of the Seal) and used to consult him on important matters. Bāyazīd Bayāt, who was in the personal service of Ḥusain Qulī, mentions him frequently in his account.² He was executed by Kāmran Mirza when the latter defeated Humāyūn and occupied Kābul.³ Many of the *qurchīs*, however, behaved badly.⁴

1. Jauhar, f. 85a-6a; Sarhindi, f. 75b-6a.

2. See Bāyazīd, p. 392 (Index).

3. Bāyazīd, pp. 129-30, probably in 957/1550.

4. For mention of *qurchīs* in Humāyūn's service, see: Bāyazīd, pp. 64-5, 72, 74, 128, 129; Badāyūnī, II, pp. 20, 172, 201, 335; *A.N.*, I, p. 253; *M.U.*, I, pp. 509-10; etc.

APPENDIX E

HUMĀYŪN AND BAHRĀM MIRZA ŞAFAVĪ

It was Nizāmuddin Aḥmad *Bakḥshī*, otherwise a judicious historian, who started the canard concerning Bahrām Mirza. The story briefly is as follows: Shah Ṭahmāsp enquired from Humāyūn the cause of his misfortune. The latter, 'being absent-minded', replied, "the hostility and faithlessness of brothers." The Shah's brother, Bahrām Mirza, who was present, took umbrage at the remark, became a bitter foe of Humāyūn and turned the Shah into his mortal enemy (*Ṭabaqāt-i Akbarī*, volume II, p. 60). The story¹ has been repeated by the *T. Alfī*, f. 575a, Badāyūnī (vol. I, p. 444), Nūrul Haq's *Ẓubdatut Tawārikh*, f. 79a, Firishta (vol. I, p. 445), and the *Rauḍatuṭ Ṭāhirin* (Bodleian 100, f. 481). The last two works add some details. The story appears, though in a different form, in *The Hindustan Chronicle* of Van Den Broecke. (See Brij Narain and Sri Ram Sharma, 'A Contemporary Dutch Chronicle of Mughal India,' *The Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, 1942, pp. 135-6.). Evidence to the contrary is, however, conclusive. Jauhar, an eyewitness, makes several references to the close friendship of Bahrām Mirza with Humāyūn, and records the touching words with which the latter bade farewell to the Mirza. (*Tadh. Wāqī'āt*, B.M. MS, 16,711, ff. 76a, 81a-b). Secondly, on Bahrām Mirza's death (in A.H. 956/1549, see Rieu, vol. I, p. 104) Humāyūn wrote a letter to the Shah in which, after expressing his deep personal grief, he says: "In view of our great friendship and love, I should have come personally to condole with you on his death, but I am prevented from coming by my preoccupations" (B.M. MS Add. 7654, ff. 174b-77a).² Thirdly, Khan Aḥmad, Governor of Gilān (and son-in-law of Shah Ṭahmāsp, see the *Ālam Ārā-i Abbāsī*, pp. 103, 304-6.), once wrote a rather boldly worded letter to

1. Banerji, *Humayun Badshah*, vol. II, accepts the story, pp. 121, 325, 324n; Ray, p. 33, is unable to make up his mind, but on p. 40 accepts the story as valid. Dr. Ishwari Prasad, p. 233, seems to reject the story, on the basis of Jauhar's evidence.

2. Calendar No. H. 12.

Shah 'Abbās I, wherein he remarked: "You do not have, as the late Shah had, nobles who on occasions could be forthright in submitting matters of state. Nor have you a brother like Bahrām Mīrza and a sister like Shāhzāda Sulṭānam. When (Shah Ṭahmāsp) wanted to hand over Humāyūn to his brother [Kāmrān], he (Bahrām Mīrza) intervened and said: 'You are destroying the honour of (our ancestor) Sultan Ṣafī; don't do it.' Thus he (the Mīrza) nullified the Shah's intentions." (*Majmū'a-i Munsha'āt* of Abdul Husain Naṣīrī Ṭusī, Bib. Nationale, Paris MS, Blochet Cat. IV, No. 2338, ff. 239a-b). Also see Calendar No. H. 15.

For a different view of the matter, see Masoom Raza Kazimi, 'Humayun in Iran,' *Islamic Culture*, XLIII, No. 1, 1969, pp.5-11. Mr. Kazimi exonerates Shah Ṭahmāsp of the charge of humiliating Humāyūn and of coercing him to change his religion. Mr. Kazimi holds Bahrām Mīrza responsible for "instigating his brother [Ṭahmāsp] to put Humāyūn to death." It is strange that Mr. Kazimi rejects the evidence of the earlier manuscripts of Jauhar's *Tadhkiratul Wāqī'āt* as against that of manuscripts of much later date. The argument he adduces for doing so is more ingenious than convincing. Mr. Kazimi seems to be unaware of the epistolary evidence that has been cited by us and which goes against his line of argument.

APPENDIX F

SHER SHAH SŪRĪ (946-52/1539-45) AND SHAH ṬAHMĀSP

The material on Sher Shah's relations with Persia is fragmentary. Only the *Tawārikh-i Daulat-i Sher Shāhī* by Ḥasan 'Alī Khan, a contemporary of Sher Shah, and the *Muntakhabat Tawārikh* of 'Abdul Qādir Badāyūnī, have anything to say on the subject. (The major part of the former work has been lost: the portion dealing with the subject now exists only in the translation of Dr. R. P. Tripathi). It appears from the *Tawārikh-i Daulat-i Sher Shāhī* that Sher Shah had at first no definite information as to where Humāyūn had fled, and conjectured his destination to be either Persia or Turkey (Turkistān being excluded because of the traditional Uzbek hostility to Timurids). Later he "sent an ambassador to the court of Tahmasp Safavī, requesting him to capture Humayun Shah and send him to the capital of India, so that the relations between the Indian and Persian governments might be made closer." Shah Ṭahmāsp thought it highly presumptuous of the upstart Afghan king to have sent an ambassador to the Safavid court, and cut off the ears and nose of the Indian envoy. Sher Shah as a reprisal ordered the mutilation and expulsion of "all the eighteen *dastas* (contingents) of Qizilbash nobles connected with Humayun's interests (or family) living in any corner of the city or part of the kingdom." Further he ordered all the Persian inhabitants of his kingdom to be expelled and their properties to be attached to the state; any one offering them help or protection was to be treated as an outlaw. Certain Indian nobles of Tughluq and Khaljī extractions who had been secretly in touch with the exiled king Humāyūn and had been plotting against Sher Shah, were also punished and their leaders executed.

Sher Shah now seriously meditated sending an embassy to Turkey. Speaking to Ḥasan 'Alī Khan, Sher Shah said, "If we send an embassy to Turkey and persuade that Hanafite kingdom to fight against the infidel Qizilbash, the fire raining artillery which supports Turkish armies would be brought into play and would bring the Qizilbash kingdom from ethereal heights to

dust. Let the Turkish armies attack from the north and west, and our armies from the south so that the pride of the Qizilbash may be changed into. . . (?)”

Hence, says Ḥasan ‘Alī Khan, when Mīr Sayyid Rafī‘uddīn applied to Sher Shah [for permission to emigrate to Mecca], Sher Shah issued the following farmān on his application: “Your application for leave reached us. I wish to despatch his (*sic*) holiness [Mīr Sayyid Rafī‘uddīn] on an embassy to the Sultan of Rum (Turkey). When I reach the sea coast and obtain full knowledge of the machinations of these infidels (the Persians), I shall direct my attention to the conquest of the Qizilbash apostates. This affair cannot be concluded without the help of the Sultan of Rum.”¹

Badāyūnī, it may be surmised, had utilized the *Tawārīkh-i Daulat-i Sher Shāhī*, though he nowhere acknowledges this. For Badāyūnī adds nothing substantial to the evidence of the *Tawārīkh*. Only he has cast the material in a slightly different form. He says that (in the year 951/1544) Sher Shah, trying to dissuade Mīr Sayyid Rafī‘uddīn *Muḥaddith* from emigration to Mecca for good, addressed him thus:

(Summary) After extirpating *kuf*r from India and reducing the few remaining forts, I plan to pass along the seashore and make war on the Qizilbāsh who have introduced innovations in our established faith and who bar the way of the pilgrims to the *Baitul Ḥarām* (the Ka‘ba at Mecca). (Simultaneously) I will send you as my envoy to the Ottoman Sultan to arrange an alliance based on the fraternity of faith between me and the Sultan so that he may hand over one of the two *ḥarams* [Mecca and Medina] to me. Then I will attack the Qizilbāsh from this side and the Sultan will do so from the other. Thus far it had been the practice with the Qizilbāsh to move eastward when the Ottoman Sultan invaded their territory, and on the retirement of the Ottoman army, to return to their habitat. If the two of us (the Afghans and the Ottomans) attack the Qizilbāsh from both sides, they will be absolutely powerless to face the vast Indian horde and the fire power of the Ottomans.²

No other chronicle, Mughul or Safavid, makes any mention of these matters. It is, however, quite likely that, with Humāyūn in Iran, Sher Shah entertained the idea of forming an anti-Persian alliance with the Ottoman Turks who were orthodox like himself, but he did not live long enough to give concrete shape to his plans. Sher Shah died in Rabī‘ I 952/May 1545, only two months after Humāyūn’s arrival outside Qandahār from Iran.

1. S. A. Rashid and R. P. Tripathi, ‘*Tawārīkh-e-Daulat-e-Sher Shāhī* by Ḥasan Alī Khan,’ *Medieval India Quarterly*, Aligarh, Vol. I, No. 1, July, 1950. The material cited occurs on pp. 60-61 and 65.

2. Badāyūnī, *Muntakhabat Tawārīkh*, I, Bib. Indica, pp. 369-70. The summary is ours. Also see George Ranking’s translation of the *Muntakhabat-tawārīkh*, I, Bib. Indica, 1898, pp. 479-81.

APPENDIX G

DURATION OF KHAN 'ĀLAM'S STAY IN IRAN

There is some confusion about the date of Khan 'Ālam's arrival at the Persian court and his departure therefrom. He left the Mughul court in Rajab-Sha'bān 1022/August 1613.¹ The *'Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī* says he broke journey at Herāt and arrived at the Persian court in 1027/1618 and places his dismissal in 1029/1620,² thus giving him only a two-year stay at the court. Pietro Della Valle and the author of the *Ihyā al Mulūk* (f. 213b), both contemporary witnesses, too speak of Khan 'Ālam's presentation ceremony in 1027/1618 at Qazvīn.³ There is, however, sufficient evidence to show that the Mughul envoy had his first audience with the Shah much earlier. Jahāngīr speaks of the envoy's presence at the Shah's court in his account of the year 1026 in the events of Rabī' I, which means that Khan 'Ālam's first audience with the Shah must have taken place in 1025 for the information to reach Jahāngīr in early 1026.⁴ Further 'Abdul Fattāḥ Fūmanī, the contemporary author of the *Tārikh-i Gilān*, mentions Khan 'Ālam's presence with Shah 'Abbās at Lāhijān in Jumādā I 1025/May 1616.⁵

Setting out from Āgra in 1022/1613, Khan 'Ālam moved slowly with his big entourage, and, after making long halts at Herāt and Qum as desired by the Persian authorities (*M.U.*, tr., I, p. 389), he reached Central Persia presumably sometimes in 1024/1615: this is also confirmed by several references to his having been expected at the Persian court for three years.⁶ The Shah who

1. *Tūzūk*, p. 121.

2. *A.A.A.*, pp. 662, 669-70; *Khuld*, IV, ff. 440a-b, 443-444, follows the *A.A.A.* The year 1028 given in the *R. Šafaviyya*, f. 372a, as the date of Khan 'Ālam's entry into Persian territory is certainly incorrect.

3. Pietro places the event in the cold weather of 1618-19. *Pietro's Pilgrimage*, p. 167f.

4. *Tūzūk*, p. 138.

5. Dorn, *Muhammadianische Quellen, III, Geschichte von Gilan* (Persian text), St. Petersburg, 1885, pp. 171-2. For a notice of this work, see Storey, I, p. 363. Also see *A.A.A.*, p. 632, for reference to Shah 'Abbās's visit to Gilān in 1025.

6. *Pietro's Pilgrimage*, p. 165.

was then away campaigning on the north-western frontier, sent a message to Khan 'Ālam to stay at Yazd and occupy himself with chase till his own return.¹ On coming back to Iṣfahān, the Shah summoned the envoy who now had his first royal audience (1025/1616). The Shah then proceeded on a hunting excursion to Gīlān, with Khan 'Ālam, himself a keen hunter, in his train. The ceremonial presentation of the Mughul envoy was thus delayed by over a year. This was rather unusual, but another case in which an informal audience preceded the ceremonial reception was the Mughul embassy of Šafdar Khan during Shah Šafī's reign (see Chap. vi above). The ceremony at Qazvīn was followed by a more elaborate reception at Iṣfahān.

The *'Ālam Ārā'*s date of Khan 'Ālam's dismissal early in Shah 'Abbās I's 34th r.y., beginning Rabi' I 1029, is also inaccurate, for the date of his arrival back at the Mughul court as recorded in the *Tūzūk*, *sc.* Bahman in late 14th r.y., works out to Šafar 1029/January 1620.² Khan 'Ālam thus appears to have stayed at the Shah's court for about four years, while the total period of his stay in Iran, from the time of his entry into the country till his exit, would be about five years.

1. *Dhakhīratul Khawānīn* (Rashdi MS), p. 280. The author, Shaikh Farīd Bhakkari, who knew Khan 'Ālam intimately, tells a curious story of how the Shah went incognito to Khan 'Ālam who nevertheless recognised him immediately from a portrait of the Shah that he always kept with him.

2. *A.A.A.*, pp. 669-70; *Tūzūk*, p. 284; R. and B., II, p. 115.

APPENDIX H

EMBASSIES TO AND FROM PRINCES

Diplomatic relations between the princes of one dynasty and the sovereigns of the other were a normal feature of our period. The practice was started by Prince Khudābanda (Šafavī) during his viceroyalty of Khurāsān when he sent an embassy to Akbar. (See Ch. iv, sec. i and iii above). The precedent was followed by his son 'Abbās Mirza when he became viceroy of Khurāsān (*ibid.*). On the Mughul side, many princes from Mirza Salīm (son of Akbar) onwards had contacts with the Shahs of Iran.

Prince Salīm and Shah 'Abbās I

Prince Salīm's correspondence with Shah 'Abbās I commenced in the lifetime of Emperor Akbar.¹ Initiative in the matter, it appears, was taken by the Shah when Salīm's agent arrived in Iran on a purchasing mission. The Shah delivered all the required articles to the agent and sent the prince (in about 1010-11/1603) a letter which is a document of considerable historical interest: after a brief review of Mughul-Safavid relations, the Shah therein complains of Akbar's coldness and his long detention of the Persian ambassador²; he remonstrates with the prince on his sending an agent instead of soliciting the required articles from the Shah as gifts. Shah 'Abbās also mentions in this letter a document bearing evidence of Tīmūr's friendship with the forbears of the Safavids.³

The next communication from Shah 'Abbās I to Mirza Salīm which purports to be a reply to some despatch from the latter, was sent with Durwesh

1. Shah 'Abbās I makes a reference to this early friendship in the letter he wrote to Jahāngīr after occupying Qandahār. See *Tūzūk*, p. 349, 3rd line from the bottom.

2. The reference is evidently to Minūchīhr Beg who was finally dismissed in 1011/1602. See p. 65 above.

3. For text of the letter, see *N. J. M.*, B.M. Or. 3482; ff. 223a-24b; Tusi, ff. 225a-29b, claims it as his own composition. Calendar No. J. 47. Also see *A. A. A.*, p. 430. For Tīmūr's document, see Appendix A above.

Beg. Addressing the prince as 'brother', the Shah therein gives an account of his capture of Erivan and other places in the course of his campaign on the north-west frontier during 1011-12/1603-4.¹ Curiously enough, the two MSS of the *Nuskhā-i Jāmi'a-i Murāsālāt* that give this letter, both reproduce elsewhere² the same letter mentioning the same emissary, this time making the letter to be a reply to Mirza Dāniyāl's letter which is also given and which is dated Farwardīn 1011/March 1603.³ What probably happened was this that the Shah's letter was originally drafted as an answer to Prince Dāniyāl but on receipt of the news of his death (April 1604), the same despatch was sent to Prince Salīm to whom also a reply was due. There is a reference to the dismissal of Durwesh Beg in a letter which Emperor Jahāngīr wrote to the Shah soon after his accession.⁴ We have copies of three other letters, two from Mirza Salīm to Shah 'Abbās I⁵ (one of these is stated to have been written by the Prince in his own hand) and one from the Shah to the Prince.⁶ All these three letters are written in an intimate and amorous style and are illustrative of the idiom of love which characterized much of the correspondence that passed between Jahāngīr (both as a Prince and as Emperor) and Shah 'Abbās.

Prince Shah Jahān and Shah 'Abbās I

Prince Shah Jahān, who emerged early in Jahāngīr's reign as the prospective successor, sought to cultivate relations with Shah 'Abbās I. In Rabi' II 1027/April 1618, he sent, with Jahāngīr's permission, some gifts to the Shah including a unique Deccani diamond as a token of his victorious campaign in the Deccan.⁷ This was probably the Prince's first step to establish relations with the Shah, and we can be sure it met a good response, for the wise Shah 'Abbās never missed an opportunity to cultivate useful contacts. About 1030/1621, Prince Shah Jahān despatched, again with Jahāngīr's permission, Zāhid Beg on an embassy to the Shah.⁸ The letter carried by Zāhid Beg

1. *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 212b-14a; also Or. 3482, ff. 224b-26b. Calendar No. J. 50. For date, see *A.A.A.*, p. 438f.

2. *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 224b-26a; Or. 3482, ff. 242b-45a. See Calendar No. I. 50. Tūsi, 235b-40a, who claims it his own composition, indicates Dāniyāl as the addressee.

3. *N.J.M.*, Add. 7688, ff. 223b-24b; Or. 3482, ff. 242a-43b; Tūsi, f. 250bf., adds the date at the end of the text. Calendar No. J. 40.

4. *J.I.*, B.M. Or. 1702, ff. 230b-32b. Calendar No. J. 52.

5. *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, f. 218b; Or. 3482, f. 235a; Calendar No. J. 48. Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ, *Majmū'a-i Makātib-i Mukhtalifa*, Majlis Library, Tihiran, f(p). 1-4 (?); Calendar No. J. 49.

6. *Tahmās Nāma*, Ethé 2067, f. 63a. Calendar No. J. 46.

7. *Tūzūk*, p. 229; R. and B., II, pp. 8-9. Also see further below.

8. The embassy of Zāhid Beg is described in great detail in the *Pādshāh Nāma* of Qazvīnī, ff. 89b-90a, and in Mu'tamad Khan's *Aḥwāl-i Shāhzādagī-i Shāh Jahān* (Chronicle of the princely

was couched in a respectful style: the Shah was repeatedly addressed as uncle and was requested to ask for more of any of the large variety of gifts sent as specimen with Zāhid Beg.¹ Shah Jahān's move to cultivate relations with the Shah may very likely have been dictated by the growing weakness of his position at home. By the time Zāhid Beg reached Mashhad, the Shah was already investing Qandahār², where he summoned the envoy. The arrival of an embassy from the most renowned of Jahāngīr's sons at this juncture would have certainly appeared singularly felicitous to the Shah: the importance attached to it is evident from the detailed notice in *'Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī*.³ The Shah received the envoy most cordially and dismissed him soon with rewards. In his reply the Shah expressed the hope that recent occurrences (i.e., his occupation of Qandahār) would not affect his relations with Jahāngīr, and requested the Prince to strive for closer Mughul-Safavid accord. The Shah highly commended the diplomatic skill of Zāhid Beg and promised to send a return Persian embassy.⁴

In the meanwhile the situation in India had changed rapidly. Prince Shah Jahān was now a rebel and was re-creating after an unsuccessful attempt on Agra.⁵ While on the way to Gujarāt, he sent another missive to Shah 'Abbās I in which, after referring to the Shah's letter brought by Zāhid Beg, he asked for help in his present predicament, saying, "It has been the tradition of this august house [the Timurids] to seek help from the holy family of prophetic descent [i.e., the Safavids]." This letter was carried by Khwāja Hajī Beg, (who had earlier been to Persia with Zāhid Beg) who left for Iran about the middle of 1623.⁶

days of Shah Jahān), B.M. Or. 3721, f. 89a-b. Both these accounts make out that the initiative in opening relations with the Prince was taken by the Shah who sent letters to the Prince through his ambassadors. It is also notable that none of these two works mentions the despatch of presents by Shah Jahān in 1027/1618.

1. The text of the letter in the *F.Q.*, ff. 101b-3a, makes it out to be in reply to one from the Shah brought by Hājī Rafiq. This point seems to be a later addition. For the text in the *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, f. 226a-b, Or. 3482, f. 245a-b and in the *Munsha'āt-i Tūsi*, ff. 204b-42a, merely says that Hājī Rafiq assured Shah Jahān of the Shah's goodwill which encouraged the Prince to send the embassy. Calendar No. Sh. 100; also see Sh. 101 which appears to be merely another version.

2. Cf. Dr. Rahim (*Islamic Culture*, 1934, p. 661) who suggests there was a secret understanding between the Shah and Prince Shah Jahān on Qandahār. We do not subscribe to this view.

3. *A.A.A.*, pp. 687-88.

4. There are two versions of this letter one of which occurs in the *Tahmās Nāma*, Ethé 2067, ff. 73a-74a, while the other appears in several collections of letters including the *Munsha'āt* of Tūsi (ff. 242b-44a) who claims it to be his own composition. Calendar Nos. Sh. 102 and 103.

5. For details, see Beni Prasad, pp. 359-65.

6. The letter appears in the *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, ff. 227b-28a, and in several other collections including the *Munsha'āt* of Tūsi ff. 258b-59a. The *A.A.A.*, p. 715, records its arrival in 1033-34/1624-25; the *Tārīkh-i Sulṭānī*, f. 416b, says (inaccurately, we think) that the embassy from Prince Shah Jahān came to congratulate the Shah on his capture of Baghdād (in Rabi' I, 1033). Calendar No. Sh. 104.

The Shah sent a reply advising Shah Jahān to submit to his father and seek his favour through service and filial devotion. He also promised to write to Jahāngīr to plead with him for the Prince. The Shah did send a letter with Āqā Beg to the Emperor, commending the Prince to him.¹ Sometime after Prince Shah Jahān's partial reconciliation with the Emperor, the Shah sent another letter to the Prince in which he expressed great pleasure at his reconciliation with the Emperor,² attributing it to the Prince's having acted upon his (the Shah's) advice.³

His successive defeats followed by his having to make submission to the Emperor, had left Shah Jahān in a very weak position and with no prospects in the immediate future. He therefore proceeded to Sind with the idea of going over to Persia. But he gave up the idea when the prospects at home brightened up a little.⁴

Successors of Shah Jahān

Prince Aurangzeb was too high-spirited a prince to cultivate relations with the haughty Shah 'Abbās II. But Murād Bakhsh was in contact with the Persian court both before and during the War of Succession.⁵ Dārā Shukoh, after his defeat in the War of Succession, sought succour from Iran and sent several emissaries to Shah 'Abbās II, who sent the prince an encouraging reply, inviting him to come to Iran.⁶ Emperor Aurangzeb, during his long reign, maintained too vigilant a watch on his sons to allow them any chance of cultivating connections with the Iṣfahān court.

1. *Jāmi'ah-i Murāsālāt*, f. 222, cited by Dr. Rahim, *Islamic Culture*, 1934, p. 663.

2. In early 1626, see Beni Prasad, p. 394.

3. *N.J.M.*, B.M. Add. 7688, 228a-b; also given in Tūsi, ff. 249a-50b. The name of the courier is given as Ishāq Beg Yazdī. Calendar No. Sh. 106.

4. *A.A.A.*, p. 751; *Tūzuk*, pp. 413-14; *Khuld*, IV, f. 485. Also see Beni Prasad, p. 427; Saksena, pp. 54-55.

5. See pp. 121-2 above. Also see Calendar Nos. Sh. 230 to 234 and Ott. 400.

6. See pp. 123-4 above. Also see Calendar No. Sh. 235 and 236.

APPENDIX I

FORMULATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

[This section could be considerably expanded. We have kept it down to its present size partly for reasons of space and partly by focussing our attention on evidence relating mainly to Indo-Persian relations. Other evidence, e.g., that pertaining to Iran's relations with other powers, has been sparingly used. What follows is in the nature of a pioneer effort, and the conclusions drawn, being based on a section of the evidence, are necessarily tentative.]

A. *Factors and Motivations*

A variety of complex factors go into the making of the foreign policy of a modern state. Some of the more familiar of these are the geographic location, the military potential and the economic capacity of the state. Among the factors that motivate the conduct of foreign relations, the more important are the desire to maintain the independence of the state and the need to protect its territorial integrity. The term "national interest"¹ occurs frequently in contemporary discussions of foreign policy and is indeed declared by one leading authority on the subject to be a "key-concept in foreign policy," but its scope and meaning are not easy to define. Yet another factor of increasing importance in the shaping of foreign policy is public opinion.² The people in general are admittedly not the best judge of foreign policy,³ but in

1. The term "national interest" and the related term "national values" are not easy to define. "'National interest' is the key-concept in foreign policy," observes Joseph Frankel. But, he adds, "If it is difficult to explain what national interest means in the abstract, it is quite impossible to find general agreement on what it implies in any specific issue." In essence, he says, national interest "amounts to the sum total of all the national values—national in both meanings of the word, both pertaining to the nation and to the state." "The notion of national interest," he explains further, "is based upon the values of the national community, values which can be regarded as the product of its culture and as the expression of its sense of cohesion, values which define for men what they believe to be right or just." *International Relations*, London, 1964, pp. 47 and 49.

2. Joseph Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy*, O.U.P., 1963, p. 71.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

modern states—democratic as well as authoritarian¹—, it has become virtually impossible to ignore public opinion on issues on which it is clearly articulated. When popular passions are aroused on a certain foreign policy issue, the freedom of action of the policy-makers is considerably reduced. When in a particular situation the foreign policy of a modern state becomes affected by passions and prejudices, these are *popular* passions and prejudices. It is rare, though not unknown, in modern times for foreign policy to be governed by the whims and passions of an individual, however powerful he might be. Admittedly, the earlier training and the prejudices and vanity of individual decision-makers do influence their thinking and action. But these fall in a category different from the whims and fancies of a medieval potentate.

The modern concept of “national interest” did not exist in medieval period. Yet the idea of the interests of the empire and the country in the context of foreign policy was not unfamiliar to medieval statesmen and writers. The theme of the importance of maintaining peace between kingdoms and of the value of such peace to the welfare of the people of the concerned kingdoms, also occurs in the diplomatic correspondence of the period. Thus Akbar writing to ‘Abdullah Khan Uzbeg observes that friendship and cooperation among the rulers is conducive to good conditions and to security and peace for living beings.² The same Emperor writing to Shah ‘Abbās I remarks that it is not permissible to make war on any one who seeks peace.³ The *Akbar Nāma* also mentions Akbar’s preference for hortative diplomacy over warfare.⁴ Hasan Khan, the Safavid viceroy of *Khurāsān*, in a letter to an eminent Mughul official, speaks of the value of amity and accord between kings, and underlines the duty of nobles and high officials to promote friendly relations between their respective masters; officials who strive in this direction, he adds, deserve the thanks of the people and earn merit in the eyes of God.⁵ In another letter to a Mughul official, Hasan Khan says that Shah ‘Abbās II had given him authority to do as suited the interests of the Safavid empire (*ān-chi maqrūn ba ṣalāḥ-i daulat dānad*).⁶ It may be remarked that while the interest of one empire as against another was something real, the oft-occurring talk of the value of friendship and amity was merely conventional and carried little meaning or intent. (The examples given above can be multiplied from the diplomatic correspondence of the period as well as from contemporary chronicles.)

In the medieval empires of India and Iran, material interests of the

1. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

2. *Har Siḥ Daftar-i Abul Faḍl*, Lucknow, 1291/1784, p. 4, lines 15-18, also p. 10, lines 6-7.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 21, lines 12-13.

4. *A.N.*, III, p. 588.

5. *Shāmlū Letters*, B.M. Add. 7802, f. 80a.

6. *Ibid.*, f. 78a.

state were not entirely ignored in the shaping of foreign policy. But as often as not, foreign relations were determined by the whims, passions and prejudices of the reigning monarch. Wise kings like Akbar would invariably take into consideration the interests of the empire and its subjects in constructing their foreign relations. The major aspects of Akbar's foreign policy can be explained and defended in terms of modern ideas. His frontier pact with 'Abdullah Khan Uzbek, his peaceful acquisition of Qandahār at a favourable moment, his policy of maintaining a balance between the Safavid and Uzbek powers, his efforts through diplomatic means to dissuade 'Abdullah Khan Uzbek from attacking Iran, his long stay in the Panjab to keep a watch on the security of his north-west frontier during the period of Uzbek ascendancy in Central Asia, his quietly ignoring Shah 'Abbās I's request for the restoration of Qandahār—all these show how clearly motivated he was by the interests of the empire in his handling of India's relations with the powers across the north-west frontier. The same, however, cannot be said of his successors. Jahāngīr was unwise both in placing too much reliance on his friendship with Shah 'Abbās I and in contemptuously ignoring the diplomatic advances made by the Uzbeks and the Ottomans. He had to pay a heavy price for these errors. The energy that he had shown in defending Qandahār from a Persian attack in the opening years of his reign, soon left him, and the next Persian attack found the fort with a ridiculously small garrison of 300 men.¹ The main reason for Jahāngīr's reliance on Persian friendship was his indolence, which explains his passionate—indeed fatuous—friendship for Shah 'Abbās I.

Shah Jahān's reign provides an example *par excellence* of how the fancies and passions of one man could in medieval times become the basis of foreign policy. What makes this example particularly notable is the fact that, judging him by his achievements in the field of administration and by his patronage of art and culture, Shah Jahān was undoubtedly one of the best rulers of the Mughul period. Yet neither his intervention in Central Asia, nor his repeated expeditions to recover Qandahār from the Persians, can be justified. Essentially the one represents an adventurist foreign policy inspired by a morbid obsession with the restoration of Timurid power in Central Asia almost a century and a half after its extinction, while the other betrays an almost equally morbid obsession with personal prestige. Qandahār was after all not a matter of life and death for the Mughul empire. During the century and a half of the period of the Great Mughuls, there were several long periods when Qandahār was outside the pale of the empire. For the entire reign of Aurangzeb, Qandahār was in Persian hands. Yet this made no great difference to the empire. Shah Jahān's persistence in the pursuit of the recovery of

1. See p. 80 above.

Qandahār was thus utterly unrealistic. It was not in the interest of India as a country—nor even of the Indian Muslim community—that Central Asia should be conquered against the wishes of its people and annexed to the Mughul empire. The same is true of Shah Jahān's Qandahār expeditions. His extension of patronage to Sher Khan who had for long been a source of distress to Indian and Persian traders, shows how, out of spite for Iran, he was ready to jeopardise substantial Indian commercial interests. Again it was Shah Jahān's inordinate preoccupation with imperial and dynastic prestige which spoiled the only substantial chance of the establishment of an Ottoman-Mughul *entente*.

Aurangzeb showed a wise moderation in his attitude towards Iran in the opening years of his reign. But after the breach with Shah 'Abbās II, he evinced no interest in restoring relations with Persia. In this he seems to have been influenced by an undue sense of imperial prestige. The interests of the Mughul empire—commercial as well as political—would have been better served if relations with Iran had been normalised. The death of Shah 'Abbās II offered a suitable opportunity for the resumption of these relations. But Aurangzeb sent no congratulatory embassy on the accession of Shah Sulaimān, nor on that of Shah Sultan Ḥusain. Aurangzeb also missed an excellent opportunity of reopening diplomatic relations with the Ottoman empire. The Mughul empire was consequently in a state of virtual isolation during the major part of his reign.

In Iran, the great Shah 'Abbās conducted his foreign relations in a manner conducive to national interest. His enterprising diplomacy served alike his own imperial interests as well as those of the country and its people. In ordering Iran's foreign relations with Asian and European powers, he gave due consideration to its economic interests as well.¹ But his great grandson, Shah 'Abbās II, fell a victim to passion and prejudice in the conduct of foreign relations. His uncontrollable temper was responsible for the breakdown of relations with the Mughul empire, a breach which in no way promoted the interests of his country and its people. With the Ottomans and the Uzbegs invariably hostile, it was in Iran's interest to retain India's friendship. The wise Shah 'Abbās I, it may be observed, persistently sought to repair the damage done to Indo-Persian friendship by his seizure of Qandahār, and largely succeeded in doing so.

It is a commonplace in international relations that the professed motives behind foreign policy decisions are often at variance with the real ones. This holds true of the medieval times as well. In royal correspondence and official chronicles, the real aims behind foreign policy decisions are concealed beneath

1. Falsafi, *'Abbās-i Awwal*, IV, p. 235ff.

a labyrinth of moral and religious platitudes. Thus in sending the expedition to Balkh, Shah Jahān's motives were none other than *mulkgīrī*, that is, seizing foreign territory by force. His only claim on the territories of the *amirate* of Balkh was that his great ancestor Tīmūr had once ruled over them—a claim which even in medieval times was not a particularly strong one. This claim is repeatedly alluded to in the letters exchanged between Persian and Mughul officials.¹ But in the Mughul royal letters as well as in the official and semi-official chronicles, quite a different set of motives is put forward. Thus the *'Amal-i Šālih* gives two reasons for the invasion: first, the massacre of Muslims in Central Asia, and second, the attack by Nadhr Muḥammad Khan on the Kābul marches in the early years of Shah Jahān's reign.² Of these arguments, the first is merely a specious description of the oft-occurring internecine warfare among the various sections and tribes of the people of Central Asia. As for the Uzbeg attack on Kābul, this had been forgiven long ago: the complaint on this count was resurrected only to provide a plausible excuse for the unwarranted Mughul invasion of Central Asia. In his letter to Shah 'Abbās II, Shah Jahān set forth the protection of the Sayyids of Balkh as the reason for his invasion of Balkh, evidently in order to gain the Shah's sympathies.³

B. Locus of Decision-making

In a modern state, though "the actual locus of decision-making cannot always be determined,"⁴ in general, the individuals, the agencies and services involved in the making of foreign policy, can be indicated with reasonable accuracy. The role of the head of the administration (the prime minister in U.K., and the president in the U.S.A., for example), of the foreign minister, of the foreign ministry (*sc.* the permanent officials in the ministry, as the Foreign Office in London), of the Legislature, of the special committees on foreign affairs, of the subsidiary services (economic agencies, intelligence service, propaganda services, to mention only a few) and other government agencies, in the determination of foreign policy,⁵ can be delineated.

For the medieval Muslim states in India and Iran, material throwing light on the process of formulation of foreign policy is very meagre. From

1. Calendar Nos. Sh.121 *et seq.* Also Shāmlū Letters, B.M. Add. 7802, *passim*.

2. *'Amal-i Šālih*, II, pp. 462-63. Lāhaurī, II, pp. 482-83, has the following far-fetched explanation to offer: since Nadhr Muḥammad Khan's attack on Kābul, the Emperor had been meditating the conquest of Balkh, but as the Shari'at did not permit invasion of a Muslim country without a special reason, the Emperor had thus far stayed his hand; now that the faithless Almāns were perpetrating inhuman excesses on the people of Central Asia, he decided to send Murād Bakhsh with 50,000 troops.

3. See above.

4. Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy*, p. 8.

5. *Ibid.*, chapter iii.

what we know it is clear that the ruler—unless he was a minor or a weakling—played a dominant part in laying down foreign policy, or rather in taking a decision on foreign policy issues as they arose. Sultan Maḥmūd of Ghaznī, though falling outside our period, is a case in point. Dr. Muhammad Nazim, citing the *Āthārul Wuzarā*, has described the proceedings of the council of ministers and commanders called by the Sultan to consider the situation arising from the assassination by the people of Kh̲wārizm of the Sultan's brother-in-law, the ruler of Kh̲wārizm. The issue was whether or not to invade Kh̲wārizm. The Sultan placed before the council the risks and gains of each alternative. The ministers were afraid to speak out for fear of annoying the king. The wazīr tried to wriggle out of the situation by saying that it was the domain of the military commanders. "They in their turn waived the responsibility by contending that their duty was 'to do and die' in the service of their Lord, the Sultan The Sultan was furious and unceremoniously dismissed his counsellors, thus, 'Avant, you cowards. It is not your desire that my kingdom should expand. I will myself decide upon the best course of action.'"¹ 'Alāuddīn Kh̲al̲jī (1296-1316) who was probably the most absolutist of all the pre-Mughul Sultans of Delhi, had the admirable rule of consulting his ministers and advisers on important policy matters. But, as the final decisions were always his own, we can assume that he made his own foreign policy. The strong-willed Sultan Muḥammad b. Tughluq of Delhi (1325-51) framed his own foreign policy without consulting any one, with consequences that were far from agreeable.² The Mughul emperors too made their respective foreign policies, but there is evidence to show that they used to consult royal princes, ministers and counsellors before making up their mind on important issues.

Bābūr who treated his nobles almost as his friends and did not stand on much ceremony in his relations with them, used to consult them on all important matters. The *Bābur Nāma* contains many references to his *kangāsh* or consultations with his counsellors, on military and political matters.³ In one particular instance he even records that he acted according to his commanders' advice which turned out to be erroneous.⁴ But the gaps in his *Memoirs* have deprived us of any record he might have made of his consultations with his counsellors on matters pertaining to his relations with Shah Ismā'īl I. The *Ḥabībūs Siyar* has an interesting entry which though without any direct bearing on his relations with Iran, will yet bear citation in full: Bābūr, after surrendering

1. Muhammad Nazim, *The Life and Times of Sultān Maḥmūd of Ghazna*, Cambridge, 1931, pp. 128-29.

2. Agha Mahdi Husain, *The Rise and Fall of Muhammad bin Tughluq*, London, 1938, pp. 124-26; Ishwari Prasad, *History of Qarauna Turks in India*, Allahabad, 1936, pp. 118-25.

3. Some of the references are: *B.N.*, pp. 73, 105, 131, 141, 149, 170, 173, 197, 229, 246-48, 300, 330, 341, 412, 628, 658, 667, etc.

4. *B.N.*, p. 170.

Samarqand to Shaibānī Khan [907/1501] and the subsequent discomfiture of his Mughul allies at the hands of Tambal and Shaibānī Khan [908/1503], sojourned at Tirmidh. Its ruler, Amīr Muḥammad Bāqir, extended him a warm welcome. Bābur (who was then a homeless wanderer with only a small band of followers¹) asked Muḥammad Bāqir's advice as to what was the most likely area where his standards might prosper. The Amīr replied: As Muḥammad Khan Shaibānī has established his ascendancy over Transoxiana and as the Pādshāh (Bābur)'s followers and partisans are in disarray, it would be best to submit to the exigencies of the times and to move towards Kābul so as to be at a safe distance from Uzbek dominions. The Amīr cited verses (probably from the *Shāhnāma* of Firdausī) to the following effect: If thou dost not have the power to fight thine enemy, then seek the path of humility without any compunction; remove thyself from his territory so as to get some respite from slaughter. Bābur considered this advice judicious and in the year 910 proceeded towards Kābul.²

Unlike the references in the *Bābur Nāma* to discussions on the Kābul move,³ the *Ḥabībus Siyar* anecdote has a foreign policy slant, for it shows Bābur's readiness to make a realistic reappraisal of his situation *vis-a-vis* Shaibānī Khan and to act accordingly. Further, in evaluating the evidence relating to discussions on the Kābul move, allowance has to be made for the fact that in exceptionally difficult circumstances, such as of Bābur described above, it was understandable for a king to place more than ordinary reliance on the judgement of his advisers.

For the period of Humāyūn's rule before his exile as well as for the few months' rule that was allowed him after his return, there seems to be no mention of any *kangāsh* (consultation with counsellors) on matters of foreign policy. For the period of Humāyūn's exile in Iran, there are a few references to his reporting to and consulting his small band of followers on the state of his personal relations with Shah Ṭahmāsp.⁴ It is also evident from the sources that Humāyūn placed great reliance on Bairam Beg's judgement both in deciding to proceed to Iran and in the conduct of his relations with Shah Ṭahmāsp. But allowance must be made for the fact that during the period of his exile, Humāyūn was not a sovereign, nor a free agent. With two disastrous defeats in India to his discredit, with his sorry plight at the Persian court where he had often to suffer studied insults, it was understandable that he should have sought counsel from those around him, especially from the able and devoted Bairam Beg.

1. *B.N.*, pp. 157ff.

2. *H.S.*, Tihiran, A.H.S. 1333, III (bound vol. IV), pp. 306-7.

3. *B.N.*, pp. 197-98.

4. See p. 33 above.

One of the problems Humāyūn had to face after his return from Persia was that of the fort of Qandahār which he had captured with Persian help from Kāmran's men and had handed over to the Persians in keeping with his understanding with Shah Ṭahmāsp. The question was whether or not he should now seize it back from its Persian commander. The pros and cons of the matter have been discussed earlier in this work. It was undoubtedly a major foreign policy issue, involving as it did the question of his personal friendship as well as of his territorial understanding with Shah Ṭahmāsp. Our main sources are virtually unanimous that the matter was discussed among Humāyūn's counsellors and that it was on their insistence that he decided to take the fort.¹ What we think really happened was this that though Humāyūn was himself aware of the strategic need of recapturing the fort, he felt qualms of conscience in doing something which smacked of glaring ingratitude and amounted to his going back on his plighted word to Shah Ṭahmāsp.² The united plea of his nobles helped Humāyūn to overcome his qualms of conscience.

After his victorious return to Kabul and after his recovery of the throne of Delhi, he seems—judging from the scanty evidence available³—to have directed his foreign relations himself. For one thing, his chief adviser Bairam Khan, was mostly away from the court during this period.

Abul Faḍl, the great annalist of Akbar's reign, set the fashion of ascribing the origin as well as the credit of every important and successful measure to the Emperor.⁴ His "rex-centric"⁵ treatment of history inevitably threw into shade the role of the king's officials and advisers. This, it may be pointed out, is in line with the general political ideas of Abul Faḍl. Says Abul Faḍl, "A king possesses, *independent of men*, the ray of divine wisdom"⁶ (our italics).

1. The following works mention the discussion among the nobles and their request to Humāyūn to take the fort: Jauhar (Add. 16711), f. 87a; Bāyazīd, pp. 50-51; *Ah. T.*, pp. 311-12; *T.A.M.*, f. 94a-b (the last two mentioned works give the credit for the proposal to Ulugh Mūrza, a grandson of Sultan Ḥusain Mūrza Baiqarā); *A.N.*, I, p. 239-40; *Af.T.*, f. 126b; *Qīṣa*, f. 12b; *Tab. Ak.*, II, p. 63; Badāyūnī, I, p. 447; *Mujmal*, f. 75a; K. K., I, p. 120. The *Akbar Nāma* and the *Mujmal* of Barārī, especially the latter, give detailed accounts of Humāyūn's predicament and the discussion among the nobles. Gulbadan, p. 74 (evidently to enhance the prestige of her imperial brother) and Firishta, I, p. 447 (a much later chronicler), omit all mention of the nobles' role and merely state that Humāyūn decided to take the fort.

2. See the *Akbar Nāma* and the *Mujmal* cited in the preceding foot-note.

3. Humāyūn's diplomatic relations with Shah Ṭahmāsp during the period under mention have been dealt with earlier. For Humāyūn's correspondence with Iran during the same period, see Calendar Nos. H. 11 to H. 14.

4. Thus the *Ā'in-i Dahsāla* which represents the culmination of the work of several successive able *Dīwāns* including Todar Mal, is presented by Abul Faḍl as the sole creation of Akbar. *Ā'in-i Akbarī*, I, p. 347.

5. For the use of this term in relation to Abul Faḍl, see K.A. Nizami, 'Abul Fazl as a Historian,' *Dr. Zakir Husain Presentation Volume*, Delhi, 1968, p. 58.

6. *Ā'in* No. 77, *Ā'in-i Akbarī*, I, tr. Blochmann, p. 163.

Both in the *Ā'in-i Akbarī* and the *Akbar Nāmā*, Abul Faḍl treats contemporary events and institutions as if these were merely an exteriorization of Akbar's mind. To Abul Faḍl, Akbar was the embodiment of all goodness, wisdom, sagacity and knowledge. "The holy personality of the Shahanshāh," remarks Abul Faḍl, "is a fount of perfect qualities, and a mine of holy principles."¹ It is highly significant that, unlike other Indo-Muslim writers on political theory and institutions,² Abul Faḍl underrates the importance of consultation on the part of the king. Whereas other writers have devoted whole chapters to the subject, Abul Faḍl mentions the value of consultation (*rāi zadan*) casually, almost as a concession.³ This should account for the very few references to *kangāsh* on foreign policy problems in the very detailed annals of the *Akbar Nāmā*. Akbar was, however, a sagacious ruler and it may be taken for granted that he did consult his advisers and ministers on important policy matters before taking a decision. Abul Faḍl, however, has largely skipped over reports of such consultations in the *Akbar Nāmā*.

In the long annals of the *Akbar Nāmā*, only two instances of consultation on foreign policy matters have come to our notice. When the second embassy from 'Abdullah Khan Uzbek arrived in 985/1577 (the first one of 980/1572-73 having failed to evoke any Mughul response), Akbar, "on the

1. *A.N.*, tr. Beveridge, II, p. 421 (text p. 285).

2. Thus Fakhr-i Mudabbir, *Ādābul Ḥarb*, B.M. Add. 16853, dwells on *mashwarat* (consultation) in chapter vii, and in chapter v describes the wazīr as an adviser (*nāsiḥ*) and recommends a clear demarcation of functions between the king and the wazīr. Diyāuddin Baranī envisages a powerful consultative council (*majlis-i rāi*) in the second chapter of the *Fatāwā-i Jahāndārī* (India Office MS); also see Ḥabīb and Salīm, *Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanate*, Advice iii, pp. 11-12. Mirza Muḥammad Bāqir Najm-i Thānī, who wrote his *Mau'izā-i Jahāngiri* (Ethé 1535) in Jahāngir's reign, devotes chapter iii of his work to *mashwarat*, and in chapter vi, enumerating the calamities and misfortunes of empires, gives first place to "keeping away experienced counsellors from oneself" (*sc.* the king). Nūruddīn Muḥammad Qādī Khāqānī in his *Akhlāq-i Jahāngiri* (Ethé 2207), also written in Jahāngir's reign, devotes one chapter (xiii) to the benefits of *mashwarat* (ff. 323b-33a).

3. We have come across only two very brief mentions of the importance of consultation in Abul Faḍl's historical writings: First, the *Akbar Nāmā*, enumerating the twelve requisite qualities in a king, says that a king should not depend upon his own wisdom and vision, but should seek the advice of knowledgeable persons. (*A.N.*, III, p. 453). Again, unlike other medieval writers on political theory, Abul Faḍl omits mentioning advisers in listing the four chief supports of monarchy and also omits mentioning the subject of consultation in his passages on the learned, the nobles and the companions of the king. It is only in the last of his several groupings of men that, in describing "the five kinds of men of whom the world is composed," he mentions very briefly "the sagacious man" as "the fittest person for a king to consult in state affairs." *Ā'in-i Akbarī*, tr. Blochmann, Calcutta, 1927, Preface, p. 8. The *Akbarnāmā*, III, p. 524, notes that "the taking counsel (is) a praiseworthy habit of the Shahinshāh."

It is possible that some other references to the subject in the *Akbar Nāmā* and the *Ā'in-i Akbarī* may have escaped our notice. But it is patent that in general Abul Faḍl implicitly underrates the value of consultation.

request of the ministers of state, sent a reply."¹ Secondly, on receipt of an embassy from Shah 'Abbās I in 999/1588, Akbar held a council of ministers an account of whose proceedings has been given earlier in this work.² Yet another case of consultation on a matter having a bearing on foreign relations, is the meeting summoned by Akbar in July 1581 at the junction of the Indus and the Kābul to consider Mirza Ḥakīm's petition for peace and to deliberate upon the question of peace or war with the Mirza. "Inasmuch as choice of meditation and the taking counsel are a praiseworthy habit of the Shahanshāh," states Abul Faḍl, "he directed that the great officers to the number of twenty should hold a special meeting and should give answers in accordance with acuteness and knowledge. He also ordered the writer [Abul Faḍl] to ascertain the opinion of each, and to report the result to him."³ The rest of Abul Faḍl's four-page account is neatly summed up by Ibn Hasan as follows: "In this case Akbar did not attend the meeting, and Abul Faḍl was deputed to open the discussion and report the opinion of each. Everyone spoke in favour of accepting peace and against marching upon Kābul, while Abul Faḍl put forward his own arguments in favour of an immediate march. They could not come to an agreement and it was decided that each should speak to the king individually. Akbar did not agree with them. The march upon Kābul was ordered and the results justified his action."⁴

Though the *Akbar Nāma* seems to contain no other substantial account of a consultation on foreign policy, we may reasonably assume that Akbar, the wise ruler and sagacious statesman that he was, did consult his counsellors on other important occasions as well. Thus Father Monserrate, who accompanied Akbar during the royal march to Kābul in 1581, speaks of several "prolonged councils of war" on the question of Mirza Ḥakīm.⁵ Akbar indeed consulted Father Monserrate himself on the problem.⁶ Father Monserrate also gives us an account of "the method the King employs in deliberation—he asks each counsellor privately for his own opinion, and then himself decides upon the course which seems to be supported by the largest number and the most experienced. He asks their advice even about subjects upon which he has already made up his mind, saying to the nobles, 'This is what I think be done, do you agree?' They reply, 'Salaam, O King'; whereupon

1. *A.N.*, III, p. 211.

2. See p. 56 above.

3. *A.N.*, III, tr., p. 524.

4. Ibn Hasan, *The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire*, O.U.P., pp. 297-98. Also see *A.N.*, III, pp. 357-58, tr., pp. 524-28.

5. *The Commentary of Father Monserrate*, tr. J. S. Hoyland, ed. S. N. Banerjee, O.U.P., 1922, p. 123.

6. *Ibid.*

he says, 'Then let it be carried out.' If however any of them do not agree with him, he listens patiently, and sometimes even alters his own opinion."¹ In general, however, the decisions were Akbar's own, as is evident from the decision on the march to Kābul. Akbar was a firm ruler and a clear-headed statesman and he kept himself well-informed about the situation in the neighbouring countries.² And, as the years passed by, he came to possess a better insight into, and a firmer grasp on, foreign policy problems than any minister could have. He was thus in a better position than his ministers to decide on foreign policy.

Jahāngīr's placing unreserved trust in Shah 'Abbās I's friendship was his own choice. No one seems to have influenced him in this direction. The influence of Nūr Jahān, Āṣaf Khan and other Persians at the court may have affected Jahāngīr's attitude towards individual Persian immigrants, but there is no evidence to show that ministers and dignitaries of Persian extraction exercised any appreciable influence on his foreign policy prior to 1622. Unfortunately for the Mughul empire, the crisis of Indo-Persian relations in Jahāngīr's reign occurred at a time when he had already started losing grip over events. Shah 'Abbās I's demand for the restoration of Qandahār unnerved Jahāngīr. The *Tūzuk-i Jahāngīrī* makes no mention of any *kangāsh* on the Qandahār problem. But circumstances suggest that consultations did take place and in these Nūr Jahān played a dominant role. 'Abdul Ḥamīd Lāhaurī, followed by Khāfī Khan, makes out that Jahāngīr first consulted the dignitaries and ministers of the empire. According to Lāhaurī, they failed to offer any advice, but according to Khāfī Khan, some of them, including both Nūr Jahān and Āṣaf Khan, opined that in order to remove the basis of quarrel with Iran, Qandahār should be handed over to the Shah, while others gave a contrary advice. "As Jahāngīr always used to consult Shah Jahān in difficult situations" (Lāhaurī), he wrote to the Prince, who was then in the Deccan (Khāfī Khan). Shah Jahān replied that if Qandahār was handed over to the Shah, even with the best of intentions, this would be looked upon by every one far and near as a sign of Mughul weakness, and further he asked: what would happen if after some time the Shah made another similar request [for some other territory]? (Khāfī Khan). According to these sources, it was on Shah Jahān's ad-

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 203-4.

2. See Faiḍī's reports on Iran in the *Laṭīfa-i Faiḍī*, calendared in our *Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations*, under Nos. A. 32 and 35. Also see Akbar's calling for a report on China from the friendly ruler of Kāshghar. More specifically, Akbar asked for information about the ruler of China, his foreign relations, his conduct of government and his administration of justice, about the great sages and scholars and artists of China, and about the religious beliefs of the Chinese. It is interesting to note that in his letter under mention, Akbar describes himself as "*hamwāra jūyā-i sawānīh-i aqālīm* (ever eager to learn about the affairs of [other] countries). *Mukātabāt-i 'Allāmī*, pp. 25-26. Calendar No. Tx. 336.

vice, that Jahāngīr decided to reject the Shah's demand for Qandahār.¹ This version, however, is not acceptable to us for the reason that it is negated not only by the evidence of the *Tūzūk-i Jahāngīrī* but even by that of the *Iqbāl Nāma-i Jahāngīrī* whose author, Mu'tamad Khan, was an ardent supporter of Prince Shah Jahān and whose account of the events under mention and of the Prince's revolt is extremely partial to the prince.²

In any case it is clear that in the most important foreign policy crisis of the reign, Jahāngīr failed to give an effective lead, and the question of a Qandahār expedition became involved with palace intrigues and the politics of the succession issue.

Shah Jahān was a strong-willed monarch and made his own foreign policy. The *Pādshāh Nāma* of 'Abdul Ḥamīd Lāhaurī does not appear to contain any substantial account of consultations on foreign policy. In the *'Amal-i Šālīh*, only one mention of a *kangāsh* has come to our notice: On learning of Shah 'Abbās II's march on Qandahār, Shah Jahān set out from Delhi with the intent of marching straight to Kābul without touching Lahore. But, as luck would have it, says Šālīh, it was decided, in view of the unlikelihood of the Shah's keeping up the march in extremely cold weather to Qandahār and on the advice of a *kangāsh* of the well-wishers, to postpone the march to Kābul³ (and make a stop at Lahore for the winter). The decision cost Shah Jahān the fort of Qandahār, and this indeed may be the reason why the devoted Šālīh Kanbū makes the nobles share the responsibility of the fateful decision.

The letters of Sa'dullah Khan relating to the first Mughul expedition to Qandahār⁴ after its capture by Shah 'Abbās II, and the letters of Prince Aurangzeb relating to the second Qandahār expedition, fully bear out the exacting control exercised by Shah Jahān over the conduct of the Qandahār campaigns. Aurangzeb's letters in particular bring out his sense of frustration in having to carry out the Emperor's tactical directives which were quite often out of tune with the actual military position.⁵ Shah Jahān's secret reporters

1. Lāhaurī, II, pp. 24-27. Khafī Khan, Vol. I, mentions the subject twice, on pp. 325-26, and again on p. 553.

2. Cf. *Tūzūk*, pp. 345-48, and *I.N.J.*, pp. 207-10; none of the works makes any mention of Jahāngīr's having consulted Shah Jahān on the Qandahār question. For Mu'tamad Khan's own mention of his partisanship for Shah Jahān, see *I.N.J.*, pp. 211-12 and 214.

3. Kanbū, III, p. 70.

4. Calendar Nos. Sh. 155 to 166. The letters occur in the *Maktūbāt-i Sa'dullah Khān*, National Museum, Karachi, MS. The work has been recently published by the Research Society of Pakistan, Lahore, edited by Dr. N. H. Zaidi.

5. Calendar Nos. Sh. 176 to 207. See in particular No. Sh. 207. The letters occur in the *Ādāb-i 'Ālamgīrī*, of Qābil Khan, B.M. Or. 177; also see Najīb Ashraf Nadvi, *Ruq'āt-i 'Ālamgīrī*, A'zamgarh [1929]. True that in one letter (Calendar No. Sh. 202, *Ruq'āt-i 'Ālamgīrī*,

also kept him posted up of any contacts between the Mughul commanders and the Persians. Thus Aurangzeb had to explain the circumstances of Sa'dullah Khan's having sent a secret agent to sound the Persian commander of Qandahār, Autār Khan.¹ It is evident that the Emperor kept a close, indeed too close, a watch on the conduct—both in relation to strategy and to matters involving foreign policy—of the princes and the ministers whom he entrusted with the command of the campaigns against Persians.

For the reign of Aurangzeb, we could not find any substantial reference to his consultations with ministers and advisers on questions of foreign policy. Aurangzeb was a firm and level-headed ruler and it may be reasonably assumed that he made his own foreign policy.

A very interesting case of consultation, though unconnected with Indo-Persian relations, is recorded in the *Aḥsanut Tawārikh* of Ḥasan-i Rūmlū. In 906/1502, Shah Ismā'il I was encamped at Arzanjān (on the north bank of the Euphrates²). Newly emerged as a powerful leader in Western Iran, he was deliberating on possible avenues for the expansion of his dominions. Troops of the various tribes were assembled under his standards. The Shah summoned some of the leading nobles (*arkān-i dawlat*, pillars of the state) and commanded them to hold conferences (*muṭāraḥa*) with the (tribal) heads of the various contingents (*sarān-i sipāh*) and to find out from them as to which direction they favoured to advance upon. The nobles, after eliciting the opinions of the various commanders, reported these to the Shah. The Shah approved none of their various suggestions, and said he would seek an omen (*istikhāra*) that night and would do whatever the Innocent Imāms bade him to do (through the *istikhāra*). The following day, he summoned the nobles and told them that the spirits of the Imāms had revealed to him that it would be best to march upon Shīrwān.³ It may be added that the campaign ended in the conquest of Shīrwān.⁴

The afore-going account, shorn of its anecdotal details, shows Shah Ismā'il as the sole and final authority in matters of foreign policy. It is interesting to compare, from the angle of decision-making, the *Aḥsanut Tawārikh*'s accounts of the two major wars fought by Shah Ismā'il. In the battle of Merv, in which the Persians won, the decision to go to war is stated to have been entirely

ed. Nadvi, pp. 58-60) Shah Jahān concedes that "decisions have to be made on the spot." But the general tenor of the correspondence cited points the other way.

1. Calender No. Sh. 198; *Ādāb-i 'Ālamgīrī*, B. M. Or. 177, ff. 17b-19b; *Ruq'at-i 'Ālamgīrī*, pp. 44-49.

2. Le Strange, p. 118.

3. *Ah.T.*, pp. 41-42.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 43-45.

that of the Shah.¹ While, in the battle of Chāldirān, in which the Persians lost to the Turks, the war is shown to have been forced on the Shah by the indiscreet acts of some of his short-sighted and headstrong subordinates.² In the accounts occurring at different places in the *Aḥsanut Tawārikh* about Shah Ismā'īl I's relations with Bābur, there seems to be no mention of any consultation with the ministers. Nor does this work's account of Shah Ṭahmāsp's relations with Bābur or Humāyūn or Kāmran seem to contain any mention of the Shah's consulting his nobles. The same is true of the *Afḍalut Tawārikh*. Jauhar Āftābchī alone writes of the Shah's having consulted his brother, Bahrām Mirza, and his sister, Sultan Begum. (See above).

The famous Safavid annalist, Iskandar Beg *Munshī*, was no whit behind Abul Faḍl in making the king appear to be the sole author of all foreign policy decisions. To deepen this impression, he eschewed all mention of discussions of foreign policy at the court. Thus in the various long notes in the *Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī* on Shah 'Abbās I's policy on Qandahār, Iskandar Beg makes no mention of any consultations with the ministers. Muḥammad Yūsuf departs at least once from the practice of his brother, Iskandar Beg *Munshī*, when he gives in the *Khuld-i Barīn* the following account of the deliberations at Shah Ṣafī's court on the question of 'Alī Mardān Khan, governor of Qandahār, whose loyalty was then suspect:

Summary

Shah Ṣafī despatched Siyā'ūsh Beg to Qandahār and sent an order to 'Alī Mardān Khan to hand over the fort to Siyā'ūsh and himself to proceed to the Shah's court. The Khan, fearing for his life, sent an *'arīḍa* excusing himself from attending the court but reaffirming his loyalty to the Shah and offering to pay a large amount of money every year to the treasury. When this *'arīḍa* was placed before Shah Ṣafī in a session of the imperial court (*dar majma'-i umarā wa arkān-i daulat*, in an assembly of amīrs and ministers), Jānī Khan *Qurchī-bāshī* who was fearless in expressing his opinion, submitted that it was evident that 'Alī Mardān Khan was avoiding to come to the court for fear of his life, that if pressed too hard, he might do something adverse to the interests of the empire, and that in view of the reported advance of Ottoman forces on Persian frontier and on Baghdād, it would be well-advised to put off the summons to 'Alī Mardān Khan and to allay his apprehensions suitably. The minister alluded to the example of the (reigning) Ottoman Sultan who had adopted a conciliatory attitude towards 'Alī Pasha, governor of Baṣra, when the latter had shown signs of disaffection. But all the other advisers (*arbāb-i kankāy*) of the Shah decried Jānī Khan's counsel and submitted to the Shah that as the minister had partaken generously from the wealth of (that is, had accepted heavy bribes from) 'Alī Mardān Khan, he was trying to protect the latter. The condonation

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 111-12.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 143-44.

of 'Alī Mardān Khan's rebellious conduct, they argued, would encourage disaffection among other governors and would spread confusion in the empire. Therefore the Shah ordered the *Qullar-āqāsī* and other nobles to proceed to Qandahār and bring 'Alī Mardān Khan willy-nilly to Isfahān. But before the *Qullar-āqāsī* could reach his destination, 'Alī Mardān Khan had already handed over the fort to the Mughuls and himself gone over to the Mughul side.¹

This account of the *kankāj* (same as *kangāsh*) at the court of Shah Ṣafī on the one hand provides another case of the king's discussing foreign policy matters with his ministers, and on the other illustrates how an unwise king could accept the wrong advice in preference to the right one. There can be little doubt that if 'Alī Mardān Khan had gone to Shah Ṣafī's court, he would have met certain death. Shah Ṣafī by his harsh policy lost to the Mughuls not only an exceptionally able officer but also the all important fort of Qandahār.

Munshī Ṭāhir Vahīd who composed his '*Abbās Nāma* in a highly panegyric vein, says that when Shah 'Abbās II resolved to recover Qandahār from the Mughuls, he, in accordance with the Quranic injunction on consultation, summoned the nobles and asked their advice in the matter. They unanimously declared the Shah's project to be perfect (lit. without blemish). The Shah thereupon issued orders to his troops all over the empire to assemble for the purpose of the projected expedition.² This account of Ṭāhir Vahīd brings out nothing except that the nobles rubber-stamped the decision of the Shah.

Unfortunately not many cases of conferences between the king and his ministers on foreign policy problems are found in contemporary records. Mughul and Persian historians followed the fashion set by Abul Faḍl and Iskandar Beg of making the king appear to be the source of all thinking and action on foreign policy. Therefore accounts of conferences which were undoubtedly held, were deliberately left out by the official historians who alone were in a position to know details. In such consultations, it would be fair to assume, the wazīr (known as I'timādud Daula in Iran) played a leading part. Sagacious wazīrs like Sa'dullah Khan and Khalifa Sultan were sure to be consulted and their views given due weight. Sa'dullah Khan, we know, was involved in foreign affairs both in drafting his master's letters to foreign potentates and in the conduct of campaigns against Persia. However, during the period of the Great Mughuls (Akbar to Aurangzeb) and the Great *Sophies* (as the Europeans loved to call the Safavids), ultimate decision on foreign policy lay with the monarch. On the other hand if the king was a weakling, all the discussions on foreign policy between him and his ministers could prove unavailing, as happened in the case of Muḥammad Shah on the eve of Nādir Shah's invasion

1. *Khuld-i Barīn*, V, f. 67a = *Dhail*, pp. 212-13.

2. '*Abbās Nāma*, ed. Dihgan, pp. 93-94.

of India.¹ The king's being a minor was also a debilitating factor in foreign policy. During the minority of Shah 'Abbās II, his ministers avoided taking a firm stand vis-à-vis the Mughul posture on Qandahār and Central Asia.

1. The failure of the Mughul court to decide upon measures to defend the country from the impending Persian invasion, before it was too late, has been accounted by Rustam 'Alī in his *Tārīkh-i Hindī*, to the fact that Muḥammad Shah did not put his trust in any one of his ministers. With the result that the measures proposed by the Khan Daurān were decried by Nizāmūl Mulk and the proposals made by Nizāmūl Mulk were opposed by the Khan Daurān. This, observes Rustam 'Alī, was productive of immense harm and mischief. (*Tārīkh-i Hindī*, B.M. Or. 1628, ff. 2181b-82a).

APPENDIX J

DIPLOMATIC USAGE

[The material on this subject is extensive. Contemporary chronicles, collections of correspondence and European travellers' accounts contain many notices of, and references to, diplomatic usage. The accounts of Olearius (secretary to the embassy of the Duke of Holstein to Persia), Pietro Della Valle, Sir Thomas Roe, Bernier, Tavernier, Chardin and Manucci provide full and vivid descriptions of the reception of envoys and other related formalities. The subject is here treated only in outline.]

Embassies and Ambassadors

The system of having permanent diplomatic missions as now obtains was not in vogue in our period. The mode of maintaining relations between states was the occasional despatching of ambassadors by one monarch to another. There was no clear gradation of diplomatic representatives as we have now. Even so, there were more important envoys and less important envoys. For the sake of convenience, we will design them as extraordinary ambassadors and ordinary ambassadors. In contemporary literature, they are all described as *Ilchi* and *Safir*, and their function as *ilchīgīrī*, *sifārat* and *risālat*. The extraordinary ambassadors were generally men of high status. It was not uncommon to raise the status of the ambassador-designate before his departure. In Mughul India, where the gradation of officers was highly elaborate under the *manṣabdārī* system, the raising of his status was registered by an increase in the *manṣab* by 500 or 1000 or more. Sometimes the elevation of status was indicated by conferring on the person concerned a new title or by creating him a *Khan*. Princes of royal family were also sent on important embassies, but this was rather rare. In the letter entrusted to the ambassador for presentation to the royal recipient (which we will hereafter briefly call "royal letter"¹), the high rank of the ambassador and his proximity to the person of the king were always emphasised. It was not uncommon to send

1. The term "royal letter" has been discussed fully in the Introduction to the present author's *Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations* (unpublished).

men celebrated for piety and learning as ambassadors, the idea being that such men would command respect from the other side on account of the esteem in which they were generally held. Rulers of Tūrān, which was well-known for the orthodoxy and erudition of its scholars, used to send them as envoys. The famous Khwājas of Jūbār were sent on important missions to Jahāngīr and Shah 'Abbās I. The good offices of men of piety were indeed quite often utilised in ironing out differences with neighbouring princes.

Religious and sectarian considerations also played a part in the choice of envoys. Thus the Mughul emperors quite often selected Sayyids as their ambassadors, as they were likely to command more respect in the Shiite kingdom of Iran. In such cases the prophetic descent of the envoy was specially underlined in the royal letter. In fact most of the ambassadors sent by the Mughuls to Persia, were themselves Persians who had migrated to India and joined Mughul service. As Persian was the language of culture and diplomacy in large regions of Southern and Central Asia, the Persians were naturally preferred for diplomatic assignments. Shah 'Abbās I once enquired from two envoys of Persian origin sent by Jahāngīr as to why Indians were not sent as diplomats. One of them replied:

در هند اگر آدمی می بود ما را کسی نان نمی داد - آدم در هند نیست

(If there were [able] men in India, who would give us a living there? In India there are few [able] men).¹ The envoys from the Deccan kingdoms to Persia were also generally Persians.

The ambassadors were selected for their loyalty, trustworthiness, intelligence and, above all, their power of elegant and persuasive conversation. Their main success consisted in their ability to please the potentate to whom they were accredited and to impress on him the desirability of maintaining friendly relations with their master. *Charbzubānī* and *mizāj-dānī*, respectively the power of entertaining and flattering conversation and the ability to gauge the mood of another person, were considered essential gifts in an ambassador.

Functions

The main function of an ambassador was to promote friendly relations between his master and the monarch to whom he was accredited. He also kept in touch with the princes, ministers and nobles as well as with other ambassadors. Occasionally an envoy was sent with the purpose of negotiating a treaty or an alliance. The agreement was confirmed by a written agreement, or by an exchange of royal letters which, *inter alia*, mentioned the substance of the understanding arrived at.² One of the duties of an envoy was to send

1. *Tārīkh-i 'Abbāsi* (Bod. 288), f. 480a-b.

2. See under '*ahd-nāma*' in the Introduction to the present author's *Calendar of*

home from time to time reports of the situation in the country concerned and the position of the king.¹ If there was likelihood of his official message being intercepted, he could send the information through a secret agent who passed under the guise of a trader or a traveller, or who indeed was a trader but did intelligence work as a side business. Such information helped the authorities at home to adjust their foreign relations. The function of a modern ambassador has been described as lying abroad for the sake of his country. The Mughul and the Persian diplomat too had sometimes to practise the fine art of telling smooth lies. Surprisingly enough, there is little mention of general trade relations in the account of the extraordinary ambassadors exchanged between India and Persia.² In the records of the East India Company, however, we often come across references to the role of the Persian ambassadors in India in connection with Anglo-Persian trade.

The Ambassador's Train

An extraordinary ambassador had a large train of officers and servants with him. The gait of the ambassador, the size of his suite, the quality and quantity of the gifts brought by him and the lavishness with which he entertained people, were the things by which the might and wealth of his master would be judged in the country he was visiting. The ambassador had with him a train of anything between fifty to five hundred men, or even more. Among the officers accompanying an ambassador, the more notable were the *Tahwīldār* or the Keeper of gifts and of the cash and accounts of the embassy, and the *Wāqī'a-nigār* or the official reporter. As the Mughul emperors were fond of *shikār*, the Khans of Tūrān used to send a *Mīr-i Shikār* or Master of the Hunt, with the ambassador. The *Mīr-i Shikār* was in charge of the animals, especially trained pigeons and hawks, which were sent as presents. Khān 'Ālam's magnificent train³ also included a painter, Bishan Dās, who brought back portraits from Persia.⁴

Gifts

Every extraordinary ambassador brought with him a large number of gifts. The kings in India and Iran loved to send rare and costly presents to their opposite numbers. The value, variety and rarity of these presents in a

Documents on Indo-Persian Relations. Also see Calendar Nos. Tx. 334 and Post-Ab. 279, the latter being the treaty concluded between Muḥammad Shah and Nādir Shah.

1. See Niẓāmūl Mulk, *Siyāsat Nāma*, ed. Muḥammad Qazwīnī, Tihiran, A.H.S., 1334, p. 101; tr. Hubert Darke, *The Book of Government or Rules for Kings*, London, 1960, pp. 98-101.

2. For one of the infrequent mentions of trade relations in diplomatic correspondence, see Calendar No. Sh. 138.

3. See p. 74 above.

4. See Plate No. 1; also see p. 76 above.

large measure determined the impression which the embassy created on the other king. A list of gifts was always sent along with the royal letter.¹ The Mughul chronicles almost invariably mention the value of gifts sent or received with the ambassadors. The royal gifts from Persia always included a number of fine 'Irāqī horses. Precious stones, drinking vessels and articles made of semi-precious stones, bejewelled daggers, brocade, and a variety of specially prepared costly pieces of cloth and robes, formed part of the stock of all major embassies. Jahāngīr, who revels in describing rarities, mentions (for example) a dagger with a handle made of the piebald fish-tooth, and a bejewelled flask made in the shape of cock and large enough to contain a maund² of wine, respectively received from and sent to Persia. Valuables captured as spoils in a successful expedition were highly favoured as gifts, for, besides being gifts, they were also tokens of victory. Rare gifts received from one country were sometimes sent as presents to another. The Shahs of Persia used to send gifts received from Russia (especially furs) and the Ottoman empire to the Mughuls. Such gifts were meant to emphasise the international importance of their sender.

Send-off Ceremony

The despatching of an ambassador was a formal ceremony. A day was generally fixed in advance. The ambassador-designate presented himself to his king. The royal letter was handed over to him. The king generally added a verbal message for transmission to the other king. Important confidential messages were, indeed, quite often sent verbally and only casually mentioned in the letter.³ The ambassador was then given permission to depart. If the actual departure was delayed for some reason, a second send-off ceremony was sometimes arranged. If necessary, the ambassador-designate was given instructions in diplomatic etiquette.⁴

Royal Letters

Royal letters were drafted⁵ either by the Wazīr, or by the leading *Munshī* (expert in elegant writing) at the court. Most of Akbar's letters were drafted by the famous Abul Faḍl. In some cases, two drafts were prepared and the king chose one of them.⁶ Shah Jahān's letters were mostly composed

1. See Calendar No. Ott. 411.

2. A Jahāngīrī maund was equal to 66.38 lb. Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System of Mughal India*, p. 368.

3. See p. 79 above.

4. See p. 100 above.

5. For a detailed discussion, see section vi, 'The process of drafting' in the Introduction to the present author's *Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations*.

6. See pp. 63-64 above, and Calendar No. A. 38 and A. 39. Also see Calendar Nos. A. 43 and Tx. 330.

by his Wazir, Sa'dullah Khan. Most of 'Abbās II's letters were drafted by the celebrated litterateur, Mirza Tāhir Vahid, who was also his minister. Royal letters were as a rule written in a highly inflated and ornate style; the name of the royal addressee was always preceded by a long string of titles. Lack of proper address in the letters from the Ottoman Sultan was one reason for the deterioration in Mughul-Turkish relations.

*Reception*¹

The arrival of foreign embassies was a matter of great import to a kingdom, for it signified the recognition of its own importance. Hence both the Mughul and the Safavid chroniclers again and again point out how the power and fame of their respective masters had attracted embassies from all parts of the world. The coming of embassies was of particular importance and significance to a new king, for it meant recognition of his accession. As soon as the news of the entry or impending entry of an extraordinary ambassador into the country was received at the court, the king ordered arrangements for his reception. An official host known as *Mehmāndār* was appointed. In Iran, the *Mehmāndār* used to go ahead to meet the ambassador and conduct him to the capital. In India, the function of the *Mehmāndār* was generally confined to looking after the comforts of the ambassador at the capital (or wherever the emperor might be at the moment). The person selected as *Mehmāndār* was either one who had been an ambassador to the other country or one who was likely to be sent there in future. Royal orders were also sent to the governors of provinces, through which the ambassador was to pass, for his reception. In certain cases nobles were sent forward to receive the envoy at the frontier and accompany him to the court-city. A robe of honour, sometimes accompanied by a royal *farmān* of welcome, was also sent to the ambassador. If the emperor was not at his capital, he would appoint a high-ranking officer, such as the governor of a province, to conduct the ambassador to the court. When the ambassador arrived near the capital or wherever the king was at the moment, nobles went out to receive him. Some good house was chosen for his lodging. In some cases it was the house of the *Mehmāndār* himself. The ambassador, during his presence in the country, was treated as a royal guest, and a large part, if not all, of his expenses was defrayed by the king. There are numerous references in the Mughul chronicles to the advance of maintenance allowances to ambassadors. It was in addition to the rewards in cash and kind conferred on him. Money was also advanced to the *Mehmāndār*

1. For a detailed account of the reception and entertainment of foreign envoys and other connected formalities at the Persian court, see Falsafī, '*Abbās-i Awwal*', IV, sec. xxii, pp. 55-74. On the Mughul side, perhaps the most detailed extant account is that of the reception

from the Treasury to meet the expenses incurred by him on account of the ambassador.

Presentation Ceremony

After the arrival of the envoy (and in rare cases, even before), a date was fixed on which he was to present himself before the king. An early date was a special favour and an indication of good relations with the ambassador's country. Generally the king sent him a message of welcome, giving a date for his presentation. Ambassadors of small countries had sometimes to dance attendance on the nobles of the court and to grease their palm to obtain an early date for their presentation.

On the fixed date, the ambassador came to the court and was ushered into the royal presence. He offered immediate salutation. The question of mode of salutation sometimes raised difficulties.¹ Ambassadors at the Mughul court were expected to salute in the Mughul fashion, which meant offering *kornish*, *taslīm* or *sijda*. "The salutation called *taslīm*," says the *Ā'in-i Akbarī* (tr. I, p. 158), "consists in placing the back of the right hand on the ground, and then raising it gently till the person stands erect, when he puts the palm of his hand upon the crown of his head, which pleasing manner of salutation signifies that he is ready to give himself as offering." The *kornish* was another variation of *taslīm*, and is described thus: "His Majesty has commanded the palm of the right hand to be placed upon the forehead and head bent downwards. This mode of salutation, in the language of the present age, is called *Kurnish*." (*Ā'in*, I, p. 158). The *sijda* consisted in prostrating oneself by bowing down the forehead to the ground.² The *sijda* was introduced by Akbar, but owing to orthodox objections, he restricted its performance to the *Darbār-i Khāṣ* (Hall of Private Audience); Shah Jahān, more orthodox than his predecessors, abolished the practice after his accession and replaced it with *zamin-bos*, a mild form of *sijda*, and later with the *taslīm*.³ Envoys from Tūrān and from all small countries performed these obsequious ceremonies so as to please the Mughul emperor and earn thereby a good reward. Permission to depart from this custom was given reluctantly and in special cases. Sir Thomas

of 'Alī Mardān Khan Shāmlū at the court of Muḥammad Shah given in the *Tārīkh-i Shahādat-i Farrukh Siyar* etc., Ethé 422, ff. 135b-47a.

1. It was a problem of long standing. For the existence of the problem in the period of the Holy Prophet and the Pious Caliphs, see Muḥammad Ḥamidullāh, *Muslim Conduct of State*, Lahore, Third edition, 1953, p. 146.

2. See the *Ain i Akbari*, Translation, I, p. 159, for Abul Faḍl's justification of the *sijda*. The custom of *sijda* and *pāi-bos* (prostration and kissing the monarch's feet) had indeed been first introduced by Sultan Ghiyāthuddīn Balban (1266-87) of Delhi. See A.B.M. Habibullah, *The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India*, Lahore, 1945, p. 154.

3. Lāhaurī, I, i, pp. 110-12; the *zamin-bos* is described by Lahauri, thus: "Placing both the hands on the ground, one should kiss the back of the hand, so that the salutation be performed

Roe, the English envoy, was allowed by Jahāngir to offer salutation in the manner of his own country; he describes how some officers at the court called out to him to perform the *sijda*, whereupon the emperor called out "No" in Persian.¹ Persian ambassadors were generally permitted to salute in their own fashion, but the permission was never accorded willingly.² One of the Persian envoys certainly performed the *sijda*.³ The Persian mode of salutation is thus described by Manucci in the account of the embassy of Budāq Beg to Aurangzeb's court, "He made his *salām* in the Persian fashion by placing both hands on his breast."⁴

The ceremony of first presentation was held in the case of India at the Darbār-i 'Ām or the Hall of Public Audience. Shah 'Abbās I who made Isfahān his capital, used to give the ceremonial audience to foreign envoys in the spacious *Maidān-i Shah*, which, according to Sir Thomas Herbert, the English traveller (1628), was "as spacious and aromatic a market as any in the world." On the occasion of the presentation of ambassadors the *Maidān-i Shāh* was closed to the public and hung with lights.⁵

After the salutation and a brief conversation between the envoy and the king, the next thing was the delivery of the royal letter. The normal custom at the Mughul court was for the ambassador to hand the letter to one of the nobles in attendance, who would then place it in royal hands. An exception was made in the case of the Persian ambassadors from whom the emperor condescended to accept the letter directly. The king perused the letter and handed it over to the Wazīr. The king would then make some enquiries from the ambassador which the latter answered. The ambassador generally brought a verbal message which he delivered on this occasion. If the king was pleased with the ambassador, or was well-disposed towards his master, or felt interested in the country from which he came, he (the king) could carry on an amiable conversation with the ambassador for sometime. Out of the numerous presents brought by him, the ambassador would on this occasion present a few choice articles. The king would, on the request of the envoy, appoint a date for the general presentation of gifts. The audience generally ended in the king giving a robe of honour and a reward in cash and properly and at the same time it may not resemble the *sijda*." Also see the *Tārīkh-i Qipchāq-Khāni*, II, f. 145b.

1. Roe, p. 214.

2. See Bernier, pp. 146-54. Bernier recounts an entertaining anecdote how a Persian-envoy ingeniously avoided the Mughul salutation. The judicious Bernier, however, does not believe the story to be true.

3. See embassy of Muḥammad Riqā Beg, chap. V, p. 137 above.

4. Manucci, II, p. 50.

5. For a vivid description of the *Maidān-i Shāh*, see W. Blunt, *Pietro's Pilgrimage*, pp. 123-30.




Plate IV. Emperor Shah Jahān receiving a Persian envoy in the Darbār-i 'Ām or Hall of Public Audience. (Bodleian MS Ousley Add. 173.) Courtesy, Keeper, Department of Oriental Books, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

kind to the ambassador which the latter received with ceremonial salutations. The ceremony of presentation over, the ambassador would be shown to a place in the *darbār* where he would stand (as did everybody else present there) till the court broke up.

Presentation of Gifts

The special ceremony of presentation of gifts was necessary only in case the envoy had brought a large number of royal presents, as extraordinary ambassadors always did. The list of gifts was handed over to the officers of the king so that they could check the contents. The king would personally inspect some of the articles. The *Taḥwīldār* of the embassy was present on this occasion. It was customary for the ambassador to offer some presents on his own account, which were known as *peshkash*.¹ A *peshkash* was a sure investment, for the value thereof was paid with a substantial addition as reward to the envoy. The officers of the king estimated the value of the royal gifts and the *peshkash*. Khan 'Ālam, who had taken an unusually large number of gifts, wanted to present them in daily instalments. Shah 'Abbās I, being too busy with state affairs, did not agree to this arrangement, and the Mughul envoy, much against his will, had to offer all his gifts at one sitting.

The extraordinary ambassador was invited by the leading nobles to their respective houses for formal dinners. The king invited him to drinking parties and pleasure excursions. Jahāngīr, who was more jovial and less punctilious than the other Great Mughuls, used to have long chats with Persian and European envoys, sometimes over a cup of wine. The presence of ambassadors at royal drinking bouts at Persian and Indian courts, is frequently mentioned. The king also invited the ambassadors to take part in royal hunts and to be present at the festivals of illumination and fireworks. Shah Ṣafī's envoy to the Mughal court was invited to attend the first 'urs or death anniversary of the late queen, Mumtāz Maḥal. Ambassadors were always present at the royal birthday ceremonies and the anniversaries of accession, and were recipients of rewards. In Persia, all ambassadors used to be present at the court on the occasion of the Naurūz or the Persian New Year's day. As a matter of very great favour, the king could personally visit the house of the ambassadors. This was, however, a rare honour.

Duration of Stay

An ambassador was expected to return to his country as soon as possible. The royal letters almost invariably included a request for the ambassador's early dismissal. However, three to six months was the minimum period an extraordinary ambassador was expected to stay, and a *congé* after this was

1. The word *peshkash* stands for all presents from a subordinate to a superior.

considered an early one. The ordinary envoys were sometimes dismissed within a few weeks.

The king generally desired to detain the ambassadors for long periods. The motive of detention is very well stated by Bernier (p. 129) in these words: "The *Great Mogol* is in the habit of detaining all ambassadors as long as can be reasonably done, from an idea that it is becoming his grandeur and power, to receive the homage of foreigners, and to number them among the attendants of his court." An early dismissal was an indication of good relations. Quick dismissals also meant a more brisk exchange of embassies, for it was a normal practice for a king to send his own representative with the retiring ambassador. In situations requiring urgent exchange of views, an ambassador could be dismissed within a month. Detention of an ambassador over a long period could occasion ill-feeling. Detention, however, was not always an unfriendly act; two of Jahāngīr's envoys stayed for several years at Shah 'Abbās I's court, in one case with Jahāngīr's explicit permission.

An Ambassador's Rewards

Oriental monarchs were fond of conferring rich rewards on foreign ambassadors with a view to enhance their reputation abroad.¹ The Mughul emperors satisfied their vanity by giving lavish rewards to ambassadors at their court and their great wealth made it easy for them to do so. A reward of Rupees 50,000 to 1,00,000 was quite normal; one Persian ambassador received over three lacs from Shah Jahān. Maintenance allowance was given in addition to rewards. Jahāngīr once assigned a village to a Persian ambassador; a Deccani envoy was similarly favoured by Shah Ṣafī.²

Ambassadors also made considerable profits by bringing a large quantity of commodities from their own countries for sale and carrying back other merchandise. These goods passed as the ambassador's personal effects, free of customs duty on the frontier and free of freight on the European ships plying between Indian and Persian ports. The East India Company records are full of complaints on this count. Muḥammad 'Alī Beg, Persian envoy to Shah Jahān's court, for instance, carried back a huge amount of goods including 500 bags of sugar on English boats, and paid nothing as freight.³ It would not be far-fetched to presume that the king and the ministers had some share in profits earned through diplomatic assignments.

1. The practice of offering gifts to the envoys is an old one. For mention of its existence in the days of the Holy Prophet, see M. Ḥamidullāh, *Muslim Conduct of State*, Lahore, 1953, pp. 147-48.

2. *Ḥadiqatus Salāṭīn*, p. 71.

3. *English Factories*, 1630-33, p. 289. For another similar case, see Krusinski, I, pp. 174-5.

Dismissal Ceremony

A date for the dismissal of the ambassador was arranged beforehand. The ambassador presented himself on that date at the royal court; the king spoke to him and conferred on him robes and rewards. In case the king was for some reason not sending his own envoy, he would entrust his reply to the retiring ambassador. If the ambassador's actual departure was for some reason unduly delayed, a second dismissal ceremony was sometimes held.¹

Ordinary Ambassadors

The despatching of an extraordinary ambassador was a highly elaborate and expensive affair; hence there was generally a long interval (at the receiving end) between the departure of one such ambassador and the arrival of the next. The diplomatic gap was sometimes filled up by a succession of ordinary envoys. Such envoys were employed on less important or more urgent business, and are often alluded to as *ilchī-i chāpār*,² that is a courier on an urgent mission. An ordinary ambassador could travel light and more quickly. Thus, when information was received of the death of a king and the accession of his successor, an embassy was sent immediately. The envoy would depart with a few gifts known as *yādbūd* and with a letter asking for his immediate dismissal. One purpose of such missions was to bring a quick report on the situation in the other country. Ordinary envoys could be sent at any time, whether or not an extraordinary ambassador was present in the other country. The latter was, however, the principal spokesman of his master, and any message or letter sent through an ordinary envoy would be communicated to the king through him.³ The ordinary envoys were generally dismissed soon. Their presentation and dismissal ceremonies were less elaborate and their rewards proportionately small. Letters bearing news of conquest or victory were generally sent by ordinary envoys so as to reach their destination quickly.

It would not be correct to describe these ordinary envoys as mere messengers or letter-bearers. In the royal letters entrusted to them, they are always described as *Safīr* or *Ilchī* and their importance is underlined, and they were received at the other end as ambassadors. It may also be pointed out that the line of distinction between the extraordinary and the ordinary ambassadors cannot be too sharply drawn and is only a rough and ready one.

1. See p. 102 above.

2. See rubric of Calendar No. Sh. 143, where the *ilchī-i buzurg* (the chief ambassador) as well as the *ilchī-i chāpār*, are mentioned in contrast thus: "... Arslān Beg, the *ilchī-i chāpār* arrived soon after Jān Nihār Khan, the *ilchī-i buzurg*."

3. See Calendar No. Sh. 117 (embassy of Šafdar Khan and Mīr Husainī).

Semi-Diplomatic Missions

Traders and travellers sometimes obtained letters of recommendation from their king to the monarch of another country. In certain cases, the bearers of these letters played a semi-diplomatic role. A purchasing mission sent by Shah Jahān to Turkey with a letter of introduction to the Ottoman Sultan led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two empires; the Sultan sent a major embassy in return. [For purchasing missions, see Chap. v above.]

Minor Embassies

The term minor embassies has been used here for embassies in which at least one of the parties was not a king. It was not unusual for royal princes and high dignitaries of the state to send embassies to kings of the other countries and *vice versa*. The Grand Wazīr of the Ottoman empire used to send and receive embassies frequently. Prince *Khudābanda* and Prince 'Abbās Mirza sent missions to Akbar. Prince Salīm and Prince Shah Jahān had diplomatic exchanges with Shah 'Abbās I.¹ Dārā Shukoh received several embassies from Tūrān and sent one to Turkey. Mughul governors of Qandahār used to send missions to the Shah of Iran; Persian governors of the fort sent similar embassies to India. Most of these minor embassies consisted of no more than an envoy and a few servants. Nevertheless, in contemporary historical literature they are always described as embassies and were no doubt looked upon as such by those who despatched or received them.

Diplomatic Usage in Strained Relations

In the period under discussion, there were no permanent embassies to be withdrawn in case relations between the two countries deteriorated beyond a certain point. But the ambassador who happened to be present in the country was not allowed, in such a situation, to see the king. If an ambassador arrived after relations had become strained with his country, he was duly received: a *Mehmāndār* was appointed to look after him; he was rewarded, though not handsomely; no lack of courtesy was shown to him by the nobles who were appointed to entertain him. But he was not granted an audience at the court; his royal letter was not likely to be accepted, and if accepted, only a verbal reply was given. Arrangements were made for his safe-conduct and an officer was appointed to accompany him to the frontier. There is no case on record in Indo-Persian diplomatic history of any envoy being ill-treated, whatever the state of relations and however unwelcome the contents of the

1. See Appendix H, Embassies to and from Princes.

letter brought by him.¹ The only exception was Shah 'Abbās II's ill-treatment of Tarbiyat Khan. However, in this case the reasons were neither political nor diplomatic but personal, namely the Shah's uncontrollable temper.²

Reward and Punishment of Ambassadors (at home)

The envoy who made a success of his assignment, was rewarded by his master in various ways. He was ceremoniously received on his return, high-ranking nobles going out to welcome him. His rank was raised and he was rewarded in cash and otherwise. A successful assignment abroad invariably led to a higher appointment, diplomatic or administrative. Envoys who failed in the performance of their duties were variously penalised. They were debarred from court on return and their rank was reduced.

1. For a fantastic and inaccurate story, see Peter Van Den Broeke's Journal, in the *Journal of Indian History*, 1932, p. 15.

2. See p. 128 above.

APPENDIX K

A NOTE ON THE SOURCES

The following bibliographical note is confined to certain general remarks about the more important of the sources on which this thesis is based. Extended notices of well-known works have been avoided.

Mughul and Safavid Sources

Khwand Amīr's *Ḥabib* *Siyar*, one of the best universal histories attempted by the Muslim historians, gives a sober, methodical, fairly impartial, and strictly contemporary account of the days of Shah Ismā'il I and Bābur. Our references are to the Bombay Edition, 1857; the new edition published at Tihiran, 1954, has also been consulted. The untitled and anonymous history of Shah Ismā'il I (C.U. Add. 200) has been fully commented upon by (Sir) E. D. Ross, in *The Early Years of Shah Ismā'il* (London, 1896). Its author was evidently a well-informed person. He completed his work early in Shah Tahmāsp's reign. The authorship of the work has been ascribed by Dr. Ghulām Sarwar¹ to one Bijan. Bijan's name as author also occurs in another work (B.M. Add. 7655, an untitled account of the life and times of Rustam Khan) written about the middle of the seventeenth century. Little, however, is known about either of these Bijans. Another history of Shah Ismā'il, Ethé 536, though commended by H. Beveridge, (*J.R.A.S.*, 1902, pp. 170-71; later on he changed his opinion, *ibid.*, pp. 889-95) has proved to be worthless. It is nearer fiction than history. It is in fact a recension of the C.U. Add. 200, with a considerable touch of fantasy. It makes Bābur go to Herāt and appear before Shah Ismā'il like a convict beseeching pardon. The MS being defective at both ends, it is difficult to fix with any certainty its date of composition. While on f. 305*b* Shah Tahmāsp I is mentioned as a contemporary, on f. 306*a* Shah Ṣafī II (*i.e.*, Shah Sulaimān, acc. 1077/1666)

1. *History of Shah Ismā'il*, p. 9.

finds a mention. The work is certainly not a contemporary history of Shah Ismā'il as Beveridge once believed.

The Memoirs of Bābur (on which we need hardly enlarge here) would have been our best authority for this period, but for the long gap in the Memoirs covering 1508-1519, the very years in which events of utmost interest to us were taking place. Mrs. Beveridge's Notes (covering up the gaps in the Memoirs), footnotes and Appendices are always helpful and illuminating. The *Tārīkh-i Rashidī* of Mirza Ḥaider Dughlāt, in the translation of Sir E. D. Ross, is also useful in filling up the above-mentioned gap in Bābur's memoirs, though only partially. The author accompanied Bābur when the latter proceeded to Badakhshān after the battle of Merv (1510). The work is weak in chronology. Its strong anti-Shiite bias in the account of Bābur's occupation of Samarqand and the subsequent events, only reflects the prevailing sentiments in Tūrān. Taken as a whole, however, it is one of the most valuable works of the period.

For the period of Humāyūn and Shah Ṭahmāsp, the best Safavid account is found in the *Tārīkh* of Amīr Maḥmūd, son of the famous historian Khwand Amīr. The author belonged to Herāt and wrote his *Tārīkh* within four or five years of Humāyūn's visit to Persia (C.U. MS; Arberry, *Supp. Handlist*, p. 32). The *Aḥsanut Tawārīkh* of Ḥasan-i Rūmlū (text and translation published at Baroda, 1931, 1934) is a good history of the first two Safavid monarchs. Its account of Humāyūn's visit is rather brief.

Khur Shah b. Qubād al-Ḥusainī, author of the *Tārīkh-i Ilchī-i Niẓām Shah*, arrived in Persia as envoy of Niẓām Shah of the Deccan soon after Humāyūn had left the country, and stayed there for nineteen years. The account he gives of Humāyūn's visit is, however, disappointingly brief; his account of Ṭahmāsp's invasion of Qandahār is surprisingly ill-informed. We have utilised and compared both the MSS of the work at the B.M. (Or. 153 and Add. 23, 513).

On the Mughul side, the first place undoubtedly goes to Jauhar *Āftābchī*, Humāyūn's ewer-bearer. Jauhar was not only a faithful servant but also a reliable diarist. He was not a historian or chronicler, but this circumstance itself adds to the value of his work, for he recorded whatever he saw or came to know (sometimes, of course, with unnecessary details of petty incidents) without any attempt to embellish his tale or omit unpleasant facts. Writing over three decades after the events, Jauhar confused the sequence at one or two places, which have been pointed out in our chapter on Humāyūn. We have used the B.M. MS of Jauhar's *Tadhkiratul Wāqī'āt* (Add. 16.711) which is the oldest and the most reliable MS of the work. Jauhar composed the work in 995/1587 and this MS was transcribed in 1019/1610. No recent work on Humāyūn has utilised this MS except through the highly inaccurate transla-

tion of Stewart (see below). We have also used the MS of Jauhar at the School of Oriental and African Studies as well as the recent Urdu translation by Dr. Moinul Haq on the basis of two other (undated) MSS. At Jauhar's request, Shaikh Ilahdād Faiḍī Sarhindī (for whom see Storey, I, p. 551) wrote an embroidered version of Jauhar's own work. We have used the King's College MS of Sarhindī. However, such material in this version as is not part of Jauhar's own text, should be considered strictly as embellishments added for effect. Major Charles Stewart published a translation of Jauhar in 1832, of which W. Erskine wrote: "The translation of Major Stewart is no translation at all. It is full of errors. . . . It adds, takes away, alters. It is not trustworthy, and one does him no injustice in pronouncing him ignorant of the geography of the country, ignorant of the language, ignorant of the duty of a translator." (See Rieu, p. 264.) Dr. Ishwari Prasad's suggestion that Stewart and Erskine used two different MSS of Jauhar,¹ is inaccurate. (See Erskine's autograph corrections in an interleaved copy of Stewart's printed translation, B.M. Add. 26, 620.) Stewart's first footnote betrays his ignorance.

Bāyazīd Bayāt's history, known variously as *Mukhtaṣar, Tārīkh-i Humāyūn*, and *Tārīkh-i Humāyūn wa Akbar*, and Gulbadan Begum's *Humāyūn Nāma* are also contemporary works. Gulbadan wrote her account on the basis of the information supplied by Ḥamīda Bāno Begum, Humāyūn's consort who accompanied him to Persia. The two works, especially the former, add some highly useful information.

Coming to the period of Akbar and Shah 'Abbās I, we find a large number of Mughul and Safavid chronicles, the outstanding of which are the *Akbar Nāma* of Shaikh Abul Faḍl and the *Tārīkh-i 'Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī* of Iskandar Beg Munshī. Both are essential works. By their prestige, they set the pattern of historiography in their respective countries. The *Akbar Nāma*, as also the later official chronicles, were compiled on the basis of official records, which provided fulsome reports of all events of consequence occurring at the court and in all parts of the empire, and which were preserved in the Records Department. Of all the Mughul (and the Safavid) chroniclers, Abul Faḍl has the best claim to be called a historian in the modern sense of the word. The *Akbar Nāma*, along with the *Ā'in-i Akbarī*, gives a full picture of the political events, the government, and the social and the economic life of the country. The *Akbar Nāma* soon became well-known in Persia and almost all chronicles from the time of Shah 'Abbās onwards mention it, and do so generally with respect (e.g., *Af. T.*, f. 117a). We have mainly used the Persian text published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal. The author has found H. Beveridge's translation of the *Akbar Nāma* and his footnotes very helpful. Abul Faḍl's

1. *Life and Times of Humayun*, p. 387.

“rex-centric” approach to history and his treatment of the material on foreign policy in the *Akbar Nāma*, have been discussed *supra* in the Appendix entitled “Formulation of Foreign Policy.”

The *Ṭabaqāt-i Akbarī* of Nizāmuddīn Aḥmad *Bakhshī*, the *Muntakhabat Tawārikh* of ‘Abdul Qādir Badāyūnī and the *Tārikh-i Alfī* make brief references to Muḡhul-Safavid relations. Badāyūnī adds some entertaining details, but his account is always to be taken with a pinch of salt. He loves to accentuate the sectarian motive. His story of the massacre of the Shī‘as in Qandahār after its seizure by Humāyūn from the Persians is maliciously false.

The *Afḍalut Tawārikh* by Faḍlī Iṣfahānī, written in the reign of Shah ‘Abbās I, was planned as a general history of the Safavids. It is unfortunate that the greater portion of this very valuable history has been lost. The extant part, of which the British Museum has a unique MS (Or. 4678), covers only the reign of Shah Ṭahmāsp, of which it gives a detailed and authoritative account, based on a first hand study of state papers. It gives a good account of Humāyūn’s visit to Persia from the Persian point of view.

Iskandar Beg *Munshī* was a sober historian and his *Tārikh-i ‘Ālam Arā-ī ‘Abbāsī*, in spite of the inevitable official bias, gives a fairly balanced account of the reign of Shah ‘Abbās I. It gives the events by years, but its chronology of the happenings within each year is not as exact as that of the *Akbar Nāma*. It tends to group together related or similar events, such as the foreign embassies, which, though useful in its own way, sometimes creates chronological difficulties. Its occasional topical resumé’s, giving a connected historical relation of an event, are very helpful (e.g., the summaries of the Qandahār question, pp. 68-70, 682-8). Our references are to the Tihiran edition of A.H. 1314. A new edition has been published at Tihiran.

The *Rauḍatus Ṣafaviyya* by Mirza Beg b. Ḥasan Ḥasanī Junābādī was begun in 1023 and originally ended in 1035, but there are two appendices which carry the account up to 1041-2. The appendices were apparently written contemporaneously and are, perhaps for that reason, not systematic or equally full on different events. It is a general history of the Safavids. The author cites his sources for the period before Shah ‘Abbās I and claims to give an account of the Shah’s reign on the basis of personal observation. Its account of Humāyūn’s visit to Persia is copied from the *Tārikh* of Amīr Maḥmūd, except for some literary flourishes. It gives a fairly detailed account of the embassies exchanged between Shah ‘Abbās I and the Indian Muḡhuls, and of the negotiations on the question of Qandahār. The British Museum MS of this work (Or. 3388) was transcribed only a decade after its completion.

The *Tārikh-i ‘Abbāsī* by Shah ‘Abbās I’s official astrologer, Jalāluddīn Muḥammad *Munajjim Yazdī* (briefly Jalāl *Munajjim*), is rather disappointing, coming as it does from the pen of a person who was in close touch with the

court. Occasionally, however, he provides evidence found nowhere else. His account of the Persian conquest of Kij-Makrān is full of detail. We have used the beautiful MS in the Bodleian Library (Bod. 288).

A very interesting and important work is the *Ihyā'ul Mulūk*, a general history of Sistān from the earliest times up to 1028/1619 or a little later. Its author, Shah Husain b. Malik Ghiyāthuddīn Muḥammad, was a well-informed, widely read and widely travelled person. He was related to the local ruling family of Sistān and played an active part in the affairs of Sistān from the closing years of the A.H. 10th century onward. The work is full of illuminating contemporary material relating to the last decade of the 10th and the first three decades of the 11th centuries A.H. It has numerous references to the intercourse between the authorities at Qandahār and in Sistān and to Mughul-Safavid relations. The author's account of his travels provides some very useful material. He was at Iṣfahān when Jahāngīr's envoy, Khan 'Ālam arrived there. His personal reflections reveal him to be a man of remarkable intelligence and sensibility. The *Ihyā'ul Mulūk* does not appear to have been used in any well-known modern work. The 17th century MS of the work at the British Museum (Or. 2779, Rieu Supp. 97) is probably unique; no other copy is known to exist (see Storey, I, pp. 364-5). A standard edition of the work, edited by Dr. Minuchihr Situdah, has been published from Tihiran in A.H.S. 1344/1966.

The *Tūzuk-i Jahāngīri* is a work of great merit and fully reflects Jahāngīr's personality. As he was particularly proud of his friendship with Shah 'Abbās I, he makes numerous references to him and to the arrival of Persian embassies and gives the text of several letters that passed between him and the Shah. The events connected with 'Abbās I's capture of Qandahār are described in fair detail. The account of the first seventeen years of the reign (up to p. 352) was written by Jahāngīr in person; the account of the next two years was composed by Mu'tamad Khan (see below) under Jahāngīr's supervision (pp. 352-80). The account of the rest of the reign, including part of the nineteenth regnal year, was added by Mirza Hādī in the reign of Shah Jahān. The present author did not find Rogers' translation of the *Tūzuk*, edited and revised by H. Beveridge, as satisfying as Beveridge's own translation of the *Akbar Nāma*. Mu'tamad Khan's *Iqbāl Nāma-i Jahāngīri*, written partly in Jahāngīr's reign and partly after his death, generally follows the *Tūzuk* for the first nineteen years of the reign. The same remark applies to the *Ma'āthir-i Jahāngīri* of Khwāja Kāmgār Ghairat Khan. Both these works, however, add certain useful material.

The voluminous *Ma'āthir-i Raḥīmī* by 'Abdul Bāqī Nihāvandī, written to record the achievements of 'Abdur Raḥīm ~~Khān-Khānān~~ (son of Bairam

Khan), provides some useful evidence relating to Humāyūn's visit to Iran and the role of Bairam Khan there (which is naturally exaggerated in this work) and the influence of Persian culture in India. The work was completed in 1025/1616. The author was a Persian and refers proudly to Persian influences in India. He praises his patron, 'Abdur Raḥīm *Khān-Khānān* as "this (great) man who has converted India into Iran."

Firishta (born 1570 at Astarābād, Persia) wrote his famous history at Bījapūr. He completed his work in 1015/1606 but revised it and made additions till 1023-4/1614-15 (possibly even later). Firishta has given a smooth and very readable summary drawn from many sources, and his *History* became immediately popular. Professor Hodivala and several eminent scholars have severely criticised Firishta and rightly so. "He adds, alters, takes away or mutilates at his own sweet will and rarely troubles to give his reasons or cite his authority," says Hodivala.¹

The *Mujmal-i Mufaṣṣal* by Muḥammad Barārī Ummī, grandson of Majnūn Khan Qāqshāl of Akbar's reign, is a general history of the Timūrids up to the end of Jahāngīr's days and was completed in Shah Jahān's reign. For the period prior to Jahāngīr, it generally follows the *Akbar Nāma*, quite often paraphrasing the narrative of Abul Faḍl. For Jahāngīr's reign, it depends on the *Iqbāl Nāma-i Jahāngīrī*. Occasionally it adds some useful detail: its account of Humāyūn's capture of Qandāhār from the Persians is the most detailed we have come across. The Bodleian Library possesses the second volume of the work, covering the period from Humāyūn to Jahāngīr (Bod. Cat. 242). The Royal Asiatic Society Library, Calcutta, has a complete MS of this work, including the first volume (Ivanov, Cat. of R.A.S.B. 43). The Bod. Cat. 101 is a general history of the Mughuls (up to 1020/1611) and the Safavids (up to 998/1590). Ivanov has erred in identifying the Bod. 101 as the first volume of the *Mujmal-i Mufaṣṣal*. The description in the Bodleian Catalogue is clear enough; further, a close comparison of the two works shows how they are distinct from each other.

Shah Jahān's reign is perhaps the richest of all in contemporary historical material. The various official *Pādshāh Nāmas* (of Jalāl Ṭabāṭabāī, Mirza Muḥammad Amīn Qazvīnī, 'Abdul Ḥamīd Lāhaurī, and Muḥammad Wārīṭh) give fulsome and detailed accounts. Though written under official patronage, they do not miss anything of consequence, including military reverses, and it is easy to get a full picture of events from them. Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Kanbū's '*Amal-i Ṣāliḥ*' gives a history of the entire reign. The *Shāh Jahān Nāma* or *Tawārīkh-i Shāh Jahānī* by Ṣādiq Khan occupies a unique place among the

1. Elliot and Dowson, VI, p. 207f; Hodivala, *Studies in Indo-Muslim History*, pp. 184, 291, 594-5. Elliot praises Firishta, but also cites von Hammer's hostile criticism.

chronicles of Shah Jahān. As *dārogha* (superintendent) of the *Ghusl-khāna*,¹ he was in an intimate position, and, as the compiler of a private chronicle, he could record them independently. Much of it was written in the time of Shah Jahān, who is referred to as the reigning monarch, but it brings down the account to Shah Jahān's imprisonment. A comparison of his description of 'Alī Mardān Khan's surrender of Qandahār with other contemporary notices shows that his account is all his own. Of special interest is the *Laṭā'iful Abkhār*, a journal kept by Rashid Khan (see Storey, I, pp. 573-4) during Dārā Shukoh's expedition to Qandahār. Its detailed account brings out all the weaknesses and stupidities of the Prince in his conduct of the campaign. The *Dhakhīratul Khawānīn* of Shaikh Farīd Bhakkārī, composed in the reign of Shah Jahān, is a highly valuable work. It consists of biographical notices of the nobles of the reigns of Akbar, Jahāngīr and Shah Jahān. The author knew many of the nobles personally and has in several cases written vivid, interesting and well-informed notices. The importance of the work is indicated by the extensive use made of it in the *Ma'āthīrul Umarā* whose authors have mentioned it as one of their sources. The *Dhakhīratul Khawānīn* is divided into three volumes. The first volume, devoted to Akbar's reign, has already been published by the Pakistan Historical Society under the editorship of Dr. S. Moinul Haq. For the remaining two volumes, our references are to the manuscript in the personal collection of Syed Hussamuddin Rashdi (Karachi).

Of the first ten years of Aurangzeb's reign, the period in which we are primarily interested, we have a full account in the '*Ālamgīr Nāma* of Muḥammad Kāzīm. The '*Ālamgīr Nāma* is the most detailed of all the official histories of the Mughul period. (See Jadunath Sarkar's Introduction to his translation of the *Ma'āthīr-i 'Ālamgīrī*.) Khāfi Khan's *Muntakhabat Tawārikh* also provides useful material for the period of Aurangzeb as well as for earlier reigns, especially that of Shah Jahān. The *Ma'āthīr-i 'Ālamgīrī* by Sāqī Mustā'id Khan is a good chronicle of Aurangzeb's entire reign. An English translation of it by Jadunath Sarkar has been recently published in the Bibliotheca Indica series.

The *Ma'āthīrul Umarā* by Ṣamṣāmūd Daulah Shah Nawāz Khan (died 1171/1757-8) and his son 'Abdul Hayy, a biographical dictionary of Mughul nobles in alphabetical order, is a well-known and indispensable work of reference. It was completed in about 1194/1780. It is remarkable that a work of such merit could have been composed in those unsettled times. Our references are to the Persian text published in the Bibliotheca Indica series. Its English translation by H. Beveridge and Bains Prashad has also been used.

1. For the significance of the *Ghusl-khāna*, also known as *Daulat-khāna*, see Ibn Hasan, *The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire*, pp. 70-80; I. H. Qureshi, *The Administration of the Mughul Empire*, Karachi, 1966, pp. 49-50.

Iskander Beg *Munshī* wrote a continuation of his history, known as *Dhail-i Tārikh-i 'Ālam Arā-i 'Abbāsī*, in which he covered the first five years of the reign of Shah Šafī. This has been published at Tihran, A.H.S. 1317, under the same title in a book in which an account of the remaining nine years of Šafī's reign has been added from the *Khuld-i Barīn* (see below). The '*Abbās Nāma*' of Mirza Tāhir Vahīd gives a full account of the Mughul embassy of Jān Nithār Khan and of Shah 'Abbās II's capture of Qandahār. The '*Abbās Nāma*' lacks dates and is weak in arrangement.

The *Qiyaṣul Khāqānī* is a general history of the Safavids written in the reign of Shah 'Abbās II by Walī Qulī Shāmlū, who served for some years under Dhulfaqār Khan, the governor of Qandahār. 'Abbās II's conquest of Qandahār and the three unsuccessful Mughul campaigns to recover it have been dealt at length here. The author has concentrated on Mughul-Safavid relations in general, and his account of the earlier reigns is also useful. He is fond of projecting sectarian motives in the account of these relations.

The *Khulāṣa-i Maqāl* by Muḥammad Tāhir ibn Muḥammad Yūsuf Qzavīnī was written in the reign of Shah 'Abbās II to whom it is dedicated. The extant portion of the work (of which the Bodleian Library has a unique MS, No. 300) stops in the account of Shah Ismā'il II. Its account varies from other chronicles on certain points; it also makes some obvious errors.

The *Khuld-i Barīn* is an enormous general history. Its author Muḥammad Yūsuf Wālīh, brother of the celebrated Mirza Tāhir Vahīd (see above), was a great plagiarist and has copied freely from the *Ḥabībus Siyar*, the *Aḥsanut Tawārikh*, the '*Ālam Arā-i 'Abbāsī*' and other works. The present author spent quite some time in identifying parallel passages in the cited works. The account of Tīmūr is taken from the *Ḥabībus Siyar*, of Shah Ismā'il I from the *Ḥabībus Siyar* and the *Aḥsanut Tawārikh* and of Tahmāsp from the latter. The account of Shah 'Abbās I is taken almost entirely from the '*Ālam Arā-i 'Abbāsī*', but the compiler has made assiduous efforts to effect changes in diction, simile, and metaphor, so as to make his narrative look independent. For the reign of Shah Šafī and Shah 'Abbās II, the *Khuld-i Barīn* is an original and contemporary source of great value, though here too the author frequently refers to the works of his brother on which he has drawn. We have compared the Cambridge MS of the *Khuld-i Barīn* with the portion published in the *Dhail* (see above) and noted the differences, including a recurring disagreement of one year in the annual headings. We have also compared it with the two incomplete MSS in the British Museum. The B.M. Or. 3481 (dated 1247/1831-2)

1. The accuracy of the title '*Abbās Nāma*' for this work has been called into question by Aḥmad Suhailī Khwānsārī in a Note in the *Vahid*, Tihran, No. 44. Khurdād, 1348/May 1966, pp. 532-33. According to him the correct title of the work is *Jāhān Arā-i 'Abbāsī*.

was probably copied from the Cambridge MS (dated 1236/1821), for the account of 1062/1652 is missing from both. The work is divided into eight *Rauḍas* which are subdivided into *Ḥadiqas*. Our references are to the bound volumes in the Cambridge University Library. The account of Timūr and his successors occurs in the bound volume III (*Rauḍa* VI and VII). The bound volume IV contains *Ḥadiqas* i-v of *Rauḍa* VIII, giving an account of the Safavids down to 'Abbās I. The bound volume V contains *Ḥadiqas* vi and vii, covering the reigns of Ṣafī and 'Abbās II respectively. The first four volumes are in a uniform fair *naskh* and were transcribed in 1272/1856, while the fifth volume, in an indifferent hand, was copied in 1236/1821.

The *Fawā'id-i Ṣafaviyya*, a history of the Safavids and their successors, was written in India towards the close of the eighteenth century A.D., with a continuation composed in the first years of the nineteenth century. Its author, Abul Ḥasan b. Ibrāhīm Qazvinī, a Persian, dedicated it to the Safavid pretender, Sultan Muḥammad Mirza Ṣafavī who had settled at Lucknow. (Morley gives a long footnote on this Mirza. See *Cat. of Hist. MSS in the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1854, p. 137.) The author was widely read and mentions the sources he has drawn upon. His account of 'Abbās II is based on the *Khuld-i Barīn*, and that of the next two Safavids is brief and sketchy. The author writes throughout as a Safavid partisan and panegyrist. We have used the Cambridge University MS (Browne, *Pers. Cat.*, pp. 119-20).

The later Safavid period, as E. G. Browne (IV, p. 116) has remarked, was not calculated to inspire Persian historians. One is tempted to observe that the later Mughul period, despite its deep-seated political *malaise*, witnessed remarkable activity in historical and literary pursuits.

Post-Aurangzeb Period

Of the sources for the Post-Aurangzeb period, the following works have been fully commented upon by Lockhart in his *Nadīr Shah*: Mirza Mahdī's *Tarikh-i Nādirī*; Muḥammad Kāzīm's two-volume history called *Kitāb-i Nādirī* and *Nādir Nāmā*; Shaikh Muḥammad Ḥazīn's *Tadhkira-i Aḥwāl*; and Khwāja 'Abdul Karīm's *Bayān-i Wāqī*. Some of these works are discussed again by Lockhart in his *Fall of the Ṣafavī Dynasty*, where he also gives a notice of Muḥammad Khalīl Mar'ashī's *Majma'ut Tawārikh*. This obviates the need to comment upon the works named above. Suffice it to remark here that the first book has now appeared under the title of *Jahāngushā-i Nādirī*, in a critical edition ably edited by Sayyid 'Abdullah Anwār; Muḥammad Kāzīm's two volumes have been published recently from Moscow under the title of *Nāma-i 'Ālam Ārā-i Nādirī*. Of the *Bayān-i Wāqī*, we examined the Panjab University manuscript as well as the India Office manuscript (Ethé 566). The Panjab

University MS is not an abridgment as stated by Storey.¹ A folio to folio comparison (made by us) of the Panjab University MS with the India Office MS (Ethé 566) shows that the first two *bābs* are given *in full* in the former manuscript. These, however, are followed in this manuscript by a three-folio account of Nādir Shah's murder. This account occurs in the India Office MS on ff. 100a-104b in the *bāb* iv. Except for this three-folio section, the last three *bābs* as appearing in the India Office MS are altogether missing from the Panjab University MS. The *Bayān-i Wāqī'* is generally critical of Nādir Shah and disparagingly describes his cruelties. On the other hand, the author is respectful in his references to Muḥammad Shah and credits him with humaneness and nobility of character.

The *Tārikh-i Shahādāt-i Farrukh Siyar wa Julūs-i Muḥammad Shāh* of Mirza Muḥammad Bakhsh "Āshob", written in 1196/1782, gives an account of the overthrow of Farrukh Siyar and of the reign of Muḥammad Shāh down to 1160/1747. For the diplomatic history of the period, the book has been particularly useful as it gives a detailed account of the Persian missions at Delhi and reproduces copies of letters exchanged between the Persian and the Mughul courts. Its chronology is not very reliable. We have used both the British Museum and the India Office manuscripts. For a notice of Mirza Muḥammad Bakhsh, see Storey, I, p. 616.

The writings of Ānand Rām "Mukhlīṣ" have proved notably valuable for the study of Indian diplomatic transactions with Nādir Shah. Mukhlīṣ whose family was well-connected with the Delhi court, was himself *wakīl* of Muḥammad Shah's wazīr, Qamaruddīn Khan and, more importantly for us, also of Zakariyyā Khan, governor of Lahore and Multān during the period of Nādir Shah's invasion. The National Museum, Karachi, has copies of both his *Badā'i-i Waqā'i'* and the *Tadhkira-i Ānand Rām Mukhlīṣ*. Both are collections of Mukhlīṣ's tracts. The account of Nādir Shah's invasion is one of the tracts common to both. The copy of the *Badā'i-i Waqā'i'* in the National Museum is stated on its title-page to be in the hand of Mukhlīṣ himself, a claim which seems to find confirmation from a specimen of his hand published in the *Oriental College Magazine*, Lahore, 1941, Pt. iv, opp. p. 90. His tract on Nādir Shah's invasion not only gives a well-informed account of the events, based largely on first hand knowledge, but also reproduces many important letters and documents. It is unfortunate that Mukhlīṣ's *Guldasta-i Asrār* which is said to have comprised Nādir Shah's correspondence with the Mughul governor of Kabul, has been lost (See Azhar 'Ali, *Safarnāma-i Mukhlīṣ*, Rampur,

1. Storey, I, p. 327, has cited for this the *Oriental College Magazine*, Lahore, II, No. 3 1926, p. 68. S. M. Abdullah in the article in the *O.C.M.*, says the work is an abridgement and cites Rieu, p. 381. But Rieu in his account of the B. M. manuscript of the *Bayān-i Wāqī'* has nothing of this.

1946, Editor's Preface, p. 40). The *Makātib-i Rāi Rayān Ānand Rām* "*Mukhlis*" (MS in the Library of Syed Hussamuddin Rashdi, Karachi) is evidently a different work, for it contains no such letters as are said to have formed the contents of the *Guldasta-i Asrār*. The same is true of the *Manthūrāt-i Ānand Rām* in the Bankipore Library (Bankipore Catalogue, IX, p. 34). *Mukhlis*'s *Mir'ātul Iṣṭilāḥ*, an alphabetically arranged dictionary of official terms, idioms, proverbs, etc., is also a valuable work, for in the course of explaining various terms, *Mukhlis* occasionally recounts historical events and anecdotes.

Muḥammad 'Alī Anṣārī's *Tārīkh-i Muẓaffarī*, a history of the Indian Timurids down to 1211/1796 (or still later), provides some information not found elsewhere. The author's grandfather, Shamsud Daula Luṭfullah Khan Ṣādiq (for whom see *M.U.*, Tr., I, p. 840) was *nāẓim* (governor) of Shāhjahān-abād (Delhi) at the time of Nādir Shah's invasion. The *Tārīkh-i Muẓaffarī* gives copies of farmāns of Muḥammad Shah and Nādir Shah to Luṭfullah Khan. We have examined both the British Museum and the National Museum (Karachi) manuscripts of the work.

The *Tārīkh-i 'Izzī* (in Turkish) of Sulaimān ibn *Khalil* 'Izzī (B.M. Or. 9318) provides valuable material on diplomatic exchanges between the Mughul emperor Muḥammad Shah and the Ottoman Sultan Maḥmūd I, and gives text of letters exchanged between the two monarchs and of the letters sent by Nizāmul Mulk to the Ottoman Sultan. We were fortunate to find, in the *Munsha'āt-i Raḍī b. Nūruddīn* (MS National Museum, Karachi, No. N.M. 1958/202-24), copies of the Persian original of one of Nizāmul Mulk's letters to the Sultan as well as of Nizāmul Mulk's letters to the Ottoman officials.

Of the *Munsha'āt-i Mahdī Khān*, we had transcripts of the letters relating to India, from manuscripts of the work in the Kutubkhāna-i Malik, Tihiran, and in the Library of the Dānishkada-i Adabbiyāt (Arts Faculty), Tihiran University. We also made use of a rare copy, in the Library of the Anjuman-i Taraqqi-i Urdu, Karachi, of the Letters of Mirza Mahdī Khan and others, published by Allah Qulī Khan (in Iran?) in 1275/1858-59. The modern works on Nādir Shah published in Iran have also been utilized.

On James Fraser's *History of Nadir Shah* etc. (published in 1742), Lockhart has an excellent and full bibliographical note (*Nadir Shah*, pp. 304-6). It may, however, be pointed out that most of Fraser's information regarding Nādir Shah's invasion of India, based as it was on the letters of Sarbuland Khan's secretary, is marked by a strong bias against Nizāmul Mulk. Sarbuland Khan had on one occasion replaced Nizāmul Mulk as governor of Gujarāt and this was followed by a protracted war between the followers of the two nobles in Gujarāt (*M.U.*, tr., II, pp. 70-76). It seems that since after this, relations between them remained strained. This circum-

stance may have been responsible for the anti-Nizāmūl Mulk bias in the letters of Sarbuland Khan's secretary.

Tūrānī sources

Tūrān has been rather deficient in historical works, and the few chronicles written there are generally poor in historical composition. (The *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, if considered a Turānī work, is an exception.) The '*Abdullah Nāma*' is a detailed account of 'Abdullah Khan Uzbek till 996/1588, i.e., ten years before the latter's death. This work (as well as the next) is nauseatingly full of eulogies and of details of recurring wars on all sides. And, like all Tūrānī works, it displays a strong sectarian prejudice; e.g., it says that Shah Ismā'il II (Ṣafavī), being a Sunnī, killed ninety thousand Shī'as. The '*Abdullah Nāma*' gives a useful account (of course, from the Uzbek angle) of 'Abdullah Khan's negotiations with Akbar. We have used the beautiful copy in the I. O. Library (Ethé 574).

The *Baḥrūl Asrār* (Ethé 575) is a history of the Uzbeks and is especially elaborate on the reign of Nadīr Muḥammad Khan to whom it is dedicated. It was composed in 1045/1635-6, but has a detailed appendix on events till 1050/1640. The most interesting part of the work is an account of the author's travels to Lahore, Delhi, Agra, Orissa, Golconda, Bijāpūr, Ceylon, Sind and Khurasān. It was while returning from India that the author got entangled in the strife between 'Alī Mardān Khan and Sher Khan Afghan of Fūshanj, and was taken to Herāt to give evidence before the Persian authorities as to which of the parties was at fault. The tenor of the work is extremely partial. An entry, which appears to be later, on the first folio ascribes the authorship to Maḥmūd b. Amīr Walī.¹

The *Tadhkira-i Muqīm-Khānī* (R.A.S., London, MS) by Muḥammad Yūsuf Munshī, written in the early eighteenth century, though valuable as one of the few general histories of Tūrān, especially for the seventeenth century, is far from reliable in its references to Mughul-Uzbek relations, as mentioned elsewhere. Its account is full of panegyrics.

The MS No. 169 in the Bodleian Catalogue of Persian MSS, needs a long note, which we are holding over for the present. The MS has been described in the Bodleian Catalogue as consisting of two works. Closer scrutiny has revealed three distinct works. The third part of the MS (second part, according to the Bodleian Catalogue) is generally named the *Tawārīkh-i Badī'a*.

1. On the *Baḥrūl Asrār*, see the present author's article on the travel portion of the work published in the *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, XIV, Pt. II, April 1966, pp. 93-97. Also see article by Professor B. G. Gafurov, *ibid.*, pp. 98-103. The India Office MS (Ethé 575) contains only the last section of the encyclopedic *Baḥrūl Asrār* which in all comprised seven volumes. Another MS of the work containing only the first volume exists in Tashkent.

This too requires re-examination. For the sake of convenience, and in the absence of any other title of this work, which is imperfect at both ends, we have followed the Bodleian Catalogue title for the present. The *Tawārikh-Badī'a* is the best and most detailed work on the history of Tūrān that we have come across. What is more, unlike other histories of Tūrān, it is a good historical composition, based on considerable study. Perhaps one reason for this was that the author wrote his work in India. The author cites among his sources the 'Abdullah Nāma, the Akbar Nāma and the 'Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī. His family came over to India at the beginning of the XIIth century A.H., and he composed this work in 1143/1730-1. The author, who belonged to a family of Uzbek Sultans, wrote from a purely Uzbek point of view, and his account of Indo-Turan relations has to be accepted with caution. A critical and detailed account of this very important manuscript will form the subject of a paper to be published separately.

The *Tārikh-i Qipchāq-Khānī* by Qipchāq Khan *alias* Khwājā Qulī Beg Balkhī was compiled by the author at Lahore during 1131-38/1719-26. Members of the author's family had for long been in the service of the court of Balkh. The author's grandfather, named in the work Qipchāq Khan, was present at Qandahār during Shah 'Abbās II's siege of the fort. The author's father, Qipchāq Khan *alias* Imām Qulī (so named because he was born at Mashhad) was Qūshbegī (Royal bird-keeper) of Subhān Qulī Khan, ruler of Tūrān. The author and his father came to India in 1107-8/1696. The *Qipchāq-Khānī* is very sketchy on the period prior to Shah Jahān's reign. From Shah Jahān's reign onward, the author gives a well-informed account, often adding details not found elsewhere. Of special value is the account of the last three decades, 1108-1138, during which the author was personally present in India. Unfortunately the *Qipchāq-Khānī* is not so full on Indo-Persian relations as are the *Tadhkira-i Muqīm-Khānī* and the *Tawārikh-i Badī'a*. The Bodleian copy of the *Qipchāq-Khānī* (Bodleian 117) has been used. The Bibliotheque National, Paris, has what appears to be the only other copy of the manuscript (Blochet, I, 348).

Diplomatic Correspondence

Extensive use has been made of the diplomatic correspondence of the period. In all we have consulted over 400 despatches. Some of these can be found in the chronicles, e.g., the *Afḍalut Tawārikh*, the *Akbar Nāma*, the *Pādshāh Nāma* of Lāhaurī, etc. But most of them are preserved in collections of correspondence. Copies of royal letters sent or received were kept in the Records Department to which official chroniclers and even others had access. Moreover, the royal letters were generally drafted by distinguished masters of literary style and were, therefore, avidly studied. Those who were

interested in *inshā* or the art of literary composition, made collections of such letters. We have consulted a large number of these collections. A list of them is given separately. The *Munsha'āt-i Salāṭīn* by Farīdūn Beg¹ (collection of letters received or sent by the Ottoman Sultans, published in two large volumes, Constantinople, 1264/1848), the *Nuskha-i Jāmi'a-i Murāsālāt-i Ulul Albāb* (also *Majma'ul Inshā*) by Abul Qāsim Ḥaidar Beg Iwāghlī [Evoghli], compiled in Iran about the middle of XIth/XVIIth century (B.M. Add. 7688; another copy with some additions and some omissions, B.M. Or. 3482),² the *Mukātabat-i Abul Faḍl*, the *Inshā-i Tāhir Vahīd*, and Ṣalīḥ Kanbū's *Bahār-i Sukhūn* (B.M. Or. 178) are well-known works and need no comments here. A MS known as *Ṭahmās Nāma* (erroneously as *Ethé* has pointed out), is a collection of diplomatic and other letters issued and received by Ṭahmāsp and 'Abbās I (*Ethé* 2067). The *Fayyāḍul Qawānīn* by 'Ibādullah Fayyāḍ, compiled about A.H. 1134/1722, is a huge and highly useful collection of Mughul letters (I.O. 3901).

A collection compiled by Ḥājī 'Abdul 'Alī Tabrīzī, contains letters issued in the names of 'Abdullah Quṭb Shah (1035-83), Abul Ḥasan Tānā Shah (1083-98), Mīr Jumla, and other dignitaries of Golconda. These letters were drafted by the compiler who held the post of *Nāzirul Mamālik* (Accountant-General) in the State. Many of these were addressed to the Mughul and Persian courts. The British Museum MS (Add. 6600) has been used and the work has been indicated in this thesis as *Golconda Letters*. Some of these letters also appear in the very valuable anonymous work entitled '*Arā'id wa Ittiḥād-nāmajāt wa Farāmin-i 'Abdullah Quṭb Shāh*, a rare manuscript of which is preserved in the Research Library of the Anjuman-i Taraqqi-i Urdu, Karachi. This work also gives certain letters not found in the *Golconda Letters*.

The *Majmū'a-i Munsha'āt* (Blochet 2338) was compiled by 'Abdul Ḥusain al-Naṣīrī al-Ṭūsī early in the reign of Shah Ṣafī (1038-52) to whom the work is dedicated. The compiler belonged to a family who were for long associated with the Safavid secretariat, and he himself had access to the state archives. Many of the despatches in the names of Shah 'Abbās I and Shah Ṣafī in this collection are claimed by the author as his own composition. Blochet (IV, pp. 281-3) considers this MS to be the author's autograph copy.

The work indicated in this thesis as *Shāmlū Letters* exists as a unique, untitled manuscript in the British Museum (Add. 7802). It comprises the letters of Ḥasan Khan Shāmlū and his son 'Abbās Qulī Khan, consecutively

1. See *Cat. of Turkish MSS* at B.M., pp. 80-3; also see E. G. Browne's notice of this work, *A Literary History of Persia*, IV, pp. 66-69.

2. See *Cat. of Turkish MSS* at B.M., pp. 86-7.

viceroy of *Khurāsān*. It contains several letters that throw a revealing light on the frontier diplomacy of 'Abbās II and Shah Jahān. The *Shāmlū Letters* will be the subject of a research paper to be published subsequently.

Several highly valuable collections of diplomatic correspondence in the libraries of Tihiran and Mashhad have been utilised. The more important of these have been listed in the Bibliography below. A fuller list, along with bibliographical notices, will be found in our *Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations*.

The study of diplomatic correspondence has considerably amplified the material on which this thesis is based. On certain points it has thrown entirely fresh light. It was, for instance, with the help of letters, with only a few hints in the historical narrative, that we were able to reconstruct an account of Jahāngīr's rapprochement with Tūrān. For a detailed study of diplomatic correspondence, see Introduction in the present author's *Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations*.

Modern Works

William Erskine's two volumes on Bābur and Humāyūn, written over a century ago, are still very readable, though necessarily out of date in parts. Professor Rushbrook-Williams's *An Empire-BUILDER of the Sixteenth Century* is a fascinating study. Dr. S. K. Banerji's work on Humāyūn leaves much to be desired. His chapters on Humāyūn in Persia and at Qandāhār (Vol. II, Ch. ix and x) are rather weak and unbalanced. They contain a great deal of unnecessary material and omit many essential points. He has magnified out of all proportion the role of Ḥamīda Bāno in Persia. Dr. Ishwari Prasad's *Life and Times of Humayun*, expanded from the lectures of Professor L. F. Rushbrook-Williams, is a much better work. Its footnotes are particularly rich in geographical notices. V. Smith's *Akbar* does not devote much attention to Akbar's relations with Persia and is generally weak on the side of the Persian sources. The great Akbar, and his equally great ancestor Bābur, each deserves a standard monograph worthy to be placed side by side with the authoritative works of Dr. Beni Prasad, Dr. B. P. Saksena and Sir Jadunath Sarkar, on Jahāngīr, Shah Jahān and Aurangzeb respectively.

Professor Hodivala's works are a perennial source of instruction to anyone working in any field of Indo-Muslim history.

The history of modern Persia has suffered from neglect.¹ Of late, however, a considerable amount of work has been in progress in Iran, Ger-

1. The Persians themselves have been partly responsible for this. See Farīdūn Adamiyyat, *'Inhiṭāt-i Tārīkh-nigāri dar Irān'* [Decline of Historiography in Iran], *Sukhum*, XVII, I, Tihiran, A.H.S. 1346.

many and England. Of the modern works on Safavid Persia,¹ the monograph of Dr. Ghulām Sarwar on Shah Ismā'il I, a highly concentrated piece of research, still remains one of the very best. Its account of Shah Ismā'il's relations with Bābur is necessarily brief. It is surprising that Shah Ṭahmāsp's long and eventful reign has attracted no scholar, Persian or foreign. Professor Naṣrullah Falsafi's work in Persian on Shah 'Abbās I, when completed, will be an authoritative work on the greatest ruler of the Safavid dynasty. Professor Falsafi's book in Persian on Safavid relations with the European powers is also an excellent work. Sir J. Malcolm's and Sir P. Sykes's works were not useful for our purpose. Curzon's two volumes on Persia occupy a place of their own, though they fall outside our period. Professor V. Minorsky's Introduction to and commentary on the *Tadhkirat al-Mulūk* are highly illuminating and instructive in understanding the Safavid state machinery as well as the forces working behind it. Dr. Lockhart's book, *The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia*, brings out for the first time the full story of Safavid decadence. This work, along with the same author's *Nadir Shah*, constitutes a very substantial contribution to modern writings on the history of Iran. Professor A. J. Toynbee's views on Safavid Persia (*A Study of History*, I, pp. 67-72: Iranic and Arabic Societies; pp. 347-402: The differentiation of the Iranic World and the Incorporation of the Arabic Society into the Iranic) would require a long note for a full discussion.

Coming to works dealing more directly with the field covered in this thesis, Mr. Sukumar Ray's book, *Humāyūn In Persia*, deserves special notice. His work is a monument of industry and a mine of information on the subject. There is hardly a source, contemporary, late or modern, he has not drawn upon, and he has recorded most of his material (including the variant readings in different MSS) in meticulous detail. The excess of material in the text as well as in the footnotes, has somewhat blurred the general outline, and the conclusions are occasionally not clear. It was unfortunate that owing to conditions of war (1939-45), he could not use the British Museum MS of Jauhar. However, Professor Sri Ram Sharma's criticism of Ray's work (*Indian Archives*, 1949, pp. 169-70) appeared to us rather unfair. Dr. A. Rahim's three articles entitled "Mughul Relations with Persia," (*Islamic Culture*, 1934, pp. 457-73; 649-64; 1935, pp. 113-30) are brief and based on a limited number of sources. In his thesis entitled *Mughal Diplomacy: From Akbar to Aurangzeb* (London, unpublished), Dr. Rahim deals with Mughul

1. Of late, Safavid studies have been receiving considerable attention in Germany and several excellent works have already appeared. Walther Hinz's *Irans Aufstieg zum Nationalstaat im funfzehnten Jahrhundert*, Berlin, 1936, described as the best account in a western language of the rise of the Safavid dynasty (see: *A Selected and Annotated Bibliography of Books and Periodicals in Western languages dealing with the Near and Middle East*, Washington, 1952) falls outside our period.

diplomacy in relation to the Safavids, the Uzbeks and the Ottomans. Part III of the thesis devoted to Mughul-Ottoman relations constitutes a valuable contribution based on Persian as well as Turkish sources. There is still much unused material on Ottoman relations with India: the subject deserves a full scale thesis. Dr. M. Jahangir Khan's unpublished thesis, *The North West Frontier Policy of the Mughals, 1556-1658* (Cambridge, 1937), is an excellent piece of work. He has studied Mughul relations with Persia primarily from the point of view of the Mughul frontier, and not of diplomacy. His chapters on Shah Jahān's invasion of Balkh and the three Qandāhār expeditions provide a detailed military history of these campaigns. His strictures on Shah Jahān and his remarks on the latter's responsibility for the decline of the Mughul empire, are illuminating. Professor S. Hasan 'Askari's article, 'Indo-Persian Relations in the Age of the Great Mughals' (*Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, Dec. 1954, pp. 323-40), though necessarily brief, is an excellent survey of certain aspects.

European Travellers' Accounts

Perusing the travellers' accounts in search of historical material on some specific subject is like a treasure-hunt. Sometimes long hours of search are fruitless; occasionally one strikes a rich vein. We have scrutinized almost all the works that are available in English. The account of Sir Thomas Roe's embassy and the works of Bernier, Tavernier and Manucci, are well-known and call for little comment here. Bernier is invariably judicious and well-informed. William Irvine, the scholarly editor of *Storia do Mogor*, has pointed out the numerous mistakes of Manucci. Pietro della Valle gives a well-informed and very interesting account of the embassy of Khan 'Ālam to Persia. Pietro, who is always fulsome in detail, also gives an interesting account of the 'Baniyans' (Hindu merchants and money-lenders) in Persia. Olearius, secretary to the embassy of the Duke of Holstein to Persia, gives a first hand account of the Mughul embassy led by Šafdar Khan and a detailed report of the fight between the staffs of the Mughul and the German embassies. Occasional and stray references, culled from the accounts of many travellers, have been utilised in the present work. In many cases these accounts are based on ill-informed hearsay and are vitiated by historical inaccuracies. The European travellers' accounts in English are fuller on the Indian than on the Persian side. The Indian travels, for instance, of Pietro, Thevenot and Careri, are available in standard modern editions, but not their Persian travels. The material found in the records of the East India Company and the English Factories in India, has in many cases proved very useful.

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A Note on the
CALENDAR OF DOCUMENTS ON
INDO-PERSIAN RELATIONS

Frequent references are made in the present work, especially in the footnotes, to the author's unpublished *Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations*. It is regretted that it has not been possible to publish the *Calendar* along with the present work. For the two works indeed constitute complementary studies, the one making a historical study of Indo-Persian relations and the other bringing together the documents on the same subject. The following is a brief notice of the *Calendar*.

The *Calendar* brings together the numerous letters and documents — lying scattered in chronicles, collections of Inshā and other works—that have any bearing on the political and diplomatic relations between the Mughul Emperors of India and the Safavid Shahs and Nādir Shah of Iran. It includes, firstly, the correspondence that passed between the sovereigns of the two countries, between their respective officials and between a sovereign and his sons and ministers; and secondly, any other correspondence having a bearing on Indo-Persian relations. This second category is culled from a cumulatively vast amount of correspondence between the Mughuls and the Shahs of Iran on the one hand, and the Khans of Tūrān, the Sultans of the Deccan kingdoms and the Ottoman Sultans on the other.

Much of the material referred to above is still in manuscript form. Some of it is known and has been used by scholars, but there is much that is only imperfectly known. Further, in the course of his work, the author has come upon a considerable amount of entirely fresh material.

An extensive study of the manuscripts in the libraries of London, Cambridge, Oxford, Edinburgh, Paris, Vienna, Istanbul, Tihraṇ, Mashhad, Karachi, Lahore, and many other places, has been made in the préparation of

this work. The total number of letters calendared exceeds four hundred and fifty. Every letter has been treated under the following standardized entry headings:

Calendar No.

Class: (i.e., royal letter, *farmān*, '*arḡ-dāsh*t, *hasbul hukm*, *nishān*, etc.)

From:

To:

Munshī:

Bearer:

Date:

Place of issue:

Rubric (if useful):

Beginning:

Ending:

Text given in (i.e., the list of the sources where the text of the letter is given):

Translations (if any):

Summary:

Comment:

Cross-references (to other related Calendar Nos.)

CORRIGENDA

<i>Page</i>	<i>Line</i>	<i>For</i>	<i>Read</i>
4	n. 1, last line	217/1511	917/1511
10	18	Less incompatible	More incompatible
107	21	molify	mollify
115	n. 4, line 4	<i>Diplonacy</i>	<i>Diplomacy</i>
156	n. 2	<i>Relati ns</i>	<i>Relations</i>

ADDENDA

P. 14 n. "... an '*arq-dāsh*t from Sultan Bahādur (possibly one of the nephews of Sultan Ḥusain Baiqarā) to Bābur ..."

Dr. 'Abdul Ḥusain Nawā'ī in his learned introduction to the text of this *arq-dāsh*t has identified its sender with Muḥammad Zamān Mirza son of Badi'uz Zamān Mirza son of Sultan Ḥusain Baiqarā. Nawā'ī has also given in his introduction a fairly detailed account of the chequered careers of Muḥammad Zamān Mirza and of his father. See 'Abdul Ḥusain Nawā'ī, *Shāh Ismā'il Ṣafawī* [Documents], Tihiran, A.H.S. 1347, pp. 364-71. Our erstwhile reasons for suggesting that "Sultan Bahādur" might have been a nephew of Sultan Ḥusain Baiqarā, have been given in our *Calendar* under No. Tx. 325.

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